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ABSTRACT
Aristotle's theology as expounded in the M e t a p h y s i c s  is seen as 
radically distinct from his predecessors' and farther still from 
traditional religion. Contributing to this view are three apparently 
peculiar conceptual features of Aristotle's God: (i) that God is
solely a final cause, who moves all other things as being loved or 
desired; (ii) that God is a self-thinking thinking; (iii) and that God 
is ontologically separate from the visible cosmos. Since no pre- 
Aristotelian philosopher has adduced (i)-(iii) in an argument to
the existence and nature of God, this prompts the question of how 
Aristotle's theology stands to preceding thought. Here arose the 
main motivation for this thesis.
But one could not hope to deal adequately with this question 
without a full exposition of preceding conceptions of god, 
traditional or philosophical. Incidentally, the orientation of the 
question enables us to be apprised of an answer to a prior
question - whether the concept of "god" as it occurs in pre- 
Aristotelian philosophies is religious and theological. An answer 
to this prelim inary question will supply a relevant cultural- 
historical perspective for the proper evaluation of the relation of 
Aristotle's God to preceding conceptions of god. This is also a 
vantage point from which arose a collateral motivation for this 
thesis: to assess the justification or otherwise of the currency of 
reading the Presocratics as the putative precursors of modern
science who had at most a peripheral interest in religion and 
theology.
O ur p re l im in a ry  in v es tig a t io n  (c h a p te r  1) a rgues to a 
hypothetical conclusion , viz., that ancien t G reek  po ly the ism  
contains a b a s i c  conception of god: god is basically a causal 
and/or originating power which satisfies a set of basic conditions 
of divinity; supremacy, self-sufficiency, ideality or perfection, and 
immortality. Divine causality is presumed to imply life. But these 
conditions also prim arily  imply a contrast to the dependency, 
imperfection and finitude of human life. A fo r t i o r i , they also 
imply that the divine is a living reality - although this reality may 
take a psychic or physical form or it may be a causally conceived 
condition. And the causal function of divine reality  is basically 
explanatory; it contains a model of explanation according to which 
the universe or a feature of it is deemed adequately accounted for 
when its divine origin or cause is traced or specified. Thus "god" 
is the reality existing necessarily  as that which is u ltim ately 
presupposed in an account of the universe or a feature of it.
This hypo the tica l f ind ing  is sub jec ted  to an a ttem pt at 
confirm ation in the exegeses o f p re -A ris to te lian  ph ilosophies  
(Presocratics - ch. 2; Socrates - ch. 3; Plato - ch. 4). The theses of 
the Presocratics will appear as logical-philosophical transpositions 
of t ra d i t io n a l  m y th o lo g ic a l  c o sm o lo g ie s ,  c u lm in a t in g  in 
metaphysical first principles (often called god) which satisfy the 
basic conditions of divinity. Plato can also be seen in this light. 
Thus the hypothesis is confirmed throughout these philosophies, 
with an additional note, that d iv ine  causa lity  comes to be 
expressed, with increasing awareness, as rational motion. The 
apparent exception to these investigations - the Eleatic philosophy 
of Being and Socratic  e thical ph ilosophy  - are, in rea lity ,
continuous with and confirmatory of our hypothesis but in a way: 
the former is concerned with the formal criteria which a first 
principle q u a  first principle must satisfy, and these criteria are 
subsumable under the conditions of d iv in ity ; the la t te r  is 
concerned to fix, by d i a l e c t i c s , a permanent desire for s o p h i a  
which is attainable by knowledge of ethical first principles. At the 
same time s ophia  is the key property of god and is constitutive of 
e u da im on ia  (divine happiness or spiritual well-being) - the final, 
non-moral end of a fully realised life. It is implied that divinity 
and e u d a i m o n i a  are associated with first principles and with 
their cognition.
Indeed, Plato's Socrates defends himself against the indictment 
of impiety or atheism and corruption of youth by appeal to his 
practice of p h i l o - s o p h i a , which he represents as a religious duty 
and service, a command of the god. Thus it is implied that activity 
cognitive of first principles is our appropriate relation to god. It is 
religion in the true sense: for this entails a critique of the forms 
of religion which seek spiritual salvation and happiness by means 
of initiation, ritual sacrifices, ecstatic catharsis, observances. Thus 
Socratic first principles play the same explanatory role envisaged 
in traditional religious thought; viz., they are the divine realities 
which are ultimately presupposed in an account of a feature of the 
universe - the e th ica l-re lig ious  phenom ena. So w hile  the 
Presocratics were generally  concerned with argum ents to the 
existence of divine first principles and causes of the universe 
conceived as an orderly system, a cosmos, Socrates was concerned 
with showing that pursuit of knowledge of first principles itself 
constitutes religion. For in this pursuit consists e u d a i m o n i a  or 
attainment of the good  of life. This apparently rational and
humanistc religion of Socrates and Presocratic  philosophy can, 
therefore, be seen as complimentary; and they culminate in Plato, 
but with a qualification: Platonic first principles are a system of 
m etaphysical Forms perm eated by the Good. Forms are the 
eternal principles of divine cognition, creativity and care. For 
humans, activity cognitive or oriented to the cognition of Forms 
has moral consequences for life here and postmortem.
We found that Aristotle (ch. 5) adopts the religion-theology 
com plem entarity  of Plato. He too conceives s o p h i a  or p r o t e  
p h i l o s o p h i a  as activity  cognitive  of divine first principles,
believes that s o p h i a  is constitutive of divine eudaimonia  a n d  
belongs especially to God, though we may share in it. As in Plato, 
A ristotelian s o p h i a  involves rational awareness of our essential 
self whose objective counterpart is represented by the system of 
first principles. But from a point of view Aristotle is unlike 
Socrates and Plato: Aristotelian science basically divides into
practical (e.g., ethics and politics) and theoretical (culminating in 
s o p h i a )  sciences. This division reflects a basic duality in man's
nature. Aristotle analyses man into a set of species-defining
properties and capacities; man is a social and political animal, but 
the chief of his dif ferent iae,  is reason. A man's life is completely 
fulfilled when these properties and capacities are fully realised. 
But s o p h i a  im plies the ex erc ise  o f theore tic  reason and 
constitutes the realisation of our potential for divine immortality 
and e u d a im o n ia ( \ . t .  a life which is god-like). On the other hand, 
there is practical reason (p h r o n e s i s ) the exercise of which
constitutes the realisation of those species-defining properties and 
capacities which exist for us q u a  human. P h r o n e s i s , however,
does not necessitate s o p h i a .  Thus for Aristotle, unlike Socrates 
and Plato , politica l and ethical life are not essentially and 
necessa rily  con tinuous with the rea lisa tion  of the specific 
difference in virtue of which we participate in divinity. But 
Aristotle thus comes to be different from Plato and Socrates in a 
way which relates him directly to and more consistently with 
trad itional relig ion : for the distinction between s o p h i a  and
p h r o n e s i s  is an expressive appreciation of the traditionally 
percieved disparity  between mortal and immortal life, between 
man and god, and the belief that politics and ethics are not 
features of divine life.
Theologically, Aristotle argues to the necessary existence of a 
divine first principle of the cosmos, which, following Anaxagoras 
and Plato, he stipulates as N o u s , calls it God, and specifies its 
causality in terms of motion. Aristotle derives (i) God as a final 
cause who moves as an object of desire by combining The Good 
and Reason of Plato. As Plato implies, the Good is, by definition, 
an object of desire; it is that which all desires, movements or 
actions anticipate. So it is a final cause. Thus logical consistency 
requires that if God is The Good, and God's causality is motion, 
then God moves, at least, as an object of desire. To derive (ii) God 
as a self-thinking thinking and (iii) God as ontologically separate 
from the cosmos, Aristotle assumes: (1) God as a living reality who 
is causa lly  suprem e, pe rfec t,  se lf-su ff ic ien t ,  eternal, m ost 
honourable (a traditional religious set of conditions of divinity); 
(2) that Matter or Body is the condition or principle of corruption, 
imperfection, contingency, evil (i.e., destruction for Aristotle) (This 
is a P latonic religious assumption which is ultimately Orphic-
x
Pythagorean). (3) He then derives (ii) and (iii). For if Reason as 
God is, e.g., self-sufficient, "his" th in k in g  cannot be seen to 
d e p e n d  on an object of know ledge lying outside "himself". 
Dependency entails at least lack o f  (a) se lf-su ffic iency , (b) 
supremacy, (c) honour. And if  God's; thinking were cognitive of 
material forms or principles, this would entail, on God's part, the 
im perfec tion , con tingency  and ev il a sso c ia ted  with m atter. 
Therefore, (ii) and (iii). We conclude (ch. 6), that the fundamental 
assum ptions and basic elements o f  A r is to t le ’s theo logy  and 
religion are adaptations of his ph ilosoph ical predecessors ', and 
that he differs from these only by be ing  closer to and logically 
more consistent with traditional r e l ig io n .  T his is w ithout 
prejudice to the acute analytical d is t inc tions  and philosophical 
refinements by which Aristotle transposed preceding thought into 
his own.
O ur conclusions have s ign ifican t con seq u en ces  for G reek  
philosophical scholarship and for the general history of ideas. For 
we show or confirm that the beginnings of philosophy and science 
in ancient Greece were not a partlhenogenetic event, but an 
organic growth of the mind fully fertilized and which continued to 
be fertilized by the logical, metaphysical, and universal elements, 
but also by other elements which are compatible with logic and 





My aim in this thesis is two-fold. My first and ostensible aim is to 
see how Aristotle’s theology as expounded in the M e t a p h y s i c s 1 
stands in relation to his predecessors, given Aristotle's conception 
of God as (i) an imm utable, im m ateria l, eternal, f inal cause 
(9 8 2 b 5 - 1 0 )2 , who moves all things as an object of love or desire; 
(ii) a self-thinking thinking and (iii) an ontologically (rather than 
conceptually) separate  reality  (kechdrismenon ti kai auto kath'  
h a u t o ,  1 0 2 5 b 3 -1 0 2 6  w ith  1 0 7 4 b 3 5 ,  1 0 7 5 a l 2 ) . 3 Thus
charac terised , A ris to tle  d istinguishes theo logy  from two other 
theore tical sciences - m athem atics and physics. M athem atics 
deals  w ith  ete nal, im m utab le  ob jec ts  w hich  are separab le  
( c h o r i s t o n ) from m atter but only as abstractions (a p h a i r e s e i s ) -
1 In this thesis, my account of Aristotle's relation to his predecessors - the 
Presocratics, Soc.ates and Plato - will be based p r i m a r i l y  on the 
M e t a p h y s i c s .  Aristotle summarily assesses the thoughts o f his 
predecessors in book one of the M e t a p h y s i c s  which, in all probability, is 
an introduction to Theology, otherwise called First Philosophy or Sophia.
2 In M e t a .  bk. i, Aristotle summarises his predecessors' philosophical 
systems as mainly materialistic theses which also represent "stammering" 
and inadequate ai tempts to formulate his four causes - material, formal, 
efficient, and fin il causes. The overall implication in this introductory 
book o f the M e t a p h y s i c s  is that properly conceived and formulated, 
theology is a sci< nee o f the final cause. This conception of theology is 
fulfilled in M e t a  xii. Aristotle's "interested" reading of the thoughts of 
his predecessors 1 as been adequately shown years ago by Chemiss (1935)
3 Aristotle distir f is h e s  between conceptual or logical a n d  simple, 
absolute, physical or ontological separation - between, i.e., c h o r i s t o n  
h a p l o s , choriston t opos , choriston kath' hauto and choriston en logoi,  
chdriston en nosei. See Meta.  1042a31, 1026al8, 1042a29-312, 1077b2-3; 
GC  320b24; de An. 413M4-15, 413b27-29, 4 2 9 a l0 -ll, 431M2-17, 432a20
1
i.e., with no existence separable and independent of matter (cf. 
Post.  An.  81b4-5). Aristotle's picture of mathematical abstraction 
is one of stripping away sensible features until one arrives at a 
conception of pure extension and num ber.4 The subject-matter 
of physics are mutable material objects. But insofar as physics is 
a theoretical study, its objects of knowledge are also in a sense 
separable  (c h o r i s t o n ), but only in account or definition (kata to 
l o g o n ) . 5 But if god is an i m m a t e r i a l  substance, this s e e m s  to 
imply that the Presocratics have no theology. This is in apparent 
c o n tra d ic t io n  to the ev id e n ce ,  ho w ev er  f ra g m e n ta ry ,  on 
P resocra tic  thought which contains a h igh frequency  of the 
occurrence of the word "god" ( t h e  o s ) 6 often associated  with 
f irs t  p rinc ip les  (a r c  ha  i ) 7 which have a m aterial form. Nor 
would Socrates or Plato have a theology8 if god is a self-thinking
4 M e t a  1061a28-35; cf. NE  1142al6-21. Further on a p h a i r e s i s , see P o s t .  
An  81b3; de An. 403bl3-15, 431bl2-13, 432a4-6
5 The objects of physical science are described as separable in definition 
at Phy.  193b3-6; cf. 194M2-14, 193b32-34
6 See the word-inde* in vol. iii of Diels-Kranz (hence DK) (1960)
7 Unless otherwise stated, I shall use "archt"  to mean "first principle". 
Its other nuances - cause, source, rule - w ill be expressed where 
n ecessa ry .
8 Again, in M e t a .  bk. 1, Aristotle sees Socrates as contributing to the pre- 
Aristotelian interest in formal causation by his insistence on the 
importance for ethics of accurate universal definitions o f the various 
virtues. From this initial impulse, he claims, arose Plato's theory of 
Forms, in which the conception of formal cause is hypostatised into a 
transcendent noumenon. Our exposition o f Socratic ethical philosophy 
will show that it has religious dimensions or grounds as well. My reasons 
for treating Socretes distinctly from Plato are two; that Socrates, unlike 
Plato, (a) does not separate forms from their physical instantiations, and 
(b) does not mak»‘ soul tripartite and ontologically distinct from body, (a) 
and (b) character se the Early Platonic (or Socratic) dialogues. For the 
periodic distinction between Early, Middle and Late dialogues, I endorse - 
without argument for lack of space - Vlastos1 (1991, pp. 46-47); except that,
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thinking who exists in ontological separation from  the visible 
cosmos. Plato's dialogues are full of "god", and his gods are, 
indeed, immaterial, eternal and immutable. But nowhere does 
Plato expressly say that god is a self-thinking thinking who exists 
in absolute, ontological separation from the visible cosmos. Do 
these characteristics of divine reality set Aristotle apart from his 
predecessors, by grounding a completely new god and philosophy 
of religion?
Since Aristotle was not working in a vacuum, his apparently 
peculiar definition of god raises the issue of how he stands in
f
relation to previous thought on the conception of god. Since this 
cannot be done w ithout a full e luc ida tion  of the preceding 
conceptions of god, my conclusion is intended to establish my 
second aim, viz: to see whether scholars are ju s t if ied  who, 
consciously  or not, follow Aristotle in reading pre-A risto telian  
thought processes as if they were neatly divisible into philosophy 
and science on the one hand, and vague poetic and religious 
feeling on the other. For instance, in Barnes (1982, p.4) we read: 
'The significant contrast between the cosmogonies of the Milesians 
and the stories found in Hesiod’s T h e o g o n y  isn 't that theology 
yielded to science, or gods to natural forces, but rather that 
unargued fables yielded to argued theories, that dogma yielded to 
reason . T heo logy  and the su p e rn a tu ra l  m ay be trea ted  
dogm atically  or rationally '.9 One would have thought he implied
because the G o r g i a s  intimates (b) above, I consider it transitional 
between the Early and Middle. Although largely Socratic, the G o r g i a s  
(504cff.) also talks o f are te  as order in the soul, and the myth at the end 
of the dialogue contains ingredients of a soul whose moral destiny is tied 
to a disincamate existence. And these are middle period themes.
9 Barnes so often contrasts science with theology, though he never really
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that Hesiodic theology is not necessarily supplanted by Milesian 
philosophy or that Milesian philosophy is rational, in contrast to 
dogmatic Hesiodic, theology. But he writes near the end of his 
chap ter  on X enophanes: ’It would not take a very  ardent
scepticism to conclude that the Milesians had no theology at all’.
He also says of Thales' p s u c h e , 'Instead of "soul", then, I propose 
the term "animator", as a translation of p s u c h e .  I prefer the 
comic overtones of "animator" to the theological undertones of 
"soul"' (p.7). Surely the translation of p s u c h e  as "soul" is not 
desirable here, given possible Cartesian or Platonic connotations. 
However, Barnes chooses "animator" for p s u c h e  in order to avoid 
theological implications. Is he right? In a recent book the author,
Merrill Ring (1917), writes: 'Thales as opposed to Hesiod talked in
n a t u r a l i s t i c  te rn s ;  that is, he offered natural explanation of the 
universe, whereas Hesiod employed quasi-personal beings; Earth, 
and Heaven. Tt ales thus raised the issue of what we today call 
m a t t e r  theory'. Cf. Barnes who translates Thales' w ater-arc /te  as 
"material principle" without qualification.10 The question is: how 
does Ring's or Barnes' reading of Thales cohere with the thesis 
that the universe is full of gods - a thesis reportedly held by 
Thales?
As I shall try to show, this inclination towards reading the 
Presocratics as n on-theological, philosophical-scientists has its root
explains what he means by "science".
10 Surely the Presocratic a r c h e  has a material form, generally speaking. 
But as we shall see, this is far from matter theory. Matter, for the 
Presocratics, is l i v ing  matter. This is a significant difference not to be 
confused with the fact that what they regarded as sufficient ground for 
being alive - having a power o f movement - may be read mechanistically 
today. By construing "movement" as a sign of life, certain deductions - 
e.g., being psuchZ  or god - follow which are not otherwise deducible.
in an inadequate grasp of the fundamental meaning of the Greek 
concept of "god". This begins, by and large, with Aristotle’s
conception of theology which is otherwise called sophia  (wisdom). 
S o p h i a , we are told, is the noblest and the highest state of 
knowledge appropriate to the cognition of god. This is alright. But 
Aristotle goes on to contrast a primary sense of s o p h i a  as the 
"science of divine things" and its s o p h o s  as a thinker more 
ultim ate than the p h u s i k o s , with the s o p h i a  of the p h u s i k o s  
said to be a kind but not the primary kind of s o p h i a  ( M e t a .  
1005a32-b2) - thus implying that the p h u s i k o s  does not cognize 
god or deal with divine things, consistent with his calling the
P r e s o c r a t i c s  p h u s i k o i 11 (o f ten  tra n s la te d  v a r io u s ly  as 
"natu ra lis ts" , "natura l sc ien tis ts" , or "physic is ts")  w hom  he 
d is tingu ishes  ( M e t a .  983b7-29) as "first philosophers" ( p r d t o i  
p h i l o s o p h e s a n t e s )  from the theologians of old ( pampalaioi  kai  
t h e o l o g e s a n t e s ). Thus the real issue regarding how Aristotle 
stands in relation to his predecessors on the conception of god, 
and why some scholars shy away from a theological reading of 
Presocratic thought centres on the conception of "god". I am not 
denying that there is a significant contrast between the thought 
processes in, e.g., Hesiod’s T h e o g o n y , and Dem ocritus ' atomic 
theory. The issue is rather whether the presum ed division or 
d iv is ib ility  of science and philosophy on the one hand, and 
theology or religion on the other hand, can validly be brought to
bear on Presocratic thought. The point is not that the frequent
recurrence of ths word "god" in pre-Aristotelian philosophies is 
being denied, bi t whether "god" is being used in a theological 
sense or not. Thus Professor Burnet (1930, p. 14) wrote:
11 Aristotle P h y ., 186a20, 187al2, 203al6; Meta. ,  xii, 1071b27.
The word "god" in its religious sense means first and foremost an 
object of worship. But already in Homer that had ceased to be 
its only signification. Hesiod's Theogony  is the best evidence of 
the change. It is clear that many of the gods mentioned there
were never worshipped by anyone, and some of them are mere
pe rso n if ica tio n s  o f na tu ra l phenom ena, or even of hum an 
12passions.
If  Burnet's judgem ent - that "god" in its religious sense means 
first and foremost an object of worship - has any truth-value, he 
means by "an object of worship", "an object which is a c t u a l l y  
worshipped". But if this were true, there would really not be a 
relig ious use of "god" from Thales through Plato to Aristotle. 
Accordingly, I shall devote the rest of this introductory chapter to 
the question of how "god" has been taken culturally , i.e., in
traditional religion. This, it is hoped, will shed some light on 
w hether and where the occurrance of the word "god" in pre-
12 In a footnote to this passage he wrote that no one worshipped Okeanos 
and Tethys or even Ouranos and still less can Phobus and Deimos be 
regarded as gods in the religious sense. He says in addition: 'this non­
religious use o f the word "god" is characteristic of the whole period we 
are dealing with'. Cf. Theodor Gomperz (1906). Current during the late 
19th century was the theory o f history vigorously canvassed and 
represented by Wdamowitz, Rhode, and Eduard Meyer, according to which 
the spirit o f Homer and o f Ionian civilisation as a whole was thoroughly 
secular: the gods of Homer have ceased to be objects of worship; Homer 
does not regard the gods with reverence, and he dissociates the idea of god 
from that o f worship. Some plausibility o f this thesis derives from the 
vitality and vigour with which, it is sometimes pointed out, Xenophanes 
and Plato attack Homer and Hesiod. See further Murray (1924, p. 265). On 
the contrary, the attacks o f Plato and Xenophanes, as with the tragic 
critiques o f Aeschylus and Euripides, far from taking the Homeric and 
Hesiodic gods as irreligious, are the best examples of how serious Homeric 
and Hesiodic religion is part of the entire social and educational fabric of 
Greek culture. Se^ Xenophanes BIO; Plato's Ion 536d, 542b.
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Aristotelian philosophies satisfies a religious or theological sense.
2 The Greek idea of god or divinity
Fortunately, Burnet's judgem ent can be disposed of summarily. 
Surely, traditional religion was largely ritual observance. But 
piety in Greece did not necessarily and always express itself in 
external acts of observance, or in cu ltic  sacram ent. Vlastos 
( 1 9 7 0 ) 13 points to Aristophanes' comedy, P e a c e  (406ff.), where 
we are told that not the Greeks but the Barbarians worshipped the 
moon and the sun, and yet the w e ll-a tte s ted  story is that 
D iopeithes , in about 430B.C, secured  a decree  to declare  
Anaxagoras an atheist for declaring the sun and the moon to be 
mere material stuff. Add A p .  26dff.: 'Do you mean that I do not 
believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, which is the common 
creed of all men?', protests Socrates to Meletus who tells the 
judges that Socrates declares the sun to be stone and the moon 
earth. The result is obvious: for if  indeed there were no cults of 
the sun and the moon - and there is no hard evidence that there 
were - then, Burnet's thesis is invalidated, if, i.e., Anaxagoras was 
banished, and Socrates stood trial for his life for impiety regarding 
entities which Athenians did not worship but still recognised and 
defended as gods What then counts as "god" in a religious sense? 
I will first theor se and then substantiate.
Fundamentally, the ancient Greek conception of god consists in 
(1) the association of god with an originating and/or causally 
conce iv ed  p o w e r14 - a conception which is presumed to imply
13 'Theology and Metaphysics in Early Greek Thought', in Allen and Furley 
(1970).
14 My use of "cause" here should not be understood to imply the sense in 
which there is a , relation between two ontologically separate things, x and
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life, and (2) conceiving divinity  in terms of (a) a state of 
p e rfe c t io n  or id ea li ty ,  (b) suprem acy , (c) im m o rta l i ty  or 
e v e r l a s t i n g n e s s , 15 and (d) self-sufficiency. (2) sets the b a s i c  
conditions in which god or a divine reality  exists. (I shall 
therefore som etim es refer to (2) simply as the "conditions of 
divinity"). The divinity of god or anything else implies (2a-d). 
Consequently, (2) is often though not always assumed rather than 
expressed where (1) occurs. (1) with (2) is necessary  as an 
adequate or ultimate presupposition in an account or explanation 
of the universe or features of it. Let me now substantiate.
(1) That god is an orig inating and/or causal pow er whose 
existence is necessary as an ultimate presupposition in an account 
of the un iverse , is a com m on fea ture  o f the m ytho log ica l 
cosmogonies, where all the gods o r i g i n a t e  from one or a pair of 
p a re n t - g o d ( s ) .16 In Homer, O k e a n o s  is the parent of all gods and 
all becomings {I l iad  xiv, 200, 244, 301). With Tethys his wife the 
mother of all gods and godesses, they have, among their offspring, 
the Sun, Night, Dawn, The Seasons, The Sea, The rivers, The
y, such that a change of state, condition or place in y is to be explained as 
the effect of the action of x. This does not occur in the Presocratics or in 
Socrates which, in this regard, is continuous with the m ythological 
cosmogonies. There is, indeed, a clear distinction of aspects, and between 
different levels or states o f existence of the cause and what it explains, 
but there is no ontological separation between the cause and what it 
explains. Consequently, unless otherwise stated, "cause" includes 
"principle": in association with divine reality "cause" is to be taken to 
mean a reality which serves as a principle of explanation. "Cause" also 
encapsulates the v i ta l i t y  implied in the conception o f the divine power 
of god.
15 in the philosophical tradition, as we shall see, everlastingness or 
immortality is fre;ly combined with or replaced by etemality.
^  There is a good sample of these mythological cosmogonies in chapter 1 of 
Kirk, Raven and Schofield (Hence, KRS), 1983
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Nymphs, the gods of the winds. In Hesiod we hear: "First of all 
came (g e n e t ') C h a o s ,  and then..." (T h e o g o n y , 116). Chaos is the 
primal, divine "condition" whose presence is associated with the 
asexual generation of Earth, Love, Erebos and Night, and from
these in turn are produced in three generations the rest of the 
gods among which the most prominent cult gods - including Zeus, 
com e la s t .17 Note that the most characteristic feature of these 
gods is that they are nature-gods, i.e., gods in and of this world, 
generated or born as part of the history of the universe, and
constitute the powers represented by the "elemental" features of 
the u n iv e rse .18 Note also that there is no question of Okeanus 
and Tethys or of Chaos creating the universe ex  n i h i l o .  The
originative or generative powers of the parent-god(s) presuppose 
existing m aterial which is merely disposed or re-arranged in :
such a way that the universe may be said to have come to be as 
an offspring or body of the divine source of all things. And there 
is an inchoate conception of the universe as a cosmos, i.e., as an 
orderly system. This is helped out by the postulation of another 
deity, Fate {Moira)
Fate is associated with the idea of (cosmic) "order", an idea 
closely related to "ethical propriety". Fate sometimes appears as 
an impersonal force possessing the whole sum of divine power, 
sometimes as a personal, though not humanised, spirit (d a i m o n )
17 The most important members o f the fifth generation include Apollo, 
Artemis, Ares, Athene, Hephaestos, Hermes, and Dionysus
18 At the beginning of the T h e o g o n y  Hesiod invokes the Muses to help 
him account not only for the origins and subsequent history o f the gods 
but also the beginnings and subsequent history o f the universe. When 
he settles down t)  account, he leaves no doubt that the two tasks are the 
sam e.
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frequently  appearing as the will of Zeus. As an impersonal 
overruling power, the personal gods, Zeus inclusive, are subject to 
F a t e : 19 ’the ordained (to chreori) is master of the gods and thee', 
says A thena i n r Euripides ' I phigenia  in Taur i s , 1486. In its 
overruling power, Fate represents that which ought to be. Its 
ordinance is at once moral and physical decree setting limits as to 
i m p r o p r i e t y  (not impossibility).20 However, Fate is not itself a 
deity with an act of will designing and generating the physical and 
moral order to which the personal gods are subject; it is just a 
representation stating a fact about the disposition of nature, and 
to the statem ent of that fact adds no th ing  excep t that the 
disposition, including succession of events, is both necessary and 
just. This is a philosophically pregnant idea. It epitomises (a) the 
supreme role of Necessity in Greek thought; (b) the fusion of 
physics and ethics, of "order" and "propriety" or "goodness"; (c) 
levels of divine power or causality if, that is, Fate, as the just and 
necessary  disposition of things, is p r i o r  to and defines the 
co n s titu t io n a l  l im its  of o ther d iv ine  pow ers  constitu ting  a 
"cosmos"; (d) belief in the orderly or structural relation of things 
and events; (e) association of divinity with real, causally effective
19 Although Zeus is sometimes identified with Fate, when he is set apart 
from it, he is an unenviable, and helpless god. Cf. II. xvi, 43 Iff. - when 
Zeus wanted to deliver his son Sarpedon from fate, Hera rebuked him, and 
he did not disregard her; that is, he gave up what he desired to do. He then 
wails, ' O woe is me, because it is f a t e d  that Sarpedon, most dear to me of 
all men, shall be subdued by Patroclus. Also: "Night, vanguisher of gods 
and men", / / . ,  xiv, 258; and Styx, the waters of shuddering chill and 
forbidding powei - the oath o f the gods, often appears to have 
overpowering authority. See also O d y .  iii, 236, vi, 188; Aeschylus, 
Prometheus  ii, 53Iff., 244; Theogony  383ff.
20 Thus at II. xvi, 780, the Achaeans prevail for a time in battle beyond 
Fate (huper aisan).  Also. Ody.  132. Strictly speaking, offenders do not go 
beyond their fate but the bounds of morality.
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logical-m etaphysical conditions21 (henceforth, causal conditions).
Although phenomenally represented, Greek gods are the various 
pow ers, physical, psychic or causal conditions inhering in or 
govern ing  na tura l phenom ena. T hese  pow ers are causally  
conceived, which m eant for the Greeks that they had life and 
energy  o f  the ir  own. C onsequently , m ost o f  them  were 
personified; Winds, Seasons, Earth, Justice, Victory, Peace, Prayers, 
e t c . 22 H ow ever, w hat is invo lved  is m ore than mere
personification. For when Theognis calls Hope or Fear "dangerous 
d a e m o n e s "  (T h e o g n i s , 637ff) or when Sophocles speaks of E r o s  
as a power that 'warps to wrong the righteous mind for its 
destruction ' ( A n t i g o n e . , 791ff), their statements are rooted in the 
naive, traditional intuitions typified in the Homeric and Hesiodic 
poem s, that psychic  forces are d ivinities existing not in but
outside and beyond the control of man and are able to influence 
his life. Three things are to be noted: (a) The fact that all the 
divine powers are translatable into psychic, physical or causal 
conditions; (b) divine reality - call it god, d a e m o n  or other - is not 
just the psycho-physical phenomenon or the causal condition, but 
the force or pow er that these represent, so that there is an
im plic it  dua lism  here  ( which is supportive  o f  A risto tle 's  
conception of god as immaterial, since a force or power is arguably
21 "Metaphysical" and "condition" in the sense that the gods are
represented in the physical elements of the universe, while Fate is the 
m e ta  -physical power, and as an operative idea might also be deemed the 
condition, which represents the arrangement o f these elements as a 
neceesary orderly system.
22 Apart from the Olympian gods, Homer and Hesiod also recognise among 
other divinities Fear (D e i m o s ), Terror (P h o b o s ), Strife (Eris) ,  Ruinous 
Folly (A t e ), Prayers (L i t a i ), The Graces (iC h a r i t i e s ), Rumour ( O s s a ) ,  
Justice ( Th e m i s ) ,  Desire (Eros) ,  Forgetfulness (Le t he ) ,  Aether, Night 
(Nux),  Dawn (Edsj,  Chaos, Death (Thanatos),  Sleep (Hypnos),  etc.
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neither material nor im m ateria l);23 (c) the fact that an adequate 
explanation of e.g., the psychological event of fear, love or hope 
n e c e s s i t a t e s  the postulation of a divine Fear-, Love- or Hope- 
agent as an original source or cause. This last intimates a certain 
m odel of exp lanation ; i.e .,  tha t a phenom enon  is deem ed 
adequately or ultim ately accounted for when its divine origin, 
source or cause is specified. Alternatively, what is deemed an 
adequate account of a phenomenon necessitates the postulation of 
its specified divine origin or cause.24
H esiod , w hose theogony  has strong  a lleg o r ica l  e lem ents , 
contributes to m aking (a)-(c) clear. H esiod gives a god a 
significant name, and suggests that the god is equivalent to some 
in te l l ig ib le  concept m u ltip lied  by d iv in ity . Thus S trength  
(k r a t o s ) and Force (B i a ) have no house apart from Zeus, nor any 
dwelling nor path except that wherein god leads them - all this, in 
order to explain the aw esom e strength and pow er of Zeus. 
Similarly, Zeus marries M e t i s  (Intelligence), and Athene, equal to
22 Aristotle is somehow aware o f this inchoate dualism when he describes 
the a r c h a i  o f die first philosophers as always remaining the same 
though changing in their qualities { M e t a .  983b6-12). Generally, 
however, Aristotle takes the physical representation o f an arc  he as just 
that a r c  he,  and lence as a material cause. But if, while the body of a 
material a r c  he e.g., Thales' Water or Heraclitus1 Ever-Living Fire -
keeps changing, the power underlying its qualitative indefiniteness 
always remains t ie  same, then here, even if crudely, is some intimation 
of the idea of umoved mover in pre-Aritotelian philosophies. Xenophanes 
comes closest when he says of his God that It abides the same eternally 
while activating the world with the will o f Its mind (ffr. 25, 26).
24 I have no doubt that the postulation of Forms in Plato's dialogues is a 
logical continuation o f this religious model of explanation: the justice of 
behaviour, the coldness o f air, the oddness of three, are all traceable to 
their respective divine Form- origins or -causes. Aristotle takes this 
model for granted, among other things, in his account o f human 
cognition in the dz Anima,  and in his concept of theology.
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her father in strength and wisdom, is promptly born from Zeus’ 
h e a d .25 Second, he marries Justice and begets Order, Law, Peace, 
and the Fates. Third, he marries Memory and begets the Muses. 
These allegories, and many .more, were invented to explain some 
god or their attributes. In the end, Zeus appears not only as the 
father of Apollo, Artemis, and Persephone, but also Peace, and 
having as wives, Intelligence, Memory, Justice. We end up with a 
partial reduction of Zeus, the apparently personal god, into a list of 
divine attributes devoid of personality. If we add up the result of 
Hesiod’s history we then get the total of a supreme god descended 
from the divine source of the universe, and largely definable as 
himself the source of power, force, justice, intelligence, memory, 
etc., in the world. ’’Z eus” thus becomes a convenient symbol 
enclosing a given quantity and quality of divine power. Yet this 
does no t w arran t the conc lusion  that the gods are m ere
personifications. Rather, this epitomises the belief that the basic 
features of the m i  verse may be explained by tracing their divine 
source, origin or cause - as that which is ultimately presupposed 
in what is considered an adequate account.
Consider to this end the Hellenistic deification of Chance or Luck 
(T u c h e ); a clear case of deification by the Greek religious mind of 
the potency of the irrational factor in order to account for the 
failings of the conscious, rational will. Here, effectual negation,
recognised for the distinctive effects consequent on its assumed
presence, is raised to a religious power considered as an adequate 
explanation  o f  a feature of the universe. W hen M enander
2 5 So in Aeschylus E u m e r t i d e s , Athena's wisdom represents the ideal of 
civilisation; she 3uts justice and judicial procedure in place o f blood- 
vengeance and primitive retribution
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observes that "That which possesses power is now worshipped as 
g o d ;26 when E. R. Dodds (1951, p. 42) writes, 'And deity is power' 
(cf. Ehnmark (1935); 'The criterion of divine pow er is its 
supernatural p o w er ')27, or when Xenophanes writes, "For this is 
what a god and a god's capacity is; to have power..." (Aristotle, 
M X G  -  A28), they must be understood to mean by "divine power" 
that power which has causal, i.e, explanatory value. Thus when 
Anaxagoras writes that "Mind rules [or has power] over all things" 
(panton nous kratei,  fr. 12) we will not be justified to read his 
thesis non-theologically simply because he does not specifically 
call Mind god or divine. Similarly, we need not deny any
theo log ica l im p lica tion  if, from recogn ising  the pow er of 
movement inhering a magnesian stone or (amber when rubbed), 
Thales infers that it has psuc h ' e , and from this concludes that the 
universe is full of gods.2  ^ For Anaxagoras' Mind and Thales' 
p s u c h ' e  are powers (of movement) which satisfy the b a s i c , 
culturally determined meaning of "god':, viz., that they are causal
rea lities  which exist necessarily  as that which - for their
p ro p o n en ts  - a d eq u a te ly  accoun t for, or are u l t im ate ly  
presupposed in an account of, the universe or some feature of it. 
This basic meaning of god, if correct, also implies that an account 
is not necessarily  non-theological simply because the ultimate 
principle of explanation which it contains has a material form or is 
in  nature ( p h u j i s ). Translated as "n a t u r e ", an interest in 
p h u s i s  may be an interest in species cf  nature or in the nature of
'To kratoun gai nun nomizestai theos’, Kock, Commicorum At t icorum
F ragmenta.
27 The Idea of  God in Homer  (Upsala), p. 11, quoted by Vlastos in Allen and 
Furley (1970).
28 Sec de An. 405al9, 411a7
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all things or both. That the Presocratics p r i m a r i l y  investigated  
the nature  o f all th ings, is hardly controversia l. Such an 
investigation, however, is not properly labled or assumed to be 
"physics" or "science" w here this im plies  a con trast  with 
"m etaphysics" or " theology". As the records show, these 
investigations prim arily  pursued the d iscovery  of fundam ental 
causal powers in clear attempts to account for things as they are 
or as they have come to be. And these powers were often called 
god or the divine,29
(2) Conditions of divinity. Divine power was e xpe r i e nc ed  by the 
pious as a transcendental reality. "Transcendental", in the sense 
that, a lthough experienced, divine rea lity  lies beyond human 
volition. Thus the H ellenistic  man experienced  T u c h e  as a 
transcendental divine force, in the sense that he felt that the 
limits to or gaps in his conscious, rational, willing activity were 
positively filled in by the divine agency of Tuc he .  T u c h e  is thus 
a explanatory postulate, presumed to be an adequate or ultimate 
account of a feaiure of the universe. Similarly, the Homeric heroi
experienced are te  (virtue) as an event of divine presence. He felt 
that his valour came to him, rather than that it proceeded from
his own conscious will or training: Ares is said to enter Hector "so
that the inward body is packed full of force and fighting strength"
29 Among the Presocratics, the mai n  theses speculate about the nature or 
structure o f the universe as a whole. The investigations which come 
under the fo llow ing studies; astronomy, em bryology, psychology, 
physiology, epist^mology, are, some o f them, mere guesses, sometimes 
deduced a pr ior i  from the structure o f the universe, sometimes
suppported by observation. However, all these are subordinate to the 
theses in which every existing thing is reducible or traceable to its 
origin or cause in some a r c  he  (or a set, or an infinite number of
a r ch a i ).
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(II.  17, 210-12); Odysseus, disguised by Athene as a ragged old 
man, is challenged to a fist-fight. Athene stands close to him and 
magnifies his limbs so that his challenger and the onlookers are 
struck with awe ( O d y .  18, 66ff.); Telem achus is described  
emerging from has chamber in the morning: "he is like a god in 
presence”: Athene has bestowed an enchantment of grace on him 
( O d y .  2 . Iff.). We remember also the restful, beautifying sleep 
bestowed on Penelope by Athene (Ody .  18, 187-96). In general, 
experiencing a state of perfection or ideality was for the Homeric 
man an event of divine presence.
Indeed, the Homeric gods are idealized human beings: the gods 
possess basically the same physical and psychological constitution 
as ours, differing only in degree of power, excellence, intelligence, 
size, etc. The human condition is taken as the basic model and 
imagined in an ideal state. Some of the perfections of Homeric 
gods are conceived negations of certain limitations of the human 
condition. Gods are a class of living, bodily beings, but they do 
not  die ( a - t hanato i ) \  they are born and do grow, but their bodies 
n e v e r  age beyond the apex of development. Am brosia and 
nectar, the (magic) foods of the gods, entail no  corruption of the 
flesh. Gods do no t  have to toil, get sick, grow old ( a - g e r o )  or 
decrepit. They are self-sufficient, in having all they desire,30 and 
are believed to enjoy a completely happy, trouble-free life, in the 
com pany of their peers, forever spending their time in feasting, 
leisure, glory and honour. Gods are causal powers, as we have 
observed, but this includes magical powers of transformation or
3 0 Part, at least, of what makes them self-sufficient is their conceived 
superior powers by which they can accomplish many things for 
them selves. But traditionally, logical/conceptual and material self- 
sufficiency are indistinguishable.
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s e lf - tra n s fo rm a tio n , as A th en e  in  the  O d y s s e y  o ften  
d e m o n stra te s . C onsequen tly , the  gods are no t (a lw ays or 
absolutely) subject to the laws of physical nature.
Im plicit in this anthropom orphic idealisation of the gods are two 
p rin c ip le s : (a) that d iv in ity  is co n stitu ted  by p reem inence ,
p e rfe c tio n , id ea lity , g rea tness , n o b ility , se lf-su ff ic ien c y  and 
im m ortality  - properites, attributions or conditions which express 
the sublimity of god; (b) the use of human nature as a basic model 
for conceiving divine nature. However, (b) creates problem s and 
contradictions for (a). The fam ily of gods, like the human fam ily, 
quarrel, hate, are jealous, suffer m isery, and in the I l i a d , w ound 
one another emotionally and physically. In a num ber of cases, the 
gods', especially  Zeus' m oral behaviour is, by human standards, 
desp icab le . Consequently, we m ust suppose that the basis of 
reverence of the gods is to be determ ined by the properties or 
conditions o f d ivinity  and the range of pow ers associated  w ith 
gods. And, of course, these are not held out as prospects for men. 
Thus it is h u b r i s  to aspire to the divine condition or to be god. 
Piety consists in the recognition both of the existence of the gods 
and/or w hat the> sanction, a n d  awareness of the lim its of mortal 
in relation to d i\in e  power. One ought to keep the right distance 
from  the gods; 'Seek not to become Zeus... m ortal things befit a 
m ortal’ as Pindai (N e m . 6, 1-7) so well put it. This is echoed in 
the D elphic motto: "Know Thyself", the original m eaning of which 
is that when entering the dwelling of god, a man has to rem ember 
the lim its of his powers. In this "geometric" and vertical relation 
between m an and god, it is significant that the Greek equivalent of 
"sin" was orig inally  'a m issing o f the m ark ' (h a r m a t i a ) - a
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cognitive and m ental aberration rather than an evil lying in the 
w i l l .  3 1 O rd inary  life  w as a re lig io u s  dem and fo r an 
in ten sifica tio n  and enrichm ent here  and now , no t he reafte r. 
C onsequently , o rd inary  p iety  was no t an in tro sp ec tiv e  self- 
analysis and self-questioning. The syndrome of the "inner life", of 
"m oral re sp o n sib ility " , or o f " in te rn a l sp iritu a l duty" and 
"obligation" first received philosophical expression in Pythagorean 
and, more profoundly, in Socratic philosophy.
The real religious significance of the Homeric gods, however, is in 
their relation  to the suprem e value system  of G reek society as 
represented by the evaluative words "are te"  (v ir tu e /e x ce lle n ce ) 
and "agathos"  (noble, good). Ancient Greek society from  Homer 
was characterised  by a dual value system  represen ted  by the 
word a r e t e .32 A man is a g a t h o s  by virtue of his possession of 
are te .  But are te  is a com plem entarity of socialising and egoistic 
parts ("quiet" and "com petitive" parts - A dkins). In H om er's 
w arrio r-socie ty  the egoistic  part o f a r e t e  was constitu ted  by 
com petitive values like valour, m ight, resourcefulness; w hile the 
socialising  parts o f a r e t e  w ere in te rn a liz e d  so c ia l-re lig io u s  
constrain ts constitu ted  by ju stice , tem perance, w isdom , p ie ty .33 
C om petitive  are t e  enables one to prosper and flourish but under 
the co n stra in ts  o f the soc ia lis ing  a r e t e ,34 The re lig ious
31 This is so visibly in Aristotle's ethical theory o f the Mean. This, in part
I
at least, explains the intellectual bias o f all Greek ethics. For the 
difference betw eei right- and wrong- doing was a mere difference of 
quantitative over- or -under doing something, not bad in itself.
32 The following account is inspired by Adkins (1960), and Beckman's 
(1979) perceptive reading of it.
33 In the I l i a d  anc! O d y s s e y , an a g a t h o s  was supposed to be, on the 
socialising side, d i k a i o s  (just, fair, or observant o f others' rightful 
claim s), p i n u t o s  (wise), s a o p h r o n  (moderate), t h e o d e s  (pious, god­
fe a r in g ) .
18
im portance of the Homeric gods is to be seen in the traditional 
be lief that they sanctify  and sanction the socialising parts of
a r e t e ,35 while ideally exem plifying the egoistic parts o f a r e t e  
which the Homeric hero occasionally embodies.
By the 5th century, are t e  has come to consist also in technical 
excellence which is productive of certain evaluated sort of goods -
whether in the arts, politics or war. But the latter half of the fifth
cen tury  is a record  of d isin teg ra ting  soc ia l-re lig ious a r e t e .  
C onsidera tions of ju s tic e  and p ie ty  becom es in c id en ta l and 
peripheral. This is amply evidenced in Thucydides’ version of the 
A thenian A ssem bly debate on rebellious M ytilene and M elos. 
W hile the M elians were appealing to consideratons of traditional 
ju stice  and practices, the A thenians were construing ju stice  as 
dependent on the equality of power to com pel, arguing that the
strong do what they have the power to do while the weak accept 
what they have to accept. The A thenians, bent on destroying
Melos, refused tc hear any appeal to traditional rights. Nor were
they £3t$rcised by piety or shame. Reflecting this m oral-religious 
crisis was Calliciean anti-moralism  (G o r g ia s ), and Thrasym achean 
im m oralism  ( R e p u b l i c ) .  The general picture is in the n o m o s -  
p h u s i s  argum ent o f the Sophists. A stu te ly  in te rp re ting  the
34 In other words, one was to pursue one's personal prosperity within the 
limits of justice and temperance sanctioned by the gods, although, for the 
most part, the logic of social right and wrong was based on personal
honour and status: to commit a wrong is to transgress a person's honour, 
necessitating vergeance and retribution. A i d o s ,  the internalized sense 
o f shame, supplemented the divine sanction o f Zeus, and retributive
deterrence.
35 The gods, panicularly Zeus, sanction earthly laws, and uphold the 
authority o f rulern. See //., 9, 98-99; 16, 386-88; Ody. ,  19, 106ff., 17, 485- 
8 8 .
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em e rg in g  s p ir i ;  o f d e m o c ra tic  e g o tism , som e S o p h is ts  
distinguished natural justice, which they identified with the Might 
is R igh t ph ilo sophy  from  co n v en tio n a l ju s tic e , w h ich  they 
conceived as arbitrary im position of "unnatural" hindrances upon 
the energies of the naturally  strong person. T hese Sophists 
canvassed  for the com petitive values o f H om eric a r e t e  in the 
nam e of personal excellence and pow er - w hether this occurs in 
war or in the field of politics and rhetoric or, even in ordinary day 
to day life.36 Related to this conception of are t e  is their critical 
a tten tio n  to the phenom enon of re lig io n , e spec ia lly  on the 
question of the origin of gods. By im plication, this critical attitude 
puts in to  question the divine sanctions associated  w ith m oral 
behaviour or positive law. Some tried to answer by im plying - as 
in Protagoras’ famous m an-measure principle - that religion is the 
projection of man's inner life or a device to make people observe 
the laws of a state (e.g., Prodicus B5, C ritias’ S i s y p h u s , Sextus 
Adv.  math.  9, 54). P lato 's Socrates responded to this m oral- 
relig ious crisis by unifying the egoistic and socialising parts of 
a r e t e ,37 which by synecdoche he identified w ith s o p h i a .38 The
36 Although not a sophist, Crito (C r . 45dff.) expresses the egoistic values of 
the day when he challenges Socrates to show that he is a g a t h o s  and 
andreios  (manly or courageous) by escaping from prison. After all - he 
goes for the ridicule - Socrates had made a r e t e  his concern all through 
his life. Socrates does not disagree with him. But he offers as the sole 
criterion of any s ich action, whether it is d i ka i os  (just)- In other words, 
the proposed action in question can be no a r e t e , if  they could not 
morally and  intellectually justify it to themselves. And that justification 
is neither determined by convention nor by consensus, but by whether it 
will lead to a spiritually better life (47eff.)
37 I offer here a highly compressed, introductory account o f Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle. I am avoiding full textual references to justify my 
claims here in order not to repeat similar references in the fuller 
account o f their espective philosophies of religion which occur later.
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S o c r a t i c  arete-  and agathos-  m an is a m orally  ex ce llen t 
p e rfo rm er w hose actions are fu lly  gu ided  by p h ilo so p h ica l 
w isdom . A r e t e  and a g a t h o n  are now a know able, causally  
rea lis tic  d i v i n e  condition or state o f the soul: a man is truly 
a g a t h o s  who knows a r e t e , and this entails that he be able to give 
a d ia lec tically  indefeasible  l o g o s  of arete {ch.  1 5 8 c 7 -1 5 9 a l0 ); 
but to be able do so already presupposes that one's p s u c h e  is in a 
s o p h i a  state or condition. This condition is real because it is a 
d istinctively  realisable state of the soul; and it is divine because 
s o p h i a  is the key property of god (Ap.  32a5-6). Yet, according 
to Socrates, to pursue soph ia  is our religious duty and service to 
god (23c, 30a). It is noteworthy that Socrates’ defence against the 
charge of im piety or atheism centres on his appeal to his practice 
of p h i l o - s o p h i a ,  whose end was to fix a desire for the overriding 
need for s o p h i a .  And to embody s o p h i a  is to attain the good of 
life {to agathon)  which is identified with e u d a i m o n i a  (sp iritual 
w ell-being or happiness), claim ed to be w hat we all want and 
want for its own sake in life {Eud.  282ff.; G.  4 70e4 -ll).
A lthough Socrates conceives so p h i a  or e p i s t e m e  as the art and 
sc ience of liv ing39 , the association of s o p h i a  and to agathon  
does not mean that so ph ia  is productive of the good  in the sense 
in w hich the know ledge of a c raftsm an  is, in app lica tion , 
p ro d u c tiv e  o f ce rta in  d is tin c tiv e  goods; ra th e r  s o p h i a  is 
constitu tive  of the good  (cf. G .  507a) as denoting the highest
3  ^ Because of the ethical orientation o f his philosophy, Socrates 
conservatively keeps to the small number of cardinal virtues - wisdom, 
courage, temperance, piety, justice. See Eud.  279a4-c2; Pr t .  329c2-d l, 
329e5-330al; G. 506el-507e7; R.  427d6-ll; Phdo .  69cl-2. All the virtues 
are one because each is a form of knowledge (e p i s t e m e ) or wisdom 
{sophia),  as Socrates understood it (see G.  507a; Phdo.  69a-b)
39 Charm.  165c; Euthd.  282e, 299; Prt. 311, 312, 319a; cf. Laws  961eff.
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fu lfilm ent of ourselves as ensouled beings. Accordingly, s o p h i a  
m ust be pursued with overriding priority (Ap.  30b, 29d9ff). This 
entails a new religion which is hum anistic and rational; for piety 
w ill be defined by what is relevant to the final em bodim ent of 
s o p h i a , and the pursuit of sophia  w ould itse lf  count as w hat
constitu tes service or duty to god.40 Such a religion is likely to 
en tail som e rejection of the conceptual aspect of god which is 
c o n s is ten t bo th  w ith ritu a l sacrifices, in itia tio n  or o rg iastic  
ecstacies as means of gaining happiness, spiritual salvation, and 
blessed after-life. As we shall see, Plato and A ristotle adopt this 
Socratic religion, with specific differences of detail. Presently, let
us note that this em phasis on s o p h i a  assoc ia ted  w ith  d iv ine
w isdom  and happiness as realisab le  psychic state or condition
presupposes a shift from the Hom eric conception of a ghostly 
p  s u e  h e  to a highly evaluative conception of psuch'e. T h i s  
conceptual shift reflects the influence of Pythagorean thought and 
the m ystery religions.
The m ystery religions (- advent: 8th/7th century BC) fill the gap 
c rea ted  in the vertical and geom etric structure  of o rder and 
p ro p rie ty  in e th ics and re lig io n  a sso c ia ted  w ith  O lym pian  
m e t a p h y s i c s ,41 and epitom ised in the D elphic m otto - Know
40 The religious element in Socrates' conception o f the pursuit of s o p h i a  
seem s anticipated by Pythagoras, if  the stories we hear are true. 
According to Heraclides Ponticus, Pythagoras was the first to coin the 
term " p h i l o s o p h i a "  (love of wisdom) and also to call him self a 
p h i l o s o p h o s  (lover of wisdom) in conscious allusion to the belief that 
that which is really wise is not man but god (Fr. 87, Wehrli). But there is 
not enough evidence to credit Pythagoras with full anticipation of  
Socratic religion as activity in pursuit or love of sophia.
41 This "vertical" culture of Homeric society is represented in its Olympian 
religion by an ordered relation between gods at the top, kings and heroes 
in the middle, and ordinary people at the bottom. This culture declined
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T hyse lf - w hich rem inds m en of the ineffab le  id ea lity  and
everlasting  b liss ' o f the divine condition  perm anently  set off 
against the im perfect finitude of the hum an condition, and which 
it is h u b r i s  for man to try to attain in this life. This bridging of 
the gap requires a highly evaluative conception of man, and in 
particular, of psuche .
Hom er and Hesiod had left m ankind far rem oved from  the gods 
w ho w ere the ir rem ote ancestors and had prom ised  a happy 
im m ortality after death to only a few. Hesiod, observing the hints 
o f H om er about the degeneracy from  the G olden age of the 
p resen t generation of men, had expanded these h ints in to  his 
eloquent portrayal of the Iron Age. In his turn he hints that the 
real hope of m ankind lies in the extinction of this race and the 
recom m encem en t o f the cycle  o f c h an g e .42 The m ystery
religions, on the other hand, guaranteed a happy im m ortality43 to
42 We may read this doctrine in the systems o f Anaximander, Anaximenes, 
Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, the Stoics.
4 3 The idea o f survival after death in Greece did not begin with the 
introduction o f the mystery religions. It was implicit in the age-old 
Greek burial customs, explicit in Homer's ghostly home, Hades. The idea 
of rewards and lunishment which goes with the idea o f survival after 
death is referred to at II. iii, 278ff., xix, 259ff. The dominant picture of 
the Homeric poems, to be sure, is that the dead left behind them souls 
which went wailing down into the dark house o f Hades beneath the earth. 
These souls wer; shadowy and w itless images without substance or 
intelligence or blood. In Hesiod, we also find blessed immortality as a 
reward for the v rtues o f the men o f the long past, o f guardian angels 
mediating between god and man, protection o f the righteous and 
punishment of the wicked. And in the battle o f the gods and the Titans, 
we find a dualistic conflict between the powers of good and evil, order and
disorder. We find traces of these also in Aeschylus where the postmortem
punishment of certain offenders is intimately tied up with the traditional 
unwritten laws and the traditional functions o f Erinyes and Alastor 
(Eum . 267ff., 339ff., Suppl iants  414ff). However, the poets of the 7th and 
6th century BC, impressed with the misery and injustice o f life, and with
23
all their devotees w ithout distinction, social or sexual. However, 
the condition upon which this guarantee was m ade varied from  
the elaborate ritual at Eleusis centred on the story of Dem eter and 
P e r s e p h o n e ,44 to the Orphic system  developed from  the story 
a b o u t D io n y su s , w hich com bined  ritu a l w ith  an e labo ra te  
th e o lo g y 45 and an ascetic d iscipline of purification. W hatever
it the problem of justifying god's apparent failure to apportion rewards 
according to merit never invoked immortality and the idea of 
compensation and retribution in another world as a possible explanation 
and palliative of the state of affairs on earth. Even the tragedians, who 
must have been subject to the influences of the Orphic and Eleusinian 
mysteries made astonishingly slight references to an existence after
death. A play could not well be ended with the statement that the hero or 
villain would receive what he deserves after death.
44 Traditionally, naiive Greece (or Athens) had her chthonic gods. Then 
came the Orphic version. Demeter, the earth-goddess, the story goes, had 
been robbed o f her daughter Persephone by Hades, god o f the dead. 
Mourning and searching took her around the world. Meantime, there
was winter over the whole earth, and the crops died and grew no more. 
Finally Zeus, touched by the plight of mankind - who were about to die for 
want o f food, prevailed on Hades to restore Persephone for a portion of 
the year. As often as Persephone returns from below and Demeter 
rejoices, it is Spring and Summer time. But when Persephone goes down 
again to Hades and the dead, and the mother mourns for her, the crops
and fruits and trets die with her, and it is Winter again.
45 The story of Dionysus, son of Zeus and Semele: Dionysus, like Demeter 
and Persephone, v as a god of fertility of the earth, of the harvest of the 
trees, and especially of vine, vintage, and wine. Dionysus was born for 
joy and blessings to mankind. His gifts bring strength and healing of the 
body, gladness and forgetfulness o f care o f the mind. Hence, his 
nickname, Lusios;  i.e. the loosener of care. He too died every year and 
rose again triumphant over death - being also a god o f the living and 
fruitful earth, of spring, summer, and o f the seeming death o f all things 
in winter. The original myth o f Dionysus had developed into a 
complicated theology in which the origin of all things was left in much
doubt; it was now Night, now Chaos, now Water and Primitive Slime, now 
Time. Eventually, from the union of Time and Necessity, or from Chaos 
and Ether, there . proceded a gigantic egg from which appeared a God 
variously called Zfus, Pan, or Phanes. This god was the World-All. Last 
and mightiest of all o f Zeus' children entrusted with the lordship o f the
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differences exist betw een them, the m ystery religions express, in 
an articulate and organised form, a yearning for redem ption from 
the im perfection , m ortality , and fin itude  of m an’s lo t. They 
fanned the hope 3f escape and peace in some life beyond the brief 
span o f hum an existence. These m ystery  re lig ions46 p rov ide 
th e ir in itia tes  w ith opportun ites fo r the  tem porary  tas te  of 
freedom  from  thfc concerns and constraints of m ortal life  during 
the orgies of sym pathetic rituals in which they aspire to identify 
their p s u c h e  with that of their god to which it originally belongs, 
and are believed in the process to actually taste, tem porarily, of 
im m ortality  and divine bliss. This ushers in a h ighly  valued 
status for the p s u c h e .  But the actual teaching of the E leusinian 
m ysteries failed to give any distinctly moral value and function to 
the idea of immortality. The fortunes of the soul were determ ined 
not by moral character and deserts but by a form al relation to the 
m ysteries. The indispensable condition for reaching the Island of 
the B lest - a heaven painted in term s of earth ly  experience, 
purified and idealised - lay not in being virtuous but in being an 
E leusinian. The p s u c h e  still retained its personality , and moved 
am id varie ty  and m ultip lic ity . T his teach ing  or experience, 
how ever, was short of the thorough-going ideal o f the m ystic 
w hose u ltim ate  v ision  was to id en tify  w ith , or loose  his 
individuality in, Ws god, rather than to be forever separated from
world, Dionysus, was torn to pieces by the Titans at the instigation of 
jealous Hera.... 2eus blasts the Titans with thunderbolt, and from their 
ashes sprang man. For this reason man is sinful and imperfect. But 
because the ashes contain also the fragment o f the divine substance 
whom the Titans had devoured, there is also within him the spark of, and
the possibility of a passage to, immortality.
46 There were more than two mystery religions in and around Athens, the
cult of Adonis, and of Cebele, are examples.
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his god on accou it of his finitude and separate character.
So in O rphic dogm a, the evil in m en has its roo ts in his 
inheritance  from  T itan ic  w ickedness, and the m oral con flic t 
be tw een  good and bad w ith in  us encapsu la tes the  struggle  
betw een Dionysus and his Titanic enem ies. The hope of salvation 
lay in freeing the fragm ent of the divine im prisoned w ithin us 
from  the foes and bonds which keep it from its divine origin, and 
of uniting it with its source. These bonds and foes, so far as 
hum an life  is concerned, the Orphic found in the desires and 
experiences of the body. The Titanic elem ent is the physical, the 
flesh, the senses, and the "world" connected with them. The soul 
is an enstrangem ent from god, corrupted by the heritage of evil 
from  the Titans. But sin is now a sym pton, not of an acquired 
shortsightedness in the soul rem ovable by any external m eans but 
of a congenital blindness which no "earthly" means could cure. 
Indeed the soul could be purified but only relig iously  by ritual 
observances and asceticism  and this, they taught, requires time. 
Hence, they foresaw  an indefinite process of transm igration and 
re incarnation  in ■ w hich the soul was born again and again - 
reaping in each dfe  the fruits, bitter and sweet, of the degree of 
her adherence to Orphic precept and practice in fom er existences. 
And they allow ed their fancy to p lay  w ith the d isem bodied  
interval which separated rebirth from  death. They im agined the 
soul led  to the underw orld  by H erm es to be judged . The 
u n in itia ted  they saw ly ing  in a m orass of m ud aw aiting  
reincarnation. The initiates they pictured as enjoying greater or 
less felicity  or undergoing purgatorial cleansing according to the 
state of purity attained on earth. Only by breaking this vicious
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cycle of transm igration and reincarnation altogether could the soul 
attain  enlightenm ent and rest eternally  in Dionysus. Only when 
the soul had drunk the living w aters of M em ory after having 
drunk, and been drugged by, the w aters o f Forgetfulness could 
she utter, 'Thou art become god from  man'. The idea of man's 
rem ote kinship with imm ortal gods is being replaced by the idea 
of direct universal participation of man in divinity; and the divine 
element in man is his psuche .
3 S um m ary
The foregoing is not intended as an account of Greek religious 
history , but as a m inim um  historical background against which 
the high frequency of the occurrence or use of "god" and cognate 
religious locutions not only in the Presocratics, but also in Plato 
and Aristotle will, I hope, be illumined. It w ill also enable us to 
assess A ristotle's relation to his predecessors on the conception of 
god or philosophy of religion.
W e may now summarise our discussions of the concept of god. 
W e have, I hope, observed that basically, god is conceived as a 
causal and/or originating power, a conception which is presum ed 
to im ply life. This pow er ranges in form  from  physical and 
psychic to causally  effective, logical-m etaphysical conditions as 
represented by Fate. Any reality whose existence is necessary as 
the ultim ate presupposition in an explanation of the universe or a 
feature of it, a id  w hich satisfies the conditions o f d iv in ity  - 
(causal) suprem acy, ideality or perfection, im m ortality, and self- 
sufficiency - is god. This basic meaning of god or divine reality 
entails a model )f explanation according to which the ultim ate or
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fundam ental ground of all things is divine, but, barring additional 
or independent characterisations or assum ptions, it entails neither 
tha t god be m ateria l nor im m ateria l,47 nor ex ist in absolute 
independence from everything else, nor be a final (as opposed to a 
m aterial, efficient and formal) cause. N or does it entail that god 
be a n th ro p o m o rp h ic ,48 nor a self- rather than -other thinking 
be ing , nor even m orally  and em o tiona lly  ap p ea lin g .49 T h e  
m ystery religions have conceived p s u c h e  as having divine origin, 
and as capable c f  divine happiness and of direct reunion with, or 
participation in, god by ritual purification.
Traditionally , piety is expressed in reverence or acceptance of 
the gods as traditionally conceived. But to prove piety it is not 
enough to show just that you pray and sacrifice the gods of the 
p o l i s .  You m ust also show that you accept and believe them. 
Thus piety is not m inimally grounded in external acts of tendence 
tow ards a god which is actually  w orshipped, but on an inner
47 I have already drawn attention to the fact that, arguably, a causal power 
is neither material nor immaterial, although it may be identified with a 
material which embodies it.
4 ^  Although as the idea of god develops, Fate, Necessity or Justice tends to 
become identified with the supreme will and authority o f Zeus. Still, as 
Hesiod has intimated, the personality o f Zeus may be analysed away as a 
set o f powers d t  properties: Force, Strength, Intelligence, Memory,
Justice, etc.
49 Cleve (1969, v o l.l, p.133), supposes that a god must "have a moral and 
emotional appeal". But what really constitutes "moral and emotional 
appeal"? Did the ancient Greeks divinize Memory, Intelligence, Sleep, 
The winds, Sun and Moon because they have emotional and moral appeal? 
Did ordinary pious men feel emotionally and morally appealed to the 
licentious flirtatious o f Zeus? Or perhaps "moral and emotional appeal" 
means a feeling pf personal relation with god. If so, it is difficult to 
understand the relig ious fervour which went into prosecuting  
Anaxagoras for impiety against the sun and the moon which were no cult 
gods, or why the Greeks would divinize Tu ch e , Peace, Victory, Memory, 
etc.
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conv ic tion  in respec t of the recogn ition  and accep tance  of 
suprem e, causal powers recognised and accepted by the p o l i s  as 
d ivine. This may entail that a philosopher is not neccesarily  
irreligious or impious simply because he argues to the existence of 
a reality  called god which is not recognisable as a cultic god, 
although such a reality satisfies the set of traditional conditions of 
divinity.
From  our discussions so far, then, if  t h e o l o g o s 50 m ay be 
translated as "rational speculation about, or justification  of, god", 
w hat is m inim ally needed for an account to be theological or 
religious is an argum ent to the ex i s t e n c e  o f god or the divine in 
its basic religioiis sense. It would seem, then, that historically, 
rational theology or philosophy of religion or the science of God or 
w hatever o ther nam e we give it, began as a se lf-conscious 
discourse representing a phase of thought w hich d iffered  from 
ordinary religion in being the reflective production or justification, 
not necessarily c f the entire content of religion, but of religious
i
categories like god, the divine or soul. So that theology would 
represent the m ental developm ent that has outgrow n sim ple faith 
and began to feel the necessity of understanding what it believes. 
An account, therefore, would rem ain theological or religious if, in 
going beyond ordinary  re lig ious consciousness in a sp irit of 
rational skepticism  and even denial, and ultim ately to the level of 
critical characterisation and essential definition, it regresses to the 
restoration or justification of the basic categories of our religious 
faith and beliefs, but in such a way that the fundam ental meaning 
of such categories are retained. It would be consistent with such
50 Nowadays, in tne western world, theology bears on divinely revealed
truth, a christianised definition.
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argum entative restoration or justification of religion, that w hile it 
y ields changes in our earlier naive consciousness, it m ay yet 
prune such consciousness of much that had counted as essential, 
so that ultim ately it is difficult but not im possible to detect the 
id e n tity  th a t has m ain ta in ed  its e lf  th ro u g h o u t the  m en tal 
developm ent in ihat account.
In the follow ing three chapters I shall be expounding the main 
pre-A risto te lian  philosophies in order to see w hether the "god" 
contained  in them  satisfies the basic, cu ltu rally  and relig iously  
determ ined m eanmg of god. Then we will be able to see how 
justified  the reading is which divides off, w ithout qualification , 
these  p re -A ris to .e lian  though t-system s in to  d iffe ren t areas of 
k n o w led g e  - p h ilo so p h y  and sc ien ce  on the  one hand , 
theology/religion and m etaphysics on the other. W hen we have 
seen how "god" has been taken ph ilosophically  by A risto tle ’s 
predecessors, we shall then be able to see how A ristotle’s "god" of 
the M e t a p h y s i c s  stands in relation to this preceding conception of 
god. A ccord ing ly , chap ters tw o, three , four and five  deal 
successively with the Presocratics, Socrates, P lato  and A ristotle. 
The conclud ing  sixth chap ter w ill be a sum m ary o f resu lts  
obtained in these previous chapters
TW O
THEOLOGY IN THE PRESOCRATICS
1 H ypothesis
In  the p rev io u s ch ap te r, I a rgued  th a t there  are  tw o 
complimentary aspects in the traditional Greek conception of god: 
that the basic religious sense of "god" is that of (i) a causal and/or 
orig inating pow er of nature - physical, psychic, or a causal 
condition - which serves as the ultim ate presupposition in an 
explanation of the universe as a whole or a feature of it, and that 
(ii) the conception of such causal power, which is presum ed to 
imply life, satisfies certain basic conditions of divinity; supremacy, 
ideality/perfection, everlastingness, self-sufficiency. I also argued 
that (ii) constitutes the conditions for the existence of god or a 
divine reality, and is thus often assumed rather than expressed. 
Is (i) with (ii) satisfied in the Presocratics? I shall argue that it is 
fu lly  sa tisfied , though we shall see that w hile (i) features 
prom inently  in these philosophies, (ii) is, for the m ost part, 
implicit. It will thus become clear, I believe, that by satisfying (i) 
and (ii), the philosophies of our major Presocratics are a series of 
rational theologies - arguments to the existence of archai  w h ic h  
sa tisfy  the basic , re lig iously  determ ined  conception  of god 
outlined above. It shall also become clear that, except for the 
exclusive eccentr city of the Eleatics, the originating and/or causal 
function of the power associated with god is expressed in terms of 
motion. It is ai if  the Presocratics had read Homer in the same 
terms as Plato: 'When Homer speaks of "Okeanus, source of the
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gods, and m other T ethys", he m eans tha t all th ings are the 
offspring of a flowing stream of change' (T h e a e . 152e). However, 
the type of m otion, hence the sense of causality  associated with
the a r c  h e ,  is o rgan ic , fu n c tio n a l and lo g ic a l ra th e r than  
m echan ica l.
2 T hales
T hales (c .62 4 /3 -5 4 6 /5 ), the f ir s t  G reek  n a tu ra l p h ilo so p h er 
(p h u s i k o s ), according to A risto tle, was also a man of practical 
w i s d o m .1 H is reputation  as a sc ien tis t - in m athem atics and 
astronom y - was incontrovertible even in classical antiquity. His
"laureateship" as one of the seven sages of Greece may have been
a consequence both of his p rac tical as w ell as his theoretical
wisdom . He encroached upon A pollo 's traditional prerogative of 
prophecy w hen he pred ic ted  a good harvest o f o lives for a 
particular season, as well as forecast the eclipse of the sun in 585
B.C. Considered in isolation these are of no theological moment, 
especially  so when his m otivation seem s practical; in the form er 
case, to establish a corner in the olive presses, and in the latter, to 
stop a battle between two neighbouring arm ies. However, if  we
add A ristotle’s report that Thales said that the universe is full of
_2gods and that the p s u c h e  is likew ise  d iffused  in the universe, 
then , the th eo re tica l a ssum p tions and  im p lica tio n s  fo r the 
re lig ious com m unity  in w hich he lived  can be all but an 
inconsequence. For here is a spirited, if unproclaim ed, rebellion, 
against traditional religious dogma, m yth and authority.
1 Aristotle's Meta.  933b20; Pol.  1259a9; Herodotus’ Histories 1, 74; 1, 170
2 Since translating p s u c h e  as soul m isleadingly resounds Platonic or 
cartesian dualism, I will be maintainig the transliteration "p s u c h e " until 
otherwise stated.
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Aristotle supposes Thales to have derived the conclusion that the
universe is full of gods from the prem ise ( h o t h e n  i s o s ) that the
p s u c h ' e  is diffused ( m e m e i c h t h a i )  in the universe. A ristotle
fu rth er supposes T hales ( e o i k e )  to have said that p s u c h e  is
som ething kinetic (ki  ne t  i kon  t i )y 'if indeed (e i p e r ) he said that
m agnesian stone possesses psuch 'e  because it moves iron' (d e
A n .  405a l9 , 411a7). A ccording to D iogenes Laertius (1, 24)
A ristotle and Hippias say that he (sc. Thales) gave a share of
p s u c h e  even to "psuche- less” objects, using m agnesian stone and
amber (when rubbed) as examples.
Thales' main thesis, however, is that the origin and substance of
3
existing  things is w ater. To recapitulate the main item s of 
Thales' thesis, we have the following:
A.  The arcKe  of existing things is water
B.  The p s u c h e , which is som ething kinetic, is diffused in the 
universe (from which - hothen )
C. All things are full of gods.
The first philosophical thesis is full of m etaphysical and religious 
language. The status o f w ater as a first p rincip le  (a r c  h e -) 4 
derives from  its inherent pow er of change m ultip lied  by an 
indefiniteness as to its quality.5 On my account, Thales' position
3 Meta.  983b6ff.
4 Already in Homer we have the mythical thesis that the watery divinity, 
Okeanos, is the parent of all gods - which means also that it is the divine 
power that generates the universe. Moreover, Miletus, as the metropolis 
of seventh century Aegean commerce, was most probably apprised of 
ancient Egyptian and Babylonian myths in which the origin of all things 
was divine water. The story goes that Thales visited Egypt.
5 According to M e t a .  983b6ff. The conception o f quality in the 
Presocratics is not abstract quality, but a concrete or quasi-concrete 
thing. See Heidel, 'Qualitative Change in Presocratic Philosophy', in 
Mourelatos (1974‘v
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as the first W estern philosopher or sc ien tis t should not consist 
m erely in A ,  even if  he also inferred from  it the proposition that 
the earth rests on w ater - a proposition which would hardly have 
been original with Thales in the then know n world. W hat marks 
or must m ark Thales off from Hom er, H esiod, or Pherecydes6 is, 
in my view, the structure, not the content, of his thought: instead 
of directly assum ing W ater as a d ivinity  - a characteristic way of 
the m ythological th ink ing  in H esiod  and H om er - we have, 
accord ing  to A ris to tle 's  p resen ta tio n , a se t o f p ropositions 
constructib le  in such a way that it y ie lds an argum ent whose 
conclusion is a definition of what it is to be a god. For, if Aristotle 
is right, viz., that Thales inferred C from B y the conclusion is that 
p s u c h ’e , which is something kinetic, is god or, in other words, god 
is the power of m ovem ent inhering nature. If  this is right, that is 
possible only if  the key term s in B ( p s u c h ’e ), and C (god) are 
com m ensurable, i.e . i f  they are in te r-tran s la tab le . It w ould 
o therw ise  be ille g itim a te  to in fe r C from  B ; for from the 
assum ption that the psuch 'e  is som ething kinetic and diffused in 
the universe, it will not follow that all things are full of gods. If it 
follows, then, there is a m issing link betw een B  and C - and this 
should be a defining prem ise which w ill identify  the terms "god" 
and psuch e .  Is there evidence for such identification? There is.
In Aristotle's text on Thales we find only a single defining clause 
for psuch ' e , viz., that it is something kinetic. The "orthodox" (in 
contrast to Orphic, and the ghostly Hom eric) meaning of p su c h e  is 
that it is the breath of life. Psuch 'e ’, o rig inally  the verbal noun of
6 Pherecydes is credited with postulating eternal cosmic principles two 
of which are Time and Earth (and also Water called Chaos, frr. 1, 2)
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the verb p s u c h e  in,  nam ely, "to breathe" m eans also  "to live". 
Here "consciousness" and "the power o f movement" are im plicit in 
the very idea of being alive. The form ula is sym m etrical; to 
breathe is to live or to move, and to live or move is to breathe. As 
we shall see, the philosophies o f A naxim enes7 and D iogenes of 
A p o l lo n ia 8 substantiate a philosophical interpretation o f psuch ' e  
w hich, apart from  m eaning "life-breath" also m eans "pow er of 
m ovem ent" and "consc iousness" . T h a les ' p ro p o sitio n  that 
magnesian stone and amber (when rubbed) have psuch 'e  because 
they move iron suggests that "to move" is "to live" and that "the 
pow er of movement" is the same as "life-force", and vice versa.
However, the very idea of a natural pow er or force is, given
certain conditions, precisely that which the Greek m ind was wont 
to divinize and to call god. Thus to call the power of movement 
psuch ' e  seems to be a transparent way of attributing divinity to 
the pow er of m otion. If so, the in ference from  B to C is 
tautological, and valid. Indeed, at L a w s  10, 899ff., Plato affirms, 
though non-attributively, this Thalean theology by arguing to the
conclusion that "all things are full o f gods", from the prem ise that 
psuchai are the causes of the m ovem ents o f the astral entities 
which in turn produce the years, m onths, seasons, as well as all 
forms of physical change. As in Thales, so in Plato, the existence 
of gods is identified with the causal pow er of m otion as what is 
u ltim a te ly  p resu p p o sed  in w ha t is  deem ed  an ad eq u a te
explanation of the cosmos or certain features in it.
Far from suggesting that Thales reasoned in a particular way, it 
would not be extraordinary speculation to suggest the following as
7 Aetius, Placi ta , 1.3,4
8 Frr. 5 and 6
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a form al, hypothetical reconstruction  o f his theological thesis, 
assum ing A and B above at the appropriate steps. (1) If anything 
has a power of movement, it is e m p s y c h o s ; viz., alive or capable 
o f movement. (2) If anything has both a power of movement and 
a cosm o-physical stuff it is God. (3) W ater has a pow er of 
m ovem ent and constitu tes the physica l s tu ff of the cosm os. 
Therefore, (4) W ater is God.9 (5) By (2) and (3), the universe is 
fu ll of go d s,10 and (6), p s u c h e  is god11 (- by definition as a 
pow er of m ovem ent). (7) By (1), (2), and (3), p s u c h e  is diffused 
in the un iverse .12 (8) Therefore, the universe is divinely a live ,13 
by 0 ) , (4), and (5). Therefore, (9) the physical stuff o f the 
universe, W ater, is the body of a divine power of motion called, 
G od. According to Diogenes Laertius (hence, DL) 1, 36 = A l, Thales 
also said that, (10) 'the divine has neither beginning nor end (ti  
to theion to mele arcKen echon mete  mete leuten), and (11) 
p s u c h a i  are im m ortal (a t h a n a t o u s , DL 1, 24). Doxography also 
attributes an apparently stoic identification of the divine principle 
in water with m ind.14
That (K)) and (11) were possibly said by Thales is not an unduly 
credulous supposition since the same ru les of adm issibility apply
9 Hippolytus, Refutat io Omnium Haeresium. ,1,3  tells us that Water was 
Thales' God.
10 Cf. Ps-Aristotle, Peri Kosmou,  397b 16.
11 See Aristotle, de An. 405a21, where he argues that the Presoratics made 
the soul out o f their arch?.  Cf. Phdo.  96b.
12 According to Aristotle. See also Aetius, 1,7,11.
13 A theme which, we shall see, is reccurrent in Presocratic thought. See 
also Aristotle's de An., 411a7; A22.
See e.g., Cicero, de Natura. Deorum 1, 25; Aetius (1. 7. 11 [DK 11A23]). Cf. 
Ps-Galen, Historic  Philosopha  35 (Doxographi  Graeci ,  618). Perhaps, we 
have no means o f confirming or refuting this testimony. Accordingly, it 
may be taken as given if, as I believe, it is not inconsistent with Thales' 
main thesis.
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to other alleged propositions of Thales so far accepted. (10) is 
se lf-explanatory . The nature ( p h u s i s ) o f all things itself cannot 
be said to have a beginning; for that would lead to an infinite 
reg ress. N or can the nature, i.e ., the fundam ental basis of all 
things be said to come to an end; for that would mean the end of 
all existence. (11) is likewise self-explanatory; a natural power of 
m ovem ent cannot legim ately be said to die, since that would mean 
the  negation  o f nature  itse lf. (10) and (11) strengthen the 
traditional truth that the divine has, at least, im m ortal life. That 
the divine is e ternal is to be found in  T hales' contem porary, 
Pherecydes. And it is subsequently a common assum ption in the 
P resocratics. Q u a  causal power an a r c h T  is indestructible and 
eternal. But its em bodim ent in water, air, fire, etc., may undergo 
all sorts of changes because of its inherently infinite qualities.
Thales could be im agined to be arguing that we should believe 
about the gods no m ore than is warranted by reason; that there is 
only  one un iversal God w hich reason  can discover, although 
derivatively  there are infinite num ber of gods as God - reference 
to the pow er o f change and m ovem ent diffused in the cosmos. 
This God is W ater, not the city 's Apollo, A thena, Aphrodite or 
Aesculapius. He would then explain this by arguing that W ater is 
found or is to be found in every natural thing everywhere, and it 
is the basis o f the infinite changes and m ovements in the cosmos. 
It m ust accordingly be the principle and cause of everything. All 
qualita tive  changes m ust be traced to the extraordinary power of 
m o v e m e n t an d  q u a l i ta t iv e  in d e f in ite n e s s  by w h ich  it  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  into every other phenom ena. M agnesian stone and 
am ber - apparently  lifeless things - paradoxically present us with
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a paradigm case of living divine power - motion. Everything else 
m ust have this power since everything is made of and from self- 
d iffe ren tia tin g , e te rnally  ex isting  W ater. It needs only be 
discovered. And, of course, ps u c h T ,  life-force, is nothing other 
than the pow er of movement. This very power of movem ent is 
the ruling m ind of the cosmos. As for Apollo's oracle and his 
pow er of prophecy they are suspect. W e can forecast the future 
sim ply by studying the living mechanisms o f physical change and 
celestia l m ovem ents.
In thus arguing, Thales would not be introducing a com pletely 
new god, far less would he be dispensing with god. He is merely 
arguing, by a m anner of thinking set within assessible canons of 
reasoning and argum entation, from the evidence of phenomena to 
the existence and nature of a principle which explains all things as 
a cause. Such a principle is what he, but consistently  with
tradition, thinks God means. He implies by his argument that we 
can no more assum e the existence of gods. W e must argue for 
them . It is true that his God does not have the psychology or 
emotional appeal of the cultic gods; it does not feel anger or joy, 
and it is not an ethical agent; it is not jealous, but nor does It, like 
Zeus, dispense justice  by the arbitrary and dictatorial hurling of 
thunderbolts. Reason is at work to purify as well as to confirm 
naive re lig ious in tu ition  by grounding it firm ly in argum ent. 
Thales' God is obviously alive, in fact, full of life and energy, the 
vital source o f all things, animate and inanim ate, but in itself, it 
has no human form. At any rate, Thales' God satisfies the basic 
conception of the Greek god, viz., a supreme originative and/or 
causal power which is ultimately presupposed in an explanation of
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the universe as a whole. And he indicates that the function of 
divine causality is expressible in terms of motion
3 A n a x im a n d e r
W ith  A naxim ander (c.610-545B.C .), a fellow  M ilesian, younger 
contemporary and possibly also an associate of Thales, we have a 
som ewhat clearer picture of a mind trying to trace not only the 
origins and growth of the universe(s), but also their characteristic 
features; their hidden m echanism , structure, and m eaning. He 
does this with a rem arkable genius of m athem atical and logical 
enterprise when he presents the astronom ical universe as spatial 
sym m etries in which the sun, moon, and stars are a sequence of 
huge concentric fire rings around which is a central earth, with 
equal intervals between successive pairs in the sequences. There 
are indefinitely  many co-existing or successive w orlds15 which 
are k o s m o i \  each k o s m o s  com prising a sublunar world and an 
a s tronom ica l w orld ( o u r a n o s ) A 6 For him, the existence of
k o s m o i  presupposes the existence and function a divine a r c h T  
called the ap e i r on .  According to Aetius (ii, 1, A17), the infinite 
heavens are, for Anaximander, equidistant god-worlds (or world- 
gods).
15 It is not clear from the text which alternative is meant by
Anaximander. See the following note.
16 At de Caelo (303bl0) Aristotle uses "all the heavens" (pantas tous
o u r  an  o u s )  as being surrounded by the a p e i r o n .  If, possibly, 
Theophrastus was relying on Aristotle for what Anaximander said, then, 
"ouranoi"  in Aristotle could well mean 'spheres of the sun, moon, and 
stars (cf. op. cit. 298b9). In that case, it is the plurality of spatial as well 
as temporal parts that Anaximander may be talking about. This would be 
something not very different from our modern language of "solar" or
"stellar" systems which, of course, are not meant as many worlds. Cf. Ps- 
Plutarch, Stromaie i s ,  2 (DK12A10), Aetius II, 21, 1, where Anaximander 
talks o f circles and spheres of the heavenly bodies.
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The only extant passage of the book presum ed to have been 
w ritten  by A naxim ander and supposedly entitled  "About N ature", 
is preserved in at least three versions by Sim plicius, H ippolytus 
and P-s P lu ta rch 17 - all of them  probably  deriving their source 
from  T heophrastus. E ach o f these  versions contains som e 
propositional variation absent in the others. But the main item s, 
which are m etaphysical, are that (a) the a rc  lie of all things is the 
a p e i r o n , w hich is neither fire , air, w ater or earth ;18 (b) the 
a p e i r o n , which pervades ( p e r i e c h e i ) the heavens, is eternal and 
ageless (aidion kai  agero ); (c) from and into the nature of the 
a p e i r o n  all the k o s m o i  com e to be and are destroyed; (d) 
generation  and destruction happen as is due and proper, k a t a  
chre ' on ; for the sources (o f generation and destruction) inevitably 
(literally , according to the arrangem ent o f time, kata ton chronou 
t a x  i n )  pay penalty  and re tribu tion  to one another fo r their 
injustice.
M any notes m ay be taken, m any questions of interpretation and 
m eaning may be raised about A naxim ander’s thesis, but I shall 
address a few which are relevant for my purposes. The a r c h T  is 
said to be "eternal" and "ageless". These indices repeat an epic 
form ula com parable to Ody.  v, 218, where it was said to Calypso; 
'fo r he is m orta l, w hereas you are  im m ortal and ageless 
( athanatos  kai  agero ) . 19 The apparent im plication is that the 
a p e i r o n  is divine and a living reality . Consequently, the many
17 Respectively, in Aristotel is Physicorum 24,13 = DK12A9; Ref.  1, 6, 1-2; 
Strom. 2 = DK12A10.
18 Some of the language we are dealing with are Peripatetic reconstructs, 
but they are not thereby necessarily a misrepresentation o f what 
Anaximander means
19 Cf. II.  11, 447
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world-gods generated as a function of the ap e i r on ' s  is consistent 
with the traditional derivation of all generated gods from a divine 
o rig in .20
" A p e  i r o n ", is  a h ighly  am biguous w ord. It m ay m ean 
"unlim ited", "unbounded", "infinite" or "indefinite". But these are 
e llip tical. Something may be unbounded either (i) tem porarily, 
(ii) quantita tively  or (iii)  q u a lita tiv e ly .21 On the other hand, 
arche  means "rule", "source", "cause", "beginning", and if the story 
is true that Anaximander was the first to deploy the term a r c h e  
for his system, it is all the more significant that the conception of
the a p e i r o n  conceptually includes (i)-(iii). T hales’ W ater could
no t be lim ited by tim e, quality  and quantity  and still be the
source and stuff of al l  sorts of things. But what exactly is the 
a p e i r o n , and how does it function? The evidence is not clear 
enough. Simplicius has 'The t h in gs  from which (eks hon )  there 
is generation i n to  t h e s e  (t a u t a )...' E arlier on, he has, ' f r o m  
which nature ( eks ties h a p  a n t  a ...reference  to the apeiron)  all
the heavens and the worlds in them come to be...'22 It has been 
argued that the plural rela tive  phrase, eks h on , refers to the 
opposite elements: hot, cold, dry, moist or to their embodiments in 
fire, air, earth, water; for these alone, being incom patible powers,
20 Cicero’s demur against the birth and the possibility of gods dying (d e 
Nat.  Deo.  1, 10 25) is misplaced. Greek gods are likewise born into 
immortality. And the chthonic deities o f the mystery religions were 
immortal only in the sense that they continuously died and were reborn.
21 Aristotle, Phy.  203b 18-20.
22 According to Jaeger (1947, p 20), "phusis  denotes the act of p h u n a i  - 
the process of growth and emergence... But it also includes their source of 
origin - that from which they have grown and from which their growth 
is constantly renewed - in other words, the reality underlying the things 
of our experience. We find the same double meaning in the word 
g e n es i s , a synonym for phusis . '
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can  be said to pay penalty  to each other. Indeed, in his 
cosm ology and m eteorology, A naxim ander noticeably uses "fire", 
"earth", "air", as formative powers, and his zoogony is based on the 
g en era tiv e  pow ers o f w ater com plim en ted  by env ironm en ta l 
factors arising from  the powers in earth and fire. If this is the 
case , the w arring, in tertransform ative function of the elem ents 
should not be taken to be any different from the function of the 
a p e i r o n  which is their underlying and ruling principle. Possibly, 
then, the a p e i r o n  is conceived in reaction to Thales' w a te r- jrc /ic l 
if  you assum e that water is one elem ent (some of) whose powers 
a re  incom patib le  w ith, or destructib le  by, one or m ore other 
elem ents, w ater fails to satisfy the minim um  requirem ent of an 
a r c h e .  For an a r c h e  m ust, at least, be indestruc tib le  and 
u n g e n e ra te d .23 Such a conception of the a p e i r o n , then, would be 
consisten t with a belief that some tem porarily, quantitatively, and 
q u a li ta t iv e ly  u n bounded  p o w e r  m ust underlie  as cause and 
p r in c ip le , the  sen sib le , d e fin ite , and m u tua lly  an n ih ila tin g  
e lem en ts  c o n s titu tin g  the  in v a rian t (kata ch re ’on ), p e riod ic  
( a n a k u k l o u m e n ' o n ) and contingent (kata chronon)  k o s m o i  of 
our experience.
That the nature of such a pow er is divine is implied not only in 
our observation of the ascription of traditional epithets of divinity 
- im m ortality  and agelessness - to the a p e i r o n , but also by 
A ristotle at P hy .  203b5-15:
...fo r a natural thing is either a principle or from a principle 
( a r c h ? ) .  But [the a p e i r o n ] is thought to be the principle of 
everything and to pervade everything (periechein panta)  and to
23 The possible destructibility of water need not follow for Thales, whose 
system is grounded on assumptions different from Anaximander's.
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steer everything (panta kubernari). . .Further, this is the divine 
( t o  t h e i o n ); for ( g a r )  it is im m ortal ( a t h a n a t o s )  and 
indestruc tib le  (a n o l e t h r o n ), as says Anaxim ander and most of 
the physiologists.
In substance, the A ristotelian exegesis or report applies to all 
who posit arche " not just the a p e i r o n , as the cause and principle 
o f all things. The point beginning 'Further...' applies to most 
P resocra tics including A naxim ander. N otice  in particu lar the 
inferential, 'And this is the divine'. Aristotle captures not just the 
argum entative spirit of the Presocratics, but, m ost im portantly, 
the argum entation to the divine. The argum ent begins with a 
m etaphysical prem ise that 'E verything is e ither a principle or 
from  a principle '. If  a reality  is the a r c h e  of everything, it 
sa tis fie s  the m inim um  requ irem en t o f d iv in ity  by being a 
suprem e originating and causal power which exists necessarily as 
that which is ultimately presupposed in an account of the cosmos. 
And we know  that "im m ortality” and "indestructibility" are the 
stock epithets o f the trad itional gods, noting, in addition, that 
"immortality" is predicated of living agents, and that the life of the 
a p e i r o n , like the life of Thales' a r c h e , is specified as (eternal) 
m o tion  ( k i he s in  a i d i o n ) . 24 B riefly , A risto tle ’s version of 
A nax im ander's  argum ent, w hich  is co n sis ten t w ith the one 
preserved  in Sim plicius and others, is that the divine is that 
w hich , by ex isting  in e ternal m otion, generates and spatio- 
tem poralises (perai )  all other things; contingent things generated 
from the a p e i r o n  must die or be destroyed in time to be followed 
inviolably by birth or regeneration. In this the ap e i r on  pervades
24 Hippolytus, Ref.  1, 6, 2; Aristotle, Phy.  2 5 0 b ll;  Simplicius in Phys. 24, 
13 (DK 12a9)
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and steers all things.
The charac teristics of the function o f the divine a p e i r o n  - 
inexorable periodicity  in cosm os-form ation, seasonal regularity in 
in te r-e lem en ta l transform ation , and the effecting calculable and 
c o n s ta n t g eo m etric  ra tio s  o f the  heaven ly  bod ies, are an 
expression of rationality. This is implied by its s teer ing  function. 
A naxim ander seems to be making a point m issed by Thales; that 
d iv in e  a c tiv ity  is  not ju s t  any m otion  or sim p le  s e lf ­
d iffe re n tia tio n , bu t ra tional and o rderly  m otion . A lso for 
A naxim ander, the process of ’’b irth", "generation", "death" and 
"destruction" constitu te  a m etaphysics o f "cosm ic ethics"; for 
generation is a p l e o n e x i a  as it results in elem ental imbalance and 
becom es an "injustice", a threat to the equilibrium  of the balance 
o f forces. A penalty arises to be paid as is due and proper, and in 
due course. D isputed by Vlastos, Jaeger calls this a philosophical 
th e o d ic y .25 The causal powers of the divine a p e i r o n  are defined, 
regular, predictable, even rational but unem otional. Anaximander 
m ust have thought, consistently with traditional religion, that any 
p lausib le  account o f the cosm os m ust presuppose the necessary 
existence a divine, causal reality  {the a p e i r o n  in eternal motion) 
as the vital ground of all existing things.
4 A n ax im en es
D oxography ascribes some association of Anaxim enes (c.546B.C) 
w ith A naxim ander, his senior contemporary and fellow citizen (DL 
ii, 3). His a r c h T  is infinite Air in eternal motion:
...from  it all th ings com e to be and in to  it they are again 
d isso lved  (a n a l u e s t h a i ). Just as our p s u c h e  being air s u n k a t e i
25 Jaeger (1947); Vlastos (1970) in Allen and Furley.
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us, so does breath and air periechei  the w hole world.
t
Anaximenes' recognition of, and in terest in, analogical argum ent, 
and in air in particular, is further attested by Plutarch (de Prim,  
f r i g .  7 ,947F (D K 13B 1).26 M oreover it was a com m on Greek 
belief that the p  sue  he  is the breath of life. So there was already 
at hand fo r A naxim enes trad itio n a l m ateria l w hich  had  the 
potentiality for being re-w orked into a m etaphysical system . Air 
ra ther than w ater, seems to offer fo r A naxim enes the organic 
p roperties of m ovem ent and c o n stitu tiv ity  (s u n k r a t i s t o n ) if, as 
he seems to think, it is by air we live and are made. Therefore 
Air, infinite (a p e i r o n ) A ir in eternal m otion (kinesin a id ion ) ,27 
he seems to argue, is the p h u s i s  of all things, hence, it is what we 
call god:
He (sc. Anaximenes) [says that] A ir is god: one must understand 
in the case o f such descriptions the pow ers (d u n a m e i s ) w hich 
interpenetrate the elements or bodies (A etius 1,7,13).2 8
However this may be a stoic reinterpretation of Anaximenes, it is 
more than in teresting that Aetius understands that by "god" the 
Presocratics (or the Greeks in general) mean the powers  in h e r in g
2 6 '...for he says that matter which is compressed and condensed is cold, 
while that which is fine and relaxed (c h a l a r o n ) - using this very word, 
is hot. Therefore, he said, the dictum is not an unreasonable one, that
man releases both warmth and cold from his mouth; for the breath is
chilled by being compressed and condensed with the lips, but when the 
mouth is loosened the breath escapes and becomes warm through its 
rarity.' The naivety and falsity of this experiment must be distinguished 
from the argumentative and philosophical motivation that inspired it.
27 Theophrastus apud  Simplicius in Phy. 24, 26
2 8 See further Cicero de Nat. Deo.  1, 10, 26; Augustinus de Civitate Dei  viii,
2
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n a tu re . Note also that the causality of the a ir-arche* is expressed 
in term s of m otion, here characterised  by a pa ir of regular 
behaviour - rarefacation  and condensation. From  this pair of 
functional regu la rity  o ther gods, th ings d iv ine, and all other 
phenom ena come to be and pass away.29
5 X en o p h an es
X enophanes, the 6th century Colophonian who m igrated to settle 
in  Sicily, brings the rationalism  of his native Ionia to bear directly 
on the very conception of god:
B ut m ortals believe that the gods are b o r n  and have a garment 
and voice and shape like them selves (fr.14). But if oxen and 
horses and lions had hands, then, horses would have drawn gods 
with shapes like horses...(fr.l5). Homer and Hesiod have told of 
the gods all that is shameful and reproach among men; stealing, 
adultery, cheating each other (fr. 11).
S ince T hales, the trad itional rep resen ta tion  of the orig inative 
causality  o f the parent-god as a biological p rocreator has been 
replaced by the idea of god as a power of m otion. This motion- 
m odel of cosm ological explanation entails the loss of most of the 
conceptual aspects of the human model so typical of the cultic 
gods. The em erging philosophical conception of the divine reality 
is rational, logical, and consequently, an abstractive one. This 
fu rth e r  en ta ils  the shedding o f rac ia l eccen tric itie s  in the 
conception of god. Consequently, the em erging universality in the 
conception o f god makes some conceptual aspects o f the human 
form incongruous, to say the least.
To start w ith, X enophanes offers a ra tionalistic  conception of
29 Hippolytus, R e f  A,  7, 1. Gods and things divine will just be one or other 
form of Air.
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im piety. W hereas trad itiona lly , a p ious person is one who
practices the relig ious observances and subm issively  recognises 
the gods as traditionally conceived, now Xenophanes declares that 
it is even impious to conceive god uncritically and illogically:
those who assert that the gods are bom  are as impious as those 
who say that they die; for in both cases it follows that the gods 
at some time fail to exist (Aristotle, Rh.  1399b6-9 = A 12)
Xenophanes seems to think that the traditional conception of god 
is contradictory, i.e., if god is a causal pow er and the principle of 
all things. For then such a principle or cause can neither be born 
nor die, which will arise if  it is subject to some other condition. 
B oth the b io log ical conception  of god and the consequentia l 
lim itations of its basic nature in tim e and space are logically and 
m o ra lly 30 inadmissible. Equally inadm issible is any conception of 
god which detracts from its basic nature as a causal power:
if  god is the m ost pow erfu l o f all ( k r  a t  i s  t o n ) ,  he (sc. 
Xenophanes) says that it is suitable ( p r o s e k e i n ) for him to be 
one (h e n a ). For if they were two or more it would no longer be 
the most pow erful and the best ([ b e l t i s t o n ). For each of the 
several being god would equally be such. For this is what a god  
and  god 's  capaci ty  is - to have p o w e r  and not to be in 
som eone’s pow er (kratein alia m ekra te isha i ), and to be most 
powerful of all. Hence, insofar as it is not more powerful, to that 
extent it is not god (ibid, M X G = A 28)
Note especially, f,for this is what a god and god's capacity is - to 
have power and not to be in som eone's pow er", which confirm s 
our hypothetical definition of god as basically  a causal pow er 
conceived in a set of conditions of w hich suprem acy is one.
Xenophanes' use o f "p r o s e k e i n " (below) in his conceptual critique of 
god as traditionally understood has both logical and moral connotations in 
context.
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X enophanes seem s to argue, that there can be only one god, if
"god" means just the cause or principle o f all things , which entails 
that it is the m ost powerful o f all things. For imagine two such
principles in existence. Then, the power o f each will lim it and be
lim ited  by the other, since both will presum ably be lim ited by a 
cond ition  of lim ita tion , w hich w ill then be greater and more 
po w erfu l than  the gods. B ut it is lo g ica lly  and m orally  
rep reh en s ib le  tha t the p rinc ip le  of all th ings, should be so
conceived. Hence:
T here is one god greatest among gods and men and in no way 
s im ila r to m orta ls in body and th o u g h t (heis  t h e o s . ^ e n  
m e g i s t o s . . . n d e m a ) \  fr. 23). All [of divine power] sees, thinks, 
hears (fr.24).
Two things are noteworthy. First, Homeric and traditional Greek 
p iety had im agined the gods as human beings in an ideal state of 
existence. But the traditional concept o f divine ideality had not 
been carried to its logical conclusion: the gods are only more so 
and so than men; for instance, they are born, like men, although 
once born, live forever thereafter. For Xenophanes, the perfection 
and sublim ity of god are not a m atter o f degree. In body and 
thought, god is incom m easurably dissim ilar to man. God is not a 
being with eyes and ears and brains, but the very principle of 
perception and intellection. Xenophanes is consistently arguing to 
the basic concept on of god as the principle of all things, and from 
this to god’s incom m easurable difference from  any other class of 
things.
Secondly, the apparent distinction between one greatest god and
48
other gods, may be interpreted in at least two ways. (i) It is 
plausible to think that the suprem acy of the one God is being 
distinguished from  a p lurality  of gods rheto rica lly  supposed to 
exist. From this point of view, it is an argum ent to this effect: i f  
there are many gods, one and only one will be the greatest. But of 
course all gods are god, since "god" sim ply is "suprem e causal 
power" - and there is only one such power, (ii) On the other hand, 
it is arguable that "gods" means those locally  em bodied bits of 
"God". Since (i) and (ii) are not necessarily  incom patible, it is 
therefore possible that Xenophanes means by "God" the universal 
power and principle of the cosmos, and by "gods" those local bits 
of one and the same God. This apparently  inconclusive view 
seems supported in the following:
About the gods. there is no leadership among them, for it is not 
ho ly  ( h o  s i  o n )  fo r any o f the gods to have a m aster 
(d e s p o z e s t h a i ) and none of them stands in need of anything at 
a ll.31
By definition as a causal power the existence of gods entails no 
relations of superiority and subordination among them selves. It 
is illogical that god qua  causal power should have a master; what 
can we make of a causal power being a servant? N or is it logical 
or appropriate to imagine god qua  causal power as a m aster of a 
causal power. For god q u a  causal power is god. Hence all gods 
are god. The theological "politics" between Zeus the king of the 
gods and subordinate gods, is illogical and untrue. The "holy" and 
"fitting" may be in use here as com prehensive  concepts to 
intimate the ethical and logical sublimity of God. Divine power or 
m astery is absolute. And as it is d iffused through the universe
-*1 Cf. Euripides, Hercules Furens , 1341-6.
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(pasi  sunphuei  = A35) its absoluteness entails every condition of 
self-fulfilm ent, com pared to hum an m astership  which depends on 
som ething else for its fulfilm ent. But X enophanes’ God shares, at 
le a s t, one th ing  w ith the Z eus o f / / .  1, 530:32 It 'shakes
( k r a d a n e i ) w ithout toil, all things by the will of its mind' (n o u s , 
frr. 25, 26).
In short, a true conceptualisation of god m ust represent divine 
pow er as the to tality  o f all conditions, and absolute rationalty . 
Only then can God be said to m otivate w ith mind all things 
w ithout toil. For fatigue im plies subjection to condition. As a 
suprem e cause that entails all conditions, God is absolute self- 
fulfilm ent, and cannot, for this reason, itse lf be said to change or 
m o v e ,33 since change and m ovem ent are conditional activities: 
there must be a place to m ove to, a tim e to change in, an end to 
change for, etc. This is im possible, fo r Xenophanes. For God 
"coheres with", or "penetrates" all things (sunphue tois pas i , A35)
- ju s t as a cause coheres w ith that which is caused. It is the 
pow er that m ust of necessity  ex ist id en tica lly  in all things 
(. . .homoios huparchein ananke pasi  to kratein.  A31), and visible 
in all aspects of things (kai pas i  tois morios aisthiZtikon =A32). 
Yet, although conscious and alive - living in the quite motionless 
life o f eternity instead of the agitated life of immortality - it does 
not breathe (me mentoi anapnein  =A1).
W e have noted that since Thales, the causality  of the divine 
a r c h e  has been specified in terms o f m otion. Anaximander and
32 cf., Aeschylus, Supp.,  96-103.
33 Cf. Epicharmus, B l. 'In Homer, the god’s quickness of movement is 
construed as a veritable token o f divine power', Jaeger (1947). See II. II, 
17, 786; xxiv, 340ff. Ody.,  1 ,96ff.
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Anaxim enes have intimated that the m otion o f divine causality is
ra tio n a l. X enophanes carries th is to  a h igher lev e l of
sophistication , by further specifying that G od's m otion is the
im m ovable motion of thinking, i.e., m ovem ent by the will of the
mind. This, with some qualification, is also the famous conclusion
in A ristotle 's theology of M e ta  xii. Xenophanes would seem to
have reasoned to the conclusion that only by postu la ting  an
em bodied mind as the fundamental causal pow er could we hope
to have a sufficient explanation of the structure and m eaning of
the cosmos as we find it.
In conceiving God as pure causality and a principle, Xenophanes
carries the idea of god to a conceptual point where he suggests,
negatively , that motion or rest, lim ited and unlim ited, and all
physical processes are inapplicable to the nature of G od.34 But
although god’s sublimity and perfection have been shown to entail
all conditions - eternal existence, se lf-iden tity , and universal
consciousness - God also has a body. Xenophanes has already
proclaim ed that God has a body and mind, only a body and mind
in no way resembling mortals. Sphericality of bodily form is also,
fo r X enophanes, entailed  by God's sub lim ity , perfection  and 
35abso lu teness. Hence:
34 A32, A35. Simplicius in Phy. 22, 22ff. = A31. MXG  977bl8 = A28. Jaeger 
(1947), relying on Aristotle's statement that Xenophanes had no idea of 
the distinction between Parmenides' log ica l and therefore finite  
conception o f the One or of Melissus' material, and hence infinity 
conception of the One, but looked at the whole heaven and declared that 
the one is God, dismisses M XG  as inauthentic, at least, with respect to the 
Xenophanic part, which he finds inconsistent with Aristotle's report. I 
am not convinced by Jaeger's argument. Certainly Aristotle's statement is 
different from that which appears in the M X G ; but I do not see with 
Jaeger that they are inconsistent.
3 ^  The sphericality of God's body is not at all impossible. KRS dismiss it as 
beyond the fragments, although it is well attested in the doxography;
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...looking at the whole heaven ( ton ho lon  o u ra n on ), he (sc. 
X enophanes) says that The One is G od;36 ...The p rincip le  ( t e n  
a r c  h e n )  is one (mi a n )  or the whole of ex istence (to on kai 
p a n ).37
KRS w rite that "heaven" here cannot m ean A risto te lian  first 
heaven. They continue; T h is clearly im plies that God is identical 
w ith the w orld , which is w hat T heophrastus seem s to have 
assum ed’ (i.e. according to Simplicius, P h y ., 22, 26, which is taken 
from  Theophrastus). 'But', they add, 'A ris to tle  m ust be wrong 
here: how could God be m otionless if  it is identical with a world 
which is itse lf im plied to m ove?' A p lausib le  answ er to this 
paradox of "unmoved mover" is that the w orld as a whole cannot 
be said to m ove or change. M oreover, G od, conceived as a 
principle of motion cannot itself be in m obility, possibly becoming 
- in the process - other than it must be. This does not prevent it
from being that by which things in the cosm os m ove. KRS are
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism 1, 224; A35; Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, Simplicius in Phy. ,  22, 22; A31; Hippolytus. Ref.  1,14; A33. 
The difficulty o f its acceptability stems from the fragment on the 
dimensions o f the earth: ’The upper end o f the earth is seen at our feet 
contacting the air. But the lower end arrives at the infinite' (gates men 
tode peras  and para possin horatai  eer i  p ro sp la zo n , to kato, d' es
apeiron hikneitai,  Fr. 28, Achill., Isagoge 4, p34). Cf. Empedocles fr.39; 
Aristotle's de Caelo, 294a21; A47. First of all, in Xenophanes "a p e i r o s " is 
associated with "to me on", and it reads like "empty nothingness".
Secondly, "h i k n e i t a i " invites a sense o f termination or destination. 
Finally "tode peras ario" p ara lle ls  "to kato de"  So that if  we read the 
former as "the upper end", it seems natural to read the latter as "the lower 
end". We then have a finite earth whose upper limit intersects the air 
while its lower limit comes to the infinite nothingness which borders it. 
The upper limit o f the air, ether, is in turn bordered by the infinite 
nothingness. The structure of the world can then be spherical.
36 Aristotle, Meta. ,986B21.
37 Simplicius in Phy. ,  22, 26.
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righ t, how ever, in suggesting that, ’It is probable that although 
X e n o p h an e s’ god is not a direct  d e v e lo p m e n t from  the 
cosm ological trad ition , yet it is to som e ex ten t based on the
M ilesian idea of a divine substance which, in the case of Thales 
and Anaxim enes, was regarded as somehow perm eating objects in 
the w orld and giving them life  and m ovem ent' (p. 172). My
em phasis. The indirection is sim ply that Xenophanes does not 
expound a cosm ogony. His God is a principle and a cause but not 
an originating pow er. But as in preceding thought, so here too; 
d iv ine  pow er is em bodied pow er. C onsequen tly , insofar as 
X enophanes did not represent divine pow er in any kind of body, 
to holon", "to p a n ", "to hen” must mean "the cosmos". The scope 
of divine power, then, is the world, its body is the physical stuff of 
the w orld. As in A naxim ander, so in X enophanes, this is 
constitu ted  by the elem ents - fire, air, w ater and earth, from 
w hich all th ings, organic and inorganic, including the celestial 
spheres and the m eteorological system are constitu ted .3 8
Such is X enophanes’ God - a truly universal God available to all 
m ankind rather than to individual races. N or is it limited to an
anim al race. To do this he had to abstract the basic idea of god as
a p rincip le  or pure causality .39 This G od Xenophanes exhorts
38 See Simplicius, in Phy., 189,1; fr.30; S Genav. in Iliadem xxl,196; Ps- 
Plutarch, S t r o m . 4 (DK21 A32); Aetius II, 20, 3). And Xenophanes, like 
Anaximander, also believes in a sort o f cycle o f change among the 
elemental forces, and their consequent effect upon all generable things: 
'...All mankind is destroyed whenever the earth is carried down into the 
sea and becomes mud; then there is another beginning of coming to be, 
and this foundation happens for all the worlds (k o s m o i )'. Hippolytus, 
R e f . ,  1,14,5. KRS interestingly suggest (op .cit.178) that " K o s m o i "  
probably means "world-arrangements"
3 9 That Xenophanes' apprehension o f god is by a combination o f  
empiricism and logical intuition is, hopefully, clear. In an elegy, he
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men to 'praise in hymns with pious myths and pure words', and to 
pray to (B l).
6 H e rac litu s
H eraclitus (c.540-480B.C .), the greatest Ionian  sage according to 
the estim ation of some scholars, is said to have flourished at the 
end of the sixth century. He is believed to have w ritten a book 
which began:
And of this eternal lo g o s  (tou de logou toud' eontos aei)4Q men 
prove to be uncom prehending both before they have heard it 
and once they have heard it. For, although, everything comes 
about as a result of this l o g o s , they are like inexperienced men 
when they experience both the words and the deeds of the sort 
w hich I recount by dividing each thing in accordance to its 
nature  (p h u s i s ) and saying how it is; but other m en do not 
notice  what they do when they are aw ake, ju s t as they are 
oblivious of things when they are asleep (fr .l) .
praises the cultivation of the intellect, 'sophieT  as compared to the 
brawn  (B2, 11-22). And he believes in the progressive character of 
knowledge: ’Not from the outset, indeed, has all been shown by the gods to 
the mortals. Yet as time goes on they find, when searching, the better' 
(Fr. 18, Stobaeus, Eel.  1.8, 2, Florilegium 29, 41). We can only, as we 
accumulate experience, come to know better but not the final truth about 
the gods and everything else. But certainly no amount o f empirical 
exp erien ce could lead X enophanes to th is h igh ly  rational 
conceptualisation of god. Therefore the reading o f Xenophanes as an 
empiricist must be qualified. We do not know about what Xenophanes said 
at B35 'Let these things be opined as resembling the truth’, but he seems 
to have distinguished between "truth" or "reality" and "opinion" or 
"belief". At B36 the incomplete fragment reads, 'All appearances which 
exist for mortals to look at...' It is possible that B36 is a discourse about 
contingent things which, for Xenophanes, may be the changing and 
hence unknowable as opposed to the self-abidingness o f their essential 
nature which he would call God.
4 0  Reading a e i  with t o u d ' e o n t o s  which relates to logou , rather than 
with the following azune to i
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L o g o s , from the verb " lege in"  - "to speak", ordinarily  means 
"w ord", and has cognate m eanings such as "speech", "account", 
"doctrine", "theory". W hen we listen to som eone we ordinarily 
lis ten  not to him  as a person but to his words or speech. 
H eraclitus could not be unaware of this. If, therefore, he is 
em phatically  biding us not to listen to him  but to the l o g o s , he 
im plies that he is a medium for the words or speech or, better 
still, for the doctrine or theory which he is about to expouse. In 
other words, the eternal logos  is not H eraclitus' subjective spurt, 
but a symbol for an abiding, objective truth or reference. Indeed, 
in Heraclitus, the double meaning of words is a lapidiary policy of 
w riting, and we will find a one-sense in terpretation of l o g o s  as 
"account" i.e., "verbal account" inadequate to the comprehension of 
h is ph ilo sophy .41 We shall see that when he promises to mark 
out the nature of each thing by the l o g o s  which is common to 
everything (fr.114), he means to define universally , and also to 
identify  by that definition, the objective p h u s i s  o f phenom ena. 
For the l o g o s  is common to everything in the concrete sense 
defined  by the logos. It is true that in fr.108, l o g o s  is just 
"doctrine", "discourse" or "speech": 'none of all those whose 
doctrines ( l o g o u s ) I have heard of comes as far as to recognise 
that the  W ise { s o p h o n )  is separated from  everything’. But the 
phrase "eis ton auton logon" of fr. 31, can hardly mean "into the 
same account" ("speech", or "doctrine"). There, it means "order", 
"proportion", "ratio", or "measure" - and in a concrete sense. And
41 Contra Barnes (1982, p 59). Those sceptical about the metaphysical 
realist meaning c f  lo g o s  must be embarrassed by fragment 52 where 
Time or Eternity is personified. Cf. Sextus Empiricus A d v  e r s u s  
Mathematicos , x, 216.
55
the concrete em bodim ent of m easure, e tc ., is identified  with a 
cosm ic ever-liv ing Fire. T herefore, I shall follow  tradition  in 
d istinguish ing  two senses of l o g o s : (i) the ordinary m eaning of 
l o g o s  - speech, account, discourse, or doctrine, etc., and, (ii), a 
techn ica l m eaning of l o g o s , w ith a capita l "L", which means 
’’R eason", "M easure", "Proportion", "Ratio" or - w hat is more 
accurate in context - "Rational M easure".
One fruitful way of approaching Heraclitus is to identify what he 
saw his predecessors as failing in, and felt called upon to fulfil or 
correct. It appears that, like his predecessors, but much more 
e laborately  and vociferously, he saw him self as a "crusader" of 
some truth whose articulation will guide the putting of things in a 
system atic  perspective . F irst, re lig ion , the cen tral feature of
trad itio n a l or m y tho log ica l ex p lan a tio n s and  p rac tices  m ust 
undergo a "liturgic" cleansing;
They purify by staining them selves with other blood, as if  one
were to step into mud in order to wash o ff mud. But a man
would be thought mad if any of his fellow  men should perceive 
him acting thus. M oreover, they talk to these statues as if  one 
w ere to hold conversation w ith houses, in ignorance of the 
nature of both gods and heroes (fr.5). They pray to statues of
the gods that do not hear them as if  they heard, and do not give
ju st as they cannot ask (fr.128). If  they are gods, why do you
lam ent them? If you lam ent them  you m ust no longer regard
them  as gods (fr. 127). N ight ram blers, m agicians, Bacchants, 
M eanads, M ystics; the r ite s  accep ted  by m ankind  in the
m ysteries are unholy perform ance (fr.14).
'They do not know what gods and heroes [really]  are’. They are 
certainly not the anthropom orphic gods o f Hom er and Hesiod, and 
if  no t, the w hole w orshipful approach to the gods m ust be
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radically revised at the altar of reason. But nor is it true, as some 
ph ilosophers th ink , that this un iverse, as an orderly  system  
( k o s m o s ) was o r ig in a te d  by some god (fr. 30). God, in the true 
sense, is the eternal expression and em bodim ent of the orderly 
and systematic changes so characteristic of phenomena:
God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety 
and hunger - [(all this together]) - is the God; he undergoes 
alteration in the way that fire, when it is m ingled with perfumes, 
is called after the scent of each perfume (fr.67).
Yet, although this should mean that the physical universe is the 
em bodim ent of god, Heraclitus sym bolises or rather identifies the 
primary embodiment of god with ever-living Fire:
This o rder (k o s m o s ) - the same of all - did none of the gods 
nor men make, but it always was, and is, and shall be an Ever- 
liv in g  F ire  (p y r  a e i z o o n ) in c a n d e s c in g  in m ea su re s  
( h a p t o m e n o n  m e t r a )  and e x tin g u ish in g  in m easu res  
( a p o s b e n n y m e n o n  m e t r a , fr.30). All things are an equal 
exchange (a n ta m o ib e )  for fire and fire for all things as gold for 
goods and goods for gold (fr.90). Fire’s turnings; first sea, and of 
sea one ha l f  is earth, the ha l f  p rester (lightning or fire)...earth  
is liquified as sea and is measured  ( m e t r e i t a i ) so as to fo rm  
the same measure (eis to auton logon) fr.31).
The word translated "order” is elliptical and ambiguous. It may 
mean (1) world-order, (2) the socio-political order or (3) order at 
all levels of existence including (1) and (2). Since, Heraclitus has 
prom ised to mark out the nature of each thing by the L o g o s , 
there is reason to think that (3) is intended here, and is favoured 
by the phrase, "the same of all". "Gods" here must mean gods as 
popularly  conceived  and/or god as o rig ina to r o f cosm os, if 
Heraclitus' own belief in God is to make sense. No god originated
57
th is eternal w orld-order, nor did any Lycurgus invent the socio­
political order, which is a microcosm of the eternal, orderly world. 
B ut why p y r l  That Greek w ord transla tes "fire". Possibly, 
H eraclitus saw in fire a paradigm atic instance of his cosmic thesis 
- the Law of self-preserving m easure in constant change. Given 
that he makes extensive use of fire in num erous other cosmic and 
p sy ch ic  fragm en ts , it is m ore p ro b lab le  th a t, w hatever its 
sym bolic value, he does not exclude a literal meaning of it. On the 
other hand, it is arguable that p y r  did not always mean fire. It is 
arguably not as fire that Philolaus used it. N or does p y r  mean 
fire  fo r A naxagoras, as A risto tle stated when he observed that 
A naxagoras em ploys p y r  in the sense of ether - the finest and 
rem otest layers of air (de Caelo  302b4). Hence it is not at all 
c lear that p y r  should equal ’’f ire ” in H erac litu s.42 In the 6th 
century, A.D, e.g., an author could qualify  the p y r  of Heraclitus 
(and H ippasus) by saying that 'By p y r , how ever, they do not 
m ean the flam e ( p h l o g a ) ' ,43  O thers suggest som ething like 
" a i r " ,44 and still others understand p y r  as "ether-like body" ( to  
a i th e r io n  s ’o m a )4 5 . M ore im portantly , it is ju st not p y r  but 
e v e r  - l i v in g  p y r .  The biological conception o f the cosmos as a 
living entity  is the com m onest them e in Presocratic thought. So 
"ever-living" is here a real qualification, and corresponds to "ever- 
being" ( L o g o s )  of fragm ent 1. The decisive significance of the 
"ever-liv ing" q u a lifica tio n  com es up w hen we find that the
4 2 The literal taking o f p y r  as fire in Greek philosophical discourse is 
probably later than Heraclitus - perhaps a stoic interpretation of him, 
from which is derived the doctrine of ekpyrosis  (w orld -con flagration ).
4 3 Joannes Philoponus ad Arist. de Anima I. 2, p. 83, 18.
44 Sextus Empiricus adv. Math, x, 233; Cf. also ix, 360.
4  ^ Stobaeus, Eel. phy. I, 5, p.l78.a.o.). See KRS p.188-189.
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H eraclitean P y r  exhibits the closest affinity to life46 and thought 
(cf. fr. 118); and etherial fire is in Greek tradition both divine and 
the p lace for souls.47 T herefore , I w ill m ain ta in  the lite ra l 
translation "fire”, while urging that "pyr"  be understood as a sort 
o f life-warm etherial stuff.
N ow , w hereas f r .l  talks about ever-being  L o g o s  as that by 
which each thing will be defined and/or identified as to its nature, 
fr.30  talks about ever-living Fire as the m aterial basis of this 
world-order. Accordingly, some link between "ever-being L o g o s ” 
and "ever-living F ire” is implied. H eraclitus intim ates that the 
cosm ic processes and changes (sym bolised) in the perpetual 
extinguishings and incandescing of Fire, are a cyclical life of death, 
birth, and rebirth. The eternity of cosmic life expressed in "ever- 
being" or "ever-living" means that by "extinguishing" Heraclitus 
m eans not "dissolution" or "extinction", but "renewal", or "self- 
renewal." Hence, "extinguishing" and "incandescing" constitute an 
"exchange" (fr.90), or "turnings", i.e., "transform ations" (fr.31). 
The fragment, 'all that we see when awake is dead' (fr. 21), would 
probably mean that things around us are "renew ing them selves" 
all the time. This self-renewal is said to be in measures  (fr.31).
Thus in saying that 'all things are an exchange for fire and fire for
all things, ju st as gold for goods and goods for gold' (fr.90),
Heraclitus is, again, conveying the idea that a certain m easure or 
value rem ains constant though the form  assum ed is different. 
There is, in other words, an eternal identity  in the constant 
change. Cosmic life, in its ever-flowing but regular mutations, is
4  ^ Partly as to its self-mobility; self-mobility is, generally in Greek
thought, associated with life.
47 Again, KRS p.188-189.
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constitu ted by the same m easure or value o f in tellig ible structure 
and underly ing  stuff. And F ire ’s tu rn ings (fr. 31), show a 
m easurable ratio of elem ental balance in the physical constitution 
of the universe: F i r e - x - W a t e r - x - E a r t h - x - F i r e  (Prester).
The arrows are changing and m easured t e n d e n c i e s : Fire is half 
incandescing, half precipitating (extinguishing) as rain (and/or air) 
into water; one half of water is evaporating back to nourish Fire; 
the other half is solidifying as earth; earth is half liquefying, and 
h a lf burning fire. M easure goes for m easure. The cycle is 
com plete; 'the Way Up and the W ay D ow n are the sam e', i.e., 
c ircu la r and continuous: 'Com m on [i.e. F ire  or L o g o s ] is the 
beginning and the end of the circum ference of the circle’ (fr.103). 
The e lem en ts are jo in ed  up in an o rd ered  ba lance , each 
instantiating contrary tendencies to change.
This in ternal contrariety inherent in F ire , and therefore in all 
th in g s ,48 does not merely keep the cosm ic elem ents in balance; it 
is, as I understand it, the principal idea in H eraclitus’ philosophy,
48 This is only a t e n d e n c y  to change contrariwise, not a coinstantiation 
of contrary phenomena. There is only one thing, Ever-living Fire, which 
is at once tending to die into water and to remain fire. Fire is not at once 
also water. When, therefore. Heraclitus says ’Hesiod is the teacher of very 
many, he did not understand day and night; for they are one’ (fr.57), the 
father of philosophy of change is not asserting that when it is day it is 
also night. Rather that day and night are constituted by the same "stuff' 
and principle which carries the orderly but contrary tendencies to
change, now into day, now into night. What is day if  not night in the 
process o f passing away, and night if  not day passing away? What is
hunger except satiety in the process o f passing away, satiety but hunger 
disappearing? The waxing o f summer is measured by the waning of 
winter and vice versa. Although he was expousing the L o g o s , Heraclitus 
was not talking about nouns and predicates, and how they are 
coinstantiated, buL about how phenomena, which incidentally happen to
succeed, or to be continuous with, each other in contrary forms, are
constituted by a certain principle o f measure and stuff.
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and the very principle of all changes, the L o g o s .  Ordinarily we 
cannot apprehend one form of the contrariety w ithout the other;
t
'they would not know the name of justice ' (right) if the opposite 
did not exist (fr.23). We can be sure, then, that by the L o g o s  we 
can apprehend the essential unity of all things. It is this principal 
idea for which he sought numerous exam ples to dem onstrate that 
contraries are in essential unity - which does not mean that they 
are identical. This idea of essential unity in difference is called 
'th e  inv is ib le  harm ony which is superior to the v isib le’ (fr.54), 
't h e  nature  tha t loves to h ide’; (fr.123) "the back-stretched  
connex ion" (pa l in tropos  h a rm o n ie ), as in the bow and the lyre 
(fr.51). H eraclitus, I believe, is trying to explain the apparent 
perpetu ity  of phenomenal flux by the idea of internal contrariety 
as common to all things. Thus he calls this dynamic formula the 
Common, but also Justice (dike)  as well as Strife:
One ought to understand that The Common (ho zenos) is War 
(p o le m o n  eonta)  and Justice (id i k e n )49 and Strife (e r i n ) and 
tha t all th ings come about by way of strife  and necessity  
( c h r e o m e n a ). W ar is both king and father of all...(fr. 80 )
C h r e o m e n a  - the "necessity" o f m easured change, is further 
brought out in the following fragments:
the sun will not transgress its m easures ( m e t r a )  or else the 
Furies, the helpers of Justice (d ike )50 will bring it back (lit. will 
find it out, fr.94) It is utterly decreed by Fate (Fr.137). Every 
creature is driven to pasture with a blow (F r .l l) .
49 Sec Craty.  412c for an exercise in the etymology of Dik'e
5 0 In Anaximander, Dik'e implies a balance o f the cosmic elements. 
Injustice refers to disequilibrium of the elemental stock arising from 
their periodic generative encroachment upon one another, and that is an 
injustice to be redressed in the course o f time.
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Its  "m easures" suggests the sun 's  m easu re  o f ve loc ity , its 
prescribed  orbit and the prescribed  d irec tion  in it. D i k e , the 
Greek word for the goddess of Justice, has here a double meaning. 
O n the one hand it m eans the con trast to the crim e to be 
prosecuted by the Furies. On the other hand it means also Fate, 
and so the "law" of motion defined by the L o g o s .  Those "natural 
law s" will compel the sun to return to its orbit and velocity if a 
change of its measures were possible at all. So the L o g o s  carries 
with it the notion of Justice and Right. "Necessity" epitom ises a 
fu sio n  o f physica l and  m oral p ro p rie ty , o f d escrip tion  and 
p re s c r ip t io n :51 if  the "law of m easure for m easure" is to hold, any 
deviation from it would not be m erely puzzling to the intellect but 
also shocking to the m oral sense. A stronom ical conditions and 
eth ical considerations are not yet d istinguished . The L o g o s  of 
com pensating m easure w ill hold all things to their places and 
natu ra l courses.
H eraclitus surely thought that there is order in the universe and 
m ost probably  saw this cosm ic order as an endless p ro c e s s , 
indeed , as a fun d am en ta lly  necessa ry  and  im m u tab le ,52 but 
r a t i o n a l  process. Hence, the e tern ity  of the L o g o s  and its 
identification with W isdom:
51 The same fusion is to be found in Anaximander, and possibly in the 
Pythagorean idea that life is continuous with the universe. It is, of 
course, implicit in all the Presorcatic systems.
52 The philosopher o f Becoming is as much a philosopher o f Being. Plato's 
representation of Heraclitus' thesis in the T h e a e t e t u s  as leading to 
sensationalism is either an exaggeration or a caricature. Possibly he took 
Cratylus seriously as a geniune exponent o f Heraclitus' thesis o f change. 
Change is fundamental to Heraclitus, but change is arrested in Rational 
Measure, i.e., in the calculable Logos .
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for the wise being that is One knows the plan according to which 
every th ing  is directed through every th ing  (einai gar hen to 
sophon epistatkai gnomen , hoke kubernatai  panta  dia panton  - 
f r . 4 1 ) .53 That which alone is wise is one; it is w illing and 
unw illing to be called Zeus (hen to sophon mounon legesthai 
Z e n o s , fr.32). Thunderbolt steers the world (fr.64).
In a direct continuation of fr.64, Hippolytus comments as follows:
H eraclitus calls the eternal fire "thunderbolt", but calls this fire 
also capable of reason and the cause o f the arrangm ent of the 
universe {Ref.  ix. 10, 6).
"Thunderbolt" is here the allegorical name for the ever-living Fire, 
or the L o g o s .  Strictly, it is not the thunderbolt that steers the 
w orld  but the god which bolts it. A nd thunderbo lt is the 
traditional weapon of Zeus. Note the pun of "zenos"  on "z e n " - 
Zeus on life. The passage may be interpreted in various ways. 
But this is also plausible: The life of the traditional godhead of 
Greek religion, Zeus, is immortal. He is also far-seeing, and wields 
a thunderbolt, often arbitrarily. Cosmic Fire too is ever-living and 
rational, and to that extent wills to be called Zeus. It is unwilling 
to be called Zeus because its life is unborn, eternal, its rationality 
is com plete; it imparts its power in the cosm os, i.e., "wields a 
thunderbolt", but in a completely rational way. The connection of 
The W ise One with Zeus is clear evidence that Heraclitus has in 
m ind divine Reason, and Fire is his a r c  h e  because it shows 
p ictu resquely  the m easured ra tionality  and constan t, generative 
diffferentiation of the divine.
The system atic, intelligible but vital structure o f the universe is, 
as it were, the external and objective counterpart of human life.
53 That reading oi fr. 41 both resolves the "infintive + accusative" syntax, 
and fits, at least, part of the meaning of ffr. 32, 64, 114.
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The activ ity  of cosm ic life can be form ulated  as objectively  
assessible laws. These laws are as descriptive as norm ative, and 
constitu te  the standard of human life, and the law s in human 
society:
For those who speak with mind (zun noi) cannot but strengthen 
them selves with that which is common to all ( z u n o i ), just as a 
c ity  m akes itse lf strong w ith its laws ( n o m o i ), and much 
strongly than this. For all human laws are nourished by the one 
divine law (hupo enos tou theiou)\ for this rules (k r a t e i ) as far 
as it will, and suffices for all, and prevails in everything (B114). 
Therefore one must follow that which is common to all. But 
although the law is universal, the m ajority live as if they had 
understanding peculiar to themselves (fr.2). The people should 
fight for the law (n o m o s ) as if for their city-w all (fr.44). To 
obey the will of the one is also law (fr.33).
A gain , notice the pun of zun hoi  (w ith reason) on z u n o ’i 
( c o m m o n ) ,  and the suggestion that speaking w ith reason  or 
in te lligence is strengthening oneself on that which is comm on, 
nam ely , the  in te llig ib le  s tru c tu re  u n d e rly in g  the cosm os. 
Heraclitus, like Xenophanes, is only partly  an em piricist. He has 
confidence in the senses, as providing us with the raw data of 
experience. But he has no distrust o f reason either. For him
reason is not a mere continuation of the process of sensation; it 
discovers more in reality than the senses can reveal. Nor is the 
L o g o s  a m ere abstraction; it is the vital law of controlled change. 
Law , O rder and Justice, are given a m etaphysical d ignity  and
basis; they are not arbitrary superficiality, but sink deep into the 
fiery  essence of things such as the unaided eye, the barbaric
p s u c h 'e , cannot fathom: ('the eyes and ears are bad witnesses for 
men if they have barbaric  p s u c h e \  fr.107). The sanction and
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valid ity  of comm unity law and organisation are to be located not
in  the fin ite  w isdom  or the arb itrary  fiat o f a Lycurgus, but
accord ing  to conform ity to the fundam ental law s governing the 
cosm os, laws which are discernible by reason. This cosmic basis of
law  is foreshadow ed in fr. 1 which calls the universe a kosmos -
an orderly  system .
H eraclitus was not only interested in the question of communal
1
duty, and socio-political conditions of life. Personal life directed 
from  the know ledge and control of the all-im portant p  s u e  he ,  is 
cen tra l to his in terest for two m ain reasons: (i) it carries an 
in terpretation  o f the phenom ena of the outer world into the inner 
states and experiences of consciousness so far as to say that "life" 
or "death", "wake" or "sleep" correspond to fire or water, (or 
earth); and the latter can be understood from  the former; (ii) it 
enab les the indiv idual not only to understand  and accept the 
term s and conditions of life, but also w ilfully to attune oneself to 
the universal order of which one's life is a microcosm, and this - 
fo r a virtuous and happy life. M ost o f the p s u c h T  fragm ents 
express a physiology of states of p s u c h T  which can be understood 
only as subtle versions of the physiology of the ever-living Fire, 
w hich is also a rational agent. P s u c h T  is in term ediate between 
fire  and w ater. Thus, it can either aspire to the dryness  o f 
in te llectual and m oral virtue, or sink below  into the wetness  of 
bodily  p leasure:
From  the L o g o s  with which they are m ost intim ately connected 
all the tim e, they are s e p a r a t e d , and those things which they 
encoun ter daily  seem s to them strange; im m ortals are m ortal 
and m ortals are im m ortals. A dry soul  is wisest and the best 
(fr.118). A man, when he gets drunk, is led stumbling along by 
an im m ature child, not knowing where he is going, having his
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p  s u e  he* wet  (fr. 117). M oderation is the g rea test v irtue, and 
w isdom  is to speak the truth and to act in accordance with 
nature (fr. 112). If happiness lay in bodily  pleasures, we would 
call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat. It is delight or 
death for psucKe  to become wet (fr.77).
These fragm ents leave no doubt that the p s u c K e  is an agent of 
intelligence or wisdom and m orality. A dry soul is not only the 
wisest, it is also the best .  "Best" is am biguously either aesthetic, 
moral or both. The language of dry and w et soul only shows the 
chem ical affin ity  betw een p s u c K e  and the fiery  essence of all 
things. It is not clear what m oderation m eans. It may involve a 
certain balance between fire and m oisture, or at least, keeping the 
p s u c h T  from being wet, since a dry soul is the wisest. And if  a 
man feels some pleasure by drinking, at the sam e tim e he loses 
streng th  and knowledge and gets closer to death. On the other 
hand, 'those who speak with in sigh t/w isdom  (no'i) cannot but 
strengthen them selves with that which is com m on’. H eraclitus 
distinguishes wisdom from knowledge in such a way as to suggest 
tha t w isdom  is operative knowledge  based on the grasp of the 
fundam ental m eaning of things. Its p roduct is virtuous a c t io n ,  
noble speech or thought. Com plete w isdom  is, perhaps, to be 
identifed  w ith God and God only, w hile to becom e a god is 
presum ably to be re-absorbed into the L o g o s  of the ever-living 
F i r e .54 In general, it will be a reasonable inference to conclude 
that for H eraclitus, a dry soul is a necessary  and su fficien t 
condition for virtue, and m oderation m ight be a degree of psychic
54 And some fragments express pessimism as far as the possibility of 
grasping the L o g o s  is concerned; frr.18, 22, 86. Ultimately, the wisest 
man will appear aj ape in relation to God (fr. 83). The way o f man has no 
wisdom, but the way of God has (fr.78).
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d ry n e s s .  The drier and closer our p s u c h e  is to the fiery essence 
of all things, the more morally and intellectually  virtuous we are.
H e rac litu s  p robab ly  be lieves th a t p s u c h ' e  is an im m ortal 
principle of life, if  he believes that we live a perpetually renewed 
life phased out in perpetual alternation o f form s of life in direct 
correspondence to the cosmic ever-living Fire: 'it (sc. the psucK e)  
is the same thing in us w hich is liv ing  and dead, awake and 
sleeping, young and old; for the latter having changed become the 
form er, and these again having changed, becom e the latter' (fr.88). 
'P su c h a i  smell of Hades' (fr.98) because, again, life (psucKe)  and 
death ( H a d e s )  are d ifferent form s (or nam es) of one and the 
same principle of life (cf. frr. 15,26,48,76). These fragments tell no 
story of personal survival after death. B ut som e eschatological 
moral is involved in keeping a dry soul and becom ing wise. It 
seems to be our moral duty in life to m ake efforts to engage in 
fiery activity. For instance, one can aim at a virtuous end of life - 
as by fighting for your nation; 'fo r gods and men honour those 
slain in battle' (fr.24). 'Souls slain in w ar are purer than those 
[that perish] in diseases' (fr.136). 'The better the death, the better
the rew ards' (fr.25). Such souls can be said 'to  rise and become 
watchful guardians of life and death ' (fr.63). Perhaps this means 
that such souls will be one w ith the ever-incandescing  part of 
cosmic Fire.
But the prospect of inuring oneself to the com m on W i s d o m 55 of
55 '...yet the many live as if  they had a wisdom o f their own. They are 
enstranged (lit. differentiated) from that with which they have most 
constant intercourse' (fr. 72). 'As a result they follow the poets and take 
the crowd as their teacher, not knowing that the majority are bad and the 
good are few' (fr. 104), and even 'the best o f them chose one thing above 
all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most o f  them are glutted 
like beasts' (fr. 29). 'One should quench wantomness more than
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which he is a part, involves other noble activities beyond active 
m artial prowess and keeping physically healthy. True happiness 
does not lie in bodily pleasures (fr.4), or fitness, but in wisdom. 
People m ust follow in the steps o f H eraclitus by searching out 
them selves (fr. 101); by "purging" them selves o f conceit (fr.46) 
and by yearning for the "sun of education", since it is given to all 
men to k n o w  themselves and to have w isdom  (fr.116). Thus for 
H eraclitus, it takes more than the orgiastic ecstacy of a Corybant, 
B acchant or Maenad, to be happy and to be spiritually  saved. 
Self-know ledge is self-fulfilling ra tionality  am ounting to insight 
into the L o g o s  and the realisation that the fundam ental nature of 
all life  is a perm anent unity of eternal in ter-transform ation  of 
tem poral contrarie ties, such that need and sa tie ty  invariab ly  
alternate (fr.65), and that it is no good for men to get all they wish 
(fr.110); for it is sickness that makes health pleasant, evil good, 
hunger plenty, weariness rest (fr. I l l ) ,  war peace How could one 
know justice if there were no injustice? (fr.23). So that where the 
com m on herd com plain, the w ise m an w ill cheerfu lly  accept; 
where they seek to avoid hardship, he will bear it; where they 
flinch at pain he will welcome it. He will also understand that that 
which d iffers from itself is in agreem ent; harm ony consists in 
opposing tension, like that of a bow and a lyre (fr.51); that at any 
rate  w ar is the king and father o f all th ings, and that it has 
revealed some as gods, others as men, some it has made slaves, 
others free. That is to say, without war, not only will peace elude 
us, but also  everything else; our very  ex is tence , w ould be 
impossible. A wise slave will acquiesce in his status, knowing that
conflagration1 (fr. 43) Cf. fr. 131). 'One man to me is worth ten thousand
if he is the best1 (fr. 49).
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the inevitab ility  of change (of status) has been prescribed by the 
d iv ine  law  of the L o g o s .  The w ise w ill accept his human
condition , nam ely, his m ortality as a necessary  contrapositive in 
the fundam ental laws expressed in the cosm ic L o g o s .  For mortals 
too w ill becom e gods; 'im m ortals are m orta ls, and m ortals are 
im m ortal; each living the death of the other, and dying their life 
(fr. 118).
Thus the whole problem  of evil is dissolved, for Heraclitus, in the 
all-encom passing  cosm ic Justice, which is identifiab le  with God. 
For God is above good and bad: to God all things are beautiful, 
good and just; but men have assum ed som e things to be unjust 
and others ju s t (fr.102). All seeming evils and im perfections of 
ex istence contribute to the hidden attunem ent, and com pleteness 
of reality. In the end, it is hard to fight with one's heart’s desire 
(fr.85); for the conflict between desire and reason is part of the 
cosm ic struggle of opposites. But it appears that our whole effort 
at becom ing happy, i.e., by keeping a dry p s u c h e  may, at some 
tim e, be overtaken by the W ay Down. W e will then become a 
(toy) game in the hands of child-Time ( a w n ) ,  the kingship of Life 
(fr .5 2 ).56
To sum m arise. Our reconstruction of H eraclitus’ thought began 
with his critique of the traditional cerem onial representation and 
worship of gods and heroes. For him, the statuary representation
5 ^  Heraclitus, I believe, is far from saying that humam life is completely 
determined by the inexorable laws of the cosmos. For how could he urge 
us to educate towards apprehension of the Common in order that we might 
be truly happy? But he faces the problem which all face who try to 
deduce a moral injunction from a purely descriptive situation. Indeed, we 
are told that a man's character is his destiny (fr.119). But how much of 
this is determined by ourselves in the overwhelming cosmic process?
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of gods and heroes, ritual sacrifice and cathartic celebrations, etc., 
as means of happiness and spiritual salvation, constitu te a gross 
m isunderstanding of what god really is, and consequently, of what 
relig ion  m eans. This world is a cosm os, a dynam ic, orderly 
system, he seems to argue. And God simply is the eternal rational 
processes, the num erically m easurable, vital and invio lable laws 
constituting the perm anent, fundam ental structure of the cosm os. 
This intelligible but vital foundation of the cosm os is called the 
L o g o s , which H eraclitus' spoken or w ritten l o g o s  sym bolises. 
The physical expression of this L o g o s  is sym bolised not only by 
the constant but measured mutations of the fire we observe in our 
hearths, but is also lite ra lly  rep resen ted  by the constan t but 
measured m utations of the physical features of the cosm os which 
are actually features of a cosmic ever-living Fire. The L o g o s  is 
not an originating power. But it is a suprem ely wise agent (to  
s o p h o n )  who steers (k u b e r n e i , fr. 41) and rules (k r a t e i , fr. 114) 
everything, and is the veritable source of law, order, justice in the 
cosmos. In relation to the L o g o s  our spiritual nature (p su c h a i )  is 
both intim ately connected all the time and yet separated (fr. 118).
It is im plied that true relig ion, consists in com ing to know 
oneself and to be wise (fr. 116). This means that we must follow 
that which is common and universal ( (fr. 2), i.e., by inuring our 
p s u c K e  to the common or universal law s of the cosm ic L o g o s  
discernm ent o f which will guide action to true happiness and true 
spiritual happiness (frr. 2, 33, 112, 114).
As our subsequent accounts w ill show, H eraclitus, am ong the 
P resocratics, offers us not only the firs t but a lso  the m ost 
com prehensive philosophy of religion of which we have evidence, 
however fragmentary and gnomic. He is one more evidence to the
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conclusion  that the Presocratic system s are a series of rational
theologies; arguments to the existence of a divine principle, as that 
w hich is ultim ately presupposed in an explanation of the cosmos. 
H e too adds to the philosophical specification of divine causality in 
term s of motion. For Heraclitus' God is, above all, the principle of 
rational change  in the cosmos, which is its embodiment.
7 P y th a g o ra s  an d  som e P y th a g o re a n s5 7
D uring the last third of the 6th century and the follow ing 5th, 
Pythagoras and (some of his) follow ers represented a movem ent 
o f thought which combined attention to the nature of man with
M ilesian  cosm ological speculation. R elig ious concerns seem to 
have  p rim arily  insp ired  P y thagorean ism  as a m ovem ent of 
thought in the 6th century, the chief concern centring around the 
right way of life .58 This involves certain beliefs about the nature 
or m eaning of life and/or the universe. Like all religious orders, 
the Pythagoreans must have developed a com prehensive set of 
credal answers to questions about life and existence.59 The term
57 The following is a speculative reconstruction o f Pythagoreanism based 
on Philolaus and reports of Aristotle which I believe represents more 
than one version of Pythagorean philosophy. However, I shall assume 
some kind of unity based on certain thematic elements - such as a certain 
dualism, use of musical properties, and number. The qualification "some" 
is a contrast to "all", and is intended to allow for the possible genetic 
development of some Pythagorean ideas which do not directly concern 
religion; e.g., the pure mathematics of Achyetus and others. Whenever I 
say "Pythagoreans" I imply "some Pythagoreans".
5 8 Pythagoras is said to have founded a religious order modeled on the 
mystical-cult society to which admission was gained by initiation - that is, 
by purification followed by the revelation o f truth.
59 It is implied in the report of Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorae  82 (DK58c6), 
that the Pythagorean initiate was informed with a number of maxims
called acousm ata  (things heard) or sumbola  (p assw o rd s) w hich
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p h i l o s o p h i a  - lover of wisdom - is reported to have been first 
u sed  by P y th a g o ra s .60 It was perhaps in such way of life 
inspired by and devoted to philosophic w isdom  rather than m ere 
rituals of cerem onial abstinences and partic ipation  in  sacram ents 
which they regarded as religion pure and undefiled: m aking clean 
the heart within and preparing the spirit for a m ystical or rather 
intellectual salvation and re-union with the godhead. The ideal of 
the mystic is to lose his individuality by total assim ilation to god, 
and the stories about Pythagoras are about a m ystic. According to 
P o rp h y ry :6 1
W hat [Pythagoras] used to teach his associates no one can tell with 
certain ty : fo r they observed no ord inary  silence. His m ost, 
universally celebrated opinions, however, were that the p s u c h T  is 
immortal; then, that it migrates into other sorts of living creatures, 
and in addition, that everything which takes place at some tim e 
occurs again according to certain  cycles; that there is nothing 
absolutely  new ,62 and that all living things should be considered 
as belonging to the same family.
The idea of reincarnation was no novelty in the Greek world. But 
there are two legs to the Pythagorean doctrine of m etem pychosis: 
(1) transmigration as a process of expiating some original sin - a 
process which ends in the redeem ed pu rity  o f the p s u c h ' e .
constitute a catechism of doctrines to be committed to memory as practical 
guide or knowledge. Perhaps possession o f these ensured an initiate 
ready recognition both by fellow initiates and by the gods. ’All the so- 
called a c o u s m a ta  fall into 3 divisions: some of them signify what a thing 
is, some o f them what is the most such and such, some o f them what one 
must or must not do'.
60 See no. 40, chapter one.
61 Vita Pytha. 19 (= DK14A8a)
62 The doctrine of eternal recurrence is also ascribed to the Pythagoreans 
by Eudemus (see fr.88, Werhli = DK58 B34).
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Possib ly  this recurs, in accordance with the doctrine of Eternal 
R e c u r r e n c e ; 63 (2a) possibly the com bination of in itiation and 
asceticism  with (2b) the’oria  or intellectual contem plation of god 
as a means of purification. If (2b), of which the evidence is weak, 
is true, it is what is novel with Pythagoreanism .64 The view of
p s u c K e  in (1) does supply catechism s about human destiny and
also provides for a cult society practising m onkish asceticism .65 
B u t i f  (2b) w ere true, p u rifica tion  w ould  have taken an
in te llec tua l turn, consisting partly  in the observance of ascetic 
rules o f abstinence from certain kinds of food and dress, partly in 
the contem plation of the divine order of things. The orgy, ecstasy, 
and sacram ent of the Bacchic or Dionysiac forms of purification do 
not appear as features of Pythagorean purification rituals.
N ow  at lea s t three questions m ay be ra ised  here about 
Pythagorean m etem psychosis: (a) why do p s u c h a i  transm igrate? 
(b) why are p s u c h a i  immortal? (c) what is the constitutive nature 
of p s u c h ' e l  There is not enough evidence to answer these 
questions or to answer them adequately. For (a), we can only 
a ssu m e  the  c lo se  assoc ia tion  betw een  som e O rphic and
Pythagorean them es, and speculate that p s u c h a i  transm igrate in 
expiation of some primal sin, although the nature of the sin, and 
the circum stances under which it is com m itted are not clear. For 
(b) we m ay turn to Alcmaeon of Croton whose affiliation with 
Pythagoreanism  is disputed. He argues that p suc K e  is immortal, 
and hence sim ilar to the d iv ine on the grounds that it is
65 Cf. 5th century Orphic version of these ideas in the works of Pindar, 
Olym.  11 and frr.l i4,116, 127 - Bowra.
64 Controversy arises about what elements in (1) - (2a) belong originally 
to Pythagorean thought, and what to Orphism.
65 See Aristotle, frr. 195, and 197; Porphyry, Vita Pytha. 42 (DK 58c6).
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intrinsically active:
Alcm aeon supposes [the p su ch T ]  to be a substance self-m oved 
in eternal m otion, and for that reason im m ortal and sim ilar to 
the divine things (Aetius, A 12); For all d ivine things are always 
m oving continuously - moon, sun, stars, and the whole heavens 
(Aristotle, de An. 4 0 5 a2 9 -b l).66
Im mortality implies, and is a condition of, divinity. Thus if  the 
Pythagoreans believed that p s u c h T  is im m ortal, they believed it 
to be divine. But by definition p s u c h T  is alive. T herefore, 
p s u c h T  is a divine principle of life. C onsequently , if  all living 
creatures are one family, this is presum ably because all lives have 
a divine origin and, presumably, a divine destiny. However, such 
a concept of immortality by motion does not necessarily carry any 
belief in, or imply any, eschatology. Intrinsic m obility  would seem 
to be required for p s u c h T  to go the rounds of transm igration. In
relation to (c) Aristotle ascribes a connection of air, breath or its
6 7pow er of m ovem ent to some Pythagoreans (de An. 4 0 4 a  17 ). 
However that may be, the question arises: Is a transm igrating 
p s u c h T  a p e r s o n  p e rm a n en tly  su rv iv in g  th e  ro u n d s ? 6 8 
Apparently, the eschatological m orality o f transm igration  requires
66 Cf. DL viii, 83 = A l; Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica  xi. 28, 9; Plato's 
Phdr . 245c-246a.
67 Cf. de An. 410b28: 'The doctrine in the poems called Orphic says that 
the p s u c h T  enters (the body of animals) from the universe as they 
breathe in, and is carried by the winds’. The Pythagoreans debating the 
nature of the p s u c h T  in the P h a e d o  - Cebes and Echecrates - seem to 
have in mind a view of the p s u c h T  as liable to be dispersed into the air, 
like breath or wind (77d7-e2).
6% Cf. Jaeger (1947, p.83), who sees the p s u c h T  o f the Pythagoreans as 
bringing about the com plete coa lescen ce o f  the life -sou l and 
consciousness as a presupposition of their doctrine o f the so-called  
transmigration of souls
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some notion of a person. But there is hardly any evidence in the 
Presocratics of a notion of p  su e  he  as a person, i.e., as an agent 
w ith  a set of unique experiences identical with some spatio- 
tem poral existence. Generally, Presocratic thought supports the 
conception of some embodied power or force with conscious and 
co g n it iv e ,  i .e . ,  m ental or psychic  p roperties , the  m ateria l 
em bodim ent being usually identified with that power - as with 
A nax im enes or H eraclitus ' p  s u e  h e .  However, the anecdotal 
evidence on Pythagoras suggests both that the p s u c h e  carries an 
e x p e r i e n t i a l  m em ory ,69 and passes through all sorts of life - 
animal and vegetable.70
An old a c o u s m a  reads; What are the Isles of the Blest? Answer: 
the Sun and the Moon. And Philolaus reportedly taught that the 
Moon, like the Earth, is inhabited, and that lunar creatures are 
fifteen times as powerful [as their terrestrial conterparts] Aetius 
A20]. So that (i) if countable persons survive the round of 
transm igrations, then, perhaps, they savour of the bliss in the 
Isles of the Blest; but (ii) if the p s u c h e  is an impersonal s t u f f  
with cognitive and mental properties, it may disperse to join its 
like at death, and there can be no identity of particular personal 
p s u c h a i .  If the Platonic dialogues - the myths of G. 5 2 3 a ,  Phd . 
1 1 3 d ,  Rep. ,  614a and Phdr.  248c - can inform  us about 
Pythagorean or Orphic view of p su c h T ,  it is that it survives as a 
p e rso n a li ty ,  acquires know ledge through "reco llec tion" , and 
u n d e rg o e s  ju d g e m e n t  and  a c le a r ly  e th ic a l  fo rm  of 
m etem psychosis after death. Yet, 'the memory implied in the
69 DL, viii, 36 = B7; op.cit. viii, 4-5 =A8; Diodorus, x 6, 2
70 Cf. Xenophanes B7; Ion of Chios DK B4; Empedocles B129; Hdt. ii, 123 and 
iv, 93-95.
75
theory of anamnes i s  may well be im personal, the same for all 
m e n ' . 71 On the other hand, Pythagoras, according to Heraclides 
Ponticus, Diodorus and Ovid,72 did remember in the 6th century 
that he was the Euphorbus who was killed in the Trojan war of 
abou t 1084BC. H ow ever, the exp erien tia l  l inkage  betw een 
Pythagoras and Euphorbos, between, i.e., the same human being 
who existed between a temporal gap is not logically impossible, 
allowing for the m ysticism  of the transm igration  phenom enon 
itself, although the story does not tell us enough about the basic 
nature of p s u c he .
There is the possibility that the nature o f p s u c h e  is a kind of 
harmonia.  This possibility arises from the m usical content of 
Pythagorean thought and from the Pythagoreans' encounter with 
Socrates in the P h a e d o .  Aristotle reports {Po l .  1340b 17) that: 
'there seems to be some k insh ip  to m usica l harm onies and 
rhythms [in the human p s u c h T ; hence many wise men say that 
the p s u c h e  is harmony or has harm ony’.73 The kinship between 
p s u c h T  and m usical harm onies and rhythm s, if  any, is not 
worked out, as far as the text of the fragments go. Simmias in the 
Phaedo  (86C) exposes an apparent incongruity between harmony 
and immortality: ’If, then, the p s u c h T  is really  some kind of 
harmony, it is clear that when our bodies are unduly relaxed or 
tensed by d isease  or some o ther  ev il, the p s u c h T  m ust
71 Comford, 'Was the Ionian Philosophy Scientific?' in Allen and Furley, 
1970, p.35. That in some form these ideas, and even more specific details 
have their origins in earlier doctrines o f the surviving p s u c h T  is 
beyond doubt and is confirmed in any case by Plato's own appeal in the 
P h a e d r u s  and elsewhere to ancient authority, including "hoi amphi  
Orphea"
72 Respectively, fr.89 W = DL viii.4-5 = A8; Metamorphosis  xv. 158-64.
73 Also de An. 407b27-32 = A23. Cf. de An. 408al3-21 = A78 ,
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imm ediately perish'. E ither the Pythagoreans were unaware of 
the P h a e d o  objection in relation to m etem psychosis  or the 
evidence of what they may have meant by h a r m o n i a  or p s u c h T  
is too little to be intelligible. On the other hand, if, as it seems, 
p s u c h ' i  is separable from body, the form er's  harm onic  nature 
may possibly be unaffected by bodily d isharm ony or laxation. 
A lthough a d ifficult notion, the c red ib ility  o f  the rela tionship  
between harmony and the nature of soul is perhaps grounded in 
the m usical basis of Pythagorean p h ilo soph y .74 According to 
Cornford's projection of this basis:
The scale is limited both externally - by the octave; for the scale 
ends, as we say, "on the same note" and begins again in endless 
recurrence  - and in ternally ...The in troduction  o f  this system 
marks out the whole unlimited field o f  sound, which ranges
indefinitely in opposite directions (high and low). The infinite
variety of quality in sound is reduced to order by the exact and 
simple law of ratio in quantity. The system so defined still 
contains the unlimited in the blank intervals between the notes; 
but the unlimited is no longer an orderless continuum ; it is 
confined within an order, a cosmos , by the imposition of limit or 
m e a su re .75
Three intervals formed the basis of the Greek m usical system; 
the octave, the fourth, and the fifth. It was discovered that 
pe rcep tib le  but recurring  d ifferences be tw een  sounds are a 
function of fixed numerical ratios. To produce notes an octave
apart on vibrating strings adjusted to the same tension, one string 
must be precisely twice as long as the other. Only a 2:1 ratio will
74 If the properties o f music were discovered by Pythagoras himself, 
h a r m o n i a  may probably be an original key word in Pythagorean
p h ilo so p h y .
7 5 Cornford, 'Science and Mysticism in the Pythagorean Tradition,' in 
Mourelatos, 1974, pp. 143-144
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produce notes octave apart. Similarly, a string will produce note a 
fifth above another only when their lengths stand in 3:2 ratio. 
And one note is a fourth above another when their lengths stand 
in a 4:3 ratio. Here is an invisible law of harmony or order that 
could be grasped numerically. However, the discovery and its 
generalisation led to some mystical interpretation or symbolism of 
number, and the whole set of powers of number was thought to 
exhaust in the number 10, the Decad  or T e t r a c t y s , i e., the first 
four numbers - 1, 2, 3, 4 = 10, usually represented graphically as:
o
o o 
o o o 
o o o o
The num ber 10 was not only thought to be the "perfect" and the 
most potent oath of the Pythagorean Order, it was also called 'the 
font of ever-flowing nature', inasmuch as the whole universe is 
a rranged according to attunement. And an attunement is a 
system  of the three concords, the fourth , the fifth, and the 
o c t a v e . 76 If the Pythagoreans believed that the universe is a 
k o s m o s , as is generally the case among the Presocratics, it is 
possible they saw the D e c a d , not merely as containing the basic 
principles o f music, but as having a deeper cosmic significance; 
that h a r m o n i a , which implies a relation of opposites reaches deep 
into the essence of things.77 Thus the Pythagoreans may have
76 Sextus, adv. math, vii, 94-5.
77 According to Aristotle {M e ta .  1090a20-22), every feature of life or 
existence had a numerical foundation: 'such and such an attribute of 
numbers is justice, such and such is p s u c h ' e  and mind, another 
opportunity, and so on for everything else'. Alexander says that justice is
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Lim it/O dd, Unlimited/Even appearing alongside Good and Bad, 
Right and wrong, Male and Female, reveal that as well as being 
descriptive, these cosmic principles are also m o r a l  and s o c i a l  
features of the universe.80
In short, the D e c a d  is projected as containing the fundamental 
principles of all things:
4, the first square number; marriage 5; opportunity 7 (in Meta 38.8-20).
Comparable assertions are attested for Philolaus B5; B7; Pseudo-
Iamblichus, A12
7 8 Aristotle Meta.  986a22ff.
7  ^ The following explanation of the entries in the table are conjectural. 
But it is far more difficult to conjecture about the geometric entries - 
straight and crooked, square and oblong, except to say that the 
Pyhthagoreans were anxious to demonstrate the universal applicability 
o f  their doctrine of opposition. This may also be evidence o f the 
Pythagorean reduction of sensibles or other phenomena through 
geometry to arithmetic. It is also evidence o f the comprehensive 
indifference o f Presocratic thought in which logic and ethics, physics 
and metaphysics derive from the same universal principle(s).
8 °  Cf. P h i l .  25d, where Plato writes salutorily about "the mixed" ( to  
m ik ton ) .  When 'the equal and the double and whatever puts an end to 
the mutual disagreement of the opposites by introducing symmetry and 
concord, produce number'.
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One m ust study the activities and the essence of number in 
accordance with the power of existing in the D e c a d \  for it is 
g reat, com plete , a ll-achieving, and the origin of divine and 
human life...(Philolaus, B l l ) .
An old acousma  runs thus; 'What is the wisest? Answer: Number. 
T he p r im a c y  of num ber in P y th a g o rea n ism  is m ore than 
a d e q u a te ly  a t t e s te d .81 Number is not ju s t  the origin of divine 
and human life; it is the divine origin of all things, the physical 
universe providing its material embodiment:
N um ber is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the 
ever lasting stability of the contents o f the universe (B23).82 
And the one is wholly the dwelling of reason (to noi) and the 
other of becoming and change, and the one is f i r s t  in p o w e r  
and s u p e r i o r , and the other is second and inferior. But that 
which is made of both, namely, the ever-circling divine, and the 
ever-chang ing  mortal, is the universe. It is well that the 
u n iv e rse  shou ld  be an ev er las tin g  ac tiv ity  o f  god and 
becom ing... (B 21).8^
The conception of god as a principle and a supreme causal power 
which is ultimately presupposed in an account of the cosmos, and 
whose causality is specified in terms of motion keeps forcing itself 
upon any one wno deals with whatever little evidence remains of 
P resocra tic  thought. For the P y thagoreans , the fundamental 
principles of the cosmos are number, which are not abstract, static 
entities but vital and governing principles with the same dynamic 
potencies of a Heraclitean L o g o s .  And there is even a report that
8 1 See Aristotle's Afe/a.985b23, 986al5, 1080bl6, 1083b8. Cf. Philolaus B4; 
Archytas B l; Iamblichus, de communi mathematica scientia 78, 8-18.
82 Iamblichus in Nt.com. p. 10, 22
83 Quoted by Stobaeus (Eel.  1, 20, 2 p. 172, 9W) from a work attributed to 
Philolaus entitled, On the psuche.
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some 5th century Pythagoreans - Lysis and Opsimus, proclaimed 
that god is an irrational number (Athenagoras, A 4).84 Even if we 
grant that this and the quoted fragments above are spurious, still 
they are suggestively Pythagorean, as they appear to echo both
the thesis of num ber- a r c h T  and the dualism  fundam enta l to 
Pythagorean teaching and explanation. The quoted  fragm ents 
above also show that the opposition of elements - here body and 
spirit - is harmonised at the higher level of the cosmos. B23 
creates the impression that the "creative" principle of the universe 
is identical with the principle of its e ternal stability , Num ber. 
These principal roles - creating and stabilising [all things] - may 
be said to combine in the Reason of B21, also called psucKe  of the 
bodily universe. W hatever the value o f  the evidence, these 
fragm ents contain  a thesis which coheres , in s truc tu re  and 
content, with the previous theological theses we have been 
discussing, in which the first principle and cause of explanation is 
called god or the divine. Therefore qualms about admission of 
these fragments have peripheral, if any effect, on anything said in 
this section.
Given the Greek perception of the universe  as orderly, the
mathematical bent of the Pythagoreans was likely to suggest a
whole new kind of arcKe  to them. They might have represented 
the numerical ratios of things as their essences since, presumably, 
any material in the same ratio will yield the same thing. Thus the 
Pythagoreans might have talked of the world and its objects as
constituted by ratios, or mathematical formulae which specify thfc**
8 4 The Pythagoreans had recognised only natural numbers and fractions, 
thought o f as ratios of natural numbers. The discovery o f the irrational 
would shatter a Pythagorean cosm ological thesis which is logically  
dependent on the commeasurability of the harmonic ratios.
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structural properties that make something what it is. The report 
of Aristotle, that the Pythagoreans held that things are made of 
num bers  or that things imitate num bers85 would appear to 
follow from their enthusiastic understanding of the universe as 
quantitatively  organised, the logical differentiation of structure 
and  co nstitu tive  s tu ff  being possib ly  (con-) fused  in the 
p ro ce ss .86
The Pythagoreans, like their predecessors excepting Heraclitus 
and Xenophanes, have a cosmogony leading to a cosmology which, 
in Philolaus, shows an epistemological approach to metaphysics. 
Here too, the account of the cosmos concludes to the existence of a 
necessary first principle who satisfies the conditions of divinity:
And indeed all things that are known have number; for it is not 
possible for anything to be thought of or known without this 
(fr.4). About nature and harmony this is the position. The being 
( e s t o ) and very nature of things (auta ha phus i s )  which is 
eternal admits divine but not human knowledge,87 except that 
nothing of the things that are and are known by us could be if 
there was not as a basis the being of those things from which the 
w orld -o rder  has been composed - the L im ite rs  and the 
Unlimiteds. And since these principles existed being neither 
alike nor of the same kind, it would have been impossible f o r  
them to be ordered i f  harmonia had not supervened  - i n
85 Possibly Aristotle, if  not quoting a Pythagorean source, may be 
representing the underlying idea when he says that 'the Pythagoreans 
say that being exist by imitation (m im e s i s ) of numbers' {M eta .  987b 11), 
and that 'they seemed to observe many resemblances (h o m o i o m a t a ) in 
numbers to the things that are and come to be, rather than in fire and 
earth and water. Other things appeared to be assimilated to numbers in 
their entire nature' {Meta.  985b27-33).
86 Cf. Aristotle’s Meta. 1080bl6 (DK58B9); 1083b8 (DK58B10). Also 1092b8 
(Dk45,3)
87 Cf. Alcmaeon fr. 1, DL V I11, 83; 'Alcmaeon of Croton...spoke these 
words..."Concerning things unseen the gods see clearly, but so far as men 
may conjecture..."'
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whatever manner this came about. Things that were alike and 
of the same kind need no h a r m o n i a , but those that were unlike 
and not of the same kind and of unequal order - it was 
necessary  for such things to have been locked together by 
h a r m o n i a , i f  they had to be held  together in an ordered 
universe (B6).
Notice the distinction between divine and human knowledge and 
their respective objects of cognition; (1) eternal being and nature 
o f  things and (2) Limiters and U nlim iteds. Presum ably divine 
know ldge  consists in a d irect in s igh t in to  (i), while human 
know ledge proceeds to (1) through analytical categories in (2). 
Now Eternal being is called the basis o f  the rela tion of the 
principles, Limiter and Unlimited, which are said to be that f rom  
w h i c h  the world-order (k o s m o s ) is composed. But Limiters are 
logically opposed to Unlimiteds. Philolaus then concludes that this 
cosm os w ould  have been im p o ss ib le  had  no t h a r m o n i a  
supervened. Thus h a r m o n i a  is invoked here as a dynamic 
e ternal basis and nature of things, a third principle  mediating 
Limiters and Unlimiteds, although Philolaus knows no more about 
i ts  n a tu re .  'N a tu re ',  we a re  to ld ,  'w as  h a rm o n ise d '
( h a r m o c h t h e ) .88 It is also said elsewhere that 'everything comes 
about by necessity and harmony’ (DL viii, 84). Probably, then, the 
Pythagorean position is that the w orld  is in te llig ib le  because 
every existing thing has a specific expressible formula, a specific 
ratio . These ratios are species of h a r m o n i a  in that they 
determine the infinite varieties of quality in things by measuring 
out ( l i m i t i n g ) how much of the u n l i m i t e d  is necessary for 
definite objects .8 ^
88 Barnes (1982, p.393)
89 'The point of tin doctrine as a whole is surely to teach that the cosmos -
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The epistemological basis of this m etaphysics suggest that the
principles - Limit, Unlimited, and H a r m o n i a , are both cognitive, 
onto logical, and analytical.90 These principles are in essential 
relation, although Philolaus is at a loss to know in what manner 
they were cosmogonically related. According to Aristotle:
They did not think that the Limited and Unlimited and the One 
are different natures - e.g., fire or earth or something else of that 
sort, but that the Unlimited itself and the One itself are the 
substance (o u s i a ) of the things they are predicated of; for that
reason number is the substance of everything (M e t a .  9 8 6a l5 -
17).
This implies that Limit, Unlimited, One, are principles of number. 
But although they are in this respect the same, they are not
identical. They constitute different aspects, and play different, 
though not clearly stated, roles, in an account of the origin and 
nature of the universe. It is not clear, for instance, whether the 
One, which is itself numerical, is prior or subsequent to the 
e lem ents of num ber .91 There is also the possibility that the
and everything that happens in it - exhibits a wholly intelligible order. 
The chief function o f the Pythagorean identification o f things with
numbers is accordingly to give symbolic expression to that order.
Particular numbers (chosen on a variety of grounds) are used to express 
the essence o f particular things; and this makes it possible the order of all
things by the member of each such number in an ordered series...1 - KRS
(1983), p.331-2. I think, however, that the Pythagoreans took number to
be more than a symbol.
90  That there is epistemic and ontological fusion in the Pythagorean 
concept o f number is further suggested by the other fragments o f 
P hilolaus.
91 According to Aristotle, the world began to take shape when the 
primaeval One breathed in some void from the Unlimited Air or P n e u m a  
that separates and distinguishes the numbers (P h y . 213b22-27). But a 
citation from Philolaus suggests that the One is composed of Limit and 
Unlimited, like everything else in the world: "the first thing to be fitted
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process of world-formation may well be the geometricisation of 
num ber (arithmetic) leading to stereometry.92
Philolaus offers a pyro-centric astronomy where the intervals of 
the musical scale explain the structure of the celestial sphere as 
based on the three ratios displayed in the t e t r a c t y s .  First, we 
have the unmeasured dark field of space called "the void" but 
fi lled  w ith "air' or p n e u m a ,93 the breath  of the animate
w o r l d . 94 Fire is at the centre of the celestial system. Philolaus
together (or harmonised), the One, in the middle o f the cosmic sphere, is 
called H e s t i a  or Hearth (B7). Another fragment speaks of number 
having two forms, odd and even, ’and a third from both mixed together,
odd-and-even' (B5). Cf. '...The One p r o c e e d s  from (to d' hen eks 
a m p h o t e r o n ) both, for it is both even and odd, and number p r o c e e d s  
from the One, and the whole heaven, as has been said, are numbers' 
(M e ta .  1.5.986al5). The evidence is, I suspect, confused. But Comford 
(op.cit p. 150) reacs "consists o f  for the first "proceeds from", and obtains 
a cosmogony with the One as the first principle. Cf. 'The universe is one, 
and it began to come into being at the middle, and from the middle 
upwards in the same direction as downwards' (B17) and 'The One is the 
beginning o f everything' (B8).
92 In another passage Aristotle says that after the original One was 
constituted "whether from a surface  or a seed, or from what they are at a 
loss to say, the nearest part of the Unlimited was drawn in and limited by 
the Limit' {Met.  1091al5)
93 Stobaeus, A n th o lo g iu m  1, 18, lc  (quoting Aristotle; DK58B30). In the 
first book of his work On the Phil osophy o f  Pythagoras , he writes that 
the universe is one, and that from the unlimited there are drawn into it 
time, breath and the void, which always distinguishes the places of each 
thing. Cf. Aristotle's Phy. 213b22 (DK58B30). The idea is obscure to me, 
though it appears to mean that existing things are marked out in time, 
and surrounded by void filled with air or p n e u m a .  Cf. also the parallel
b iological thesis ascribed to Philolaus by Aristotle's pupil Meno: 
'Immediately after birth the animal whose body is predominantly hot 
draws in the breath from outside, which is cold; and then sends it back as 
if  paying a debt’ (DK44A27).
94 That the cosmos is animate is typical Greek thought, and is a forceful 
demonstration o f the continuity between mythological and philosophical 
cosm ogon ies.
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calls this central position "the hearth of the world", "the House of 
Zeus", "mother of gods", "bond", or "m e a s u r e  of nature. Then 
again there is another fire enveloping the u n iv erse  at the 
circumference. Around the centre ten divine bodies dance: first 
the sphere of the fixed stars, then, the five planets, next the sun, 
then the moon, then the earth, then the counter ear th ,95 and 
finally the fire of the hearth which has its station around the 
centre* (Aetius 11 7, 7 (DK44A16).96 The celestial bodies are 
disposed in relative distances varying in the ratios corresponding 
to the notes of the musical scale, so they constitute by themselves 
a celestial music. It is probable, therefore, that H a r m o n i a  is the 
divine principle of order in all things, and is basic nature to the 
specific dispositions of the elements of the t e t rac t y s  in all things, 
lunar and sublunar.
So once more, we have here a rational theology. According to 
the Pythagoreans, any plausible account of the universe perceived 
as a cosmos will conclude to the existence of a divine h a r m o n i a  of 
fundam ental principles, which are num erical in nature; these 
constitute the intelligible and divine basis of our dynamic cosmos.
8 P a rm en id es
Parmenides' main thesis, the T r u t h , which occupies the first half 
of his poem, contains no direct connection of the first principle, 
Being ( e s t i , o n ), with god or the d iv ine . C onsequen tly , 
Parmenides' system is perceived as falling outside m ainstream  
Presocratic theological speculation. I shall argue an alternative
95  The counter-earth was invented by the Pythagoreans in order to 
square up the number o f planetary bodies with the perfect and sacred 
number 10.
96 Cf. Aristotle de Caelo 293al8 (DK58B37).
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p o s i t io n  that there is a relig ious d im ension  or ground in 
Parm enides’ system. Traditional religion had presented the divine 
dim ension of reality by projecting causal powers that are both 
experienced and conceived as explanatory principles. Thales and 
his successors had reconstituted this naive religious intuition by a 
series o f critical arguments which conclude to the existence of 
divine a r c h a i  in terms of which the universe is intelligible and is 
capable  o f being explained. Parmenides, on the other hand, 
argues that there are formal criteria that an a r c  he  qua a r c h T  
must satisfy. An a r c h e  can only be grasped a priori  by reason 
alone; for sensation and sensibles cannot meet the formal criteria 
of Being. To demonstrate this, Parmenides in peculiar contrast to 
his predecessors adopts a completely different form of argument; 
he self-consciously isolates the most basic form of thought or 
speech - esti - and builds upon it an entire metaphysics, using 
hexam etre  verse, the traditional medium of divinely inspired
truth. In the poem, "e s t i "  is equivalent to " o n "  or "to o n ”
(being), implying that the fundamental reality is a verbal noun.
P a rm e n id e s ’ m etaphysics  falls  under two ep is tem olog ica l 
headings, Truth, and Opinion. "Truth", Parmenides implies in the 
proem to his versified message, derives from reason. Opinion, on 
the other hand, is meaninglesss or contradictory mortal babbling 
that arises from and depends on the senses (cf. fr.7,3-5):
For never shall this be proved (d a m e i ), that things that are are
not (einai me eonta)  but you must hold back your thought from
this way of inquiry, nor let your habit, born of much experience 
force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or 
an ear or a tongue full of meaningless sound: judge by r e a s o n  
the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me (fr.7).
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The basic contrast here is between the W ay of reason  and the 
W ay of sense .  Against this epistemic basis of Truth and reality, 
the anonymous goddess who relates the m essage of Truth declares 
that Parmenides should learn both the " im m ovab le” ( a t re rnes )  
heart of well-rounded (e u k u k l e o s ) Truth as well as opinions of 
mortals in which there is no true reliance (fr. 1, 28-30). As it 
turns out, the meaning of 'immovable heart of truth' here means, I 
suggest, that the argum ent for Truth is unfa ls if iab le , i.e., is 
necessarily true. That the argument is "well-rounded" is because 
it is not only persuasive  but also lo g ica lly  com plete . By 
implication the proposition that expresses opinion will turn out to 
be not only untrustworthy but also invalid  or contradictory and, 
for that reason, logically incomplete.
The account of Truth begins by proclaiming what it consists in, 
and what it is opposed to. These are offered as the only ways of 
inquiry that are to be thought of. The way of Truth is:
(1) That it i s , and that it is impossible for it not to be ( h o p o s  
estin te kai hos ouk esti me einai). The opposed way is:
(2) That it is not , and that it necessarily is not  ( hos ouk estin 
te kai  hos chreoh esti me einai).  This path is declared to be 
undiscernible; for you could not know (gno i&s )  that which is 
not (to me on): that cannot be done; nor could you indicate or 
say (phrasais) it. Cf. fr. 8, 8
The italicised e s t i , e i n a i , to on , express (1) the W ay of Truth, 
while ouk esti , me einai , to me on express (2) the nameless a^d 
unthought Way. Both Ways are said to exhaust the ways of 
thought. But the further qualification of the second W ay, viz., that
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it is neither thinkable, knowable, nor sayable - is, I think, the key 
to understanding Parmenides. It implies that est i ,  e i n a i  and its 
p a rt ic ip le  equ ivalen ts , on  or to on , are linked to sayability, 
know ability  or thinkability. However, e s t i  or e i n a i , etc., is a 
carrier  of state, time, quality or quantity, o f a (grammatical) 
subject, and is not uttered or knowable per  se. In the formula "... 
est i"  the blank space is filled by a grammatical subject. Now if 
we translate e s t i  and its participle equivalents as "to be" or 
"being", and for the sake of argument fill in "...e s t i ", we get an 
instance of being, as for instance: Theaetetus is sitting.  Then the 
Way of Truth - (1) above - is instantiated as; "Theaetetus is sitting 
and he necessarily is s i t t ing” (i.e. since if  he is sitting it is 
impossible for him not to be sitting). The second Way would be: 
" T h e a e te tu s  is not sitting and he necesarily is not  s i t t in g " .97 B u t  
this second W ay a lready im plies th a t  T h eae te tu s  is  and 
necessarily is standing or lying or sleeping or squatting or.... In 
general, "x is not  F" means "x is y or z or..."98 Here, I believe, is 
what Parmenides means by saying that we can never say, think or 
know or indicate "what is not". This is further suggested by the 
following fragments:
There is no other thing besides being (fr. 8,). For it shall never 
be proved that things that are are not (fr.7, 2). It must either 
be  completely or  not at all (fr.8)...it is or  it is not. But  in f a c t , 
it has been decided to leave the one way unthought and 
nameless; for it is no true way (fr.8). There remains only one 
account of a way, namely, esti
97 The function of to ml on, ouk esti shows that the d istinction between  
negative ex istentia l propositions, and negative subject-predicate  
propositions was not yet drawn.
98 Plato in the Sophis t  develops this insight of Parmenides.
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In other words, es t i  is a self-assuring, underlying necessity, a 
logical force inherent in the very attempt to speak or think at all.
To speak or think at all, is to speak or think that "x i s . . . " .
Therefore, Parmenides concludes; being, thinking, saying, are one 
and the same:
W e necessarily speak and think Being; (chre to legein te noein to 
eon emmenai )  for it is to be, (esti gar einai) whereas nothing is 
not. (meden d'  ouk est in , fr.6). To think and to be is the same
(fr.3)....you will not find thought without being in which it is
expressed (fr.8.34ff).
B e in g , then , is for P a rm en ides , n ecessa r ily  unnegatab le . 
Therefore the formula of mortal opinion, "to be and not to be" is 
contradictory, hence invalid, and also a "backward-turning way" 
(pa l i n t ropos  keleuthos) .  After his proof of est i  as the most basic 
axiom of expression, thought or knowledge, Parmenides proceeds 
to draw exis tentia l consequences from it and to demonstrate 
finally that Being is also the most basic principle of existence, so 
that e s t i ,  as a verbal noun, at once underlies and collapses all 
kinds of existences, states, qualities, quantities, time, into its 
logical necessity and unity, with the following consequences (fr.8): 
Being is thought (or absolute insight, to noein),  one (hen) ,  of a 
single genus ( m o n o g e n e s ) ,  undivided or undifferentiated ( o u d e  
d a i r e t o n ) ,  se lf - iden tica l  ( t a ' u t on  me no n ) ,  whole ( o u l o n ) ,  
c o n t in u o u s  ( s u n e c h e s ) ,  spherical ( eu k u l o u  sp ha i r e s ) ,  full 
( e m p l e o n ) ,  perfect or complete ( t e le ion) ,  not lacking in anything 
( o u k  e p i d u e s ) ,  u n g e n e ra b le  ( a g e n e t o n ) ,  im p e r i s h a b le  
( a n ' o l e t h r o n ) ,  im m utable  or unm oving ( a t r emes ,  a k i n e t o n ) , 
e te rn a l .
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These deductions express the sublimity of Being as an absolute 
beginning, existence or thought. The truth of this is guaranteed
by Justice (D i k ' e ), and strong Necessity  (k r a t e r T  AnankT)  - 
n a m e l y  the force of reason or logic, 'which hold Being in the 
bonds of logical limits, preventing it from coming to be; while Fate 
(m o i r a ) fetters it to be whole and changeless'. All this implies 
that the absolute exclusion of "is not" ( m T  on)  from the Way of 
Truth or reason involves the absolute exclusion  of time and 
change from Being; for, by saying that it w a s  we imply that it is  
n o t ,  and by saying that it w ill be, we im p ly  tha t it is not 
y e t . "  However, the inescapable "it" will not give way, but is an 
eternal presence, and has a logical coherence and completeness 
from  which it may be deduced that it is tem porarily  or 
qualitatively full, complete, whole, continuous, spherical, etc.
True, Parmenides does not expressly equate Being to god. Yet he 
alone among the Presocratics accumulates for characterisation of 
Being the total of attributes and conditions of divinity reserved
"  The first and most conspicuous difference between the Way of Truth and 
the Way of Opinion is that the Way of Opinion contains two forms 
(m o r p h a s ) of which mortals ought not have named so much as one (fr. 8, 
53-61). These f o r m s  are then materially filled up incongruously by 
mortals; for the one form is aitherial flame o f fire, gentle and very light, 
in every direction identical with itself, but not with the other, although 
that other too is in itself the opposite; dark night, dense in apppearance 
and heavy. These opposite or contradictory forms and their qualities 
combine to produce the phenomena of the entire cosmos by the agency of 
an overruling goddess - Justice {Dik'e) or Necessity (A n a n k e ) - frr.10, 
12; Aetius 11. 7, 1. Parmenides calls this account o f (mortal) Opinion 
(d o x a ) a 'deceitful ordering of words' (fr.8, 1. 50). The account of this 
second part o f the poem grounds perceptual experiences and the 
imperfection or contradiction of the mortal formula - to be and not to be 
- in the two contradictory cosmic principles, in contrast to reason  which 
knows, and is grounded in only one true form, to be. It is difficult to 
fathom all the relevant relations between the two parts o f the poem. But 
cf. no. 101 infra.
for god both in popular religion and in the philosophical religion 
introduced by the Milesians. The identity of an entity may be 
legitim ately inferred on the basis of its categorical specification: 
the  p resence  of "god" m ay be reasonably inferred from the
tra d i t io n a l  set o f  cond it ions/a ttr ibu tes  or from  the set of 
predicates that are definatory of it. Before Parmenides - but all 
sum m ed up in Xenophanes' concept of god - the notion of 
"etern ity" , "wholeness", "completeness" and "perfection", "not- 
lacking in anything" (or self-sufficiency), "oneness", "sphericality", 
"rationality" or ’ thinking", etc., have specified the condition and 
nature of divine reality. Thus Parmenides seems to have argued, 
from a purely existential axiom - esti - for the validity of these 
conditions of and attributions to Being, impliedly conceived as 
divine reality, graspable a priori  by reason only.
The divinity of Being is also suggested by the proem to t£e
poem. The main motif of the proem is the journey of the quest for 
Being under the guidance of an anonymous goddess, perhaps 
Justice  { D i k e )  cr Fate {M o i r a ) ,  who reveals the "measures" or 
"sign-posts" o f the route. To be sure, Parm enides uses the 
religious motifs as metaphors to convey a new truth about "reality 
in and of itself", or "the ultimate reality beyond the relativism of 
the common-sense world". However, the journey conveys a sense 
of the sublime, and suggests that Being is apprehended a priori  
by a kind of rational, divine intuition. Being itself is sublime.100 
But sublimity is, in Greek, a condition of divinity. Hence, being is 
divine. This conclusion is further intimated in the disciple of
100 Since Being is sublime, Parmenides could not describe its nature in
positive terms but only signified it in negative and positive attributive
terms implying perfection, self-sufficiency, etemality and supremacy.
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Eleatic philosophy, Melissus of Samos.
9 M elissus the  Sam ian
According to Melissus (floruit c. mid-460 B.C):
Nothing that has a beginning and an end is either everlasting or 
infinite (B4). But as it always is (est in aei),  so must its t o  
meg  e th o s  always be infinite (apeiron  (B3)...if  a thing has room 
(chorei  ti) for or admits ( e i sdeche ta i )  something, it is not full: if 
it neither has room for nor admits anything, it is full (B7, 9). It 
must necessarily be full...If therefore it is full it does not change 
(B7, 10). If therefore Being is, it must be One; and if it is One, it 
is bound not to have body ( a s o m a t o s ) .  But if it had bulk, it 
would have parts, and would no longer be  (B 9).
Melissus is seen by some scholars as absurdly drawing a physical 
conclusion (B3) from a temporal premise (B4). This physicalist 
reading, beginning with A ristotle , renders " m e g e t h o s "  "size". 
Although this is not impossible on the face of the fragments, a 
non-physicalist reading is not only possible, but also the more 
probable in my view, considering B9. For "m e g e t h o s " is not only 
a word of quantity, it is also a word of quality: it does not only 
mean "size", it also m eans "greatness" (o f  pow er, m ight), 
"m agnanim ity" (v. Liddell and Scott). The main pillar of Eleatic 
metaphysics is the correlation of changelessness and timelessness. 
To change is to change in time. Being does not change. Hence, 
Being is timeless (eternal now, for Parm enides). M elissus, it 
seems, is talking about the infinite greatness (of power) of Being 
in relation to its timelessness (aei on, esti), and not, I suppose, in 
relation to infinite material extension (B4 & 3). For a materially 
infin ite  ex tension  is rad ica lly  in co m patib le  w ith  a bodiless
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(a s o m a t o s ) Being (B9). Again, B9 defines "full" and "not-full" in 
terms of admissibility of something. But d e c h o m a i  does not 
necessarily mean physical reception. It may mean "I approve". 
Here, I suspect, a logical sense of chore i  and d e c h e t a i  is meant. 
Thus by "If therefore it [Being] is full, it does not change", all 
Melissus may mean is that Being’s infinite greatness and eternity 
are a completeness that admits of no temporal gaps. Hence, 
insofar as change occurs in time, eternal Being is changless.
But M elissus also seems not only to correlate "time" with 
"finitude" and "change", but also "change" with "physicality".101 
Body entails not only change, but also temporal and physical 
parts. So that if anything is timeless, it is, for Melissus, infinite in 
greatness and changeless, and if changeless it is bodiless. In all 
the other fragments Melissus denies that Being has bulk and
1^1 ’If things are many, they would have to be of the same kind as...the One. 
For i f  there is earth and water and air and fire and iron and gold, and 
that which is living and that which is dead, and black and white and all 
the things which men say are real; i f  these things exist, and we see and 
hear correctly, each thing must be of such a kind as it seemed to us to be 
in the first place, and it cannot change or become different, but each 
thing must always be what it is. But now we say we see and hear and 
understand correctly (B8, 2); and it seems to us that the hot becomes cold, 
and the cold hot, and the hard soft and the soft hard..so that it comes about 
that we neither see nor know existing things (B8, 3); and if  it changed, 
Being would have been destroyed, and Not-Being would have come into 
being. Thus, therefore, if  things are many, they must be such as the One 
is’ (B8, 6). Those fragments tell us not that there are not many things or 
that there are many, but that the many in their ever-changing 
character, and hence unknowability, presuppose Being, since we k n o w  
only that they a r e , not how or what  they are. As Being lies beyond 
particular things, it fulfills them all without being identified with any of 
them. Nor is Being the mere sum of things. Rather it is their formal 
essen ce . Hence Being is One, and the logic of its very nature prevents it 
from ever changing or coming to be or perishing or...Only by being 
a s o m a t o s  can it fulfil such a formal function (B9). On my reading, this 
conclusion is not different from Parmenides'.
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parts, in other words, physical or mortal attributes: Being is not 
divided (BIO); It does not change (B6) or come into being (Bl), and 
therefore has neither beginning nor end (B2). It is neither dense 
nor rare (B8); It does not alter, become larger, perish, recompose 
(B7, 2). It does not feel grief (B2 & 5) or pain (B2 & 4 & 5), but is 
healthy (B4 & 5). The psycho-physiology of B2, 4, 5 is not 
accidental, as it appears in more than one place. These fragments 
add up to a total picture of a Being whose perfection, greatness 
and com pleteness lie in an identity transcending physical and 
mortal limitations while embodying vital conditions that are ideal, 
e.g., that of being healthy. According to Aetius and Olympiodorus 
(A13) Melissus made the One (i.e., Being) G od,102 and frr. 2, 4, 5 
would seem to support this.
Thus it is possible to conclude that, like their predecessors, 
Parmenides and Melissus think that any plausible account of the 
universe m ust presuppose an arche  or a r c h a i  - this is left open - 
whose d iv ine sublim ity and logical necessity  engender a status 
wh i c h  is distinctive of all the imperfections and limitations which 
accom pany physicality  and im m ortality , generation, destruction, 
having feelings of pain, etc.
10 E m ped oc les
Empedocles of Acragas (c.438-423 BC) is reported to have written 
at least two poems, On Na tu re  and P u r i f i c a t i o n s , which are 
deemed incompatible with each other; the first being a rational, 
philosophic thesis, the second, expressing an irrational, religious
102 cf. The apparently contradictory view of DL ix .24 = Al); 'He used to say 
that one should say nothing about the gods, for there is no knowledge of 
them.' There is no contradiction here if  "gods'1 mean gods of traditional 
religion, which are not the same as his.
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mysticism. Therefore, he is by the estimation of some scholars a 
com plex personality  or worse than that; e ither he curiously  
com bined  p h ilo sophy  with re lig ious m ystic ism  or, i f  the 
P ur i f i ca t i ons  is the later of the two, that he retrogressed from the 
sobriety of a rational, scientific thinker to an irrational religious 
m ystic. This assessm ent is unjustified. For the so-called 
E m p e d o c l e a n  s c i e n c e  h a s  b e e n  s o l i d l y  e r e c t e d  o n  s ix  
m e tap h y s ica l  p r in c ip le s :  L ove  ( A p h r o d i t e !  C y p r i s ) ,  S trife
( N e i k o s ) ,  Fire ( Z e u s ) ,  Air ( H e r e ) ,  Earth ( A i d o n e u s ) ,  W ater 
(N'estis).  Empedocles calls the last four "roots” (rhizomata:  f r .6 ) .  
But all are divine powers 0d a e m o n e s ) ,103 equal and co-eval. On 
the basis of their combined activity, he forges a concept of 
im m ortality  and urges a new understanding of what people 
ordinarily mean by life and death:
A wise man in such matters would not surmise in his mind that 
while they lived what they call life, so long do they exist, and 
good and ill befall them, but that before they were formed as 
m ortals and cnce they are dissolved, they do not exist  a t 
a / / . 104...of all mortals none has birth nor any end in accursed 
death but what is mingled (fr. 8). And when these are mixed in 
the form of man...or in the form of wild beasts or of plants or of 
birds, then, they say that this comes into being, but when they 
are separated, they call this wretched fate. They do not name 
them correctly as is right...(fr.9). Fools, for they have no far- 
reaching thoughts since they think that what before did not exist 
comes into being or that a thing dies when completely destroyed 
( f r . l l ) . 105
*03 Fr. 59, Simplicius, de Caelo 587, 20
104 Fr. 15, Plutarch'j adversus Colotem 1113D.
105 There are Parmenidean echoes. In the latter part of fr. 8, Parmenides 
says that 'what is has been named names which mortals have laid down 
believing them to be true - coming to be and perishing, being and not 
being, changing place and altering colour'. It seems that in both
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(A lthough he thinks that the conventional understand ing  and 
use of "birth” and "death" is wrong, he will continue to use these 
terms as just a concession but not a commitment to convention, 
fr.9). It may be possib le  to read the above passages as a 
"scientific" reduction of metaphysical sentiments about life and 
death. But to succeed, one has to show that Empedocles' straight 
words are merely poetic. His straight words are that if  we are 
wise we would not surmise that once the cosm ic elements of 
w hich we are com posed are dissolved we  do not exist at all.
Even if  men are formed and dissolved by mechanical processes, 
yet the meaning of this passage is metaphysical; we  do not exist 
just when we are  mortals. W e  do not cease to exist at all when 
we die, i.e., when our constitutive elements are dissolved. It is 
im p lied ,  th e re fo re ,  tha t to live is to be and to be is to be
i m m o r t a l .  H ence, when in their p roductive  function , the 
elements that are  in term ingled: 'Quickly, things turned mortal
Parmenides and Empedocles mortal error arises in the same way; in the 
way in which the categories o f "generation", "destruction", "birth" and 
"death" or "change" in general contain ex nihilo presuppositions - 
presuppositions which are logically indemonstrable. The metaphysical 
grounds o f their thesis is clear. But whereas Parmenides talks of the 
im possibility o f change o f Being - which is the same as Thought, 
Empedocles talks about the immortality and divinity o f life by reference 
to the cyclical changelessness o f the interplay o f  the six divine 
principles o f which, by the agency o f Love, we are composed. 
Empedoclean princples are, in conception at least, Parmenidean beings: 
'For it is impossible for anything to come to be from what is not, and it
cannot be brought about or heard o f that what is should be utterly
destroyed' (fr. 12). Empedocles may have understood Parmenides as 
barring absolute coming to be and destruction. This is true since every 
com ing-to-be and destruction presupposes Being. Hence, the relative 
unreality o f time and change for Empedocles, who tries to accommodate 
Parmenidean Being and changing phenomena.
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that used to be immortal before\ 106 
Empedocles, like Heraclitus, has a thesis of a grand cosmic life, 
insofar as his basic cosm ic elem ents are l iv ing  d iv in ities . 
Empedocles’ concept of "immortality" is cyclical birth, death, and 
r e b i r th :107 '...insofar as they (sc. the roots) have learned to grow 
one from many, and again as the one grows apart grow many, 
thus far do they come into being and have no stable life (a i o n ); 
but insofar as they never cease their continual interchange, thus 
far they exist always (a e i n ) changeless (a k i n e t o i ) in the cycle' 
(kata kuklon,  fr.17, 1-13). Empedocles' fervent urging of a new 
understanding of life and death, by suggesting, in the words of 
KRS (p. 292) that 'our real existence extends before "birth" and 
after "death" depends on a theory of a grand cosmic life. If that 
reading  is p lau s ib le ,  then, it  in tim ates  the  d o c tr in e  of 
m etem psychosis prom inent in the P u r i f i c a t i o n s  according to 
which mortal life - animal and vegetable, etc.- is a life f a l l e n , by 
the agency of Strife, from blessed, long-lived gods. Mortals will 
return as gods after a predetermined time decreed by broad oath. 
The religious tone of these passages coming from On Nature  is 
further bolstered by elements of traditional theology; the belief 
that all the gods are bom from some divine first cause:
But as one d i v in e  element mingled further with another, these
Fr.35, Simplicius, de Caelo, 528, 30.
107 Frr. 17 and 35 also refer to elements learning to grow one and then 
many. At one tine the cosmic cycle of birth and death as of the mingling 
and separation of the elements, seems to be controlled by the periodic 
alternation of the waxing and waning o f Love and Strife, at another, to be 
predetermined by Oath (fr. 30; cf., B115) or Necessity. Cf. Aristotle, 
P h y . .252a7-9 = A38; 'Empedocles would seem to say that the alternate 
domination and moving o f Love and Strife belong to things from 
necessity'. See further Aetius A32, A45
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things [sc. resulting creatures] fell together as each claimed to 
m eet the other and many other besides these were constantly 
resulting (fr. 21). From them [sc. the divine elements] come all 
that was and is and will be in future - trees...and men, and 
wom en, beasts and birds and water-bred fish, and long-lived 
gods (t heous  do l icha ionas)  too, highest in honour (fr. 21. Cf. 
fr .23 ).
Just as in Hesiod, Zeus, born in a later generation, becomes the 
supreme authority in the community of gods, so too is Empedocles' 
supreme god born out of the four divine elements in the fullest 
integrity of Love, and to the total exclusion of despicable Strife.108 
The result is a supreme God, perfect as to shape and supreme as 
to mind:
As to the form of the cosmos, he describes what it is like when 
ordered by Love in the following manner; No twin branches 
spring from its back, it has no feet, no nimble knees, no fertile 
parts, but it was a sphere and it is equal to itself.109 For, he is 
not furnished with a human head upon limbs...but he is mind 
alone (phren  m o n o u n ), holy ( h i e r e )  and beyond description, 
darting through the whole cosmos with swift thoughts.110 There, 
neither are the swift limbs of the sun distinguished - thus it is 
held fast in the close obscurity of h a r m o n i a , a rounded sphere 
rejoicing in its joyous solitude. But as Strife begins to win 
supremacy once more, one by one all the limbs of the God begin 
to qu iver .111 W hen great Strife had grown strong in the l im b s  
(sc. of the God) and sprang to its prerogatives as the time was 
fulfilled which was marked for them in turn by a broad oath...112
Empedocles talks of l im b s  of the God, giving as an instance, the
108 Cf. frr. 29, 27, 31
109 Fr. 29, Hippolytus, Ref. vii, 29, 13
110 Fr. 134, Ammonius, de Interretatione, 249, 6 Busse
111 Frr. 27 and 31, Simplicius, in Phy., 1183, 28
^ 2  Fr. 30, Aristotle Meta.  B4, 1000B12
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sun, which is part of the constitu tional features of a fu lly  
articulated cosmos. The anthropomorphic conception of god was 
radically  rev ised  by X enophanes' pow erful objec tions against 
tradition. Only mental powers and some ideal psychological states 
such as joy or happiness are retained.113 The supreme God of 
Empedocles is modelled partly on the Xenophanean God, and 
partly on the Heraclitean. The three specifically connect supreme 
"reason" or "mind" with God. Like Xenophanes' both Gods are 
spherical in body. Like Heraclitus', God is a dynamic harmonia  o f  
d ifferent tendencies. Xenophanes' or Heraclitus' God is eternal, 
Empedocles' God is immortal in a cyclical sense. However, since 
"death" for Empedocles does not entail the existential negation but 
the m ere "reb irth" , "renewal" or " transfo rm ation"  of life , 
Empedocles' God. like Heraclitus', can be said to be "ever-living". 
But unlike his philosophical predecessors, though like Hesiod and 
Homer, Empedocles' supreme God is generated from more basic 
divine powers.
Empedocles' Love and Strife114 function as metaphysical grounds 
for psychic, moral, social and epistem ic115 phenomena. Love is 
the principle of friendship, harmony, joy, love, goodness, holiness, 
reason, and that by which we are conscious o f  lo v e .1 1 6
E.g., in Heraclitus, the drier the p s u c h e , the wiser and the happier. 
And a dry psucKe  approximates to God, i.e., the fiery essence of all things 
which is said to be the Wise one. It is implied then that God is the happiest 
state of existence. Moreover, Xenophanes' God who is mind, governs the 
cosmos without toil. Likewise, Melissus' Being feels no pain but is 
heal thy .
114 Love, like Strife, is most probably spatially extended, but so tenuous as 
to be invisible. Empedocles enjoins us to contemplate it with the mind and 
not with dazed eyes (fr.17).
^ 5  Fr.109: For with earth do we see earth, with water water, with air bright 
air, with fire consuming fire; with Love do we see Love, Strife with dread 
Strife.
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Empedocles calls Love blameless  (fr.35), while Strife is accursed  
and hateful  (fr.17). By calling Love blam ew orthy  and Strife 
accursed, he registers not only h i s  m oral judgem ent, but also 
articulates the moral properties of Love and Strife. In fr. 115, a 
passage classified under P u r i f i c a t i o n s , sin is explicitly associated 
with "trusting in raving Strife". Heraclitus had proclaimed the 
universal necessity of Strife as the principle of this world-order. 
For him such a principle is perfectly compatible with h a r m o n i a .  
For E m pedocles , S trife  is fundam en ta lly  in com patib le  with 
harmonia  and Love.
Strife may indeed be a power of s e p a r a t i o n  or d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , 
Love of union and harmony  - powers in the exercise of which 
Love and Strife contribute to zoogony and cosmogony leading to 
cosmology (fr. 35 ) .117 But the four roots as active, divine, living 
powers, seem to share in the pow er of d ifferentia tion  and 
unification:
Come now, hear how fire as it was separated raised up the
116 'for she [Love] it is who is thought innate (e m p h u t o s ) even in mortal 
limbs; because o f her they think friendly thoughts and accomplish 
harmonious deeds, calling her Joy by name and Aphrodite. She is 
perceived by no mortal as she circles among them' (fr. 14).
1 1 7 This fragment talks about 'countless mortals pouring forth’. It also 
talks o f "things" (sc. elements) some o f which are not yet mixed, some 
being mixed by Love. Since our present world contains large compact 
chunks o f the elements, this fragment is possibly speaking in general 
terms on cosmology or cosmogony and zoogony. Other fragments relating 
to Love's "creativity" are B71, 73, 96, 98, 86, 87. According to Aetius, ii, 6, 3 
(DK31 A49): 'Empedocles holds that aether was the first to be separated 
off, next fire, and after that earth. From earth, as it was excessively  
constricted by the force o f the rotation, sprang water.' These first stages 
of cosm ogony are most probably the effect o f the vortex motion 
introduced by Strife. Cf. Fr. 38;. DK31A49; 31A30
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nocturnal shoots of men and pitiable wom en...118 W hole-natured 
shapes first sprang up from the earth, having a portion of both 
water and heat. These fire sent up , wishing to come to its 
like.(fr.62)
Fire r a i s e d  and sent  up whole-natured shapes in its up-going 
tendency, to join  its like. Each of the other elements have their 
natural tendency too. And their co-existence - e.g., fire and water, 
naturally engenders certain meteorological even ts .119 The matter 
is complicated: Love and Strife also appear as causes both of 
s a m e n e s s  and d i f f e r e n c e  (fr. 22). The problem  is, perhaps, 
artificial, remembering that the six Empedoclean principles are 
each an active, divine principle. Consequently, it appears that 
Love's principal business is not so much to motivate as to qualify, 
i.e., by c o n t r i b u t i n g  mutual desirability, beauty, harmony ( o r  
proportion), holiness and thought, to properties of the inherently 
active Roots. Empedocles' spherical God is grounded in a 
perfection of the harmonic relation of all things, in a state of 
unified concentration of all the divine powers, except Strife. Such 
union is occasioned by Love in its fullest presence. The result is a 
cosmos of the highest order of life - a God which is mind alone. 
Strife not m erely differentiates principles capable of existing 
apart of them selves; it d i s h a r m o n i o u s l y  a n d  ha t e fu l l y  
differentiates. And this includes the active depreciation of the 
holy mental life of the spherical God. For Strife's power reaches
Aetius v, 181 (DK31A75): 'Empedocles says that when the race of men 
were produced from the earth, the day lasted as long as ten months does 
now, because o f the slowness of the sun's motion. But as time went on, the 
day lasted as long as a seven month period now. For this reason ten- 
month babies develop in a single day...'
Aristotle, G C .  B6, 334al; Aetius 11. 6, 3; Ps-Plutarch S t r o m ,  a p u d .  
Eusebium, P.E. 1.8, 10 (DK31A30).
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its acme when Love is fully present in the joyous solitude of an 
all-mind cosm ic-God. On N a t u re , therefore, is not a purely 
scientific, materialistic treatise as is sometimes claimed; it also 
contains a theology and some religious notes.
The P u r i f i c a t i o n s , on the other hand, develops Orphic religious 
themes understandable only by assuming the m etaphysics and 
theology of On Nature.  The Pu r i f i c a t i o n s  expands on the moral 
and psychic role of Love and Strife by showing how the conflicts 
of human life, which arise from our daemon  ( E m p e d o c l e a n  
equivalence of psucKe)  reflect our intrinsic participation in Love 
and Strife. So that with Love we are always tending to 
harmonious relation with other things and finally to union with 
god, while with Strife we are tending apart, first from god, and 
then, disharmoniously from other things. Let us begin with the 
period of absolute supremacy of divine Love:
Among them was no war-god Ares worshipped nor the battle- 
cry nor was Zeus their king nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Cypris 
[i.e.Aphrodite] was queen. Her they p ropitia ted  with holy 
images, with paintings of living creatures, with perfumes of 
varied fragrance and sacrifices of pure myrrh and sweet-scented 
frankincense, throwing to the ground libations of yellow honey. 
Their altar was not drenched by the unspeakable slaughters of 
bulls, but this was held among men the greatest defilement - to 
tear out the life from noble limbs and eat them (fr 128). All 
things were tame and gentle to men, both beasts and birds, and 
their friendship burned bright (fr. 130).
This "Hesiodic" golden age reflects a cosmic period in which Love 
is still very strong, and Strife is negligible. In On Na ture , we 
were told in no uncertain terms that Love’s nature is to be defined 
by its function: among others the p roduction  o f  harm ony,
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friendliness, and the perfect harm onisation  o f  the d a e m o n i c  
elements into a single supreme deity whose indescribable  holy 
mind darts through the whole cosmos. This "god-cosmos" or 
"cosmos-god" contains no iota of Strife, so that no distinction of 
god's "limbs" are visible. The limbs in question are the sun, water 
or sea, and other elemental features of our present cosmos. The 
same thought is re lig iously  applied here w ith  m ore or less 
coherence: first the q u e e n s h i p  of Aphrodite in whose tenure a l l  
t h i n g s  are t a m e  and gentle  - both beasts and m en, and their 
f r iendship  burns bright. Secondly, the holy  mind o f  the sphere- 
God is given a religious treatment; it is attended by sacramental 
purity , which needs no fu rther e labora tion  excep t to stress 
absence of sacrificial defilement by bloodshed. To say that in the 
golden age, "no war-god Ares was worshipped nor was Zeus their 
king nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Cypris was queen", implies a 
state of advanced supremacy of Love. And if, as is suggested by 
the text, there is indeed social life in the golden age, although one 
that is characterised by im peccable  sanctity , then it is more 
probable that the golden age corresponds to a stage next to the 
absolute queenship of Love. This near-perfect harm ony of all 
things to the alm ost abso lu te  exclusion  of S trife  would be 
com patib le  w ith the ex is te n ce  of agen ts  w hose  na tu re  is 
encom passed by a (neglig ib le) degree of Strife  which is not 
sufficient to make the golden age impossible.
However that may be, let the time sealed by broad oath mature, 
and let A phrodite  begin to relinguish  her suprem acy by the
i
| incursion of Strife. Then the ratio  of advancing  Strife and
|
retreating Love engenders an unpleasant state: the h a r m o n i c
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binding of existing things and friendly feelings begin to wane; 
accursed  and selfish indiv iduality  begin to return; unreason 
begins to resurface; piety is diminishing. The golden age of Love- 
dom inating cosmos is being replaced by our Strife-encompassed 
cosmos. The process entails a hybrid of the powers of Love and 
Strife:
T here  w ere  fa r-see ing  Sun, b loody D isco rd  and serene 
h a r m o n i a , Beauty and Ugliness, Haste and Tarrying, Lovely 
Truth and blind Obscurity (fr.112).
Strife 's advance tends to despicable proportions. Em pedocles 
could not help crying (at birth, perhaps) at the sight of this
unfam iliar place where Murder and Anger and the tribes of 
other Deaths... and the d a e m o n e s  wander in darkness over the 
meadow of Doom (fr. 118). Alas, poor unhappy race of mortals, 
from what strifes and groanings were you born .120 From what 
high rank and from what height of b liss .. .121 we have come 
under this roof... clothing (sc. the d a e m o n )  in an alien garment 
of flesh.122
Torn off by Strife from the felicity and tranquility of the holy all­
mind God, man is a d a e m o n  f a l l e n  directly from the divine bliss 
of the long-living or blessed gods (ffr. 21, 115) who, it seems, are 
interm ediate  in status between the supreme spherical-G od and 
man; and man will go through a series o f transmigrations until 
purified of his primal sin, he returns as god to the divine bliss:
For I have already been once a boy and a girl, and a bush and a 
bird, and a leaoing, journeying fish ( f r . l l7 ) . . . I  too am now one, 
an exile from the gods and a wanderer, having put my trust in
raving Strife (fr. 115). Among the beasts t h ey  [d a e m o n e s ] are 
bom as lions with lairs in the hills and beds on the ground, as 
laurels among fair-tressed trees (fr.127). But at the end t h e y  
come among men on earth as prophets, bards, doctors and 
princes; and thence they  rise as gods highest in honour, sharing 
with the other immortals their hearth and their table, without 
part in human sorrows or weariness (frr. 146, 147).
Empedocles himself has reached the threshold of becoming a 
god; for he sees himself as a prophet, a bard, a doctor, and now a 
prince, almost Love incarnate as his presence in every city d r a w s  
a throng:
An immortal god, mortal no more, I go about honoured by all, as 
is fitting, crowned with ribbons and fresh garlands; and by all 
whom I come upon...I am revered...They follow  me in their 
thousands asking where lies the road to profit, some desiring
prophecies, while others ask to hear the word of healing for 
every kind of illness...(fr.l 12)
However, all life is sacred, since it originates from the d a e m o n i c  
divinity of the six principles. Here is the ground for moral and
ritual in junctions against bloodshed and cannibalism , and for 
selected vegetarianism ( f r .136,123 fr.140,124 fr.141). Cannibalism, 
anger, bloody discord, murder, blind obscurity, etc. are a function 
of Strife. Now Em pedocles adds or ra ther explains "blind
12 3 'The father lifts up his own son changed in form and slaughters him
with a prayer; blind fool, as he shrieks piteously, beseeching as he 
sacrifices. But he, deaf to his cries, slaughters him and makes ready in 
his halls an evil feast. In the same way, son seizes father, and children 
their mother, and tearing out the life tV y eat the flesh of those they 
love'.
*24 It is not cleai why, or rather it is inconsistent to insist on, abstinence 
from only some plants - if, as it appears, the sacred origin of life grounds 
the asceticism of a practical believer in transmigration.
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o b s c u r i ty " 125 as perjury, and suggests that indulgence in these bar 
d a e m o n i c  red em ption  from  the travails  o f transm igration . 
B loodshed is a prim al sin, and transmigration is a necessary 
process of expiation:
An oracle of Necessity, ancient decree of the gods, eternal, sealed 
with broad oaths; when anyone sins and pollutes his own hands 
with bloodshed, who by his error makes false the oath he swore 
- spirits whose portion is a long life (m a k ra i on os . . . b i o i o ) 126 - for 
thrice ten thousand years he wanders apart  from  the blessed, 
being born throughout  that t ime in all  manner  o f  f o rms  o f  
mortal  things , exchanging one hard path f o r  another.  The force 
o f  the aether pursues him into the sea, the sea spews him out 
onto the floor of the earth, the earth casts him into the rays of 
the blazing sun, and the sun into the eddies of the air; one takes 
him from the other, but all abhor him. Of these I too am now 
one, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, having put my trust 
in Strife (fr.115).
The P u r i f i c a t i o n s  is a quest for a desirable quality of life, and 
the m anner of its attainment. The highest life is that of the 
spherical God. Next is the life of the blessed or long-lived gods 
( d a e m o n e s  m a k a r e s , fr.115, t h o u s  d o l i c h a i o n a s { fr.21)
presumably born in an advanced supremacy of Love and having a 
good amount of Love and the corresponding rationality. Perhaps, 
living the life of a god happens during the Golden age - since this 
period seems to admit of social life. This is the point from which 
humans, first as long-living d a e m o n e s  are descended. By fr.115 
we appear to be directly descended and alienated from them, i.e., 
born into shorter-lived, mortal forms of life by Strife in whose
*2  ^ In fr.122 he had contrasted Lovely Truth with blind Obscurity. It seems 
that it means blind Falsehood.
126 The fragments of Empedocles contains only a single occurrence (B138) 
o f  psuche , and then it means life.
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trust we violated the eternal de.cree and thereby necessitated  our 
alienation. At this time Ares (or Strife) was negligible and Love 
was very Strong. Next, the wretchedness of human life with the 
advancement of Strife, and the still lower forms of life - bestial, 
fish, bird, and vegetable, are concom mitant to the life  o f  an 
alienated da em 'on .  The P u r i f i c a t i o n s  then offers a program m e 
for redeeming our origin as daemones makares.  E m p e d o c l e s  
seems to think that despite the fact that the alternating periodic 
sup rem acy  o f  S tr ife  and Love is governed by the  ru le  of 
Necessity, it is possible willfully to specifically cultivate Love for 
the prospect of a m a k a r i o s  life. And, no doubt, part of our 
success will depend on how far we carry out Orphic precepts.
Fr. 115 suggests that the alienated d a e m o n 127 begins his thrice 
ten thousand years exile directly from element to element, trying 
to assimilate itself to each and failing each time; from the force of 
aether (or air) to the sea (water) to the earth to the sun's rays 
(fire), and back again to aether. The elemental round of the fallen 
d a e m o n  repeats the succession in which in On Na t ure  Strife 
articulates the elements, i.e., the limbs of the spherical-God.
But, what survives the round of transmigrations? W e are told 
that the more harmoniously constituted, the more in te lligent we 
a r e . 128 Since the sphere-God is a perfectly harm onious entity
127 Empedocles both in On Nature and in Purifications  seems to have 
rationally re-worked themes from Hesiod's works; the importance of 
Strife, Aphrodite (ErTfs) and the idea of the Golden Age, for example. Cf. 
T h e o g o n y  775-806 which tells o f the fate o f any god who engages in 
quarrel and strife and then foreswears the oath to desist. And man is 
identified with the banished god
128 'Those in whom the elements are equally blended or nearly so...are the 
most intelligent and the most acute, in sensation, and those closest to them 
are appropriately (acute and intelligent), while those with the opposite 
composition are the most foolish...And those who have an equable blend
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which is also all-mind, it follows that there are degrees in 
harmonious nature of which the long-lived gods come between us 
and the spherical-God. Though all life is, in the end, immortal, the 
life of the spherical-God is the highest and the best. Then that of 
the long-lived gods who are said to live free o f human sorrows 
and weariness. They also have an unwearied, happy life, free of 
the miseries of anger, bloody discord, murder, and other "Strife- 
engendered" anxieties. Empedocles comes closest to tradition in 
his conception of the gods. But as we have already seen, he stops 
short of attributing human form to the spherical-God. W e may 
reasonably infer that he likewise refrains from attributing human 
form to the long-lived gods. However, both the spherical-God and 
the lesser gods have kinds of personality: the spherical-God comes 
to exist in j o y o u s  solitude; and the long-lived gods are a happy, 
blessed lot, free of human sorrows, etc. W hat survives the round
of incarnations is an agent but not necessarily  of a human
psychological form.
We might conclude with the note that for Empedocles too, as for 
his predecessors, the fundamental ground of all things are divine 
realities (constituted by the six basic d a e m o n e s ), which serve as 
that which are u ltim ately presupposed in an account of the 
universe; and the explanatory  function o f  divine causality  is 
expressed in terms of motion.
11 Anaxagoras
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c.500-428 BC). The famous jibes
in some one part are skillful with that part. Therefore some men are good 
orators, others craftsmen, because the (proper) blend in one case is in
their hands, in the other case in their tongue; and the same is true of
their capacities1 (Theophrastus de Sensu 10-11 = Empedocles A86, 10-11).
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which Plato's Socrates threw at Anaxagoras in the P h a e d o , 129  and 
the subsequent use of N o u s  in the P h i l e b u s  and the T i m a e u s  
exp la in  why P la to ,130 with Aristotle in the M e t a p h y s i c s , is 
unsparing even as he admires A naxagoras. A naxagoras had 
postulated or derived the existence of the h ighest possible  order 
of reality, N o u s  (Reason or Mind), but, on Plato's reading, failed to 
express its function in teleological terms; Anaxagoras does not 
show that phenomena in the cosmos contribute in a rational and 
definite way to the good of a whole. He only shows that the 
universe is a rationally ordered system, a cosmos, because N o u s  
is diffused in it:
All things (chr*emata) were together, infinite in respect of both 
number and smallness; for the small too was infinite (fr. 1)...while 
all things were together, there was not even any colour plain; for 
the mixture of all things prevented it...(fr.4) The things in the 
one cosmos (en k o s m o i )  are not separated one from the other 
nor cut off with an axe, neither the hot from the cold nor the 
cold from the hot (fr.8). And since these things are so, we must 
suppose that there are many things of all sorts in everything 
that is being aggregated, seeds of all sorts of shapes and colours 
and tastes (fr.4). How could hair come from what is not hair, or 
flesh from what is not flesh? (fr.lO)...the first principles of things 
were the homoiomeres. For it seems...impossible that anything 
should come into being from the non-existent or to be dissolved 
into it. Anyhow we take in nourishm ent that is simple and 
homogeneous, such as bread or water, and by this are nourished 
by hair, veins, arteries, flesh, sinews, bones and all the other 
parts of the body...(Aetius 1, 3, 5 (DK59a46). In everything 
there is a portion (m o i r a ) of everything except Reason (n o u ); 
and there are some things in which there is Reason as well 
(fr. 11). And when Reason initiated motion, from all that was 
moved Reason was separated, and as much as Reason moved was 
all divided off...(fr.l3). But Reason, which ever is, is assuredly
!29 Especially Phdo. 98b =A47.
130 Cf. Meta. 985al8-25 =A47. Also PA 687a7-12 = A102
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even now where everything else is too, in the surrounding mass 
and in the things that have been either aggregated or separated 
(fr.14). And all the things that are mingled and separated and 
divided off Reason knew all (panta egno nous) .  R e a s o n  
arranged every th ing  (panta diekosmese nous ) y including the 
present rotation of the stars, the sun, moon...(fr. 12)
♦
The main threads of the thesis may be said to hang on a few 
principles or assumptions and deductions. Let tQ be a pre-cosmic 
moment, and t j  any cosmic moment. Anaxagoras assumes that:
(a) Although the things in t h i s  universe - things i.e., hot, dry, 
cold, wet, colour, shape, etc.131 - are perceptually differentiated, 
they are not actually separate one from the other (fr. 4, 8).
(b) Hair cannot come from what is not hair or flesh from what is 
not flesh (fr. 10).
(c) This  universe is a cosmos, i.e, a dynamic, orderly system.
From these assum ptions (and presum ably with some others), 
Anaxagoras infers: from (a) that (1) at tQ, all existing things at tj  
were together; from (a) and (b) that (2) there must be infinite 
s e e d - a r c h a i  ( s p e r m a t a ,  moira)  - i.e., self-sufficient sources of 
(hot, dry, flesh, colour, hair etc.- i.e.) everything inter-containing 
one another, some containing reason; (2) implies that (3) there is 
no absolute coming to be and destruction, and that generation and 
destruction occur by aggregation and separation. The crucial 
assum ption is (c) which suggests that ex is ting  things are
f
seggregated or mixed in an orderly system. Indeed, to say that
every existing thing has a seed (s p e r m a ) as its source is to
suggest some kind of dynamic, self-sufficient source for the 
existence of each thing. However, such a source is not in itself
1 3 1 Anaxagoras, like his predecessors, does not distinguish between a
"thing" and a "quality". See fr.12.
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sufficient cnou,;h to account for the existence of this universe as a 
cosmos. Anaxagoras may have reasoned that for sufficiency of 
account, there must be another factor - Reason - whose function, 
adequately specified, will be jointly sufficient with the presence of 
the infinite seed-archai  to account for this universe perceived as 
a cosm os.132 Although he does not call Reason god, Anaxagoras' 
specification of Reason's function leaves no doubt that he has in 
mind the sort of ar c  he  recognisable in the context of preceding 
thought and in traditional religion as divine.
That Anaxagoras' thesis is theologica l is obvious from  the
follow ing reconstruc tion : at tQ all existing things at t j  were
together, apart from Reason, and at t j  some, but not all things, 
contain parts of Reason. Reason who k n e w 1^!  this cosmos at tg, 
m o v e d  and arranged  ( i .e ., seggregated  and m ing led) existing 
things into a cosmos at . The further specification of the nature 
of Reason in fr. 12 suggests that Reason is a divine a r c h e ; "Reason 
has power [or rules] over all things" (panton nous kratei).  But
having causal power grounds the Greek idea of god. Further, the 
d ivinity  of d iv ine pow er is grounded  in con d itions  of (1)
eternality, (2) supremacy, (3) ideality/perfection. (i) is satisfied 
by the relative clause in fr. 14: Reason, "which ever is" (hos aei  
est i ) .  (2) is satisfied by the scope o f  R eason’s pow er or rule 
(panton nous kratei).  The satisfaction of (3) is suggested by the 
qualitative nature of Reason: it is "the f i n e s t  and the p u r e s t " of
!3 2  ^11 Reason is alike, both the greater and the smaller. But nothing else 
is like anything else; on the contrary, each individual thing is and was 
manifestly those things of which it contains most’ (B12).
133 According to Simplicius = A45, 'Reason wanted (bo u le th e i s ) to make a 
world; He seemed to say that all things were together and at rest for an 
unlimited time, and that the cosmogonical Reason, wanting to separate out 
the kinds which he calls homoiomeries, created motion in them'.
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all things. The radical opposition of Reason and Matter which we 
find in Plato and'Aristotle is not yet made in Anaxagoras. There is 
no suggestion that the infinite other principles are inert. For 
Anaxagorean realities are seeds (,s p e r m a t a , moira)  - which are 
b io-chem ically  dynamic s truc tu res .134 Yet the power of Reason, 
which is causally conceived, functions primarily in movement and 
cognition, and then in arrangement - the sort of activities which 
seeds are incapable of performing.135
Other clues to the divinity of Anaxagoras' Reason are the scope 
of its knowledge, its consciousness, and the satisfaction of (4) - 
self-sufficiency. .Anaxagoras thinks that Reason's power is fullest 
when unencumbered. He therefore grounds R eason’s supreme 
power in four conditions: (a) self-rule; (b) unmixed purity ;136 (c) 
control of everything; and (d) infinity. (a) and (d) satisfy 
condition (4); (a), (c) and (d) also satisfy (2), while (a) and (b)
134 c f  Simplicius, in Phy. 27, 11 (DK59A41),’Theophratus says that the 
theory of Anaxagoras resembles that of Anaximander; for Anaxagoras 
says that, in dividing up of the infinite, things o f like kind t e n d  
together, and what was gold or earth in the original whole becomes gold 
or earth respectively'. Also DL 11, 8 (DK59A41)
135  According tc Simplicius, in Phy. 27, 2, Anaxagoras 'shared the 
philosophical beliefs of Anaximenes'. So that he is taken to have taught, 
with his student Achelaus, that p su ch T  is made of air. Aristotle says that 
'Anaxagoras says that psuche is the moving principle' (de An. 404a25). 
It is not clear to me whether the Peripatetics read Achelaus into 
Anaxagoras; that is, whether Anaxagoras thought that Air or Aether could 
serve the unmixea purity o f Reason.
136 Anaxagoras' pupil, the Athenian Archelaus, wrote in protestation 
against the unmixed purity o f Reason: 'he maintained that from the outset 
there was a certain mixture immanent in Reason...Reason is inborn in all 
animals alike; for each of the animals as well as man makes use of Reason, 
though some more rapidly than others' (Hippolytus, Ref. 1 , 9 . 1 ) .  
According to Aetius, ’[He held that reason and Air are god, but not the 
cosmogonical reason]' (A12)
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satisfy (3). (c) is said to depend on (b). And (b) is explained as
"all alike, both the greater and the sm aller quantities". Since 
Reason knows, controls, arranges, "he" is, at least, alive and 
conscious. Consequently, if also Reason is everywhere, the entire 
cosmos is animated by Reason's ubiquity. Item  (b) - unmixed 
purity - enables Anaxagoras to account for the limited presence of 
Reason as an internal constituent of (some) living things. Item (c) 
- control of everything - includes (i) the control of all living things, 
(ii) arrangement of all things by motion - separation, aggregation 
and rotation at " t j" .  (ii) includes the present and future comings- 
to-be and perishings, and the present rotation and arrangement of 
the stellar and solar systems.
"Reason, which ever is , has know ledge  abou t every th ing ."  
Anaxagoras also says not only that Reason knows all that are 
m ing led  and separa ted  and d iv ided , bu t a lso  th a t  every  
arrangem ent, and the motion by which the a rrangem ents  are 
made, now and :n the future, is predetermined by Reason. It is 
suggested then that Reason has timeless knowledge, and with it 
planned the blueprint for cosm ogony and determ ined how the 
primordial mass should be articulated into a cosmos, now or in the 
future, just as in the past.
Once again, here is evidence that what is deemed an adequate 
account of the universe perceived as a coftflps terminates in the 
existence of a divine cause and principle of (rational) motion, as 
that which is u ltim ately  presupposed  in that account. This 
conclusion is even more conspicuous in Diogenes of Apollonia.
11 Diogenes c f  Apollonia
Diogenes (floruit c. 440-430) is, next to none, the locus classicus
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for the argum ent that Presocratic  philosophy is also rational 
theo lo gy . His m ain thesis  is A nax im enean  w ith some 
sophistication deriving from his ecclectic hindsight. His own 
words are indispensable:
My opinion, in sum, is that all existing things are differentiated 
from the same thing, and are the same thing...for if  the things 
that are present in this cosmos (e n . . . k o s m o i ) - earth, water, air, 
fire and all the other things apparent in this world-order - if any 
of these were different from the other (different, i.e., in its own 
proper nature (heteron on tei idiai phusei ), and did not retain 
an essential identity (me to auto eon...) while undergoing many 
changes and differentiations, it would be in no way possible for 
them to mix with each other, or for one of them to help or harm 
the other, or for a growing plant to grow out of earth or for a 
living creature or anything else to come into being, unless they 
were so composed as to be the same thing. But all these things, 
being differentiated from the same thing, become different kinds 
at different times and return to the same thing (fr.2). For...it
would be impossible without reason for it (sc. the underlying 
substance) so to be divided up that it has m e a s u r e s  of all things 
- of winter and summer, and night and day, and rains and winds 
and fair weather. The other things, too, if one wishes to consider 
them, one would find disposed in the best possible way (fr. 3)... 
For this very thing seems to me to be a god, and to have reached 
ev e ry w h ere ,  and to d ispose  all th ings and to be in
every  th in g .. .( f r .5).
Diogenes assumes that the universe is a c o s m o s  arranged in 
the best possible way.  On this assumption, the following laws or 
inferences must hold: (i) The apparently different things in the
cosmos must be related to or must interact with one other; (ii) - (i) 
is possible if  and only if  the apparently different things in the
cosm os have a [common] proper nature, i .e ., i f  they are 
e s sen t i a l l y  one and the same thing; (iii) If (i) and (ii) are to hold, 
Air must be the a rc  he1 of all things in the cosmos (fr. 5); (iv) It
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follows from (i)-(iii) that the apparently different things in the
cosmos are e s s e n t i a l l y  A ir ;137 To satisfy the conditions of an
a r c h e  of a cosmos arranged in the best  possible w a y , A ir must
(a) reach everywhere, (b) arrange all things, (c) be in everything
and, above all, (d) be intelligent (fr.5; cf. fr. 8). (a)-(c) are satisfied
for Diogenes because A ir is conceived as infinite in power, in
differential qualities, and in quantity  (see fr.5); it  is "many-
fashioned", p o l u t r o p o i , and displays its infinite qualities through
138rarefac tion  and condensation . By those processes of change 
p s u e  he  is produced of warm  air of varying tem perature  for
varying kinds of living creatures (fr.5). All these  m anifold 
changes are engendered by the internal dynamic character o f Air.
[Air] is also said to be eternal, and immortal body (fr.7), great, 
strong, and much-knowing (fr.8), while of the rest some come into 
being, some pass away (fr.7). "Much-knowing" is supportive of
the express a ttribution of in te lligence to Air; it satisfies the
condition of in te lligence  required  of an arch"e  o f  a cosmos 
arranged in the best possible way. Such is what god is. Hence, the 
inferential, 'For this very thing seems to me to be a god' (fr. 5). 
Notice the self-consciousness with which it is suggested that the 
p roperties  of the a ir - a r c h e  sa tisfy  the concep tion  of god. 
Diogenes, like his progenitor Anaximenes, may have confirmed (or
137 'The others say that perceptible things are by nature ( p h u s e i ); but 
Leucippus and Democritus and Diogenes say that they are by convention 
(n om oi ), i.e., in opinion (d o x e i ) and in our affections (p a th es i , A23)
1^8 Simplicius = A5: 'He says that the nature of the whole is Air, unlimited 
and eternal; and from it, as it is condensed and rarefied and changed in its 
affections, the form of the other things comes into being1. Or, Ps- 
Plutarch, A6; 'He makes the cosmos thus: as the whole is moved, and 
becomes rare here and dense there...'
116
established) the vital, divine ground of the cosmos and its rational 
function by an analogical argument:
Further, in addition to those, these too are important indications. 
Men and other living creatures live by means of air through 
breathing it. And this is for them both p sue  he  and reason, and 
if  this is removed, then they die and reason fails (fr.4). And it 
seems to me that that which has reason is what men call air, and 
that all men are s t e e r e d  (k u b e r n a s t h a i ) by this, and that i t  
has power  (or rules, kratein)  over all things (fr.5).
Note the "steering" function and supreme or ruling power of the 
divine ground of all things. The first sentence suggests that 
Diogenes was trying to confirm rather than find grounds on which 
to infer the living divinity and intelligence of Air, but the other 
way might be true.
Thus Diogenes also thinks that the existence of god or a divine 
power is necessary as the ultimate presupposition in an account of 
the universe as a cosmos. Such a power is deemed sufficient to 
account for the existence of our teleologically conceived cosmos by 
its inherent power of motion expressed in terms of rarefaction 
and condensation.
13 The atomists
A gainst the common tendency to read the atom ic system of 
Democritus and Leucippus as a non-religious, material philosophy 
of science, I shall, in what follows, argue that the Atomists share 
with the Presocratics the general pattern of thought by which god 
or divine reality is associated with the a rc h e '  of all things; that 
some god-producing a r c h T -atom provides an atomistic theology. 
There are, to be sure, different strands in the account of the gods.
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But these d ifferen t strands are not necessa rily  incom patib le . 
However, their coherence, if  any, is not a smooth one, as Cicero 
observes. After importing that Democritus says that Reason is god, 
and is in the spherical atoms (de Nat.  Deor.  1, 12, 29), Cicero 
continues:
What of Democritus who now counts as gods images which travel 
about, and now that nature which pours forth and sends out 
these images, and now our own thought and mind; is he not 
vastly mistaken? Does he not altogether destroy god, when he 
denies that any compound is imperishable, since it never abides 
in the same condition, so that he makes any notion of god
impossible? For at one moment Democritus says that images 
endowed with divinity are present in the universe, and then that 
the first beginnings of Reason, which are also in the universe are 
gods, and then images endowed with p s u c h e , which are wont to
benefit us or do us harm, and then some images so huge that
they embrace the whole universe from without...(43, 120)
Some prelim inary remarks about atoms (a t o m o s  in Greek) is 
relevant here. "A t o m o s " means, first and forem ost, that which 
cannot be cut into parts, the indivisible. Democritus is said to 
have referred  to his atoms by the word "phus i s"  ( B 1 6 8 ) .
A risto tle , regu larly  uses the words "to pleres"  (full) and " to  
s t e r e on "  ( so lid )  to d e s ig n a te  the a tom s (cf . e sp e c ia l ly  
M e t a . ,9%5bA-22 = A6). In his m onograph on D em ocritus, 
Aristotle says that Democritus calls each of these atoms "b e in g "  
( o n ) ,  " th in g " ,  " m a s s y " .  A risto tle  opposes a tom ism  ( M e t a  1) 
because, to him, it recognises only a material cause. We must 
object that although some materiality may be involved in the 
conception of atoms, Aristotle's reading of the atoms as a material 
cause, implying the exclusion of Aristotle's three other causes -
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formal, efficient, and final cause - is, in all probability, another 
example of his "interested" reading of his predecessors. Indeed, 
Democritean atoms do move, but they are in every other respect 
poles apart from Aristotelian matter - i.e., the materials of a thing 
as opposed to the structure that holds them together. And, 
although the system of Leucippus and Democritus has had the 
deepest impact on modern science; for the postulation of atoms 
surely contains a high degree of scientific rationality, their atoms 
are no chemical or electrically charged elements. And there is no 
evidence of any empirical methodology on which atomism was 
grounded. Already in antiquity it differed from Epicurus', and the 
latter's from Gassendi's.
Apart, p robably , from  in trinsic  m obility , the  a tom s were 
conceived as indivisib le  geometric shapes (s c h e m a ) or forms 
( r h u s m o s ) of infinite variety: 'There belong to them every kind of 
shape and every kind of form...some are scalene, some hooked, 
some hollow, some convex, and they have innum erable other 
d i f f e r e n c e s ' .139 As geometric forms, individual atoms have no 
qualities as such. They produce qualities by their infinite shapes
being in contact with one another and being arranged in infinite 
possible w a y s .140 Thus all qualitative differences in objects are
139 See Aristotle's Meta., 985b 16 = A6. Cf. Cicero, Al l .
14 0  Simplicius (AS)  says [Leucippus] hypothesised unlimitedly many 
eternally moving elements - the atoms - and the unlimited quantity of the 
shapes among them because nothing is rather such and such...'By 
convention sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by 
convention cold, by convention colour, but in reality atoms and void' (fr. 
9, Sextus Adv Math,  vii, 135). There is a controversial Peripatetic 
attribution of weight to the atoms (See Aristotle's G C  326a9 = A60; 
Sim plicius A61; Theophrastus, de Sensu, 61 = A135) - against Aetius’ 
explicit denial (A47). The controversy subsists as long as we subscribe to 
the Peripatetic attribution o f mass to atoms and follow them by taking 
atoms to be just material bodies. But the atomists could, presumably, do
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the result of quantitative and organisational d ifferences alone:
coming to be and destruc tion  are ju s t  con g lom era tion  and
dissolution of atoms. This is made possib le  because of the
existence of void or space, which the atomists called, "non-being"
(cf. A risto tle’s M e t a .  985b4-10). It is not clear, though, what
"non-being" m eans - w hether, i.e., it is em pty  space or a
permeable atmosphere.
However that may be, the conception of a t o m o s  appears to
answer the question  all o ther P resocra tics  m ay have asked
themselves and tried to answer: W hat is the fundamental ground
and nature of all things? The orientation of this question is
metaphysical., and the ontological order which the postulation of
atoms is supposed to fill, legitim ately  inspires attribution of
divinity to atoms, and is adequate to the consideration of some
atomic nature as productive of gods or p s u c h e '.
According to Aristotle:
There are some who maintain that the psuche"  is preem inently  
and primarily the cause of m ovem ent...Hence Democritus says
that p s u c h e  is a sort of fire or heat. For the shapes and 
indivisibles are infinite; and he calls those which are spherical 
fire and p s u c h T ..Because such shapes can most easily penetrate 
everything, and being them selves in motion, can most easily 
move all others ...(de an. 404aff). Democritus says that of all the 
shapes, the spherical is the most mobile; and this is the shape for 
both fire and mind (ibid. 4 0 5 a l  1).
Although all atoms may be intrinsicctlly  mobile, some atomic
shape is pre-eminently so. This shape is the source not only of 
fire or heat but also of life and mind, and of the pow er of 
penetra tion  everyw here . It is m ost easily  ab le  to m ove 
away with weight for individual atoms.
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everything else and impart motion to all living things. This 
spherical atom is distinguished from other atomic shapes which 
are the source  of bod ily  constitu tion . A c o m m e n ta ry  of 
Philoponus’ on Aristotle's de Anima  (83, 27) says: "Democritus 
says that fire was incorporeal, not absolutely incorporeal - for 
none of them said this - because of its subtlety. And Aetius (68 = 
A74) reports that according to Democritus god is reason (n o u s ) in 
the fire atom. Cicero too (= A74) adds that Democritus thinks that 
our knowledge and intelligence or the principle of reason are 
divine. According to Aetius thought and perception arise when 
the p s u c h ' e  or reason -atom is set in motion by the impact of 
congruent a tom s141 (A 164).
Accordingly, I take it that there is an atomistic theology, and 
that this is founded on three limbs of the atomic hypothesis: (i) 
spherical atoms are god-, mind-, and life- producing atoms; (ii) 
gods are products of the sort(s) of atoms in (i); (iii) because the 
god-producing atoms are pre-eminently mobile and have the the 
property which enable them to peneffate everywhere, these atoms 
may be said to move all others, (i), (ii) and (iii) put the Atomists 
firmly in the mainstream of Presocratic theological thinking which 
postulates, or derives from the cosmos, some divine arche"  of 
motion as the fundam ental ground of phenom enal existence. 
Here, a supreme kind of mobility attributed to the spherical atom 
establishes a status for it which is causally superior to all other 
atoms. Given (i) and (ii), we may as well believe the story 
according to which, for Democritus,
certa in  e i d o l c  approach men, and that of these some are
141 Aetius iv, 8, 10. Cf. Alexander, de Sensu 56, 12.
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b e n ef ic ien t  and some m a le f ic ie n t .142 That is why he even 
prayed to attain felicitous e ido l a .  These are great and indeed 
enorm ous, and hard to destroy, though not indestructible, and
they signify the future to men, being seen and uttering sounds. 
Hence the ancients, getting a presentation of these very things, 
supposed that there was a god, there being no other gods apart 
from these having an indestructible nature.143
The idea of "aerial" divinities is not peculiar here. It also appears 
in the theogony of the E p i n o m i s  which the author supposes to be 
a sequel to Plato’s L a w s . Cicero complains not about an atheistic
Democritus, but about the coherence of the many strands in his
account and conception of god. Democritus nods over the nature 
of gods, treating the e id o l a  sometimes as (a) being themselves 
divine, sometimes as (b) images produced by the gods. Clement, 
in accepting (b), says that e ido la  fall on men and brute animals
from the divine substance (A79). On this view, the term e idola  is 
taken in the psychological sense of d e i k e l a  or a p o r r h o i a i , i.e., 
films or effluences. H^mippus, the 3rd century BC biographer, 
tak ing  (a), says in turn that Democritus "naming them [sc.
d a e m o n e s ] e i d o l a  says that the air is full of these" (A78). It is 
probably  with reference to (a) that the following controversial 
passage was written:
O f the sage men, a few raising their hands to what we Greeks
*4  ^ It is perhaps in evident allusion to this passage that Pliny asserts that 
Democritus admitted only two gods, Penalty and Benefit (A76).
143 According to the last sentence, Democritus (a) may be denying the 
existence of gods behind the eidfi la  or (b) may be affirming e idola  as the
only gods there are or (c), both (a) and (b). But possibly (d): since the
ancients did not have an atomistic knowledge of the gods they took the 
e i d o l a  as the only gods there were, unaware that on an atomist view, 
those eid'ola  are mere, filmy representations of real gods. Neither (a),
(b), (c) or (d) denies the existence of gods. And this is all I need.
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now call air, said: ’Zeus is everything; and he knows everything, 
and gives and takes away; and he is king of everything (B30).
Some scholars take it as equivalent to Critias' law giver (see 
below) who invents god as a sacred sanction to bolster obedience 
to public laws. Others see it as an ironical reference to the sage of 
old. And still others see in it a genuine acknowlegement of the 
intuitive wisdom of the sage. We read in Alexander Polyhistor144 
that
the whole air is full of p s u c h a i  who are w orshipped as the
d a e m o n e s  and heroes, and it is these who send mankind
dreams and om ens.145
(a) and (b) above can be grounded on the atomist theory, (b) on
the general a tom istic  theory of p e rcep tio n 146 which makes
deikela (or e i d o l a )  effluences similar in kind to objects from 
which they flow .147 The second difficulty Cicero finds with the
Democritean conception of god is that it is inconsistent with the
belief that the gods are immortal, and is destructive of them: if
144 Alexander Polyhistor apud  DL viii, 32 (=DK 58Bla). Cf. Posidonius a p u d  
Cicero, de Divinatione. ,  1.64.
145 Cf. E.R. Dodds, op.cit. p. 118 , who takes the atomistic account o f the 
eidola  to be a mechanistic basis for objectivised dream experiences.
1 4 6 'He has seeing occur by reflection...for the reflection does not occur
immediately in the pupil, but the air between sight and the object of sight 
is given an impression as it is compressed by the object seen and the seer; 
for from everything there is always some effluence issuing. Then this
[air] being solid and differentiated in colour [from the eyes], is reflected 
in the moist eyes; and the thick part [of the eye] does not receive it, but 
the moist part lets it through' (Theophrastus, de Sensu, 50 = 135).
147 Tertullian (A74) has Democritus generate gods with the rising of the 
heavenly fire.
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e i d o l a , the filmy [divine] images are, on the atomic theory, 
effluences of the god-producing atoms organised in a certain way, 
Gods, then, would be compounds. But if compounds they are 
ultimately dissoluble into their atomic constituents. This amounts 
to destroying the immortality and imperishability of gods. This is 
the case whether or not (a) or (b) is to be preferred. But Cicero is 
not fully justified. The Greeks, we have noted, were used to the 
idea of a god who dies cyclically. The immortality of Persephone 
and Dionysus consists in a cyclical birth and death. Much more, 
whether (a) or (b), Democritus has provided for the persistent 
existence of gods and/or e id o l a  by the [eternal]148 presence of 
the god-producing atoms. The characterisation of god as great, of 
enormous size, hard to destroy though not imperishable, portent- 
agents, is an adaptation of traditional religion.
Whatever the true view of Democritus about gods, it is not easy 
to explain away what is obviously religious and m etaphysical 
dimensions of the conception of atoms, especially in view of the 
preceding patterns of thought in which physics is grounded in 
metaphysics, while the latter confirms religion and culminates in 
theology. D em ocritus1 positive asseverations in ethics, increase 
the d ifficu lty  for those who are inclined to ra tionalize  his 
apparently religious language:
It is best for a man to live his life with most cheer and the least 
grieving; and that will happen if he takes his pleasures not in 
mortal things (B189). For good spirits come to men through 
temperate enjoym ent and life commensurate. Deficiencies and 
excesses tend to turn into their opposites and to make large 
motions in the p s u c h ? .  And such p s u c h a i  as are in large-scale 
motion are neither in good balance nor in good spirits (fr. 191).
1 4 8 No such word as "eternal" appears to have been used by Democritus. 
But we can assure ourselves for once that atoms as archai  are eternal.
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They alone are* dear to the gods to whom injustice is hateful 
(B217). He who choses the goods of the p s u c h J  chooses the 
more divine; he who chooses those of the body, the human (B37). 
The gods grant men all good things, both in the past and now. 
But what is bad and harmful and useless, that neither in the past 
nor now do the gods donate to men...(B175).
A ccording  to these  fragm ents , D em o critu s’ concern  for the 
spiritual care of the p s u c h e  or of the inner self, almost matches 
Socrates’ in zest.
There is also the purely psychological explanation of religious 
consciousness which is not easy to reconcile with the previous 
accounts that seemed to depend on the atomistic theory. It is that 
religious consciousness is inspired by the primitive terror caused 
by elemental forces like thundering, lightning, eclipses, e tc .149 
However, we do not know in what contexts these thoughts were 
expressed, and it may well be that they entail no inconsistency 
with the previous accounts. Democritus may be explaining why 
some phenomenal aspects of religion are borne out of ignorance of 
the nature and workings of meteorology- This may leave his ’’true" 
atomistic relig ion intact. The same issues arise about what is 
supposed to have been said in On Tranqui l i t y , believed to have 
been written by Democritus. Here, he essays to explain religious 
conscience - such as guilt, be lief  in here-afte r,  and divine 
retribution - as arising from  unphilosophic temper. Something 
similar appears in On the Things in Hell  where postm ortem  bliss, 
is by implication, dismissed:
I 4 9  Cf. 'The ancients, seeing what happens in the sky - e.g., thunder and 
lightning, and thunderbolts and conjunctions o f stars and eclipses o f sun 
and moon - were afraid, believing gods to be the cause o f these' (A75). 
This does not ground atheism yet. At most he means that those 
meteorological occurrences are not caused by gods.
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Som e m en, ignoran t of the dissolution of mortal nature, but
conscious of the miseries of their life, crawl, during their life-time, 
in troubles and fears, inventing falsehoods about the time after
their death (B297).
Perhaps there  is no such thing as life after death, perhaps the 
stories about postm ortem  life  are only untrue. But neither 
consideration  im plies atheism. These observations on religious 
p sy cho logy  m ark  the tw iligh t zone between the wanings of
P re so c ra tic  c o sm o lo g ica l  ph ilosophiz ing  and the waxings of
Sophistic qualms and critical reflections about the phenomenology 
of religion.
14 Some sophists and others on religion
By this time the Sophists, more accurately some of them, and the 
atom ists contem poraneous with them in the 5th and early 4th 
century, had began to raise the matter of religious experience as 
an epis tem ological issue. The classic aphorism of Protagoras - 
man is the m easure of all th ings150- carries a h u m a n i s t i c  mood
that p resum ably  reflects  the general intellectual climate of the
period. The tendency was to regard the human fac tor  as t h e
locus of truth-claims, as of virtues. But it is also perceived that 
the human condition is subject to historical, local, physiological, 
and other re la tive  or accidental circumstances. There are two
con sp icuo us  v ic t im s in this new hum anism . The first is
Presocratic  ra tionalism  with its assumption that it is possible to
obtain by reason alone knowledge of the nature of divine reality.
The second is the h itherto  settled acceptance of doctrines of
1^0 Reported in Plato's Theae. 152a; Craty. 386a.
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tradtional ethics and religion. These are now open to question or 
sceptical nonchalance, at least. Protagoras is reported as saying:
About the gods I cannot know either that (or how) they are (or 
exist) or are not (or do not exist)...For many things prevent one 
from knowing: the obscurity, and the life of man, which is 
sh o rt .151
Some of the new rational relativists like Prodicus and his 
contemporary, Critias, were straight-forward a theists .152 Prodicus 
teaches that things that in nature have been w holesom e and 
nutritive for m ankind have been looked upon as gods by the 
earliest of men and honoured accordingly.153 And Themistius (B5) 
has Prodicus explain all religious beliefs in terms of agricultural 
fears and hopes. Among non-sophists Critias, in his Satyr play 
S i s y p h u s , makes the hero say that religion was invented for its 
solemnity as a permanent sanction of morals and law. Of equal 
interest is the h istorically  obscure D iogoras of M elos, who 
probably lived in the second half of the 5th century. He is 
reported to have committed "verbal impieties about foreign rites 
and festivals" [i.e., the Eleusinian mysteries]. He also "made the 
downright assertion that god does not exist at all" (Athenagoras, 
111, 9).154 An anecdote of Diagoras has him turn atheist when he 
became a victim  of in justice; an opponent had successfu lly
151 DK B4.
^ 2  The attribution of the Sisyphus  to Critias is by Sextus, Adv. Math. 9, 54. 
The theistic representation o f the divine sanction of law and the legal 
institutions of the democratic state of Athens is dramatised in Aeschylus' 
Eumenides.
^ 3  Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 18 (Prodicus B5). Sextus has a list of the things 
which Prodicus has in mind; the sun, the moon, rivers, springs, lakes, 
meadows, just as the Nile was worshipped by the Egyptians.
^ 4  Cf. Cicero de Nat. Deo., 1.63
perjured him (Sextus, adv. math. , IX .52). He concludes from his 
personal experience, and perhaps from  o thers’, that in justice  
thrives unpunished by gods. Thrasymachus and Theognis had 
said something similar:
The gods do not observe human affairs; for they would not pass 
over the greatest of human goods, justice; for we see that men do 
not use justice (B8).155 The gods ought indeed to love the just 
and to hate and punish the unjust; but alas, they do not; for the 
unjust evidently prosper (Theognis, 732-52).156
The problem of evil became acute in 5th century Athens. The 
dramatic poets are the best evidence of th is .157 The settled belief 
that gods sanction virtues are by now breaking down. The 
"strongman” ethics of Thrasymachus, Callicles and others, and of 
A thenian im peria lis t  a ttitude towards the M elians and other 
satelite states of her empire, are adequate reflections of this. As 
soon as the independent objectivity of gods was questioned, the 
metaphysical basts of morals crumbled. It was into this moral- 
religious crisis that Socrates was born and educated, and it is his 
persuasive and rational response to this crisis that the next
chapter will be concerned with
155 Further on Thrasymachus see Aristodemus in Xenophon’s Me mo ,  i, iv. 
11; cf. Plato's Laws  885b, 888c, 899e-903a
Cf. Thucydides ii 53, 4, who writes about the effect o f the Athenian 
plague of 430BC thus; 'no fear o f god or law of man restrained the people, 
who judged worship and no worship to be indifferent because they saw 
that all perished equally'. Epicurus' gods do observe the miserable lives
of mankind, but they simply do not care: though omniscient they are not
practically benevolent. Cf. 'The statements of most men about the gods 
are not cognition but false suppositions, according to which the greatest 
harms befall the bad from the gods, and the greatest benefits the good'
(Letter to Menoeceus., 124).
157 See, for instance, Euripides' Bellorophon  fr. 286.
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15 Summary
So far, I have, I hope, shown that the scrappy ev idence  
notwithstanding, Presocratic thought is full of arguments to divine 
first principles, a r c h a i , who exist necessarily as realities which 
are ultimately presupposed in an account o f the universe often 
conceived as a dynamic, orderly system. The arc he  is conceived 
as an e m b o d i e d  suprem e and eternal power, w ith  a causal 
function expressed in motion. Hence, we may say that the 
Presocratic ar c h e - g ods are motion-gods. First, it is assumed that 
the universe is a cosmos; it is then argued to the conclusion that 
the fundamental ground of the cosmos must be a living, divine 
cause and principle of motion. The rationality of divine motion is 
intimated in the frequent equation of the nature of the power of 
the arche  with Mind or R e a s o n . 1 ^
By a peculiar but distinctive argument, Parmenides, less acutely 
followed by M elissus, brought out with logical acum en and 
vehemence, largely unarticulated assumptions that had guided the
This is implied in the function of Anaximader's a p e  i r o n  which 
systematically and regularly equilibrates the encroachments o f the 
elements on each other, and by which the architetonic symmetries o f the 
celestial dispositions are made. It is also implied in the regularities of 
rarefaction and condensation by which Anaximenes' Air maintains the
cosmos. Philolaus' fr. B21 talks about the universe as containing two
basic principles - one o f which is associated with mind (n o i ) which is 
ever-circling divine, and something else (presumably body) which is 
ever-changing mortal. A ccording to D iogenes, Air must have 
mind/intelligence as an arch e  o f the cosmos. Heraclitus' L o g o s , which
accounts for the mathematically expressible mutations in the ever-living  
Fire, is identified with the Wise one. Xenophanes' God, abiding its place 
eternally, moves with the will of his m i n d , just as Empedocles' sphere- 
god darts across the Love-engendered cosmos with the holiness o f his 
mind. Anaxagoras supreme principle is Reason. Even the logically- 
minded Parmenides, identifies Being with thinking.
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rationality of preceding cosmological speculations. He argues, 
somewhat to the effect, that an a r c h e  qua a r c h e  must satisfy 
certain conditions: since an arche  is postulated or inferred as that 
which causes and explains that which comes to be and perishes
(i.e., moves in place, changes colour, state or condition, etc.), it 
follows that the a r c h e  qua a r c h e  m ust i tse lf  rem ain  self­
identical - since it cannot undergo change and still be an a r c h e ; it
m ust be com plete , perfect, se lf-suffic ient, viz., not lacking 
anything or not causally dependent on that which it explains), it 
must be immovable, ungenerable and hence eternal; it must be 
colourless, e tc .159 These characterisations (and many more) of an 
a r c h e  are consistent and continuous with the divine content of 
Presocratic philosophies.
i t  Tto&y he objected, that what all this suggests is that the 
P resocra tics  are concerned  with a ra tio na l  and sc ientific
explanation of the universe, especially so because they adopt 
causal explanations and often specify this causality in terms of 
motion, with the consequence that much that would otherwise 
count as relevant to religion is rejected. While such a conclusion 
would be perfectly true, we will answer that it is false if  it 
implies, what is not supported by the evidence, a distinction 
between science and religion. For what is rejected here are
N0t only did Parmenides influence Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the 
atomists who tried to accommodate his conceptual demand o f what arch T  
qua arch e  must be, but also his influence can be felt in Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle. In Socratic dialectics, a Socratic form (e.g., the form of the 
pious) is the "same as its e lf , "itself by itself' "a single form" (E u th y . 5c- 
d). So too are Platonic Forms and Aristotle's first substance. As we shall 
see, the kind of realities which answer to these characterisations of 
changelessness, causal supremacy, etc., are, in these subsequent systems 
of thought, divine. Thus divine reality answers to a systematic 
characterisation o f some sort.
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anthropomorphic traits, which are not necessarily entailed by the 
b a s i c  religious conception of god. Furthermore, the model of 
explaning a thing by specifying or tracing its divine origin or its 
underlying divine cause is a logical continuation of traditional 
religious thinking and the mythological cosmogonies, whose basic 
content is theological. Thus Eros, Hope, Peace, Sleep, etc, are 
examples of traditional divinities which serve to explain human 
love, hope, peace, sleep, etc. It is no objection to my conclusion 
even if the Presocratics were unaware of this. What is required to 
be shown, which I hope I have done, is that the theological or 
religious language so comm on in Presocratic  th inking  is not 
peripheral, but lies deep in the content of Greek thinking. On my 
reading, the basic difference between Hesiod and Hom er on the 
one hand, and the Presocratics on the other, is not in the content 
of thought - which is theological and religious in both cases, but in 
the structure of thought; the former assume the existence of gods, 
the latter argue to their ex is tence  by accountab le  steps of 
reasoning. We may therefore see the Presocratics as putting on a 
m ore ra t ion a l  and in te l l ig ib le  basis, the n a iv e ly  g rasped  
conception of divine power(s) endowed with properties in terms 
of which they serve as the ultimate presuppositions in an account 
of the world or c f  features in the world.
The mark of Socratic philosophy is its ethical orientation, an 
apparently significant break from the cosmological speculations of 
the Presocratics. But, as we shall see next, Socrates neither 
departs from the critical argum entation of his predecessors nor 
break from the traditional thought which explains existing things 
as fundamentally grounded in divine first principles.
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THREE
SOCRATES' RELIGION AND THEOLOGY OF RATIONAL ETHICS
1 The historical Socrates
Socrates was executed in 399B.C. after a jury found him guilty of 
impiety or a the ism .1 He had been indicted with (ia) refusing to 
recognise  the gods recognised  by the p o l i s , (ib) believing 
( n o m i z e i ) 2 or making (p o i e i ) new div in ities (d a i m o n i a
k a i n a ) , 3 and (ii) corrupting the youth.4 As to why Socrates
1 Socrates’ paraphrase o f the charges brought against him (A p .  29a) - 
'...that I do not oelieve that there are gods' (ou nomizo theous einai) 
implies that he understood the charges to include an imputation of 
atheism (a t  he o s ,  29c5), in the sense that he does not believe in the
existence of the traditional gods. At 26b-c Socrates begins to interrogate 
Meletus as to the precise meaning of the charges. Does he wish to say
Socrates believes in some gods or that he does not believe in any at all?
The answer is, 'you disbelieve in gods altogether'. This is confirmed by 
the first part o f his defence which aims at dissociating himself from 
natural philosophers like Anaxagoras who are believed to be atheists. 
(The atheism of t.:e Presocratics must be understood to mean only that the 
gods they argued for are radically different from the gods of civic
religion). Some scholars think - not implausibly - that both the
indictment against Socrates and its success was politically motivated. See,
for example, Adams’ (1901) Introduction to his edition of the A p o l o g y
(Cambridge University Press), pp. xxiv-xxvi
2 Ap.  24b6-9; "No mi ze i "  equivocates between "observing a nomos"  i.e.,
customary law cr usage (in civic religion, according to our present 
context), or "beli wing" (holding or accepting) it. That it is the latter 
alternative which is meant has been noted in no. 1 above and will be made 
clear below.
3 E u t h y p h r o  3b has "make ( p o i e t e n ) new divinities". The indictment 
preserved by Diogenes Laertius (DL, 11, 40), which probably rests on the 
authority o f Favorinus has "introducing" ( e i s  e g o u m e n o  s ) .  T h e  
difference, if any is negligible.
4 Probably (ia) and (ib) constitute a specific form of (ii).
132
cam e to be ind ic ted  at all the d ram atic  b io g rap h ie s  in
A ristophanes' comedy, C l o u d s , Xenophon's M e m o r a b i l i a , and
Plato’s early woiks are the main evidence worth considering.
Aristophanes represents Socrates as belonging both to the class
of natural philosophers and sophists (cf. A p . 18b5ff.). He is 
portrayed as one who runs a "Thinkery" ( p h r o n t i s t e r i o n )  where 
disciples attend his lectures. He appears as the foremost exponent 
of m e t e o r o s o p h i a , speculation about the physical nature o f the 
heavens or, more generally, about lofty, abstruse matters, such as 
the ultimate nature of the universe. By understanding natural 
philosophy as speculating that the ultimate realities are no more
than physical stuffs like  air, e ther, fire , etc, the na tura l 
p h i lo so p h ers  appear to be deny ing  or u n d e rm in in g  the 
anthropomorphically conceived gods. As a sophist, Socrates would 
also make eristic arguments his stock in trade. In this too he is 
portrayed as contributing to undermining the settled system of 
ethical-religious beliefs by "making the worse argum ent appear 
better and the better worse". Socratic dialectics, which proceeds 
from people's settled beliefs and usually ends in refuting them 
has enough superficial semblance to eristic practice  to warrant 
this mistaken imputation by the less philosophically acute minds. 
T yp ica lly ,  the G reek  p o l i s  has a re l ig io u s  fo u n d a tio n ;  
g o d s /g o d d e s se s  p a t ro n iz e  i ts  s o c io - p o l i t ic a l  o rd e r  and
i n s t u t i o n s . 5 Hence, observing the re lig ious  n o m o i  is an 
important evidence of civic piety but is not always enough. The 
religious foundakon of the p o l i s  was equally threatened by any 
teaching which offended the sensib ilitW  of public  p iety . A 
teaching which denied or implied denial of the existence of gods
5 As was dramatised in the case o f Athens in e.g., Aeschylus' Eumeni des
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as traditionally concii’ved is a case of impiety. Herein lies the 
gravamen of the indictment against Socrates: how can he satisfy 
the jury that his philosophical activity implies no undermining of 
the settled assumptions about the basic elements of the socio­
political order, namely, the gods as traditionally conceived, when 
Socratic dialects proceed from people's settled beliefs and usually 
ends in showing that such beliefs are viciously circular, self- 
contradictory or inconsistent?
In his defence, Socrates vigorously denies that he is a sophist, a 
natural ph ilosopher or an a th e is t .6 The C l o u d s  - which is 
ev idence  to the con trary  - is such a farc ica l bu rlesque , 
Aristophanes him self may not have intended it as a h istorical 
documentation, much less as a philosophical assessment o f the 
intellectual history of Greece at this time. Xenophon's pfltrait of 
Socrates, is equally suspect. He is not above putting into Socrates' 
m outh  X enophon tic  o p in io n s .7 If this is negligible, still, it is 
nearly impossible to understand why, on his account, Socrates was 
ever indicted for im piety in the first p lace. A m odel of 
conventional piety, Xenophon's Socrates never fails to fulfil his 
religious obligations. Greek piety has two sides: (a) conscientious 
participation in ritual observances, prayers, and sacrifices; and (b) 
believing or accepting the gods of the community. It would seem 
that (a) and (b) are complementary, so that the one without the 
other would be inadequate evidence of piety. Xenophon seems to
6 Although the P h a e d o  (96aff.) suggests that he once entertained 
naturalistic explanations. Still, this is not inconsistent with Socrates's 
denial in the A p o l o g y  (19b) that he ever inquired into 'things below the 
earth and in the sky and made the weaker or wrong argument defeat the 
stronger or right argument'.
7 See Field (1967, p 135-45).
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claim that Socrates satisfies both (a) and (b). On (a) he states 
categorically that Socrates offered public and private sacrifices; 
'he offered sacrifices constantly and made no secret of it, now in 
his home, now at the altars of the state temple...’ ( M e m o ,  i, 1, 2). 
Socrates dutifully observes all the sacrificial observances of the 
p o l i s  (bid.  i, 3, 1). Plato corroborates this at E u d .  302c, where 
Socrates says: 'I have my own altars and my own religion, and 
family prayers and all that sort of thing, as much as any other 
Athenian’. This is, of course, a private, family religion. But with 
reference to Socrates' scrupulous respect for the laws of the p o l i s  
(as represented in the C r i t o ), there is no good reason to doubt his 
piety regarding the religious observances,8 public or private.
On (b) - the intellectual aspect of piety - Xenophon represents 
Socrates not only as believing in the traditional gods, but also as 
essaying a theological argument to the existence of a divine Mind 
who providently guides and directs the course of events in the 
cosmos at large. Again, Xenophon's Socrates is a wise man who 
defines the virtues and inoffensively instructs his associates in
8 Martin Nilsson (1969), observes that when evidence o f citizenship was 
required, an Athenian citizen proved his civic rights by referring to his 
altar of Zeus H e r k e i o s , to Apollo P a t r o o s  - i.e., "inherited from father", 
and to his ancestral graves. More than once in Plato, Socrates is made to 
pray. At Symp. 220d, e.g., Socrates prays to the sun. At P h d r .  279b, he 
prays to the gods thus: 'grant that I may become fair within, and that 
such outward things as I have may not war against the spirit within me. 
May I count him rich who is wise, and as for gold, may I possess so much 
of it as only a temperate man might bear and carry with him'. At 
Xenophon’s M e m o .  1, 3, 2, Socrates is reported as usually praying to gods 
to give him simply what was good, thinking that the gods best knew what 
kinds of things were good. The lone of these prayers, the content of their 
request, is consistent with a Socratic irony which dresses up less than a 
total commitment to religion as traditionally conceived with verbal 
concessions to public piety.
135
moral matters, although at M e m o ,  i, 2, 3, Socrates never professes 
to teach virtue, and at op. cit. iv, 4, 9, Hippias is made to state 
that it was Socrates' practice never to state his own opinion. At i 
1, l l f f . ,  Xenophon denies that Socrates discoursed on the whole or 
about celestial phenomena. These apparent inconsistencies make 
Plato’s position much more credible.
For in Plato, Socrates consistently claims ignorance in "higher 
matters", both in respect of things in the sky and below the earth, 
and specifically in the E u t h y p h r o  he is sceptical about stories 
which contribute to the system of traditional beliefs about the 
gods. Generally, the characteristic conclusions of his dialectical 
encounter with personalities who embody traditional wisdom and 
beliefs is negative and critical. And in those few moments of 
positive asseveration about gods, he gives the impression that, 
although he believes in gods, his conception of them is different 
from that of traditional religion. At Phdr.  229, for example, Plato 
makes Socrates answer the question whether he believes the 
legend of Boreas and Orithyia. He replies that it is not impossible 
to find natural events which explain the supernatural events 
alleged in legends: a girl killed by being blown onto the rocks by 
the north wind, becomes a maiden snatched by Boreas; only that 
he finds such stories charming and regards attempts to rationalise 
them a waste of time, and furthermore, an ungracious one. In the 
same dialogue, having made a speech in condemnation of Love (or 
Desire, ErWs),  Socrates intends to break off the conversation but is 
forbidden to do so by his "divine sign". He takes this to mean that 
in his speech he has blasphemed against E r o s  who is a "divine 
thing" (242e), and that he must recant. He does so by saying that 
some madness under which he had included romantic love is of
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divine gift, and he proceeds to praise divine madness for the 
benefits it confers on man through prophecy, religious frenzy, 
poetry, and passion .9 He then elucidates the divinity of E r o s  as 
the innate force which operates on men to bring them to the 
divine sphere of gods and Forms. By this he suggests that Era's  is 
not in itself an independent object of religious worship, contrary 
to what is traditionally believed.
Thus one can see in Plato why Socrates could have been indicted 
for impiety or atheism. An under-current of revisionary critique 
can be felt in his verbal concessions to public piety. I do not 
im ply  th a t  P la to 's  d ia lo g u e s  r e p re se n t ,  w ord  by w ord , 
circumstance by circumstance, what Socrates said and did. Only 
that the early Platonic works appear to embody the philosophical 
s ignificance  of the Socratic  ph ilosoph ical approach; the full 
implications of the dialectical encounters, its logical-metaphysical, 
and human side too, viz., the paradox and irony (cf. S y m p .  
218d6 -21 9a l;  R.  337a) which contribute, in relevant contexts, to 
a subtility of critical attitude but also a positive contribution to 
the ethical-religious tradition. The following discussions, centred 
mainly on the A p o l o g y  and E u t h y p  h r  o , is an attem pt to 
substantiate this conclusion.
2 The A p o l o g y
In his defence Socrates insists that he is pious and a theist, and 
appeals to his p ractice  of p h i l o s o p h i a . He claims that his 
dialectical e l e n c h u s , that method of close and systematic cross­
9 That these may possibly be Plato's general attitude to traditional 
religion or myths is only part of the historical problem of differentiating 
Plato and Socrates.
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examination of those who profess to be wise, is according to god 
(kata theon , 23b): for it is a testing of the pronouncement of the 
oracle at Delphi, according to which Socrates is the wisest of his 
generation. As he is to d iscover, his being w isest m eans, 
paradoxically, that he knows at least one thing which the poets, 
politicians, craftsmen, i.e., the wise of the day, do not; the extent of 
his own ig n o ran ce .10 We might say that he alone, among his 
contemporaries, embodies the Delphic motto - Know Thyself - the 
divine injunction dem anding m oderation and self-know ledge on 
the part of mortals in recognition of the limits which distinguish 
their powers and capabilities in relative inferiority to the superior 
pow ers of the gods. Socrates claim s that his p rac tice  of 
ph i lo so ph ia  consists in "assisting the god" by showing to men who 
pretend to wisdom that they are really not wise (23b6-7), and 
that in reality, true wisdom belongs to god (23a5-8). He implies, 
then, that his characteristically  destructive and refutative method 
- which has produced so many enemies - is employed to bring 
home to men the realisation that the wisdom they claim to possess 
is no real wisdom, and that nonetheless, there is an optimum 
wisdom of the divine kind. He claims that his philosophical 
activity is in obedience to a command by, and a service to, the 
g o d .11 Thus p h i l o s o p h i a  his way is a religious service and duty. 
His pious acceptance of this duty borders on the fanatical; for he 
insists that while he lives, he will never relinquish this duty 
under any circumstances - even on pain of being sentenced to 
death or of disobeying the laws of the state (29c-e). This way of
10 Socrates is not, I presume, claiming the extreme, viz., he is a b s o l u t e l y  
ignorant. See Ap.  25d9e3, contra  21b4-5
11 keluei ho theos, huperesian, 30a; l a t re ian , 23c
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defending himself creates the deepest pathos of dramatic irony; a 
zealously pious and theistic man, as he claims, is standing trial for
his life for impiety and atheism.
Although powerful, Socrates' defence does not convince the jury 
- as far as the charges go; he does not prove that he is pious in the 
traditional sense. While the charges specifically demand that he
prove acceptance of or belief in the gods of the po l i s  (Athens), it 
is to the pan-hellenic god at Delphi that he declares devotion. It 
would not be arbitrary, then, to think that the piety claimed by 
Socrates with respect to the oracle is suspect, given the decline of 
the oracle's veridical authenticity and the secularised dimunition 
of its prestige at this tim e.12 Indeed we may suppose that 
Socrates felt an intense personal devotion to the god at Delphi. 
But this is to be juxtaposed with the curious and typical irony that 
pervades Socrates' whole approach to philosophy. Typically he
claims to know nothing, nevertheless he maintains, inter al ia , 
that virtue is knowledge, that no one desires bad/evil things, and 
that all who pursue evil/bad things do so involuntarily.13 So we 
have reason to suspect Socrates' claim to traditional piety which 
has to do with a submissive reverence of the gods as traditionally 
conceived. Indeed, Socrates is within tradition when he says that 
in reality wisdom belongs to god (A p . 23a). However, we shall 
see shortly that Socratic wisdom is rated higher than and is
something entirely different from prophecies. Consequently, it
would seem that Socratic wisdom would be distinguished from the
^  The oracle had become suspect to most intelligent men at this time. It 
had supported Sparta during the Peloponnesian wars and there were 
stories of how Lysander attempted to manipulate the oracle. See further 
Parke (1967, chapter 111); also Nilsson (1940, rpt. 1972, p. 129-132)
13 G. 468c5-7; Meno 77b-78b; Prt.  358c.
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particular matters of oracular pronouncements associated with the 
god at Delphi.14
Apart from his claim that his philosophical way is at the behest 
of the god, Socrates defends his claim to be pious in another way:
he has had from childhood a d a i m o n i o n , a personal, divine voice
which never urges him on but dissuades him from courses of 
action he intends to undertake (31c-d). He has also received 
revelations in dreams. However, although the d a i m o n i o n  and the 
dream s are part of the fu rn iture  of trad itional re lig ion , they 
remain vague, private forms of piety. They do not constitute a
proof of belief in the gods of the polis.  M o re o v e r ,  a l th o u g h  
Socrates may truly believe in the divinity of the d a i m o n i o n  
(31c8, 31 d 1) and the dream s, there is an ironic  flair in his
invocation of these in defence of the charge of impiety or atheism. 
First of all, the d a i m o n i o n  is concerned with m undane, even 
trivial, matters-of-fact, and least of all concerned with religious 
m a t t e r s .15 Secondly, his general attitude to divine inspiration is 
a telling com m entary  on the status which he gives to his 
d a i m o n i o n , and the dreams. The I o n  carries a discussion of the 
re la tio nsh ip  betw een d iv ine  in sp ira tion  and know ledge , and 
concludes that only so long as one has no reason ( nous )  in him, or 
is out of his senses (ekph ro ' n , 534b5), is one able to make poetry
* 4 As we shall see in the E u t h y p h r o , Socrates takes issue with 
Euthyphro's b elief, consistent with tradition, that the gods are 
superhumans, which implies that they too quarrel, i.e., as far as their 
humanity goes. It follows also that in their humanity, the gods would 
quarrel most of all about what is good and bad, just and unjust. However, a 
truly wise agent, for Socrates, knows in the absolute, irrefutable sense 
what is good and bad, just and unjust. Since ignorance of good and bad is 
the basic ground for quarrelling about moral issues, the gods as 
traditionally conceived would hardly qualify as truly wise agents.
15 See Phdr.  242c; cf. Ale. 1, 103a; Eud.  272e; Theae.  151a.
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and chant prophecy (534b). Thus, while agreeing that a rhapsode, 
poet, seer, e tc ., are d iv inely  insp ired  (e n t h e o n , 533e4 ,
e n t  h o  u s  i a z o n t o ' n  , 533e5), and are p ossessed  by god
( k a t e c h o m e n o i , 533e7), he refuses to grant divine revelation the 
status of knowledge or truth, contrary to the traditional view. The 
same conclusion is reached in the Meno  (99c-d), w here  he 
l ikew ise  a ttr ibu tes  d iv ine  insp ira tion  to a sta tesm an who 
constantly  gets things done rightly without any real, conscious 
knowledge of what is right. It would seem that by "divinely 
inspired" Socrates means the g i v e n n e s s  of an extraordinary 
power or resource which is beyond our rational control and by 
which we get things rightly done. This would suggest that 
Socrates thinks that appeal to divine revelations in dreams and to 
a d a i m o n i o n  would curry defensive weight as far as public piety 
is concerned, since his concept of divine inspiration is superficially 
consistent with the logic of traditional religion, viz., belief in causal 
powers transcending those of man and affecting his life. Socrates 
may endorse the logic of this belief without endorsing the specific 
determinations of those powers, which is why the dreams are 
vague enough, and his own d a i m o n i o n  lacks any determination 
whatsoever. He may also believe in the practical efficacy of these 
g i v e n  resources, as is the case with his own d a i m o n i o n .  But he 
knows that for positive truth and wisdom, it is to philosophy that 
we must turn. Indeed, the d a i m o n i o n  p rov ides  p rac tica l  
gu idance  in pa rticu la r  m atters  of fact, but ph ilosophy  is 
sufficiently independent of inspiration, such that while both can 
compatibly co-exist in the same person, the latter can still be the 
cause of impiety or atheism even while the former is believed to
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have divine origin. Let us return to the A p o l o g y . 16
By an indirect way, Socrates argues to the conclusion that he 
does believe in the gods. He attempts to show that his accusers 
are themselves ignorant and confused. First of all, they confuse 
him with Anaxagoras, when they impute to him Anaxagoras' 
cosmological thesis acording to which the sun is a stone and the 
moon is made of earth. Socrates' reply to this m istaken 
imputation is a question: 'do you suggest I do not believe that the 
sun and the moon are gods, as is the common belief of all 
mankind?' But to assume the common belief of men is not a proof 
that you hold it as it is. Nor was the religion of the po l l s  founded 
on the cult of the sun and the moon. In another move, Socrates 
does a little elenchus  on Meletus by way of proving his belief in 
the gods of the po l i s .  Proceeding on the assumption that not he 
but his accuser is wise in the matters for which he is prosecuting 
him, he asks if Meletus claims he believes in some gods, only not 
those of the p o l i s  or in none at all? Meletus answers that 
Socrates does not believe in any at all (26b-c). Now Socrates' 
d a i m o n i o n  is well known, even to Meletus. Socrates then argues 
(27b), that if Meletus grants he believes and teaches others to 
believe in spiritual activities (da imonia  p r a g m a t a ), he ought 
necessarily to grant he believes in gods. For neither does anyone 
think that there are actions performed without agents to perform 
them, nor believe in spiritual actions but not in spiritual agents 
(27c); 'and we all take spirits {da imonia)  to be gods or children of 
gods'. Thus the claim to be a recipient of an authentic spirit
16 Impiety and atheism are compatible with belief in gods and the divine, 
provided the concept o f god or the divine is not consistent with basic 
beliefs about the gods as traditionally concieved.
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entails the acceptance of the gods. The conclusion is an obvious 
contradiction for Meletus: Socrates believes and does not believe 
in the gods (of the po l i s ) .  But the jury who, it seems, were not 
philosophically minded, were probably not impressed by logical 
contradictions in the prosecution 's  case or in the deductive 
implications for the defence's argument. One may speculate that 
nothing short of an easy and direct proof of positive belief in the 
gods of the polis will do.
Presumably in an answer to the claim that he corrupts the 
youth, Socrates counter-claims that he believes that no greater 
boon has befallen Athens than his service to the god (30a). This 
conviction is restated in the G o r g i a s , according to which Socrates 
is the only true practitioner of the political art. This is explained 
at 515b-c as making the citizens as good as possible (cf. 521d). 
Yet, his making citizens good has not involved taking public office. 
In the A p o l o g y , he explains this as due to his d a i m o n i o n .  As to 
how he makes the citizens good, he explains thus:
I go about doing nothing but persuading you - young and old - to 
care not for the body (sTTmaton)  or for wealth (c h r ' e m a t a ) so 
much as virtue {a re t e )  of the soul { p s u c h T ). I tell you that 
virtue (are tT )  does not come from wealth but wealth and all 
other human goods { ta. . .agatha)  - both public and private - from 
virtue (30b). (Are you not ashamed that you give your attention 
to acquiring as much wealth as possible and give no attention or 
thought to wisdom {phron es i s ), truth and the perfection of your 
soul? - 29d9-e3)
Prima  f a c i e , this is hard to believe: (i) how does Socrates 
persuade people, when all we know of his philosophical way is 
that it usually ends in refuting their opinions? (ii) Socrates keeps 
a small list of traditional a r e t a i  - wisdom, temperance, justice,
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piety, courage. But what does he mean by implying that truth and 
virtue of the soul are more important than and prior to the body, 
wealth, and all other human goods - public or private? (iii) How 
do (i) and (ii) constitute service to god? These issues, which 
can no t be trea ted  fu lly  here , lie  beyond the A p o l o g y .  
Accordingly I discuss them in the following new section.
3 Socrates' humanistic religion
(i) T he  fa m il ia r  fe a tu re  o f the S o cra tic  d ia lo gues  is 
characteristically  the systematic and logical cross-examination of 
propositions put forward by those who profess to be wise. The 
result is usually negative; the interlocutor is shown to be ignorant, 
contrary to his confident self-esteem. But the texts intimate that 
the negative dialectic has a positive, therapeutic or educational 
f o r c e . 17 I n t er  a l i a , d ialec tics purges the individual soul of 
pretentious dispositions and disposes one to the need to justify 
what underlies one's knowledge-claims. The end of Socratic ethics 
is action governed by reason, the intellectual component having to 
do with discernm ent of the good and the bad .18 As action- 
o rien ted , the neg a tive  con c lu s io ns  of d ia lec tics  bring the 
interlocutor to a degree of self-consciousness of the extent of his 
own ignorance. This is supposed to free him from the mistaken 
conceit of know ledge which produces unreflective, intemperate
17 See Theae.  149aff.; 151 c5; Soph.  230d6-e3; Ap.  21c3-e2, 29e3-30a2; 
cf. Ch.  166c7-d6; Soph.  230c3-d4
18 Socrates insists that any true definition of virtue includes knowledge of 
the good (cf. Ch.  174b 11 ff.; La.  198b5-199d). He somehow manages to 
give a utilitarian or a merely conventional facade to this radical idea by 
sometimes identifying what is good with what is lawful, beneficial or 
honourable (Crito; G.  470a-b, 476e, 477a).
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action, and to make him calm and modest, as he comes to terms 
w ith k n o w le d g e  of the  l im its  o f  his own pow ers and 
p r o c l i v i t i e s . 19 By showing how ignorant one is in matters in 
which one self-confidently believed one was wise, one is made to 
see that one has yet to start on the road to true wisdom. True 
wisdom  only begins at know ledge of the extent of your own 
ignorance. Apart from self-knowledge, another basic feature of 
dialectics is that it points to o u s i a i  or i d e a i  (essences or forms 
in  th ings) ra ther than to the traditional gods as the highest 
realities and the only objects of knowledge in its highest sense. 
D ia lec tics  im plies  that know ledge  of form s offer a better 
alternative, and possibly a permanent solution, to the fluctuating, 
circular, inconsistent, and often contradictory beliefs about the 
gods, and the ethical values based on such beliefs. Our tentative 
con c lusion , then, is tha t Socratic  persuas ion  in d ia lec tical 
negativity is aimed at creating an open-mindedness which is at 
the same time oriented towards a desire to be fulfilled with true 
wisdom by means of forms.
(ii) The focus of orientation in socratic persuasion is the soul 
distinguished from the body, as the seat of virtue or wisdom and 
truth. Is this distinction between soul and body real or merely 
conceptual? It is real, since soul but not body is distinguished as 
the primary source of physical character and of good and bad.20 
To say that 'life with a bad soul is even less worthwhile than life 
with a corrupt and diseased body' (C r . 47c8-e l), is to imply a 
relation but also a real difference between soul and body.21 The
19 In the Cha r mi d e s  (167a l-7; cf. 166c7-dff; Ap.  21dl-7), Socrates casually 
exam ines the association o f temperance with self-know ledge and 
knowledge of one’s own knowledge and ignorance.
20 Cf. Ap.  30b, Ch. 156d5-157bl; Prt.  313a, 351a-b.
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same thesis appears in a long discussion of the relation of evil to 
happiness in the G o r g i a s , and there it depends on such a real 
d istinc tion  betw een bodily  evil and psychic evil. G . 477c
id en tif ie s  th ree  ev ils  - poverty ,  d isease  and in jus tice  as 
corresponding to m aterial fortune, body and soul. It is then 
argued to a conclusion that evil of the soul - injustice - is the 
m o s t  sham eful, the m o s t  painful and the m o s t  h a rm fu l.  
Consequently, the happiest of men is he who has no evil in his 
soul (478d). At L a .  185eff., psych ic  p rio r ity  to body is 
emphasised when on the question of the education of the young, 
and on whether, specifically, the art of fighting in armour will 
im prove the young, Socrates transform s the subject-m atter at 
hand as really having to do with training the sou l s  of the boys.22 
Hence, Socrates ' adoption  of Zalm oxian holistic  therapy: the 
method of curing the whole - soul and body - by addressing, not 
the body but the soul with certain charms (ep’o i d a i ) composed of 
"appropriate  accounts" (k a l o i  l o g o i 23).24 Through this the soul
2 1 Consider also the exchanges at 47e-48a: 'Well, is life worth living with a 
body which is worn out and ruined in health? Certainly not. What about 
the part o f us v/hich is mutilated by wrong actions and benefitted by 
right one?....Or dc we believe that this part of us, whatever it may be, in
which right and wrong operate, is less important  than the body?
Certainly not'.
22 This is matched by the repeated mentioning of the legendary teacher of 
Socrates, Damon, in connection with training the character through the 
modalities of music. Cf. DK B4, B6, B7, A8.
2  ^ K a l o s  is ambiguous: aesthetically, it connotes various kinds of beauty; 
functionally, it describes the successful performance o f a characteristic 
task or purpose - as being, e.g., admirable, noble; morally, it stands for 
acceptability or propriety o f persons, actions or things. Socrates did not 
distinguish these. It would seem, therefore, that a kalos logos induces a 
kale psuche , in all these senses. L o g os  is similarly ambiguous. Socrates 
and Plato employ it at many levels - ("word", "statement", "account", as
sometimes opposed to tales or myths) - the highest of which stands for a
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is to gain s o p h r o s u n e  (temperance), and head and body health 
{Ch.  155dff.). Thus the health of the body is epiphenomenal on 
the "health" of the soul.25 It becomes axiomatic for Socrates, that
Socratic account (or definition), i.e., a dialectically irrefutable account. 
Context decides which sense is meant.
24 The importance of "appropriate account" in relation to virtue in the 
soul is also the basis of Plato's critique of what he considers as Sophistic 
pretension to teach virtue, and also his critique of rhetorical practices of 
the day. At Prt .  313eff., Hippocrates is told that listening to doctrines 
(m a t h e m a t a ) from a sophist is receiving something good or bad, but 
rather something bad into your p s u c h f ;  and Socrates warns against the 
danger of "buying" such psychic wares without knowledge of good or bad. 
Cf. Gorgias  (463e-466a, 510a-c), where Socrates understands cookery and 
rhetoric as quackeries passing off for true sciences of body and soul 
respectively. They treat of their subject-matter from convention or 
experience (e m p e i r i a ) rather than from the nature and cause of what 
they treat. This compares to the true sciences of medicine/gymnastic 
correlated to justice/legislation - respectively concerned with body and 
soul. These are all practical, beneficial art-sciences rather than 
productive sciences: they do not make good objects; they make objects 
good. And they put their object, soul and body, in good condition. And 
they do this by knowledge of the nature and function of the subject- 
matter which they treat. Thus Socrates' endorsement of the Zalmoxian 
holistic therapy works on the analogy with m edicine/gym nastic 
justice/legislation only if  these are purged of all preoccupation with
means and e m p e i r ia  as opposed to ends and a theory of the whole. He
attributes a similar approach to Hippocrates at Phdr .  270c - the argument
that it is impossible to know the nature o f body without knowing the
nature of the whole. See Ancient  Medic ine  20, where reliance on 
e m p e i r i a  is not explicitly excluded. Socrates may have distorted or 
purified the Hippocratic theory in order to make the analogy work.
25 Cf. Xenophon's M e m o r a b i l i a .  There, Socrates regards bodily regimen 
as the principal way to influence soul which is an important part of a
human being, and is directly influenced by the same things that
influence the body which also plays an important role in the
achievement of over-all control in the affairs, demands, and temptations 
of one’s life, although soul has properties quite distinct from body. At
M e m o ,  iii, 10, Iff. Socrates asks a painter whether he tries to reproduce 
the character of the soul (ies psucKes ethos) as well as the image of the 
body; and this psychic character is manifested for Socrates in the eyes of 
the subject as they exhibit such qualities as kindness, moderation,
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physical and ethical behaviour manifests the character or the
state of the soul.26
As to why a r e t T  has overrid ing  im portance over all o ther
human goods, the answ er is, at least partly , that Socrates
combines a functionalist and a teleological view of life based on a
real difference between body and soul. The end of life is t h e
good:  'it is in pursuit of the good (to agathon)  that we walk when
we walk' ( G . 468bl). Cf.: 'the good is the final end of all our
actions; everything must be done for its sake' (G. 499e7-8). "The
good" instead of "some good" (agathon ti) implies that life is
inclined to some objective end for each or all ind iv iduals .2 7
intelligence or arrogance. At ibid. iii, 10, 6-8, the same line of argument 
is directed against a sculptor.
26 Again cf. the hylomorphism of M e m o ,  i.3.5, where Socrates is said to 
have trained body and soul by a regime that, barring accident, allows a 
confident, safe, and inexpensive life. As a consequence, he ate only
enough to guarantee pleasure, drank only when thirsty, and at feasts
advised others to avoid eating what would encourage further excess, 
holding such foods to be harmful to stomachs, brains and ps ucha i .  Again 
{Memo,  i, 21-5), he was in control of his sexual and gastronomic passions, 
able to endure heat and cold; he was generally moderate in his needs, 
making others cease from the corresponding vices by giving them 
confidence to care for themselves. He exercised only as much as would be 
good for his psuchT.  Plato's Socrates endorses a more or less distinct and 
sovereign soul from the body, to the extent that no physical calamity can 
harm a good soul (Ap.  41d)
22 in the L y s i s  it is argued that there is a primary object of love {pro' ton
p h i l o n , 219d 1) which explains all actions: whenever A chooses x, his
choice of x must be explained by his choice of some end; he chooses x for 
the sake of y. His choice of y is explained in turn by his choice o f z, and 
so on (2 19c 1-5). The process cannot continue ad infinitum; we must 
recognise some object of desire not desired for any further end (291c5-
d2). The primary or final object of desire is the good  (200b 1-7). When
we seem to want a subordinate object chosen for the sake o f something 
else, and appear to be concerned about it, our concern is really for the 
primary object, the final good (219d5-220b). All the intermediate goods
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H o w ev er ,  the g o o d  is associated with a r e t H  of the soul as 
d is t in g u ish ed  from  body; its c o n te n t28 is identified  with 
e u d a i m o n i a  (spiritual well-being) - believed to be the supreme 
end of life, what we all want and want for its own sake29. By 
synecdoche, a r e t e  is referred to as s o p h i a  (or e p i s t e m e )  - 'the 
g r e a t e s t  of goods which everyw here  m akes ( p o i e i ) 30 men 
succeed, since... she never errs but must needs be right in act and 
result, otherwise she could no longer be so p h ia '  (E u d . 279c); and 
'he with whom s o p h i a  is present (sophias  parouses )  has no need 
of success (e u t u c h i a s ) as well' ( i b id .  280b, 280). These texts 
would seem to imply that s o p h i a  is necessary and sufficient for 
e u d a i m o n i a  . 31 W hile  accep ting  this conclusion , V lastos 
( 1 9 9 1)32 nevertheless argues, reasonably well, for the view that, 
a lthough non-m oral goods like "health", "w ealth", etc., are 
n eg lig ib le  in va lue  com pared  to a r e t e ’, they are goods 
nonetheless, and that we shall be happi er  with than without 
them, if, i.e., their use (add - or their acquisition) is guided by 
moral wisdom (sophia) ,  otherwise they can make us miserable.
It is noteworthy, that the distinction between moral and non­
are deceptive shadows (eid.’o la ) of the good (219d).
28 The many components o f the good  are called goods: virtue, health, 
beauty, strength, etc., of which a r e t e '  is the chief and the most important 
component. Moreover, Socrates recognises "parts" o f arete  all of which 
are "goods" of the soul, though they are at bottom one. Thus at P r t .  
329c6-dlff., it is argued that ar e t e  is one thing, and the names of a r e t T  
are all names of that one thing. This may mean, not that the names of the 
a r e t a i  are synonymous but that they have the same reference though 
different senses - as the morning and evening star refer to the sun. See 
also Prt.  329eff.; Meno  72cff., 74-6; La.  190c-d, 199e.
29 Eud.  278e3-6, 280bl-6, 282al-2; cf. G.  468c5-7, 466ff.
3  ^ Poiei  is causal, as the context shows.
31 See also G.  470e4-ll; 507b8-c7; Ap.  30c6-d5, 41c8-d2; cf Ly.  215a6-7.
32 Ch. 8. See his summary at pp. 230-231
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moral goods, the association of the former with what is necessary 
and sufficient for e u d a i m o n i a , and the fact that the beneficence 
of the latter is conditioned on the presence of moral wisdom 
( so p h i a ) ,  depends on a real distinction between soul and body, 
and on the thesis that behaviour takes its character from the state 
or condition of the soul. Further, the use of so ph ia  by synecdoche 
for arete", and the identification of the content of the good  with 
e u d a i m o n i a  confirm arete"  or the good  as a state or condition of 
the soul. Consequently, since soph ia  is the [key] property of god, 
and is also associated with the good  of life, it follows that s o p h i a  
is a divine and optimum state of the soul. And indeed Socrates 
often represents a r e t e  as the "health" of the soul. He would 
therefore justify urging a primary need to acquire aret"e before 
everything else by a belief that the optimum and divine condition 
of the h u m a n  soul functions causally  to determ ine  how the 
acquisition and use of all other goods - bodily health, wealth, 
honour, etc. - conduce or will contribute to the good  (of the soul). 
In this sense, soph ia  or arete" may be said to be productive of all 
other goods; for they are goods insofar as they are acquired or 
utilised wisely. On the other hand, s o p h i a  is constitutive of t h e  
g o o d  - the final, non-moral end of all actions. This teleological 
conception of life implies a functionalist view of a r e t e ; ^ 3  for, in 
view of the end - the good (of the soul) - actions and acquisitions 
may be evaluated and life itself may be judged to be lived well or 
badly. According to Cr .  (48b), therefore, it is not living that is 
important, but living well, and this involves liv ing justly  and 
h o n o u rab ly .
33 This would seem to apply generally to perceived goal-directed entities 
- to men as much as dogs, horses, tools (R. 335b6-c2; cf. G.  506d).
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The functionalist conception of arete  is traditional and Homeric: 
a r e t T  is excellent perform ance which is productive of valued 
results - honour, status, material goods, etc. By the 5th century, 
a r e t e  comes to be expressed in t e c h n i c a l  excellence in a wide 
range of activities. Socrates thinks that life is to be lived artfully 
and sc ien tif ica lly , and this m eans to be fully  guided by 
ph ilosoph ica l-m oral w isdom  (s o p h i a ) .34 But Socrates does not, 
c o n t r a  trad ition , iden tify  a r e t e "  with physical or verbal 
behaviour. Rather, he traces the cause or origin of aret~e-  
excellence to the soul, d istinguished from body, and construes 
m o r a l - a r e t e  as excellent perform ance resulting from the soul's 
being in excellent condition or state35 understood on an analogy 
with bodily health (cf. G.  474c-480). He seems to combine the 
Sophistic claim of teachability, and hence, knowability of a r e t e ' 
with the Homeric association of are t e  with functional excellence. 
But he rejects the conception of are tF  as excellent performance in 
competitive supremacy, a Homeric conception which, for the types 
of Thrasymachus or Callicles, entails the subordination or rejection 
of civic piety, viz., restraints shown in temperance and justice by 
recognition that they are divinely sanctioned by the gods.
Such a Calliclean conception of a r e t T , Socrates might have 
thought, (a) misconceives the function of life and (b) ignores the 
real difference between soul and body. By (a) people think that 
pleasure s i m p l i c i t e r , the acquisition of public honour, wealth and 
the power to out-compete or bring others under your control and 
m anipulation, are the m ost im portant things in life. For this
34 I have already mentioned Socrates' analogical identification o f virtue 
and the arts and sciences. See chapter one, no. 39; cf. no. 37 infra.
35 Cf. R. 353d3-ell
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reason a man needs only s e e m  but not be really  ju s t  and 
temperate, if only to avoid public opprobrium or punishm ent.3 6 
For Socrates, this is to put the horse before the cart. For, insofar 
as wealth, honour, pleasure, etc., are thought to be goods, they 
presuppose the good , the having of which is sufficient for the 
perm anent satisfaction of the s e l f  which all strivings aim at 
benefiting, (b) In consequence of the inability to discern a real 
difference between soul and body, the good of life is supposed to 
be gratification of every particular desire to the utmost, as if  to 
suppose it to be the greatest good of the body to have the utmost 
possible satisfaction of all the appetites without any consideration 
of health. Callicles, for exam ple, m ain tains that suprem e 
e u d a i m o n i a  consists in having as many and diverse desires as 
possible, provided only that we have the opportunity of satisfying 
them (G. 491e-492a). For him, e u d a i m o n i a  is the life of pleasure 
which consists in maximum flow (493dff.). For Socrates, however, 
the Calliclean model of life is like a leaky, rotten vessel which one 
is compelled to keep filling day and night or else suffer the 
extremities of pain. No one can be e u d a i m o n  whose life consists 
in replenishing ever-devouring cravings which are ever-receiving, 
and never have received satisfaction. Against this, Socrates puts 
forward the picture of a temperate man, the one whose soul is
36 Socrates’ encounters with Callicles and Polus in the G o r g i a s , with 
Thrasymachus in the R e p u b l i c , contain historical evidence o f this neo- 
Homeric conception of aretT.  In the R e p u b l i c , Glaucon and Adeimantus 
observe that the conventional recommendation of justice was not based 
on the intrinsic value o f justice as such: they were to be practised for the 
sake of rewards and repute due to opinion (whether o f gods or of men). 
To illustrate this Glaucon asks us to conceive a situation where the just 
man had an unlimited power to do what he pleased with impunity. He 
concludes that if  the unjust had such a power, no one could be found of 
such adamantine character as to persevere in justice... (358eff.)
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ordered, and therefore in satisfaction with himself (493e). That is 
to say, given the real difference between soul and body, every 
desire or every object of desire has a limited value which must be 
strictly kept in regard to any other, and in primary reference to 
the good of the soul. Knowledge of the good of the soul, therefore, 
necessita tes  a structure of desires and satisfactions. Hence, 
Socrates conceives virtue as a kingly or super-ordinate science of 
living; knowledge of the good of the soul is needed to enable us to 
use r igh tly  the products o f other sc iences.37 The spiritual 
priority  of a r e t e  over health, wealth, honour, etc., therefore, 
depends a real difference between soul and body, on Socrates' 
teleological and functional conception of life, on the identification 
of the end of life with e u d a i m o n i a  (spiritual well-being), and on 
the belief that this end is attainable chiefly by aretT.
But if  the difference between soul and body is real and even 
crucial to Socrates' ethics, as I claim, is a separable soul entailed 
by the difference? Orphic independence of soul from body is 
hardly present in the Socratic d ialogues.38 Socrates may have 
thought that the soul is divine {Memo ,  iv 3, 14) or can be made to 
achieve divinity by moral-intellectual excellence. He admits at 
E u d .  302d-e that gods are animals insofar as they are ensouled. 
But although the concept of god entails immortality, he seems to 
have no firm beliefs about the after-life. At Ap. 29a-b, he claims 
that no man really knows what happens after death. He does not 
know whether death is good or bad (37b7-8). The proper attitude
37 See Ch.  174b l-175d l, 173a8-d; Eud.  289b-c; 281d2-el, 291c-d; Ale.  11, 
146d7-e3.
38 I consider the Me no  and G o r g i a s  as a sort of transition between the 
early Socratic and middle Platonic dialogues.
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is to recognise one's ignorance in this regard, and to attend to the 
only concern of any importance - doing what is right. For our first 
religious duty is to search for truth, wisdom and the perfection of 
our souls. However, at 40c, he speculates that death is e i ther  the 
a b sen ce  o f  c o n sc io u sn ess  o r  a change in the form of an 
em ig ra tion  (m e t o i k e s i s ) of the soul. This way of putting the 
m atter means that he does not know either way. Indeed the 
second alternative is characterised as "according to what is said" 
(40c7); "if what we are told is true" (40e6). It would seem, 
therefore, that he does not have any firm beliefs about an "after­
life" or about the Orphic doctrine of metempsychosis. He seems to 
hold that i f  there is an after-life, life continues there, it seems, 
in ways not very different from here (41), except that there will 
be better judgem ent, more happiness and immortality there, and 
also other fine men to converse with, "if what we are told is true". 
He believes that his accusers cannot harm him because divine law 
( t h e m i s ) does not permit a better man to be harmed by a worse 
man (30c7-d2), and that the fortunes of a good man are not a 
matter of indifference to the gods (41c-d). This must mean, that 
since the state of our soul is the only matter of first and final 
im portance, and given that there is a real difference between 
body and soul, no bodily calamity can harm the good soul. If we 
add to all this Socrates' conviction that to a good man no harm 
comes either in life or after death (41 d), it would seem reasonable 
to infer that he most probably regarded a virtuous soul as the 
suprem e ideal of life the attainm ent of which is, at least, 
necessary to guarantee a permanent satisfaction of all our basic 
needs, hopes and desires, whether in this life or in some other 
possible life. Such a conviction, which implies that things are so
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organised as to be inexorably conducive to human goodness, is 
religious, but it is also humanistic, insofar as it is not motivated by 
any firm belief in an after-life, while being fully motivated by a 
faith in the adequacy of our innate capacity to attain the good  of 
life.
(iii) From this point of view we may now reasonably guess a 
tentative answer to our third question. We have seen that 
Socrates used  d ia lec tica l  e l e n c h u s  as a negative  form  of 
persuasion to bring to his fellow countrymen a forceful, if painful 
recognition of the extent of their ignorance, and thereby to open 
their minds up towards a humble beginning in the search for true 
wisdom, by means of forms. 'No one really knows what happens 
after death', but Socrates knows that the function of life is to be 
truly, i.e., virtuously wise. And true wisdom belongs to god. Thus, 
when Socrates claims that no greater boon has befallen Athenians 
than his service to the god - and this refers to his practice of 
p h i l o s o p h i a ; when he exhorts his fellow citizens to care primarily 
for a r e t e ; and when he devises dialectics to promote recognition 
both of the need and the means to be truly wise, he seems to be
philosophising in the service  of a "god" who is a pe rfec t
exem plification of virtue-w isdom , an agent truly wise in the
knowledge of forms. This "god" will not be the god at Delphi or 
generally, the traditional m ythological gods who fail to satisfy
even ordinary human criteria  of a r e t T .  Socrates, how ever, 
manages to give a conventional face to this by proxy, i.e., by
reference to the god at Delphi, who has given a sign to Socrates to
rouse Athenians from their ignorant complacency - a psychic
pathology which seems to him to be the real cause of Athens
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socio-political ills - to the need to be truly wise, the only real 
salvation which must begin with each citizen undergoing psychic 
therapy of the sort which the Socratic e l e n ch u s  provides.39 This 
suggests that Socrates m ust have had a different conception of 
"god", "service to god", and hence, of "piety". This is not merely 
plausible if  we take account of his well known irony, but also 
there are hints in the E u t h y p h r o  to suggest that this is most 
probably true.
4 The E u t h y p h r o
We have argued that Socrates believes in god(s), but not the gods 
of traditional religion. Our tentative conclusion is that a Socratic 
god is the p e rfec t  exem p lica tio n  of v ir tue -w isdom . The 
E u t h y p h r o , I believe, obliquely confirms this conclusion, and 
supports also the anxiety of the Athenian public about the critical 
im plica tions  for trad itiona l  re lig ion  and eth ics of Socratic 
d i a l e c t i c s .40 As I understand them, these critical implications 
refer to a basic doctrinal presupposition  which m otivates the 
typical Socratic question, W hat is ( the)  x? where "( the)  x" is a 
substantive (e.g., a noun) or a substantivised ethical term (usually, 
a defin ite  artic le  + a s ingu lar  neuter or s ingu lar fem inine 
adjective). The subject of inquiry in the E u t h y p h r o  is the pious  
( t o  h o s i o n , 12e, used a lte rna tive ly  with to e u s e b e s , 5c).
T r a d i t i o n a l ly ,  "hosios” means what the gods approve for man. 
A lte rna tive ly , a pe rson  is h o s i o s  w hose behav iour is in
39 Cf. 'It seems to me that he [the god at Delphi] is not referring literally to 
Socrates but has merely taken my name as an example ... to tell us that 
human wisdom has little or no value' (Ap.  23a7-b3).
40 This is not to suggest that the prosecution or condemnation of Socrates 
is justified.
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consonance with divine requirements. E u s e b e i a  is a religious 
behaviour that p roceeds from  good d ispositions . The two 
complem ent each other, and the translation "pious" is roughly 
adequate to characterise both.
Euthyphro, a religious expert and a seer (3c),41 is about to 
prosecute his father for homicide by culpable negligence leading 
to the death of h i s  T a b o u r e r .^ 2  He meets Socrates at the porch of 
the king-archon. He is surprised to find out the charges brought 
against Socrates. Euthyphro seems unable to understand what 
"new gods"43 Socrates is charged with making, unless they refer 
to his d a i m o n i o n  of which he is familiar. W hile  Euthyphro
marvels with Socrates at the knowledge and wisdom of the young 
accuser who claims to k n o w  how the young are corrupted, 
Socrates is equally struck, not merely by Euthyphro 's apparently 
impudent behaviour - attempting to prosecute his own father - 
but by the incredible confidence by which he claims k n o w l e d g e  
of divine matters. Socrates exclaims:
Good heavens, Euthyphro! Surely the crowd is i g n o r a n t  of the 
way things ought to go. I fancy it is not correct for any ordinary 
person to prosecute his own father on this charge, but only for a 
man already f a r  advanced in point  o f  wisdom (4a-b).
Euthyphro, both by his practical attempt to indict his father, and 
by his public reputation as a religious expert, claims to be pious 
and to know what piety is. For Socrates, however, to be pious
41 Cf. Craty.  396d-e, 400a
42 For the historical and legal merits of the case, see Allen (1970, pp. 20- 
23)
4  ^ The plural, daimonia ka i na , in the charges may refer to Socrates' 
personal d a i m o n i o n , and the Air and Ether of Aristophanes' C l o u d s  that 
were insinuated as his personal deities.
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is to know  piety. A c co rd in g ly ,  S o c ra te s  w ill dem and  that 
Euthyphro prove that he k n o w s  piety. Socrates is anxious to be 
E uthyphro’s pupil, so that properly  inform ed, he could refute  
Meletus' charges against him. Euthyphro, accepting the challenge, 
confidently believes that, were he in court, he would quickly find 
the weak spot in Meletus' position (5a-b). With such a promising 
assurance, Socrates asks:
What sort of thing is the pious and the impious in connection 
with murder and other things? Or is not the pious itself by itself 
{auto autoi)  the same in every action (tauton en pasei praxe i ), 
and, on the other hand, is not impiety the opposite of all piety, 
always the same with itself and whatever is to be {an mellei)  
impious possessing some one form {mian tina idean , 5c-d)?
Euthyphro replies with an ostensive definition:
. . . the  p ious is w hat I am doing  now , p ro secu tin g  the
wrongdoer...whether it be your father or m other...and not to 
prosecute would be impious. Does not mankind believe that Zeus 
is the most excellent and just among the gods? And these same 
men admit that Zeus shackled his own father [Cronus] for 
swallowing his [other] sons unjustly, and that Cronus in turn had 
gelded his father [Uranus] for like reasons? (5dff.)44
Socrates responds:
There, Euthyphro, you have the reason why the charge is brought
against me. It is because, whenever people tell such stories about
the gods, I find it hard to accept; and so, it seems, that is why they 
will maintain that I am sinful. Well, now if  you who are so well 
versed in matters of the sort entertain the same beliefs, then,
necessarily, it would seem, I must give in, for what could we urge 
who admit that, for our part, we are quite ignorant about these
44 By insisting on the justice o f his supposedly pious action, he gives a 
hint of the Socratic hypothesis that the virtues, at least, imply one 
another.
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matters? But in the name of friendship, tell me. Do you actually 
believe that these things so happened? (6a-b)45
E u th y p h ro  tak es  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  b e l ie f  in com m unal 
responsib ili ty  for certa in  offences com m itted  by any of its 
mem bers against the gods very seriously. And he fears the
comm unal and social pollution which inevitably results from a 
failure to punish such offences whoever was responsible. He 
thinks that divine justice  requires punishment of the wrongdoer, 
which entails that failure  to undertake to punish is impious. 
W hile he expects this to be common knowledge to his fellow 
citizens who are imbued with the Homeric "theology", these same 
people are accusing him of intending to engage in an impious act 
by p ro secu tin g  his fa ther . E u thyphro  accuses them  of
inconsistency (6a). Although Socrates' reply does not show that
he does not believe in gods, it tells us in fairly clear terms that he 
belongs to the tradition of rational criticism of the gods of popular 
religion, and that it is this habitual critical attitude to the gods,
which is at the roo t of the charges brought against him. 
Accordingly, his frequent references to gods in his defence against 
impiety requires a more critical understanding than is suggested 
on face value.
How ever that may be, Socrates' question quoted earlier, was 
inclusively disjointed into a primary but vague question, What is 
the pious? and a secondary question of increasing specification of
4  ^ In the C r a t y l us  (400d), however, Socrates makes a somewhat stronger 
statement: ’There is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we 
must acknowledge - that of the gods we know nothing, either of their 
natures or of the names which they give themselves'. This is consistent 
with the conclusions of this chapter if, i.e., we understand by "gods" gods 
as traditionally conceived.
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"the pious" as "itself by itself", "the same in all pious actions" and 
"a single form". Three conceptual points are worth making here. 
First, the term - idea (5d, 6e) - is traditionally  translated for 
Socrates as "form" or "character" ,46 its other synonym, e i d o s  
(characteristic), is equ ivalen t in m eaning to a thing's essence 
( o u s i a ), as opposed to its affection ( p a t h o s , 11a). Secondly, in 
saying that "the pious is the same in all pious actions", Socrates, 
confirmed by Aristo tle ,47 locates "forms" firmly in but not, as in 
P lato 's  m iddle period  d ia logues , beyond  sensib le  ob jec ts .4 8 
Accordingly, I shall use "form" with a small "f" and "Form" with 
capital "F" respectively to denote the difference between Socratic 
forms and Platonic m e f^ p h y s ic a l  Form s. Thirdly, the Greek 
expression "the pious" is a substan tiv ised  adjective. It is 
ambiguously either (i) a singular referring noun or (ii) a generic 
noun or (iii) an abstract noun, (i) assumes the existence of some 
singular existing thing called the pious,  (ii) stands for the class or 
collection of pious actions or persons or any pious person or 
action. This is excluded from the primary question, what is the 
pious? as subsequently specified. (iii), which means the idea or 
attribute of piety is not meant by the primary question. The
choice for (i) is therefore strong. Traditionally , "pious" and 
"impious" are relational terms used to describe a person's attitude 
or other relation to the gods. In substantivizing the adjective, 
p i o u s , Socrates is conceiving it not as an attribute or as a
4 6  I shall use i d e a  to imply both these meanings. In Plato, abstract 
equivalences of e i d o s  occur; e.g., g e n o s  is occasionally used to mean 
"class", "race", etc ., and these run side by side with the 
metaphysical/ontological sense o f idea.
47 Meta.  1078b30-2
4  ^ See for example, La.  191e
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relational predicate or as an idea existing in our minds, but as an 
objective reality existing distinctly from the actions or things 
which manifest it. For he explicitly distinguishes the form of a 
pious action from the action, and indicates this by specifying t he  
p i o u s  as ’’itself by itself”, "the same in every action", and "having 
one form"49. This string of specifications occurring in one long 
question reduces the ambiguity of "the pious" by disqualifying the 
candidature of (ii) and (iii); for that which is "itself by itself" a n d  
"the same in all pious actions" is neither a particular pious person 
nor an action, a class of such persons, actions nor actions of a sort.
Neither is it an idea existing in the mind nor an attribute whose
existence depends on particulars. Thus Socrates was right, I think,
to take Euthyphro to have got him wrong, and to remind him 
about the specified meaning of the pious:
Call to mind that this is not what I asked you; to tell me one or 
two of many pious acts, but to tell me the form itself by w h i c h  
all pious actions are pious; for you agreed that it is by  one form 
that impious actions are impious and pious actions are pious 
(6d -e) .
Here, as earlier, some single form in all pious actions is being 
distinguished as "the pious itself by itself" apart from particular
pious actions which manifest it. The invocation of the formula
4  ^ ’The progress of dialectic involves a passage from the respondent's
naive existence assumption that "there is such a thing as "piety" to his 
acceptance, if  dialectics is successful, o f the highly sophisticated  
assumption that there is an essence of piety, and that it can be defined. 
But if the latter is true, the passage is continuous: for the commitment to 
essence is then latent in our ordinary use of words. The essence of piety 
is what the word "piety" means; to the degree that we do not understand 
that essence, we do not understand the meaning of our words.’ Allen, op. 
cit. p. 110.
161
"itself by itself" implies that tfie pious is a pure, unmixed form- 
type which exists in a certain complexity to be disentangled. 
Euthyphro, it seems, is invited to isolate, definitionally, the pious 
i t s e l f  by i t s e l f  from  any e n cu m b ran c e .50 U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  
Socrates does not explain the formula. However, given that in the 
dialogues he persistently rejects behavioural accounts of virtue, 
and insists dialectically that we look beyond the appearance or 
the affections to their nature and cause, he is implying that the 
pious as a psychic-form - given that virtue is a state of the soul, 
and piety is a virtue - is d istinct from, and is not entirely 
reducible to, its bodily manifestation.
There is a further specification in the above quotation. In 
addition to the apparently imm anental " in "  ( en  pase i  praxe i )  
at 5d, where particular pious acts are also said to ha ve  (e c h o n ) a 
single form, we have here also a causal or instrumental dative 
hoi  - which I translate "by which". This strengthens a causal 
interpretation of forms. It also suggests that Socrates is interested 
in p r in c ip le s  w hich  c a u s a l l y  d e te rm ine  and e x p l a i n  
moral/religious behaviour. W ere he interested in explanatory 
principles of non-ethical things too, he would have researched into 
the single form by which  bees are bees as such (Meno  72bff.).
Given the causal r ea l i t y  of form and its specification as "itself 
by itself", the original question, What is the pious? demands that 
the in te rlocu to r  a r t icu la te  a lingu is tic  s truc tu re  adequa te ly
50  This is not an unimportant point; for Euthyphro's main attempt to 
answer the Socratic question failed, at least partly, on the ground that he 
adduced a behavioural example in answer, whereas the pious is supposed
to be that by which pious actions are pious. To call a form "one" (mia)
and "itself by itself" is not to say that it is a bare simplicity. Socrates, I
believe, is counting the qualitative identity of forms.
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reflective of the pure and causal nature of the form. Obviously, 
such a linguistic structure cannot be a merely nominal equivalent 
of the pious. The prim ary  question  seems to dem and a 
d ialectically  adequate a c c o u n t  ( l o g o s )  of the form as a cause. 
Since a form is i tsel f  by i tself , this implies that, an adequate 
l o go s  will pick  out  its qualitative purity from what lies outside 
it. Consequently, the l o g o s  of a form must be criterial or 
paradigmatic: by having it we can identify, classify or otherwise 
diagnose or even predict actions that are or are to be pious and 
those that are or are to be impious. And so Socrates insists - in a 
further specification of the pious, that Euthyphro teach him
what the form which is the same as i tsel f  is, so that [he] may 
look to it and use it as a paradigm ( p a r a d e i g m a t i ) which, should 
those things which you or someone may do be of that sort, [he] 
may affirm that they are pious but should they not be of that 
sort, deny it (6e).5 1
The language of 6e, that (i) a form may be looked to and used as
(ii) a paradigm, suggests the possibility of a visual or even a 
tactile acquaintanceship with an idea.  But this is an incidence of 
the root of the term idea -id or ei-  which is the same for the 
verb of seeing and knowing. However, the passage intimates that 
Socratic dialectics is not just a semantic business; its basic 
orientation is practical, concerned with how we must get on in this 
world. To "look to and use a form as a paradigm" is more than an 
epistemic metaphor employed analogically on two limbs. First, it 
implies that we possess the ability to express a paradigmatic 
logos  [of a virtue-form] when we claim, like Euthyphro, to know
51 Cf. Meno 72c
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what a virtue is. Secondly, given the close association of being 
and knowing, this ability to express a l o g o s  - which amounts to 
knowledge - already presupposes an aretF-soul ,  i.e., a divine or 
optimum state of the soul. Consequently, it will not be inaccurate 
to say that the l o g o s - p a ra d ig m  c o rre sp o n d s  to "p sy ch ic -  
p a ra d ig m "  as its  o b jec tiv e  c a u s e .52 The former is the 
propositional or verbal aspect of the latter as an objective reality.
The Socratic man is an agent- rather than act- centred ag a th o s .  
The Homeric or traditional man needs only point to his socially 
approved actions as sufficient justification of his claims to are te .  
For the Socratic man an action per se is not sufficient; an action 
cannot ju s t ify  itself. A claim to a re t ' e  is to be justified  
intellectually. Thus at C h .  158c7-159al0, Socrates says that if 
t e m p e ra n c e  is p r e s e n t  t o  C harm ides, it m ust give some 
intimation of its nature and qualities which may enable him to 
formulate a notion of it which he can express. At La.  190c, it is 
said that if we know the nature of are t e  we must surely be able 
to tell, so that Nicias' inability to account for courage cast doubt on 
his own courage. And in general, if one is virtuous one k n o w s  
virtue, and if  one knows virtue, one must be capable of expressing 
a l o g o s  of virtue; and this is the mark of a true s o p h o s .  Thus, if 
E u thyphro  is  truly wise in religious matters, if, i.e., he is truly 
pious as he claims, his pointing to his impending suit against his 
own father is not sufficient ground for piety, even though his 
action has divine precedent to boot. To prove that he is truly
5 2 in the same sense in which the hot element causes heat in things, 
according to Greek science, such that heat characterises the nature of its 
cause. This does not entail a self-predicating thesis; an action is pious but 
only derivatively, in the sense that it bears the character of a pious soul, 
which is primarily what the p i o u s  is in itself.
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pious, he would have to support his action with a /^ g o s -p a ra d ig m , 
i .e .,  a functionally  c rite r ia l  logos  w hich  is e x p lic a to ry ,  
justificatory, and predictive of pious actions. Such a l ogos  must 
be dialectically  irrefutable. Accordingly, if Euthyphro cracks 
under the e l e n c h u s  and is unable to express a l o g o s , not only 
will this imply that he will often mislead and misinform his 
clientele - since he would not know what he is a professor of - but 
also it will imply that he is not truly religious, contrary to his own 
se lf -b e l ie f  and to public  s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ^ .  s 0 here is a 
different conception of religion according to which to be truly 
pious is to be in a divine or optimum state of soul, and this entails 
the ability to express, on demand, a dialectically adequate l o g o s  
with which to justify your beliefs, and to guide your own and 
others' lives. This is the demand Socrates is making of Euthyphro, 
the religious expert, the seer, who also claims to be pious. Can he 
satisfy Socrates by offering a paradigm-Z^gos of piety? He makes 
the attempt:
The god-loved (to theophi l t s )  is pious, and the god-hated (t o
theomise s )  is impious (6e-7a).
5 3 The necessity of previous knowledge of the nature of the pious for a 
successful career in the identification of its manifestations is not 
supposed to mean that ordinarily, people are unable to identify these. But 
the conflict as to whether Euthyphro's claim to piety based as it is on 
divine precedent is true, shows that conventional usages are not a sure 
guide to resolve difficult cases, and even what may look like easy cases 
may, on dialectical prognosis, cause a lot of difficulties. Socratic dialectics 
aims at directing minds from shifting conventional and subjective 
standards, to unchanging, and universal standards of justice or beauty or 
piety, etc., knowledge of which is presumed sufficient for successful and 
justifiable identification of all instances of justice, beauty, piety, etc. cf. 
H.Ma.  286c-d.
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This defin ition , consis ten t with E u th y p h ro 's  b e lie f  in the
traditional anthropomorphic gods, has the semblance of a criterial 
proposition; it attempts to pick out something definite, "the god­
loved". It is accepted provisionally to be examined for what it is
worth. Two r e d u c t i o ^  su cceed  a g a in s t  E u th y p h ro
respectively on the basis of his conception of g o d s ,55 ancj on a 
definitional analysis of "to theophi les"  and "to t heomi ses". The 
first is this; if  the gods are as co nce ived  by E uthyphro , 
anthropomorphic and quarrelsome, then, like us, they are wont to 
disagree most of all on matters of ethics and aesthetics, matters 
about which there are no o s t e n s i v e 5 6  standards for settlem ent
(7’off). The contradiction will be generated that the same thing 
would be both "god-loved" and "god-hated" (7eff.). For if the gods 
quarrel, Euthyphro may be sure that Zeus likes his action, but 
Hera may despise it. To avoid this conclusion, Euthyphro had to 
claim at least one of three things. The first is to say - what is 
trad itionally  believed - that the gods, un like  hum ans, have
54 These are not demonstrative but dialectical arguments. They proceed 
from the respondent's own belief(s), which here includes the assumption 
that the pious = the god-loved (cf. Me  no  75d), and the conclusion is 
drawn by analogy from premises established by (obvious) examples.
55 This premise is not made explicit in the language of the text, but only 
on its assumption is Socrates' response to Euthyphro intelligible.
56 I say "ostensive" because Socrates is far from claiming that there can 
be no standard - both of substance and procedure - to which moral and 
aesthetic unlike "factual" issues can be appealed in cases of dispute. Were 
he to imply this, the whole purpose o f dialectics would be defeated, since 
Socratic dialectics proceeds on the assumption that there are such
objective standards. He is here merely distinguishing the subject-matter 
- matter o f value or worth - about which quarrelling and enmity arise 
and the situations in which they arise. In any case the heart of the 
matter goes deeper. Socrates is against any measure of truth which is 
volatile. And an explanation in terms o f anthropomorphic whims and 
predilections seems to suggest such a measure.
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superior knowledge, and to link this to the expectation that this 
superior knowledge enables them to settle questions of worth and 
va lue  w ithou t q u a rre l .57 For it appears that Euthyphro is 
appealing to the moral authority of the gods on the basis of their 
superior knowledge. Yet he cannot avail himself of this, since it is 
comm on know ledge that the gods quarre l. The preceden t 
Euthyphro invokes to justify his own action is itself a testimony of 
the quarrelsomeness of the gods. For Socrates, however, to 
quarrel about questions of beauty, justice, and so on, presupposes 
lack of true wisdom about these. Hence, if there are gods, they 
cannot be the ones envisaged by Euthyphro or traditional religion, 
given that true wisdom is the property of god. The second way 
out for Euthyphro is to heed Xenophanes' call to abandon the 
anthropomorphic conception of the gods. But Euthyphro's own 
definition would have collapsed, since it depended on such a 
conception. Thirdly, he can claim that there is exactly one god, so 
that the question of quarreling does not arise. This, too, he cannot 
claim since his concept of the pious was inspired by the relation 
of, at least, two gods. Also, the existence of one and only one god 
may not in itself be sufficient, if  that god lacks true wisdom.
At any rate, neither of those expedients would save Euthyphro. 
But he does not realise it. Rather he confidently invokes a 
common belief in the moral principle that everybody, with all the 
gods, agrees that he who has done wrong ought to be punished. 
His father has done wrong, he seems to argue. Therefore, his
57 How often Zeus, the king of gods, is easily duped and seduced by his wife 
Hera, and at times found to be quite ignorant of what is going on around 
him, is just part of the numerous inconsistencies in the traditional beliefs 
about the gods as agents far superior in many ways - including 
knowledge - to human agents.
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father ought to be punished. Socrates points out, that real
disagreement among men or (anthropom orphic) gods concerns 
not  the universal, moral principle - that the wrongdoer must be 
punished - but what circumstances provide a valid case under this 
principle (8d). Euthyphro, however, cannot - on request - prove 
that the circumstances which his father set in motion and which 
led to the death of his labourer are impious and that his intending 
action is a case subsumable under this moral principle. Whatever 
the worth of that principle, Socrates is prepared to grant, for the 
sake of argument, what Euthyphro cannot prove: let your father's 
conduct be wrong, and let a l l  the gods hate it and declare it 
impious (9c-d). Still, the question remains; W hat is the pious? 
Euthyphro's amended definition reads:
the pious is what al l  the gods love, and the impious, what a l l
the gods hate (9e).
This offers a new ground for the second reduct ion  which is also 
the central argum ent in the E u t h y p h r o . The argument is 
prompted by this question: Is the pious loved by the gods because 
it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? (10a) 
Euthyphro does not understand this question which has the logical 
form; Is it p because q or q because p? Socrates promises to 
speak more clearly (10a). He adduces a series of parallel cases 
which has the form "p because q but not q because p", and then 
concludes that the pious is not the same as the god-loved. Since 
the refutation of Euthyphro turns on answers to the question - Is 
it p because q or q because p? - we might ask why Socrates 
thought that that question was relevant to the search for the 
nature of the pious. This preliminary question is all the more
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important because the rule of inference from the premises to the 
conclusion is unexpressed.
As we have seen, Socratic dialectics supposes that the pious , as 
an objective state of the soul, is a cause of all pious actions and the 
source of a d ia lec tica lly  adequate  l o g o s  w hich  functions 
epistemically as a criterion e n ab l i n g  us successfully to pick out,
classify, justify, and predict al l  instances of piety and impiety. 
Minimally, then, a dialectically adequate l ogos  must reflect three 
conditions of the form: its (i) universality (ii) objectivity, and (iii) 
causality. This is already intimated in the thesis that "an action is 
pious b e c a u s e  of the p i o u s ", where "because" is causal, and
implies the objective reality of the substantive "the p ious", whose 
universality lies in the fact that it is in a l l  p iou s  act ions .  In
thus asking the question: (A) Is that which is pious loved by the 
gods b e c a u s e  it is pious or  (B) Is it pious b e c a u s e  it is loved by 
the gods? it is being asked whether to be pious causal ly depends  
(A) on the  pious58 or (B) on the love of the gods. Opting for (A) 
would entail that the act of loving is caused by, i.e., is consequent 
to some intrinsically pious, and objectively existing thing called 
the p ious .  (B) would mean that the act of loving causes 
something to be pious. (A) and (B) are formally inconsistent, 
indeed, incompatible. By agreeing to (A) and (B) Euthyphro was 
torn between the demands of d ia lectics and his traditional 
religious sensibility. Given his belief in the gods as traditionally 
conceived, piety would be nothing unless it somehow relates to
58 The definite article is missing here but the point is clear. The question 
is whether an action's being pious depends on, i.e., is caused by its 
intrinsic worth or on an external evaluation. It turns out that the act of 
evaluation depends on something prior to it, and is thus caused in turn.
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the gods' pred ilec tions. H ow ever, the d ia lec tical thesis in 
operation is that all behaviours, walking, attitudes, preferences, 
w hether they come from  man or gods an th ropom orph ically  
conceived - are psychically  caused and reflect the state or 
character of the soul. Euthyphro's unwitting acceptance of both 
(A) and (B) prepares the ground for the falsification of his  "logos".
The foregoing preview  gives us some perspec tive  on the 
relevance of the question at 10a - is it p because q or q because 
p? its connection with Euthyphro's l o g o s , and the continuity of 
the argument in the dialogue. The argument to refute Euthyphro 
is as follows. If anything is being carried, it is a carried thing 
be ca us e  of the carrying; but it is not being carried because it is a 
carried thing. Similarly with "being led", "being seen" (lOa-b). It 
is then said that "being loved" belongs to this class (10c). All this 
implies that in general, any affection or attribute - all expressed 
in the phrase "being....", depends  on the prior existence of an 
objective  reality . In context, the obvious im p lica tion  for 
Euthyphro's equation of "the pious" with "the god-loved" is that 
since "god-loved" is a "being..." thing, i.e., an affection, it causa l l y  
d e p e n d s  on the gods' loving attitude to it - to the extent that "the 
god-loved" would not exist if the gods did not love it, just as 
"being carried" would not exist if  there were no carrying.59 This 
is inconsistent with the dialectical requirement (i) - (iii) above, 
viz., that that "the pious" be an objectively existing universal
59 The argument leading to the summary at 10c: 'If something is coming to
be or something is affected in a certain way, it is not because it is a thing
which is coming to be that the process of coming to be exists, but because
of the process of coming to be, it is a thing which is coming to be; it is not
because it is affected that the affecting exists, but because o f the 
affecting, the thing is affected'.
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c a u s e .60 By unwittingly accepting that it is by the pious that all
actions are pious, and that to be pious is to be loved by the
g o d s 61 Euthyphro paves the way for his own refutation which 
Socrates summarises with a touch of irony at 11a:
...the two are completely different. For the one [the god-loved] is
of the sort to be loved b e c a u s e  it is loved; the other [the pious],
because it is o f  the sort to be loved, therefore is loved. It would 
seem, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what the pious is,
you did not mean to make its essence (o u s i a ) clear to me; you 
mentioned some mere affection (pathos ti) of it. The holy has 
been so affected as to be loved by all the gods. What it really is, 
you have not said.
So far, then, we may tentatively conclude that, if there are gods, 
piety would not be determined by what they love, since their love 
would be logically subsequent to the form of piety. But this may 
in turn suggest that forms in general must be prior to gods, and
that it is insofar as the form of piety exists in the first place that 
there is a pious attitude, preference, or behaviour (whether of god
6 0 Some scholars have proceeded to the analysis of the argument as if  it 
centred on (1) a Leibnizian principle of Substitution according to which 
two expressions for the same thing must be mutually replaceable s a l v a  
v e r i t a t e .- Geach (1966), (2) the principle o f the substitutivity of
definitional equivalents - Cohen (1971) or (3) a pair o f principles - 
transitivity and causality - Sharvy (1972). That the argument m a y  
involve some principle of substitutivity or transitivity and causality is 
not denied. But these principles do not explain why Socrates may have 
resorted to them, if  he resorted to them. For these principles have no
obvious connection to the arguments in the text as a whole. On my 
account the whole argument is held together by a more unifying  
dialectical thesis, viz., the dialectical conception o f the pious  and its 
implications for Euthyphro's definition.
61 The definite article is missing here but the point is clear. The question 
is whether an action's being pious depends on, i.e., is caused by its 
intrinsic worth or on an external valuation. It turns out that the act of
valuation is in turn caused.
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or men), but not vice versa. But if piety is a kind of s o p h i a , 
which is an optimum and divine state of the soul, this would 
imply that for Socrates, the fundamental grounds of religion are 
divine forms. It also implies that true religion does not depend on 
ex te rn a l  or acc identa l re la tions  of a tt i tudes , a ttr ibu tes  or 
sacrifices. Thus there may well be gods, but they would not be 
the gods as traditionally conceived. This conclusion underpins the 
subsequent discussion of what it means to worship, care for 
( therapeia ,  12eff.), or serve (hup ere t i k e , 13d) god.
Socrates suggests to Euthyphro that the form of the pious may 
be understood as a part ( m e r o s )  or a specific difference of the 
larger form called the just. Euthyphro, takes up the suggestion, 
and defines the pious as the part of the ju s t  concerned with 
attendance ( t h e r a p e i a ) to the gods, and the remaining part of the 
just is concerned with attendance to men (12e).62 For Socrates, 
however, a ttendance or service aims either at benefitting or 
making better the subject-matter of attendance or  at aiding in 
the production of something (13bff.). Euthyphro, who must know 
that traditionally gods are thought to be self-sufficient, cannot 
conclude that religious attendances or services benefit and make 
the gods better. But nor can he figure out what service to god is 
productive of. Euthyphro now defines the pious as e p i s t e m e  
(14b) or an art (t e c h n e ,  14e) of gratifying the gods in praying 
and sacrificing, the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is the 
impious (14b).
At this point Socrates says that Euthyphro has come right up to 
the point of answering his question and then turned away (14c). 
This may refer to two possibilities. Socrates, with appropriate
62 Cf. Cr.  54b, La.  199d, Prt.  330c-331e, G.  507a-b
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adjustment to what he means by "god" and reference to the 
A p o l o g y , may believe that true religious service is in aid of 
producing virtue in our souls, as Vlastos (1991) holds. But this 
should  be unders tood  to mean that god, as the pe rfec t 
exemplification of virtue-wisdom, is that by which we measure
the production of virtue in us. The other possibility may be that
by referring to service of god as e p i s t e m e  (or t e c h n e )  of prayers 
and sacrifices, Euthyphro came close to the realisation that piety is 
agent-centred, a kind of wisdom, a state of the soul. He failed in 
the full realisation because he still has an act-centred approach to 
religion; he connected e p i s t T m e  and t e c h n F  with prayers and 
sacrifices. Both possibilities are compatible, but if Socrates does 
not mean both it is not clear which he has in mind. Let us go back 
to the text.
Now to sacrifice means to give to the gods; to pray means to ask 
from the gods. But we will hesitate to give to the gods unless they 
really need what we give, and they will give just what we rightly 
need. So that it would be right asking and right taking that would 
be involved here, if worship is to be a t e c  f ine  or e p i  s t e r n e  
( 1 4 e ) .63 Although, everything good that is ours comes from the 
gods (14e-15a), and although the trad itiona l conception  of 
worship is a "give-and-take" between men and gods, Euthyphro 
cannot see what sort of advantages ("ophe l i m a ) the gods derive 
from such commercial (e m p o r i k F )  conception of worship of or 
service to gods. He now suggests honour and praise - things
6 3 if  r i g h t  asking and r i g h t  giving go into true worship, the
qualification of r ightness  may, after all, make the content o f asking and
giving something entirely different from that entertained in traditional 
religion. Cf. the highly philosophical prayer for personal goodness and 
harmony attributed to Socrates at Phaedrus .
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suggesting  g ratitude  (15a). But w hat is g ra te fu l  is not 
(necessarily) god-loved, Socrates points out. "It is god-loved", 
replies Euthyphro. Euthyphro has come full circle (15a) to the
definition rejected earlier, namely, that the pious is god-loved.
5 Summary
The stage has been set for a rational reduction  of religion.
Although the result of the dialectical discussion in E u t h y p h r o  is, 
as often, obviously negative, its positive implications are fairly 
discernible. From our discussions so far, we see that dialectics 
suggests the existence of perm anent, ob jec tive  and universal 
standards of truth and value as opposed to opinions64 and social 
conventions in religious or moral matters. Religious and moral 
attitudes, attributes, or actions are a function of our real self, our 
soul. True religion, true piety, is to be grounded in the optimum
state of our soul Such a state of soul is commensurate with t h e
g o o d  of life, which is what we all want and want for its sake. 
Theological voluntarism - the view that whatever is good, pious, 
etc., is so because god wills it, and the subjectivist accounts of 
ethics which define goodness, etc. in terms of approval, are here 
firmly rejected in favour of the objectivity of goodness or piety as 
p sy ch ica lly  rea lisab le  fo rm a l  co n d it ion s . The trad ition a l  
conception of gods entails absurdities in the practice and theory of 
worship of or service to gods. True worship or service to god is a 
project of perfecting one's soul or of helping to perfect others' soul 
- which was the end of Socratic phi lo soph ia  by dialectics.
Traditional Greek religion was largely a matter of things done -
64 Beliefs may desert a man under scrutiny - cf. Euthy.  I lb 6 -e l; La  194b; 
R.  334b - but knowledge (of form) is stable.
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ritual observance, and hardly a matter of how the individual felt 
or though t. R e lig ious standards were thus largely  ritual 
observance, with little supporting creed or dogma. From Thales 
on, the Presocratics brought religion to the bar of reason, by
transposing m ythological cosmologies to systematic philosophical 
accounts of the world - accounts in which god appears as the 
constan t de te rm in ing  p rincip le  o f  the m ovem ents, order and
consciousness in this world. Socrates has been concerned with 
how we should live the best possible life. But this necessarily 
involves a certa in  conception  of what the world really  is.
D ialectics points to forms as the fundam ental realities which 
underlie  the structure of the world, and virtue-forms constitute 
the p rincip les  in terms of which truth, re lig ion , virtue, or
happiness in their true and highest sense are to be defined. 
Knowledge of form is true wisdom, but to be truly wise is the key 
characteristic of god. Thus the forms set the conditions for the 
divinity of ensouled beings (man or god). The existence of forms, 
like the Presocratic divine a r c h a i , is necessary as that which is 
ultimately presupposed in an account of a feature of the cosmos, 
viz., the moral-religious phenomena. God, for Socrates as for his 
predecessors, is associated with first principles. But while the 
Presocratics did not generally moralise their a r c h e - g od, one of 
Socrates' distinctive contribution to Greek thought is his ethical 
grounding of religion or theology. Since moral forms set the 
conditions for divinity, God, as the truly wise being, is for Socrates 
the being who fulfils the optimum condition of rational and ethical 
excellence, i.e., one who embodies the virtue-forms. This retains 
the traditional conception of god as an ideal embodiment of the
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(com petitive) virtues. But it does so by rem oving , what 
traditional relig ion  accom m odated , every trace of sub jec tive  
arbitrariness, ignorance, and moral perversion  from the notion 
and being of god. God must be morally and intellectually perfect.
In Greek orthodox religion, it is impious to strive for divine 
excellence. For Socrates, piety is no longer the simple, uncritical 
and submissive reverence to the gods accepted by the community. 
True piety is wisdom, it is an optim um  state of the soul; 
derivatively, it consists in p h i l o - s o p h i a , i.e., activity dedicated to 
the perfection of one’s or others' soul. True religion would then be 
ph ilosoph ica l activ ity  conceived  and o rgan ised  tow ards the 
realisation of one's rational and ethical perfection. In other words 
religion is, as Socrates implies in the A p o l o g y , p h i l o - s o p h i a .  
P h i l o - s o p h i a  is our divine duty and service to god, but it is also 
the best policy; for "no man really knows what happens at death"
(Ap  29a-b). And, at any rate, the fundamental essences of things 
are comm ensurable with the good  of life, to the extent that the 
good man suffers no evil either while he lives or when he is dead.
The distinctive feature of our next chapter is the explicit cosmic 
application of Socratic religion in Plato's middle and late dialogues. 
The real difference is the metaphysical status o f soul and Forms 
a n d  all that this entails. The metaphysics of this philosophical 
religion is m otivated by the explanatory pow er underlying the 
Orphic-pythagorean conception of the substantial separability of 
soul from body, of the former's possible im m ortality  and non- 
earthly destiny. It is the conceived im plic it  truth o f these 
elements in the popular religion which Plato, like Socrates, has 





The previous chapter tends to the argument that true religion is 
activity in pursuit or love of s o p h i a .  But s o p h i a  is the key 
characteristic of god. Yet, according to Socrates, the function of 
human life is to attain s o p h i a  which is the good.  S o p h i a  simply 
is an optimum state of the soul attainable by knowledge of ethical 
first principles - principles of divine wisdom and happiness, of the 
highest values and excellent action. Thus, being divinely happy, 
wise and good implies the prior existence of the forms which 
dialectics leads to. According to the Socratic dialogues, Socrates is 
not committed to an after-life. But in a culture now dominated by 
the religion of initiation, ecstatic k a t h a r s i s , and other forms of 
ritual as rites of passage to spiritual salvation, happiness, and the 
b lessed after-life , the function  of forms im plied  in Socratic 
dialectics entails a new kind of religion. It is this new religion, 
applied to the conception of a soul with non-earthly destiny and 
substantially separable from a body, which we find fully blown 
out in m ost post-S o cra tic  d ia logues . A ccord ing ly , P lato 's 
philosophy of religion is built upon three basic factors; Forms, soul 
and body. It is the soul's relation between Forms and body which 
defines both the content and structure of P la to’s philosophy of 
religion in the pc st-Socratic dialogues.
In talking of P ato's philosophy of religion two qualifications are 
necessary. First, I am aware that what is called Plato's philosophy 
of religion is not completely and coherently presented in a single
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Platonic dialogue. Plato usually pursues different purposes in 
different dialogues. Yet, a more or less coherent picture of 
Platonic religion is visible in the post-Socratic dialogues. Secondly, 
in talking about Plato's philosophy of religion, I am not implying 
that Plato has a Unitarian conception, throughout the dialogues, of 
what I have identified as the three pillars of Platonic religion, viz., 
Forms, soul and body. Plato may not have developed the concept 
of tripartite soul of the R e p u b l i c  while writing, e.g., the M e n o  or 
P h a e d o .  He may not have developed the T i m a e u s '  concept of 
the atomic structure of body in e.g., the R e p u b l i c  and P h a e d r u s .  
Again, the Platonic Forms as appear in the S o p h i s t  and P h i l e b u s  
may possibly be different from  those of the P h a e d o  and 
R e p u b l i c . Broadly, however, I acknowledge the traditional 
distinction between the M iddle and Late dialogues, as I have 
distinguished these from the Early or Socratic dialogues. But a s  
far  as Plato's phi losophy o f  religion is concerned , the possible 
conceptual developments of Forms, soul and body are most 
probably not sufficiently radical to warrant discontinuity of the 
basic m eanings of these terms throughout that developm ent. 
Consequently, I think that "Plato's philosophy of religion" is a 
textually warrantable designation of an aspect of Plato's thought. 
Accordingly, although I shall distinguish between the Middle and 
Late dialogues, it shall be clear that the distinction does not affect 
the basic meaning and continuity of what I believe to be Plato's 
thoughts on religion.
The basic framework of Plato 's philosophy of religion is as 
follows. First, there is the "realm" of Forms. Forms are causally 
e ffec tive  parad igm atic  p r in c ip le s  of tru th , goodness and 
happiness, and the intelligibility  and essences of phenomena. 1
1 That forms are paradigms was intimated in the E u t h y p h r o  and, apart
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Forms are divine, and their divinity is implicitly linked both with 
their causal function and with the paradigmatic conditions of their 
ex is tence: uniqueness , invariance, uniform ity , incom positeness,
invisibility, eternality, and logical self-sufficiency (i.e., they do not 
depend on anything else for their existence or nature). The Forms 
constitute a system permeated by the universal Form of the Good. 
The Good is not merely a d u n a m i s  (a power), and an a i t i a  (a 
cause/reason) - emphasis on its causal efficacy - but also that 
which holds all things together for the best (P h d o . 99c.); it also 
makes all other Forms intelligible in the way that the sun makes 
phenom enal objects in te llig ible  (R . 506e3-4, 508b-509b, 517c). 
In this the Good serves as the ultimate hypothesis in a scientific 
account of the universe2 conceived as a cosmos. As the P h a e d o  
(99bff.) and T i m a e u s  show, Plato thinks that a scientifically 
adequate account must be a teleological one of the purposive kind 
based on the postulation of Forms. In the T i m a e u s , the Good 
appears as the Form of animal; the cosmos is said to be good and 
beautiful as a visible image of the Form of animal copied out by 
God as a divine Craftsman (Demiurge).3
from its being specifically so characterised in the T i m a e u s , Forms are 
usually in Plato the realities which phenomena strive for but fall short. 
In the late dialogues "measure" (m e t r o n ) and its Platonic equivalence 
"limit" ip e r as )  tend to replace paradigm as the primary designation for 
the aspect o f Forms as exemplars. In technical passages in these late 
dialogues, "paradigm" often means "parallel case" rather than exemplar 
(St.  278e). That Forms (of virtue) are principles of happiness, goodness, 
etc., is at least implied in Socratic dialectics, and is clearly the case in the 
middle period, as we shall see.
2 Phdo,  100cl0-d7, lOld-el; cf. R. 526e, 527e, 533b.
3 In this essay, I shall, without argument for lack o f space, take 
Demiurgic creation as an argument to the conclusion, that if  anything is 
subject to an intelligible explanation, it satisfies the requirements of 
creation, not in the sense that the thing in question has been brought 
into existence from empty nothingness, but in the sense that the thing
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At the opposite end to the nature of Forms is the nature of body 
which constitutes either the principle of or condition for visibility, 
variability , contingency, evil, non-rationality  and tem porality .^  
Next in "hierarchy" to the "realm" of Forms is the astronomical 
sphere, "the abode of the gods" - the innum erable stars and 
planets. Gods are souls everlastingly united with their bodies 
over which they have perfect rule. Gods are divinely happy, wise, 
good, blessed, just, caring, and in absolute control of their bodies 
but in virtue of their being imbued with Forms. This is put 
succinctly in the S y m p o s i u m :  'none of the gods are seekers of 
truth. They do not long for s o p h i a  because they are wise'. And, 
of course, in Plato, to be divinely wise is to be imbued with Forms. 
A lternatively , the P h a e d r u s  presents the same doctrine in a 
m ythical l o g o s : the gods "feast on", "have a vision of" "are
nourished by" "contem plate" Form s (P h d r . 247). But being 
imbued with Forms entails that gods do honest work in the
universe - that of conducting the celestial revolutions through 
which they transmit justice, care, goodness, and those standard- 
establishing conditions of Forms that are capable of being received 
more or less by bodily nature - viz., uniqueness, invariability, 
uniformity, and eternality. But also by being imbued with Forms 
the life of god constitutes the standard life for all other souls. 
Human beings are souls ephem erally  united with a body over 
which they have no absolute rule. The T i m a e u s  and E p i n o m i s  
explain the nature  of the body of the gods as fiery  or
p redo m inan tly  f iery , and tha t  o f h um ans as ea r th ly  or
can be accounted for as if  a creative mind had planned and executed it.
4 Phdo.  78c6-9; 7 9 a l- ll;  78cl-3; 78cl0-d; 79a; 79c-d; 65a-c; 80d5; Ti . 28c- 
29
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predom inan tly  earthy.
The function of human  life is to "join the company of gods", i.e., 
to be imbued with or know Forms, which amounts to being truly 
virtuous or s o p  ho s.  Hence, Platonic religion is the system of 
activities undertaken in love of s o p h i a  or, alternatively, the
system of activities that facilitate the rule of reason in us as 
embodied souls. This implies that the activities involved must 
lead the soul to the apprehension of Forms, which in turn implies 
a move away from the influence or conditions of bodily existence. 
Accordingly, the moral dimension of Platonic religion - viz., that 
w t  o u g h t  to know Forms, is grounded on the intellectual. For 
access to Forms is pr imar i l y  by way of dialectical l ogo i , activities 
that inure the soul to a p r i o r i  thinking, away from the sensible
and the sensual, towards a sublime vision of the Form of Good. 
Not surprisingly, Plato's religious devotees are first and foremost, 
philosophers, in his sense. Nevertheless, for the majority of 
o rd inary  peop le  incapab le  of the d irec t  and asce tica lly
intellectualist ascent to Forms, a degree of acceptable piety will 
avail them if they contribute, in a social or political community, to 
the rule of highly rational beings who have either apprehended
Forms or are truly devoted to the love of s o p h i a .  A failure to
pursue the moral injunction to know Forms has earthly and
eschato logical consequences; we shall never approximate true 
happiness or true justice while we live, and when we are dead,
i.e., when our soul is separated from our body, the soul shall be
incarnated into other lower forms of bodily life. This, in a 
nutshell, is Platonic religion.
However, there are two successive trends in Plato's philosophy
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of religion. The first is characteristic  o f  the m iddle period 
dialogues - Phaedo ,  Republ i c ,  P h a e d r u s  a n d  Sym pos iu m .  
A lthough gods are mentioned in these dialogues, their role in 
Plato 's philosophical-religious scheme is not em phasised. The 
main feature of Platonic religiosity is presented as if  it consists in 
the d i r e c t  "contemplation" of Forms by the human soul. Let us 
call this the "contemplative" approach to religion. This is first 
intimated in the M e  no  with P h a e d o .  The R e p u b l i c  represen ts  
its fullest developm ent in a curriculum  o f abstract studies - 
arithmetic, geometry, astromony, harmonics - intended to acustom 
the mind of a "devotee" to a pr ior i  rea so n in g , w hich will 
culminate through philosophical dialectic in the sublime vision of 
the Good. Plato constantly contrasts "devotees" of this religion as 
lovers of wisdom, of beauty itself with the lovers of sight, physical 
beauty  or se n su a l i ty .5 But in the late dialogues - S o p h i s t ,  
Phi l ebus ,  S ta t e sman ,  Laws ,  T imaeus ,  E p i n o m i s ^ - a new 
em phasis, first in tim ated  in the P h a e d r u s , appears. The 
cosmological passages of these dialogues seem to demonstrate the 
rule of divine Reason in the cosmos as a whole. Plato does so by 
describing Reason in the cosmos as Soul,^ defined as "motion of 
Reason" (nou kinesis , L a w s , 897d). Reason is imbued with ("has 
a view to" Ti.  29a) Forms. Alternatively, since Soul is Reason in 
motion, then, insofar as Reason is imbued with Forms, Soul can be
5 Phdo.  64e, 68c; R. 476a; Phdr. 242bff.
6 It has been believed that it was, at least, largely written by Philippus of 
Opus, although the doctrine there presented appears to have been 
promised by the Stranger at the end of book 12, and it is, for all intents 
and purposes, a sequel to book 12. I shall so take it.
7 Henceforth, Soul (with capital "S") will alternatively distinguish cosmic 
or divine soul (of god) from human soul or soul generically speaking, 
which will be written just as "soul". Likewise, "Reason" will distinguish 
divine Reason (of God) from human or generic "reason".
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poetically represented as having been constructed of the Forms of 
Being, Sameness and Difference (77. 34c-35). Here, the function 
of Forms is consistent with the eternal and constant homeostatic 
conditions of our organic, dynamic cosmos. The emphasis is on the 
ph ilosophically  restated  roles traditionally  associated with the 
gods: that of influencing events in this world by (impartially and 
inviolably) imparting justice to and caring for all things (through 
the celestial revolutions). Religion comes to consist in ordering 
our lives in accordance with the properties of order, uniformity 
and harmony which characterise the celestial movements. This 
new emphasis on movement, may well substantiate the E p i n o m i s , 
w hose author argues (991 e) that astronomy is the supreme
subject of study which leads to the truest wisdom, piety, and sure
preservation of virtue. For it is in astronomy that we learn the 
rational convolutions in which the heavens declare the glory of
god, and thereby bring our minds in conformity to the divine 
mind of the cosmos. Let us call the religiosity arising from this 
new emphasis on movement the "movement" approach to religion.
Is th e re  a d if fe ren c e  be tw een  the "con tem pla tive"  and 
"movement" approaches to religion? Yes and no. The difference, 
if any, is one of perspective. For Platonic philosophical-religious 
c o n t e m p l a t i o n  ( t h e o r i a ) m e a n s  n e i t h e r  th o u g h tfu l  
consideration/observation  nor, as in Christian religion, spiritual 
meditation of the soul upon a separately existing God. Rather, it is 
activity of an entire quality of life signifying the highest self-
fu lfilm ent in which the essential nature of the soul has been 
brought, th rough long and arduous in te llectual and ethical 
p r e p a ra t io n ,  in to  c o m m e n su ra t io n  w ith the  fu n d am en ta l ,
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intelligible and divine principles of reality. Such a life entails the 
ability to translate these intelligible principles into action, and/or 
being able to utter words which constitute a l o g o s  of things as 
they really are. From this point of view the two approaches to 
religion are the same. However, a difference in perspective exists; 
compared with the middle period, the late perspective emphasises 
the causal dynamics rather than statics of Forms. Also, the late 
perspective more than the middle period perspective  corresponds 
to Plato 's  p reparedness to accom m odate  a la rger degree of 
pleasure in human virtue. The P h a e d o  (see 81b) emphasises the 
moral duty to avoid, as f a r  as poss ib le , association with a n y  
bodily affection for the sake of philosophical wisdom. But in the 
P h i l e b u s , to the question whether any of us would be content 
with a life in which he possessed  w isdom , unders tand ing , 
knowledge, and a complete memory of the w'hole of history but 
experienced no pleasure, pain - great or small - the answer is an 
emphatic No (21d-e). The life of feeling has become for Plato a 
defining clause of human nature. In the L a w s  we are told that 
’no one would consent, if he could help it, to a course of action 
which would not bring him more joy  than sorrow ' (663b Cf. 
733a). And at 733a, it is said that nothing is so native to human 
life as pleasure, pain and desire. Generally, the L a w s  shows that 
the la te  p e rsp ec t iv e  m ay accom m o date  m ore  open, less 
intellectualist activities when Plato implies there that any activity 
- d rinking , dancing , m usic, o ther fes t iv it ie s ,  leg is la tion  or 
obedience to a genuine kind of legislation - is an acceptable 
degree of religious piety, provided it meets the criteria by which 
such activities may imitate, or in any degree produce an imitation
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of, the rule of divine Reason in the cosmos, a rule which is 
identical with the patterns of celestial movement.
In what follows, I shall, for the purposes of exposition, refer to 
the middle period emphasis on the d i r e c t  "contem plation" of 
Forms as the "contemplative" approach to religion, and the late 
period emphasis on movement as the "movement" approach to 
religion. The fundamental identity of the two approaches has 
many elements, at least two of which are that (a) the basic logic of
Plato’s religion is based on traditional Olympian deism and orphic-
pythagoreanism; this is linked to (b) the conception of religion as 
fundamentally having to do with the function of life, understood 
to be the attainment of the good  which is interpreted as so p h i a .  
Both approaches may be viewed as successive ways of defining 
"true" religion as activity in pursuit or love of s o p h i a .  The
"contemplative" approach implies but does not em phasise the 
"movement" approach. Incidentally both approaches attempt to 
face the tasks not addressed in the Socratic dialogues, viz., a
description of the (ia) nature of and (ib) relation between soul and 
forms - where (ib) includes the mode and (ii) the means whereby 
soul acquires access to forms. Accordingly, the following essay is 
divided into 5 sections. Counting the present section, the next 
section, 2, states the "contemplative" approach; 3 states the 
"movement" approach. How far Plato intends his  religion to be 
an adequate substitution of traditional religion is suggested by the 
fact that he presents these approaches in conjunction with the 
sensitive  but all-im portant them es of d ivine providence and 
justice, the issue of evil, and eschatology - the presentation being 
done in the full flower of m ythical and mystical verbiage 
associated with the Olympian and mystery religions. Accordingly,
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section 4 attempts to deal with these themes. Section 5 (a) and 
(b) deal with education by dialectics and legislation as the two 
principal but complementary means to Platonic religiosity. The 
final section, 6, summarises the results of the discussions.
2 The contemplative approach to religion
In the P h a e d r u s  (242b8-257a) and S y m p o s i u m  (20 0e-2 12a) ,  
Socrates' mythical speeches about E r o s  (Love, Desire) culminate 
the middle period approach, and contain intimations of the late. 
In the P h a e d r u s , Socrates ' second speech  was in tended to 
supplement his first speech which had treated E r o s  as a blind, 
irrational force that works in opposition to reason, a sort of 
m adness associated  with the desire  for p leasure  and sensual 
gratification. He recognises that E r o s  is either a god or a divine 
thing (242e2). But god or the divine cannot be an evil thing. Nor 
is madness invariably evil. According to Socrates, the greatest 
blessings of mankind - oracular truth, prophecy, poetic creation - 
come in the form of divine madness or possession (244a-b).^ 
These madnesses inspire to truer results than is otherwise the 
case in ordinary sanity (245c). Divine madness is a gift of the 
gods fraught with the h ighest bliss. To prove this requires 
d iscernm ent of the nature of soul, both divine and human, its 
experiences and activities (245c). This is presented in three 
roughly distinct parts: Part (1) deals in general terms with both 
divine and human soul; (11) deals with the soul of gods, its
 ^ There is, to be sure, some irony in this passage, since in the same 
dialogue as elsewhere, Plato ranks the prophet, seer and the like far 
below the true sophos (248c-e). Plato's main point here is that Er os  has 
a metaphysical status and dimension.
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experiences and activities; (111) returns to the human soul, its 
experiences and activities. I will present (111) in connection with 
the S y m p o s i u m  and other texts in section 4.
(1) From P h d r .  245c to 246a, Plato argues that the soul is 
immortal because it is essentially self-moving,9 A self-mover is 
an a r c  h e ,  a first principle. This entails that it is itse lf
ungenerable and imperishable. As an arc  he,  soul is the source of
all other movements (k in e se i s ) and becomings {to g ignomenon) . 
Soul traverses the whole universe in ever-changing forms (246b- 
d), we are told. At least, part of its function is to care for all that 
is inanimate. All self-moving beings are ensouled. Soul has a 
constitutive nature which can be told only poetically, i.e., by 
analogy: soul is like a union of p o w e r s  in a team of winged steeds 
and their winged charioteer. All the gods' steeds and their
charioteer are good, but not so with other beings. Among
mankind, it is a pair of steeds, one noble- and good, the other 
ignoble and bad, which the charioteer controls (246a-b). At
253c8-e, the three parts of the soul are explicated with reference 
to what they are inclined to: the good steed is the lover of glory, 
but with temperance and modesty, and needs no whip; the other 
is hard to control, consorts with wantonness and vainglory; it is 
implied that the charioteer is inclined to s o p h i a .  The term
"mortal" applies to a composite of soul and body; "immortal" to 
such a composite whose elements are in everlasting unity.
(11) Next, the life of the divine soul, its activities and experiences. 
The mythical l o g o s  is interesting enough to be quoted here at 
some length:
9 So Alcmaeon (Aristotle's de An. 405a29-bl) as noticed earlier in the 
chapter on the Presocratics
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In the heavens, Zeus, the host of gods and other d a i m o n e s
orders and cares for all things... (246e). Within the heavens are 
many spectacles of bliss on the highways whereon the blessed 
gods pass to and fro, each doing his own work. But as such times 
as they go their feasting and banquet, they climb the steep
ascent onto the summit of that arch that supports the heavens,
and easy is that ascent for the chariot of the gods; for they are
well balanced and readily guided... (247c). Of that place beyond 
the heavens where none of the earthly poets has yet sung ... we 
must be bold to tell what is true... It is there that true being 
dwells, without colour, shape, cannot be touched; reason alone 
can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof. The 
thought of god, like every soul that has care to receive her 
proper food, is nourished  by reason (n o i ) and know ledge  
(e p i s t e m e ). Wherefore, when at last she has beheld being she is 
well content... And while she is borne round she discerns Justice 
i tse lf , T em perance , and K now ledge. And when she has 
c o n t e m p l a t e d  (t h e a s a m e n e ) likewise and feasted upon all else 
that has true being, she descends again within the heavens and 
comes back home. And having so come, the charioteer sets his 
steeds at their m anger, and puts am brosia before them and 
draught of nectar to drink withal (247e). Such is the life of gods. 
Of the other souls that which best follows a god and becomes 
most like thereunto raises her charioteers' head into the outer 
region, and is carried round with the gods in the revolution 
(248a).
There are a number of significant notes some of which will be 
taken up later in section 4. Presently, we may take the following 
notes. Plato is inclined to boldness to tell the truth which the 
inspired poets - Homer, Hesiod, etc., and generally, traditional 
religion, have missed. Part, at least, of this truth is that there is a 
p lace  beyond the heavens w here  true  being - in tang ib le , 
shapeless, colourless, namely, Forms (Beauty, Justice, Temperance, 
etc. 247d6, 250b5) - dwell. That the Forms are "beyond the 
heavens" simply means they are immaterial realities. That the 
"place beyond heavens" is an intelligible plane of pure rationality,
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beyond sensation or sensuality, is also the reason why 'r e a s o n  
a l on e  can behold it'. Since the gods of the heaven are ensouled 
bodies, it follows that they cannot dwell in the im m aterial, 
intelligible "realm" of Forms. Yet, it is exactly there that they 
must feast and banquet. The reason is said to be because the soul 
of gods, like every other soul, must be nourished (i.e., informed) 
by knowledge and reason; and it is implied that only in relation to 
Forms are souls nourished. Note that Plato has boldly but wisely 
made Forms rather than ambrosia and nectar the primary and 
proper meal of the gods. It is only after the gods have fully 
feasted on Forms and returned to their sensible, sensual abode 
that the c h a r i o t e e r  (the rational part) of their soul sets - what is 
not needed in reality - ambrosia and nectar before the steeds (the 
spirited and appetitive parts of their soul).
The souls of the gods have easy or ready access to Forms 
because the charioteer and steeds are in perfect balance. This is a 
poetic way of saying that the gods are imbued with Forms. The 
steeds are good and easily guided; they present no conflicting 
tendencies betw een them selves or each in re la tion  to the 
charioteer. The gods return home, after a full feasting on or 
contemplation of Forms, to their task - that of conducting the 
heavenly revolutions, and through that of o r d e r i n g  and c a r i n g  
for all things (my reading of 247e, 246b, e). The point of the 
"spectacles of bliss" along the heavenly roads in addition to the 
final sublime vision in the region outside the heavens seems to be 
that the gods keep the Forms in view as they go about their 
celestial activity. Their actions are governed by a constant vision 
of the Forms. Because Forms are principles of knowledge, wisdom,
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true happiness, truth, etc., P lato  describes vision beyond the 
heavens as knowledge (247d7), blissful (250c4), blessed (250cb7), 
and the "place beyond the heavens" itself is described as the Plain 
of Truth (248b8).
Let us summarise our discussions so far. Although Plato offers a 
d ifferent conception of relig ion , its structure is insp ired  by 
tradition. Traditional religion conceives gods as causally effective 
powers who affect the career of the world, gods who are immortal 
living beings dwelling on Olympus, and whose im m ortality  is 
nourished somehow by their feasting on the ideal m eal of 
ambrosia and nectar, and who are ideal exemplifications of human 
life - wise, good, fair, everlastingly blessed and happy. Plato 
espouses a new religion but does so by using religious elements 
and imagery of Homeric theology and the mystery religions. In 
addition to the presence of the Homeric gods by explicit mention 
(Zeus, 246e, 250b, 252e; Hera, 253b; Apollo, 253b; Ares, 252c; cf. 
77 40dff.) or allusion ('for the rest, all such as are ranked in the 
number of the twelve as ruler gods lead their several companies, 
each according to his rank', 247e), there is mention of heavenly 
feasting and banqueting (247a), chariot driving by Zeus and other 
gods, ambrosia and nectar (247e), and the brilliant, pure light of 
the divine realm (250b-c). The attainment of the vision of the 
Forms is likened to initiation into the sacred, purifying mystery in 
strong terms redolent of the Eleusinian mysteries; we have sight 
of and initiation into the mystery rites (250b8; spectacles of bliss, 
247a4; the full vision of the perfect mysteries, 249c7-8. But Plato 
has appropriated naive religious truth in order to transpose it 
onto a higher level. He explains that it is by being located in the
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heavens that gods are composites of soul and body. However, 
their immortality arises from the essential nature of their soul 
q u a  soul, i.e., as self-mover rather than by birth-right. And a 
self-mover is the first principle of all becoming, and the orderer 
and carer of all that is inanimate. Thus gods are not idle beings 
feasting ceaselessly in leisure on Olympus. They do honest work 
in the universe as a whole. By their causal powers they conduct 
the astronom ica l revo lu tio ns , and  th roug h  tha t  cause  the 
generation and perishing of phenomena, as well as care for all that 
is inanimate. All this is acceptable to tradition. But the most 
significant truth which enboldens Plato to speak out is that Forms, 
not gods, are the ultimate realities, and that it is the constant 
vision of Forms by gods which explains the latter's very being as 
wise, fair, good, everlas ting ly  happy and b lessed  d iv in ities  
ordering and caring for the phenom enal world . Thus, the 
perfections of god - perfections which serve as standards for all 
other souls which follow god - logically depend on the prior 
existence of Forms. It is Forms, not ambrosia and nectar, which 
constitute the r e d  and proper "food" by which the god-souls, but 
also human souls, are nourished, and it is by possessing reason 
that souls are able to "ascend" to the intelligible "realm" of Forms.
3 The movement approach to religion
The metaphor of god-souls "ascending" the summit of the heaven 
towards Forms which reason alone  can behold is replaced, in the 
movement approach, by the explanation that god-souls are, by 
definition, motions of pure, d iv ine Reason w hose objects of 
cognition are Forms. The movement approach, first intimated in 
the P h a e d r u s , appears more inform ative ly  in the P h i l e b u s ,
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T i m a  e u s , S o p h i s t , S t a t e s m a n , E p  i n o m i  s , L a w s .  The 
argum ent from movement culminates in the dem onstration that, 
given the universe as a cosmos, i.e., as an orderly system, any 
plausible account of it will consist in an argument to the rule of 
divine Reason in the cosmos as a whole. Generally  in these 
dialogues, the rule of divine Reason in the cosmos is associated 
with the motions of a cosmic soul or the set of celestial motions; 
and there  is an in tim ation  that R eason  is im bued  with 
parad igm atic  Form s. Hence, the p roperties  o f  Form s are 
transmitted to the visible world through the motions of Reason. 
Let us begin with the Law s .
In Laws  x, Plato proposes that legislation could be a viable 
in s trum en t for m oral regenera tion  and sp ir i tua l  en rich m en t 
provided laws are genuine imitations of the rule of divine Reason 
in the cosmos at large. Believing that materialism is one of the 
in te l lec tu a l  foundations of im m oralism , im p ie ty  or a theism  
(889ff.), he essays an argument from motion to prove spiritual 
priority over body, and the rule of divine Reason in the cosmos as 
a whole. He begins by arguing that his materialist contemporaries 
or predecessors are mistaken in their approach to the study of the 
universe. This involves their thesis (889aff.) that everything 
comes to be by "nature", "chance" or "art". They espouse a 
cosm ogony or cosmology, taking the prim ary bodies, fire, air, 
earth , water, and their chance and m echanica l re la tio ns , as 
sufficient to account for the evolution of the cosm os or for 
p h e n o m e n a .  i n this materialist philosophy, the existence of
values and gods are assigned to art, conceived as "unnatural" 
10 This is a paraphrase, not Plato's exact words.
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constructions of the imagination. It is as creations of art, argue 
the materialists, tha t gods and values vary from place to place. 
Plato argues to the contrary  that all physical or phenomenal 
features - being "hard", "soft", "light", "heavy", "hot", "cold" (892b, 
897a) depend on ten possible forms of motion reducible to two 
basic ones: bodily or m oved m otion and self-moving motion. 
Moved motion can cease to move at some time; and when it moves 
it must be moved by something other than itself, whereas self- 
moving motion is eve r  in motion. Hence, insofar as things in the 
universe are in motion, i.e., come to be, their motion depends on 
or presupposes self-moved motion (also Phdr .  245cff.).
Plato  then defines soul as "self-m oving motion" (896a, also 
P h d r .  ibid), qualified later as "motion of Reason" (nou k inesi s , 
897d). Hence, soul means "rational self-motion", or "Reason-in- 
motion" (cf. Ti.  34a, 35a-37c, 40b). Its manner is indicated as 
orderly , un iform , regu lar, ro ta ry , rev o lu tiona ry , lawful and 
according to plan (898a-b, Epin .  982bff). The state of such a soul 
is said to be "happy", "virtuous", "prudent", "blessed", "divine", and 
"supremely good" (897b; E p i n .  8 9 1 e ) . l l  Plato calls such a soul 
the prim ary source of all things (896c). Soul is that which 
conducts the revolutions of all things, and is that by which the 
circle of the heavens is turned about with all foresight and order 
(898c). The very form s of Soul's  m otions are forms of 
consciousness : "w isdom ", "law", "m oods", "habits o f m ind",
"w ishes", "ca lcu lations" , "purposes" , "m em ories" , "judgem ent" 
"reflection", "counsel", "foresight" , "pleasure and pain", "art",
5 1 Although this is not textually stated, it is clear both in context and 
description that a blessed, supremely good, divine, etc., soul is cosmic or 
astronomical soui, the one which is closest in contact with Forms. 
Accordingly, I shall so refer to it.
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"hope”, "fear", "hate", "love" (896c-d, 892b), "control" (d i o i k e i n , 
896e), "governance" (a r c h o u s a n , 896c), "care" (903b, P h d r .  
246b). Thus, if the materialists mean by "nature" the phenomenal 
world, it derives rather from divine art and mind (892b) which 
are presupposed in phenomenal changes. And insofar as the 
materialists may also mean by "nature" that which is primary,
Soul, rather than fire, etc, is eminently natural, since its motions -
wish, purpose, wisdom, art, etc., take precedence over body 
(reading, 892b-c). Next, Plato moves to call Soul god (899a). This 
is not an illegitimate move. As we have seen, the idea of causal 
power realistically conceived grounds the basic Greek idea of god
(cf. Ep in .  983d). A further move from "god" to "gods" is made
with reference to the multiplicity of Soul's celestial embodiments 
in the numerous stars and planets (899b, and E p i n .  891e; 
77.40a-b).
As primary motion, Plato speaks of Soul as the governor and 
primary source of all things. Soul is said to g o v e r n  Warehouses)  
body according to nature (.L a w s  986c, 898c). Elsewhere, Soul as 
first principle of motion is said to be immortal, unbegotten, and 
im perishab le  {Ph dr .  245c9, d; cf. L a w s , 904b, 967d; cf. E p i n .  
982a), ruler and mistress of the universe (77. 34c), carer and 
orderer of all that is inanimate and controller of the whole world 
{ P h d r .  246b), moulder and fashioner of body { E p i n .  981c ). 
Nevertheless, Plato still speaks of Soul as "older than body", "the 
first of comings-to-be" {L a w s , 896b, 892a, 967d; also 77 .3 4 c . ) .  
Against this he speaks of an eternal "King" distinguished from the 
gods recognised by law, who governs or cares for all, and 
systematically orders all things with a view to the preservation
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and virtue of the whole {Laws ,  903bff.). The question that arises 
is: what is the relation between Soul and Reason, or between Soul 
and the e ternal King? A lternatively , does Plato have two 
governors and carers - Soul and the King - of one and the same 
cosmos? The answer is this: the definition of soul as "motion of 
Reason" (in L a w s  x), together with the characterisation of motions 
of Reason in terms of consciousness - "wisdom", "purpose", "wish", 
"art", "calculation", etc., suggests that the eternal King is Reason. 
In the T i m a e u s , Soul is distinguished from divine Reason called 
Father (28c), and the latter is presented poetically as creating the 
former. Although I claim that Soul just is motion of Reason, I do 
not thereby im ply that Soul is identical with Reason. The 
following argument, divisible into two subsections (a) and (b) 
concludes: that (a) not all  Reason is in the cosmos or, in other 
words, Soul is that part of Reason immanent in the cosmos; and 
that (b) since i m m a t e r i a l , c h a n g e l e s s  Forms are the fundamental 
causes and principles of whatever order, intelligibility, goodness, 
etc., there is in the ma te r ia l  and changing  cosmos, Plato requires 
Reason as a "m ediating"12 agent whose ontological credentials 
enable it to transmit the properties of Forms to the physical world 
by means of mction. Consequently, if we understand that Plato 
views order, etc., in phenomena as made out of, and extending 
over, that which is inherently chaotic (viz., bodies), we then see 
that it is reasonable to assume an analytical distinction between 
(i) a regu la to ry  and constructive  function  of Reason which 
bestraddles the intelligible "realm" of Forms and the physical
12 "Mediating" requires qualification in respect o f the question at hand, 
i.e., what is the relation, if  any, between Forms and Reason? This 
question will be addressed in a note infra.
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"realm", and (ii) a contemplative function of Reason outside the 
sou l-body  com plex , un a ffec ted  by the  n a tu ra l ,  c o rru p tin g  
influence of the corporeal. Let us now attend to the evidence.
(a) In an array of factors constitutive of the cosmos in the 
Philebus  (3 0 a -b )  - Limit, Unlimited, the Cause, and the Mixture 
- the Cause, which is synonymous with Reason (22c, 28d, 30c) is 
said both "to furnish" ("create", T i m a e u s )  the soul of the universe, 
and to be "the best of causes" (30e). At 30c9-10, we read that 
W isdom (s o p h i a ) and Reason ( nous )  - probably the same thing - 
could not be present ( g e n o i t h e n )  without soul. At Ti. 28b, The 
Creator (= Reason, 48a), which is the best of causes (29a), is the 
first principle of becoming ( archT  genese 'os , 28b). Reason not 
only creates Soul in the T i m a e u s , it is also argued (30b) that in 
order that the cosmos might be of its nature m ost beautiful 
(k a l l i s t o n ) and most good (a r i s t o n ), Reason fashioned the world 
by endowing it with a soul; and that Reason cannot possibly be
presen t ( p a r a g e n e s t h a i ) in anything apart from soul (c f .Ti .  
3 0 b ) . 13 it is further implied that soul must be present in body. 
These passages could mean one of two things: either that (i) if a
13 Cf. the Statesman's myth in which God (= Reason) is said to make Soul 
and to form the ordered world-body. The circuits of soul are referred to as 
God's own rotations or circuits which are under his own control (269c8-
d l, 273b6-7). At Epin.  983b, the author bluntly states that the universal 
governorship o f Soul presupposes a God who alone has the power to
imparl soul, and that it is easy for God to give life to any body and then to 
set it moving as it judges best. At Craty.  400a Hermogenes and Socrates 
agree that Reason or  Soul is the ordering and containing principle of all 
things. "You may", says Socrates, "well call that power p h u e c h e  which 
carries and holds nature (he phusin ochei kai echei) and this may be 
refined away into p s u c h J " .  Beneath the verbal fanfare is a doctrinal 
seriousness: the ordering and containing o f all nature ( p h u s i s )  is a
psycho-rational function. "Reason or  Soul" are two ways of conceiving 
this function.
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thing is rational then it is a soul, or (ii) when Reason is in 
something, what it is in must be ensouled. That (ii) is what is 
m eant is further supported at S o p h .  248e-249a. There the 
Stranger gets assent to his thesis that motion, life, soul and Reason 
are really present in complete Being which is neither devoid of 
Reason, fixed nor immovable. It is then said that if it [sc. complete 
Being] has Reason, it must have life, and if it has both Reason and 
life, it cannot possess them except in soul. The argument, 
therefore, is that there is soul where Reason is present. It is 
noteworthy that Plato is not talking of Reason s i m p l i c i t e r , but 
only of Reason as it is possessed by or as is present in something 
else.
Given that soul is defined in terms of motion, the following 
passage is supportive of the above conclusion. S o p h .  249b-c 
argues that: (i) If there is no motion, there is no Reason (nous)  in 
anyone about anything anywhere. (ii) On the other hand, if we 
admit that all things are in flux and motion we shall remove 
Reason itself from the number of existing things, (iii) Sameness of 
quality , nature or relations could never come into existence 
without the state of rest, (iv) Without these - namely, sameness 
of quality, etc. - you cannot see how Reason could exist or come to 
be anywhere. Now (i) establishes that there is motion w h e r e  
Reason is present, (ii) denies (i) where there is motion a n d  flux, 
(iii) and (iv) qualify (i) by establishing a condition for (i) to be 
true, viz., Reason is present only where there is motion of 
sam eness of quality , nature or re la t io n s .14 That is, there is
14 In a discussion of causes at the end of the S o p h i s t , spontaneous causes 
(ai t ias automates , 265c7) are said to generate without intelligence (a n e u
dianoias phouses , 265c8) and are specifically contrasted to causes like 
Soul which arise from divinity (apo theou, 265c9) and are endowed with
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rational motion or motion that is not in flux where Reason is 
present. This ccmes back to Plato's thesis that soul is motion of 
Reason. But it also shows that by this Plato is not claiming that 
soul is  Reason, for he is not talking of Reason s i m p l i c i t e r  but 
only of Reason as is present in something else. This allows us to 
infer reasonably, that given the definition of Soul as motion of 
Reason, Plato conceives of Soul as the regulatory and efficient 
aspect of Reason or, in other words, the part of Reason present in 
the visible cosmos. The S oph i s t  passage just considered (249b-c) 
also intimates that Reason in motion imparts properties of Forms 
to the cosmos; for sameness of quality, nature and relations in
motion intimate the presence of properties of Forms in rational
motion. This is poetically articulated in the creation story of the 
T i m a e u s , a brief discussion of which will point to conclusion (b) 
above which, in other words, is that Reason "mediates" Forms a n d  
the physical world in the form of Soul.
(b) In the T i m a e u s  the universe is presented as a unique animal 
p ro d u c e d  by God (R e a so n ) ,  n ick n a m e d  the  C ra ftsm an
( D e m i u r g e ) .  *^ God, we are told, was good, and being free from 
j e a l o u s y ,  desired that all things should be good, i.e., be a 
s im il i tu d e  o f  H im se lf  o r  the E ternal (T i . 29e; 3 0 c ) .1 7
reason and knowledge (meta logou te kai epistemes, 265c8).
1^7?. vii, 530a; Soph.  265c-266d; St., 269c-273e, Phil. 26e-27b, 28d-30e.
1 6 Olympian theology saw no contradiction between just gods who were 
also envious of human prosperity; their own ideal life set the bounds 
across which human effort is presumptuous, impious, and deserving of 
nemesis. As we shall see, Plato, like Socrates, thinks that similitude to god 
is the consumation of true piety.
17 But also Plato often paraphraslically uses "eternal being" for Forms ( R . 
484b4, 485b2, 500c2-3, 527b5, 7, 585cl-2, 61 le3; Ti. 29al, 3, 35a2, 37b3 37e5, 
48e6, 505c5; Phil.  59a7).
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W herefore, finding the whole visib le  sphere not at rest, but 
moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he 
brought order ( taxis) .  God imposed order (30b) by projecting 
paradigmatic and intelligible Forms, shape and num ber onto an 
otherwise inherently  chaotic , and un in te llig ib le  bodily  nature 
(53a, b3-5, 69b4). Reason is said to have "looked to and used" or 
"had a view to" the Form of an im al18 which is in every way
Unless one can show that Plato is careless about "Himself o r  the 
Eternal", the indifference here signified by "or" suggests that although 
Reason and Forms may not be identical, they are so closely related as to be 
alternative ways of refering to the same thing. "Eternity" or "eternal" 
( a i o n i o s )  is said of Forms distributively. Secondly, the cosmos is 
described as "good" and "beautiful". But this is the result of the doctrine 
that (1) Reason is good, and it is impossible that the product of the good be 
anything but good (30a), and  (2) the goodness and beauty of the product 
imply the pre-existence of Forms. If  (1) and (2) are compatible, this may 
suggest that the causality of Reason depends Forms, but not necessarily 
that Reason is subordinate to Forms. Indeed, Ti.  36e-37a says that the 
Demiurge is the best of intelligible and eternal beings (ton noeton aei te 
onton) ,  and 37c calls the cosmos, 'the becoming image o f the eternal 
gods' (ton aidion gcgonos agalma).  In context, "eternal beings" and 
"eternal gods" are proxy for Forms. And these texts do not suggest that 
Reason is subodinate to Forms. But if  not, and if  Plato is not careless 
either in saying 'Himself or  the Eternal", or in using "Eternal gods" for 
"Eternal Forms", he may well mean that these are different ways of 
looking at the same thing, and possibly that Reason [or gods are] is the 
subjective aspect of Forms - so that Reason and Forms are distinguishable 
as analytical elements in an account of the cosmos. If this were the case, 
it would follow that my expression "mediates" in 'Reason mediates Forms 
and sensible things' will be a metaphor bom of the exigency of analysis. 
So too would the expression 'Reason has a "view to" Forms'. However, if 
the possibility exists that Reason and Forms are more than analytically 
distinct, still, the phrase 'Reason "has a view to", "uses" Forms' would 
require a non-poetic understanding, since Reason cannot literally have a 
view or a use of something existing independently of itself. Likewise, 
"contemplation" (of Forms), understood as a Platonic technicality will not 
do. For it has to do with a quality of life rather than a "bird’s eye" view of 
Reason. Thus it is more plausible to see Forms, Reason and Soul as 
analytically distinctive aspects of one and the same thing rather than as 
ontologically separate entities. With these qualifications in mind, I shall
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complete (29e-30d, 31 b l ) rather than specific Forms of animal or 
their images, 'for no image of an incomplete (a t e l e i ) thing is ever 
good. So the cosmos is an image or a copy of the Form of animal 
(30d-31a). The completeness of this Form is, therefore, necessary 
for the result to be k a l l i s t o n  and a r i s t o n .  But in what consists 
com pleteness? It consists, I think, in its being a standard- 
establishing property  or c o n d i t i o n .  19 i f  this is true, Demiurgic
perform ance will be estimated by two complementary criteria,
ontological and e p i s t e m i c ; 2 0  by the extent to which His product 
reproduces (1) that which a Form q u a  an ontological standard 
archetyp ica lly , perfectly , and purely is, and (2) the formal 
properties or conditions in which a Platonic standard exists q u a  
standard, viz., (2i) uniqueness, (2ii) uniformity, (2iii) invariance, 
(2iii) eternality, (2iv) immateriality, hence its invisibility; (2v) 
d iv in ity . 21
However, the Demiurge, like all Greek gods, is not omnipotent. 
Consequently, he cannot be expected to make invisible and divine,
what is by definition the principle of visibility, corruption, and
chaos, namely, the primary bodies. Plato acknowledges this when 
he insists that the Demiurge desired that 'all things should be good 
and nothing bad as f a r  as this is at tainable ' (30a). Moreover, 
"divinity", in context, as a standard-establishing property or 
cond ition , is a second-order p redicate; it characterises the 
standard-establishing conditions in which Forms exist, viz., (2i-iv).
henceforth use "mediate" and cognate terms without quotation marks.
*9 For completeness as a mark of standards and measures, see R.,  477a3,
504cl-3, 597a5; Phil.,  201dl-6; cf. 60c2-4, 65b8, 66bl-2.
20 Plato arrives at the ontological on the basis of the epistemic.
21 S t c P h d o .  78c6-9; 7 9 a l-ll, 78cl-3, 78cl0-d, 79a, 79c-d, 65a-c, 80d5; Ti.
28c-29
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On the other hand, the whole Demiurgic "creation", which consists 
in imposing order on disorder, reduces to the investment of the 
physical world with Soul, which is the image of the Form of 
animal. In other words, this cosmos is as it is - beautiful (k a l o n ) 
and good (a r i s t o n ) - because of the presence in it of Soul. But 
Soul is not only immortal, it is also immaterial, hence, invisible. 
M oreover, that which is imm ortal, i.e., self-m oving, is divine. 
Therefore, insofar as there is a cosmos, it is permeated by an 
imm aterial, invisible, divine Soul. From  this poin t of view, 
requirements (2iv, v) - imm ateriality or invisibility  and divinity 
as standard-establishing conditions or properties of the Form of 
animal are satisfied in the cosmos. But how is completeness 
satisfied with respect to requirements 2i-iv? First, uniqueness.
Form, as a perfect standard, is unique, according to Plato. So 
"completeness", as a standard-establishing property  or condition, 
must be p rim arily  p red icab le  o f the o rig ina l (Form ) and 
derivatively of its visible copy (the cosmos as a whole). Since the
copy too is to serve, f o r m a l l y , as a standard in the visible sphere,
it must be unique, otherwise, claims Plato, an infinite regress will 
be generated (3 Ia-b ) .22  (1) Ontologically, the Form of animal is
pure animality (animal-in-general, or universal animal), its image
22 Cf. R.  597c for uniqueness of individual Forms as standards. For, if two 
Forms are such that they may both equally serve as standards for the 
same type of thing, they would have to be numerically distinct but 
formally similar to each other. Otherwise we would not know that they 
were of equal service as standards for the same type of thing. But the 
condition of similarity or formal identity between them destroys the very 
possibility that either of them is a standard. This condition is a third
thing which neither of them is, if, by hypothesis, all identicals exist by 
reference to standards and not by reference to merely relative 
comparisons. So that this third factor rather than they, would be the
standard for their kind. They would be mere instantiations of it.
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is the immaterial, divine soul of the cosmos. The uniqueness of 
cosmic soul, as an image of the Form of animal, consists in the fact 
that just as the original is animal-in-general, so the image is 
cosmic or universal soul, i.e., soul directed to body in general and 
not to any specific body. Thus the Form of animal is said to 
contain, embrace, encompass as its parts, all the specific Forms of 
animal (30c7-8, 31a4-5). The parts of the Form of Animal are not 
only ontological. They are also logical. Hence, the unique Form 
cannot be reduced to the parts (cf. S o p h .  253d). The "universal" 
Form (of animal) is present in the more specific Forms as 
ex tend ing  through them (cf. d i a t e t e m e n e ,  S o p h . 253d6);
nevertheless, the universal Form exists in logical and substantial 
independence of its parts by permeating or encapsulating them 
(d8). This is indicated at Ti.  34b by saying that the Demiurge 
caused Soul to be extended throughout the world-body and 
wrapped the body round with Soul on the outside.
That the universal Form of Animal is unique by being logically 
and substantially independent of its parts may also be viewed
from Plato's conception of a living thing, which is just a soul or a 
s o u l - i n - b o d y . ^ 3  The Form of "living thing" is [universal] Soul or 
Soul directed to body [-in-general]. The primary bodies in which 
soul finds itself will specify the types of creatures there are. The 
specific Forms of animal will be defined by the elements - fire, air,
water, earth {Ti.  51b). Thus gods are described as essentially
souls in mostly fire-body and residing in the fire or astronomical 
region. Fish or water creatures are souls in mostly water-body
and residing in water region. Birds or air creatures are souls in 
mostly air-body and residing in the air region. Solid, fleshy
23 Phdo.  105c9-ll; Ti. 30b4-5, with 7-8; Soph.  246e5-7.
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creatures are souls in mostly earth-body and residing on earth 
(40a; cf. 91e-92c; E p i n .  982aff.)). 41d with 34c-36 add an
exp lanation  of m ortality  as aris ing  from  a m athem atica lly  
structural gradation to a second or third degree of the soul- 
structure of the star-gods. However, the existence, number, and 
nature of the bodily elements and their Forms are not entailed by 
the Form of animal. If one may use the language of "genus" and 
"differentia", we might say that in Plato, the d i f f e r e n t i ae  of the 
kinds of animals are not differences contained in the general 
notion of animal such that if they did not exist, then it would not 
exist. The d i f f e r e n t i a e  are thereby  not qua lif ica tions or 
constitutive determinations of Soul qua  Soul (cf. S o p h . 2 5 1 c l - d 5 ) .  
As Platonic species, the parts of animal are incomplete as being 
inadequate as standards for animality; for they are posterior to 
the Form of animal in which they participate and which exists 
over and above them as itself a unity quite independent of their 
being parts of it. Thus for Plato, but not for Aristotle, it is possible 
to have an animal that is not any particular kind of animal. So 
that the world-animal is a unique instantiation of the Form of 
animal without being a particular kind of animal; for it includes 
every iota of material there is, all confined in a spherical space 
(58a). The uniqueness condition is thus satisfied.
Apart from uniqueness, the standard-establishing properties or 
conditions of "invariance", "uniformity" and eternality are satisfied 
in the motions c f  Soul. Plato pictures the creation of Soul as a 
blending of Being, Sameness and Difference. Mixing these up in a 
bowl, the Demiurge produces an immaterial, self-moving "stuff" 
which he cuts up into strips and joins the ends into mobile circular
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bands. Plato thus gives expression to his thesis that rotary motion 
is "the most appropriate for reason and intelligence", and is a 
m ovem ent which espec ia lly  belongs to Reason { n o u s )  and 
In telligence ( p h r o n e s i n , 34a). Only thus, Plato thinks, can the 
absolute invariance and uniform ity  of Form s be approxim ated 
within the ceaseless variance which is inherent in bodily flux. The 
first of the soul-circles the Demiurge puts at the circumference of 
the cosmos to produce "the movement of the same", a movement 
which Plato thinks runs through the whole universe: everything in 
the cosmos, from its periphery down to the centre of our earth, is 
subject to this motion (36e2-3). For Plato, the innumerable stars 
are ever-lasting gods (37b6). Their predominantly fiery body, is 
in a perfectly self-contained sphere and they enjoy intelligence of 
unpeturbable rationality, not being subject to the bodily influx 
and efflux which afflict our reason (77. 43a). The visible motions
of the countless multitude of the fixed stars is exclusively the
movement of the Same. But the sun, the moon, and the five 
planets, have visible motions which exhibit also movement of the 
Different.
Plato seems to be reconciling his a pr ior i  conviction that all 
celestial motion is rotary with the empirical facts concerning the 
"wandering" motions of the seven stars - the sun, moon, and the 
five planets. He designs to effect this reconcilia tion  by the 
hypothesis that the sun, moon, and planets are in every case 
compositions of wrcwandering c ircu la r  m otions proceed ing  in
different planes in d ifferent d irections at d ifferen t velocities.
Each of these motions exhibits a long term solution of its own from 
which the fixed stars are totally exempt. First, all of their periods
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are much longer, with wide variations in length among them. 
Secondly, these orbits proceed in different planes from those of 
the fixed stars. Finally, all of these orbits exhibit "turnings" 
( t r o p a i ), points of maximum deviation north and south at which 
the wandering stars turn back and proceed  in the reverse  
direction until the opposite point of turning has been reached. 
Because of the invariant periodicity of their motions the stars 
provide measures of time. The sun contributes the spectacular 
alterations of light and darkness caused by its rising and setting, 
and the year by its annual circuit. The moon's eastward circuit of 
the heavens gives us the lunar month. The periods of the five 
planets too, if  they had been determ ined, would have further 
units of time-reckoning. If a clock may be defined roughly as a 
regularly repeating  motion with some m arker which m akes 
possible the counting of the repetitions, Plato's abstract expression 
of this is in his claim that time proceeds or revolves numerably 
(37d6-7, 3 8 a 7 - 9 ) , 2 4  ancj he implies that the wandering stars or
planets are the markers whose circuits are the regularly repeating 
motions and the m e a s u r a b l e . 25  37c-38e makes it clear that
24 The concept of time as celestial clock(s) in the T i m a e u s  is an 
elaboration of the one mooted in the brief discussion of astronomy in the 
Epinomis  and R vii, 528e-530d.
25 Insofar as these markers are ensouled bodies, and soul is immortal, the 
phenomenal "realm" which depends on the markers is sempiternal - that 
is, exists through all time by existing at all times (possible dates) 
infinitely into the past and infinitely into the future. In this sense, they 
are qua  standards of time not subject to dating and are thus eternal, since 
it is the very basis of measuring time or dating (37d7). But by being
bodily, the celestial clock markers possess only partial sempiternality
because their even repetitiveness and numerability do not exist in
unqualified eternity; for the possibility of a corporeal dissolution of the 
celestial clock back into Chaos is possible, and is thus entertained (38b7, 
cf. St.273c-e). When Plato refers to "it was", "it will be" as eide  (forms ,
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Plato intends the Demiurge's introduction of time to be viewed as 
a production of a sensible standard, so that the introduction of 
time and the making of the universe into a unique animal are 
paralle l projects of image-m aking (39e3-4) - to m irror the
condition of eternity of the original standard F o r m . ^ 6 Thus the 
circuits which constitute a regulatory function of Soul explain how 
the planets contribute to the maintenance of such stability, order, 
intelligibility, time, number, as there is in the c o s m o s . 27 It is 
clear that these properties of the cosm os - stability , order, 
goodness, etc., imply that Soul is imbued with forms.
To summarise. The universe is a cosmos whose fundamental 
principles are a system or "fabric" of intelligible, immaterial and 
immutable Forms permeated by the universal Form of Good. But 
by being intelligible, immaterial and immutable, it is difficult to
kinds) of time (37e), he is referring, I believe, to time measured or 
measurable against a standard, and are therefore posterior to that 
standard. So that the Demiurge "makes" past and future does not mean 
that there was a time past prior to his creations, nor does it stand in 
blatant contradiction to Timaeus' narrative according to which there was 
a past time prior to the formation of the Heavens. The talk of "past" and 
"future" presupposes a standard of Eternity for temporal measure. 
Accordingly, we must view Timaeus's talk o f pre-cosmos time as an 
exigency of narrative account.
26 See 37d5, 7; 38a7, 38b8-cl, 39el-2
27 In the S t a t e s m a n , Soul maintains the homeostatic conditions inherited 
from the Demiurge against the necessary, erratic, and even explosive 
incursions of body (273a, c-d). The reverse circuits represent nothing 
over and above the disorderly motions in the cosmos. In the P h i l e b u s  
(30a-c), Soul maintains the homeostatic conditions of body which is in 
flux (43a, 59a-b). The order of the world-body is derived from the 
transcendent rationality of the Demiurge which is the cause of the 
presence of Soul and its rationality in the ordered world-body (30c-d). 
Soul is viewed as standing to the order of the universe, as represented in 
the years, seasons, and months, as our souls stand to our bodily order as 
represented in health (30b-c).
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see how Forms can be the principles of the material and changing 
cosmos. Plato’s way out is to supply the medial a g e n c y  of divine 
Reason who relates to Forms as objects of its knowledge and who, 
as an a g e n t , needs to articulate itself. It does so in its aspect as a
principle of motion. Reason’s motion is otherwise called S o u l ,2 8
and is specified as rotary or circular self-movement. A self­
mover implies, at least, the existence of a moved t h i n g . 29 T h e  
self-mover is not only prior to, but is also the cause of the moved. 
All physical or chemical movements fall under "the m o v e d " . ^ 0  
Hence, Soul is by definition the arch'e  of all becomings, where 
"becoming" entails bodily or phenomenal existence. But, although 
Reason is immanent in the cosmos in the form of Soul, it is not 
im m anent un ifo rm ly  and w ithout qualif ica tion . It is more 
truimphant in the fiery, astronomical or lunar sphere than in the 
sublunar sphere. The astronomical sphere is constituted by the 
set of countless rotary stars and the set of wandering or revolving 
stars or planets. Both sets execute a complex variety of circular, 
rotary and revolving motions; and these in turn constitute the
28 Since divine Reason or its phenomenal aspect, Soul, is i m m a t e r i a l ,
Plato has no answer to the problem of how an immaterial reality relates to 
and controls the material. But this is a problem which all dualists face.
29 Although Plato did not specifiy these, he implies them.
30 Plato seems to contradict himself when he sometimes conceives body as 
inert, as in the P h a e d o  and P h a e d r u s , and sometimes, as in the T i ma e u s  
and S t a t e s m a n , as a dynamically non-rational factor. This is not strictly 
true. From the middle period to the late period, Plato's moral psychology 
has been built on an assumption that bodily nature is, at least a p o t e n t  
condition of the conflicting tendencies in our soul. Moreover, the 
primacy of psychic motion is established in an a c c o u n t  o f phenomena. 
It is arguable, then, that any plausible account of phenomenal existence 
presupposes two basic interractive motions - self- and moved- motion, the 
latter o f which is in eternal dependence on the former. Since such an 
account was not the issue in the middle period dialogues, the irratic 
nature of body was intimated but there was no need to emphasise it.
207
standard motions for, and the cause of, all sublunar motions. It is 
by means of the astronomical motions that Reason in motion 
transm its  the causality  and the standard-establishing properties 
of Forms to the physical world; it is in this indirect way that 
Forms are the f u n d a m e n t a l  principles of phenomena.
Divine Reason is called God, but so too is its derivative, Soul, and, 
indeed, all the countless motions of Reason inhabiting the stars. 
M oreover, the power and causality of the gods are defined in 
terms of motion. Thus Plato’s gods are gods of motion, but motion 
of the sort which is fully invested with the properties of Forms. 
Insofar as divine, psychic motion is the a r c h e  of all becomings, 
the cosmos may be said to be permeated by the divine. As Plato 
h im se lf  reco g n ise s  (L a w s  899ff.), this conclusion links his 
cosmology directly to the Presocratics whose a r c h e , often named 
god, is an a r c h e  of motion. For Plato, however, it is in terms of 
Form s that the motion-gods impart justice, care, time, number, 
order, intelligibility, goodness, beauty etc., into the cosmos. It is 
also in terms of the Forms that the motions of the gods are 
described as orderly, uniform, intelligent, etc., and the god-souls 
are said to be in a state of wisdom; goodness, virtue, happiness, 
b le s se d n e ss ,  k n o w le d g e ,  hav in g  tru th  and fo res ig h t,  etc. 
Consequently, whatever perfections gods have depend on Forms. 
We may now ask: where does human life fit in this broad scheme 
of P lato 's cosm os? In other words, in what consists Plato's 
religion? The rest of this chapter is devoted to an attempt to 
answer this question. I shall argue that for Plato, religion consists 
in activities in love of wisdom (s o p h i a ), which is a state of soul 
imbued with Forms. Since s o p h i a  is the chief property of god, it
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follows that the function of human life is to be like god. The issue, 
then, is how we can come to be imbued with Forms, and what 
follows from a failure to pursue knowledge of Forms.
4 Religion as activity in love of s o ph i a .
For Plato, as for Socrates, p h i l o - s o p h i a , love of wisdom, and 
religion coincide. The P h a e d o , e.g., is dedicated to the proof of 
the im m ortality  of the soul, but by way of justify ing  the 
philosophical life as the best form of life which answers fully to 
the spiritual needs, desires and hopes of man; for, if the soul is 
shown to be deathless and to be the source of all happiness and 
misery, then, it is of utmost importance that one must strive for 
the optimum state of the soul: ...'but since it [sc. soul] is immortal, 
there would be no refuge from ills or salvation from it, except to 
become as good and wise as possible. For the soul enters Hades 
taking nothing but its education and nurture, which are said to do 
the greatest benefit or harm to the one who has died...' (107c-d); 
and philosophers are the best placed to reap this greatest benefit 
(63el0-65). At P h d r .  249c-d, we hear that 'it is meet and right 
that the soul of the philosopher a lon e  should recover her wings, 
for she, so far as may be, is ever near in memory to those things a 
god's nearest thereunto makes him truly god. Wherefore if  a man 
makes right use of such a means of rem embrance, and ever 
approaches to the full vision of the perfect mysteries, he and he 
alone becomes truly perfect'. At R. 500d, it is said that 'the lover 
of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become 
orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man'. Or, E p in .  
986c-d: 'In a happy man this [sc. divine, celestial] order awakens 
first wonder, and then passion to learn all of it that mortality may;
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for thus will he spend his days best and with most good fortune, 
and after his death reach the proper abode of virtue, as he has
been in itia ted  into the true and real m ysteries by receiving
w i s d o m  in her unity in a reason which is itself a unity'.
But the desire to be truly wise entails that the aim of human life
is to becom e like god or to jo in  the com pany of gods.3 1 
Consequently, to achieve the standard of goodness and happiness
assoc ia ted  with god, we m ust orient our lives towards the 
cognition  of Forms, or towards the c losest approximation to 
m otions of Reason of the v irtuous sort exhib ited  by starry 
b eh av iou r  (Ti  41e-42b). In the P h a e d o , P h a e d r u s , T i m a e u s , 
and elsewhere, Plato explains the difference between a god-soul 
and a h u m an -sou l as o n to lo g ic a l ly  d if fe ren t ia te d  by the 
env iro nm en ts  tc which they re la te : god-sou ls  re la te  to a
( p r e d o m in a n t ly )  f ie ry  e n v iro n m e n t  w h ich  is p e rfe c t ly  
conform able to rational self-movement; human souls relate to a 
r e c a lc i t r a n t ,  a m ore  d iso rd e r ly ,  (p re d o m in a n t ly )  earth ily
e n v i r o n m e n t . 32  Thus our happiness, goodness, and spiritual 
sa lvation , depend  on the success with which we are able, 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y ,3 3 to bring rational order to the non-rational 
tendencies in our soul (Ti .  42). And this further entails that a 
human life be perm anently informed by the "vision" of Forms. 
The questions that arise are: (I) is there any basis for the human 
soul to come to know Forms? If there is, (2) by what means can
31 Phdo.  79d-81a; R 501b, 613e; Theae4 176a-b; Laws  716c-717a
3 2 To remind ourselves of a previous note: the T i m a e u s  adds that the
human soul is mathematically a degradation of the god-soul.
3 3 Not any and every way is appropriate. Certainly initiation rites of the 
Orphic faith will not do. Plato's favourite way is intellectual education, 
ideally, dialectical philosophy, or laterly, astronomical studies.
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we come to know Forms? (3) In what consists knowledge of 
Forms? I attempt the following answers.
(I) In the M e  n o  and P h a e d o , the perm anen t possibility  of 
knowing Forms is stated in a myth according to which the soul has 
once had a vision of the Forms in its disincamate existence. Plato 
thinks that for this to be possible, the soul must be s u n g e n e s , i.e., 
be by nature akin to the Forms; it must be more like the invisible 
than the v i s i b l e . ^ 4 The soul then is conceived as belonging
essentially and properly to the "realm" of Forms but as matter of 
fact resides in this world as well. Hence, the soul in its true 
nature is pure, simple, divine, etc. In Plato, but with special
reference to the P h a e d r u s ,  the power of soul is specified as erotic 
energy, that which t ends  to something else to fulfil itself. What 
soul tends to are Forms. This is what was ignored in Socrates' first
speech in which he represented E ro s  as an irrational force which
tends to work contrary to virtue. The first speech neglected and 
obscured the implicit but important and positive role of Eros  in a 
life ruled by reason. In the P h a e d r u s  and S y m p o s i u m , Socrates 
rehabilitates h im self  with the recognition that E r o s  is a divine 
power which acts in between men and gods, between the world of 
mortals and the divine, eternal "realm" of Forms. The divinity of 
E r o s  derives from its orientation and its transcendent, non­
human origin. E r o s  points to divine a g a t h a  and ka la \  its being 
is apprehended only relative to them.
In practical life, E r o s  was com m only understood to be the 
emotional experience of love; it was the passionate desire roused 
by the physical beauty of the beloved. Plato reads a metaphysical
34 79b 16-17, e2-5, EOa-b, 79b, 79e, 80a
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basis  in to  it by expand ing  its m eaning  to em brace  the 
fundamental drive in mankind to attain a perm anent state of 
happiness; Er f f s  is nothing less than that innate, ineradicable 
longing in every human being to possess the good : 'for the happy 
are happy in as much as they possess the good , and ... there is no 
need for us to ask why men would want to be happy...' (S y m p . 
205a). If Er'os  is fundamentally the desire to be happy, fully 
without end - which is the condition of being divine - it is then 
implicit in Plato 's redefinition of E r o s  that man by his very 
nature aspires to the divine condition. In S y m p .  202, the gods 
are defined as those beings who are wise, and possess the good 
and the beautiful, and happiness (e u d a i m o n i a ). They are to be 
d is tingu ished  from men in the degree of possession  and 
enjoyment of goods common to both human and divine life. For 
gods too are possessed of soul and body, only that their soul and 
body are united for all time (246c-d).
Our bodily nature presumably accounts for the division of our 
psychic energy into, at least, three parts35 - (a) rational, (b)
35 Although Plato repeatedly insists that the soul is immaterial he does not 
balk at expressing its nature in physical language. T i m a e u s  actually 
accounts for the three parts of soul as three areas in which, although 
dif fused  throughout the body, the soul is concentrated (see 69e-70a, 75ff., 
89e), the differences in the nature of parts being attributed to the amount 
o f flesh encumbering a concentrated area. The T i m a e u s  further 
explains that when the soul "stuff" is implanted in the body, it becomes 
subject to sensations and passions, giving rise to all kinds of irrational
movements. Late:' (44dff.) the passions are treated as forming a "mortal" 
soul, within which he distinguishes a spirited and appetitive part.
("Mortal" must here mean that passions or emotions do not survive the 
intelligible state of the soul, which is nous).  In the P h a e d o  too, the soul 
is said to be s p r e a d  throughout the body but capable of collecting and 
gathering itself up from all parts of the body into one mass (65c-d, 67c-d, 
83a-b). Thus Plato seems to hold generally that disincamate soul is a
simple unit, and Ihat divisions in it arise from the soul's communion with
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spirited and (c) appetitive.36 These parts of the soul are neither 
"faculties", "principles" nor "aspects". They constitute one soul, in 
that they are but different ways of channelling one finite stream 
of spiritual energy correlated to a body at a time. Plato
picturesquely compares the parts to channels into which flow this 
f in ite  stream  of spiritual energy .37 The total flowage is a 
constant, so that what goes into one channel is lost to the others 
(/?.485d-e; cf. 588b7-589b). Therefore, our tendency for spirited 
and appetitive ends dim inishes inversely  to the am ount of 
spiritual energy we invest in trying to apprehend Forms. We may 
conclude that, according to Plato, the soul is akin to and is by
nature  oriented towards the Form s, and that this is the
fundamental basis for the possibility of knowing Forms or of
body (cf R. 610e9-611e3, 612). See two notes below.
36 Plato is undogmatic about the number of parts at R . 4 4 3 e l, 544d7-9). 
Plato's classical statement of the parts of soul is in the R e p u b l i c , where 
each part is described as a "phi lo-"  compound: to p h i l o - m a t h e s ,
calculative- or wisdom- loving part (439d5, 581b7); to philo-nikon, lover 
of victory; to phi lo-chrematon  - lover of wealth (possessions or p h i l o -  
kerdes,  gains, 581a). This part also loves food, drink and sex.
3 7 in the myth of the P h a e d r u s , the main function of soul is exercised by 
the "charioteer" in its drive towards the apprehension of Forms, the 
achievement of which makes the function of the "steeds" otiose. For 
ambrosia and nectar are fed to the steeds only after the charioteer has 
feasted fully on Forms. In reality the function of ambrosia and nectar in 
Plato's scheme of things seems to be an exigency o f the mythical 
narrative, and a desire for consistency in the conception o f soul 
generally. For if soul qua  soul is a principle of movement that relates to 
a physical environment, Plato would want to maintain that soul qua  soul 
is tripartite. This would also enable him to conceptually distinguish 
"soul" from "Reason". Thus given that the parts of the god-souls are in 
perfect order, and a god-soul is "nourished" by Forms, Plato's poetry may 
once be distinguished from his philosophy: the "steeds" of the god-souls 
are there to symoblise a conceptual distinction between "soul" qua  soul 
(whether of man or god) and pure "Reason". Otherwise the "steeds" are 
functionally otiose.
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attaining permanent happiness. How, then, can we come to know 
F o rm s?
(2) Plato has two educational instruments as the principal means 
by which we may come to know Forms; (a) dialectical philosophy, 
and (b) legislation. Education (with training) is Plato’s principal 
m eans for a tta in ing  happiness , sp iritual salvation and bliss. 
Acccording to the T i m a e u s , 'if a man neglects education he walks 
lame to the end of his life and returns imperfect and good for 
nothing to the world below' (44c). The Stranger in the E p i n o m i s  
says that the truest wisdom and the truest piety, and the only 
sure preserver of moral virtue is astronom y;^ 8 f0r in this we
learn the rational convolutions of the celestia l dance of the
heavenly  bodies reference to which we bring our minds in 
conformity with the divine mind. At 992b-c, we are told that one 
who knows astronomy, i.e., one whose soul becomes attuned to the 
law, order, and harmonies of the starry convolutions not only 
becomes truly wise but also when he undergoes what we call
death - if he may be said to still endure death, will no longer be 
subject to a multitude of perceptions but one alloted portion, as he 
has reduced the manifold in him to a unity, and in it will be happy 
(cf. 77. 90b-d). The nature of astronomical studies is laid out at 
9 9 le . To properly  pursue astronom y, one has to learn all
g eo m etr ic  co n s tru c t io n s ,  all sys tem s of num ber, all duly
constituted melodic progressions, the single ordered scheme of all
celestial revolutions. As a man reflects on these, he will receive 
the revelation of a single bond of natural interconnection between
3 8 it was common opinion that there was something impious about 
astronomy. But now the man who realises that spiritual things are the
grounds of physical things will see how false this opinion is.
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all the problems in the study. Such a man, we are told (992b) will 
be happy, blessed, and will rise, in death, having reduced the 
manifold within him to a unity. It is conceded at 992c that bliss 
and happiness are possible but for the few - the sober and 
virtuous of soul - who have mastered the whole content of the 
blissful science. The hope is that we have never been left 
unheeded by the forgetfulness and carelessness of the higher 
powers (99Id), given that all of us have the capacity to acquire 
true wisdom (974b).
The most persuasive and detailed argument for the spiritual 
value of education is offered in the R e p u b l i c , where Plato 
proposes a curriculum of education whose pursuit will ensure a 
facilitation of the best performance of the characteristic function 
of parts of the soul. The structure and content of the curriculum 
are based on Plato's recognition of the nature and potential 
capacities of soul. In this, Plato has a nutritive and dietetic view 
of the treatment of soul. This is intimated in his criticisms of 
actual poets, dramatists, sophists, rhetoricians in the R e p u b l i c  
and elsewhere. At R.  605b-c, Plato criticises the mimetic poet for 
pleasing the irrational part of the soul, by feeding it a hearty 
meal, and increasing its strength and vitality relative to other 
parts (cf. 606a-e, 585b4, 585d5-7, 589b7). The kinds of art - 
poetry and music - which please the possession-loving part, at the 
expense of the others, is to him psychologically, morally, and 
politically both unhealthy and unacceptable (411a-412a, 404d-e, 
607a).
By recommending that traditional poetry and music be censored, 
Plato is not necessarily advocating an ascetic programme, if by 
asceticism  is meant an antipathy to any satisfaction of the
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possession- and honour- loving parts; for at 571eff., he advises 
that these be neither starved nor over-fed; and he notes that 
under the rule of the wisdom-loving part, these other parts will 
enjoy their appropriate pleasures (586e-587a). The poets fail to 
understand that the appetitive part is already too large and over­
bearing (442a; cf. L a w s  689a-b). In their ignorance they stuff 
w hat needs a reducing  d iet, as when they describe their 
charac ters’ excessive sensual gratification; they starve the very 
part which needs feeding (605e-606a). Yet it is possible and 
desirable to contrive poetry, music or rhetoric which quiet and 
soothe the lower parts of the soul in order to render them more 
easily satisfied and more nearly in tune with the wisdom-loving 
p a r t  (6 0 6 b -6 0 7 a )3  9 R ight at the beginning of education, 
re in fo rcem ent of the ra tional, and the dom estication of the 
appetitive and the spirited parts come from without in the form of 
carefully chosen myths, music and poetry.
In an earlier stage of education, religious education is one of the 
main items in the curriculum. At first the citizens are to be kept 
out of sight of moral and religious difficulties, and taught simply 
that all things are ordered for the best by perfectly good gods.
The philosopher-king in an ideal state must regard the business of 
art and poetry as presenting only edifying truths in ethics and
religion; that is, in the form such as to inculcate a simple faith in
3^ Given Plato's sensitivity to the power of words, it is likely that the 
function of myths in Plato is not necessarily a means to satisfy higher 
truths inaccessible to dialectical expression, but, coming as they usually
do at the end of "dialectical" arguments which appeal to the wisdom-
loving part of the soul, and in reference to the subject-matter with which 
they characteristically deal - punishments, rewards, victories and 
honours in after-life (see P h d o .  114d; G.  523ff, R.  619b-620e), they may 
be invoked to soothe or sublimate the lower parts of the soul.
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the omnipotence of goodness upon those who are not yet prepared 
to grapple with the problem of evil; 'If they can be got to believe 
us', says Plato, 'we shall tell our citizens that quarrelling is unholy, 
and that never up to this time, has there been any quarrelling 
among the citizens' (378c). In the second stage of education, those 
capable of it are to face all the problems of life, and are to 
endeavour to solve them by the aid of philosophic reflexion. At 
the same time Plato is deeply aware of the transition from the 
first to the second of these stages. The difficulties, illustrated in 
the seventh book, arise from the dangers of that period of doubt 
and criticism with which philosophic enquiry must begin. Plato 
therefore urges that this "initiation", even in those who are fitted 
for it, should be delayed till their character has been thoroughly 
confirmed in the light of what is good, and the hate of what is evil; 
and that in the great body of the citizens this will not take place at 
all since the basic requirement of a dialectical nature is already 
too high for them. For the many, therefore, Plato restores in a 
higher form, the Greek city-state in which they will be citizens 
tra ined  in civic v irtue , pa tr io tic  se lf-devotion , educated  by 
p u r if ie d  and ed ify ing  m y th o lo gy  and env ironed  by many 
beautiful forms of art. The citizen will lead a simple-minded life 
anchored in aesthetic and material goodness, grounded in religion 
and ethical faith which are sheltered from all sorts of doubt and 
intellectual difficulty.
For the philosophic few who have hitherto outgrown the culture 
of poetry  and mythology, the few for whose mind imaginative 
pictures no more play essential role, all the difficulties or secrets 
of science must be revealed. These must exhibit the intellectual
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capacity 'to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued 
as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey 
of their affinities with one another, and with the nature of the 
things' (537c). They must go through series of intellectual studies 
of increasing abstraction and generality; studies that tend the soul 
to contemplate essence (o u s i a n , 526e), truth, or what always is. 
These, in P la to ’s tim e, were p u rsu ab le  th rough  a rithm etic , 
geometry, astronomy, harmonics. Abstract studies of the sort will, 
it is believed, enhance our rationality; and this has the effect both 
of tending cogn ition  tow ards Form s and of reduc ing  our 
dependence on the sensible, generative, and such contradictions as 
are given in phenomena.^0 
This entails an intellectual "scaling". As each science deals only 
with an aspect of nature, its principles are therefore hypotheses 
and must rest upon something other than themselves. Therefore 
to reach the ideal of an absolute princip le , we must take a 
synoptic view of the principles of all the sciences, and seek the 
Form which is at the basis of them all. As in the P h a e d o , so in 
the R e p u b l i c , dialectical study is the most, general study which 
brings together all the principles obtained in the special sciences 
in c lu d in g  th o se  of m a th e m a t ic s ,  and  p r o g r e s s e s  no t 
d e d u c t i v e l y ^  1 but regressively by the adoption of higher and
40 Cf., Ibid., 524e-525a.
41 In the late dial :>gues, the sort of dialectics pursued would involve a pair 
of processes complementary to each other. In the P h a e d r u s , • after 
Socrates had delivered his speeches on Er os  and Phaedrus had said that it 
gave him great pleasure to listen totWvjthe former proposes to recapitulate 
the serious part of its content, namely, a pair of principles o f procedure 
which emerge from the speeches (265c-d). The first is to take a synoptic 
view (sun o r o t A a )  and bring widely dispersed things ( d i e s p a r m e n a )  
under a single Form (i de a n ), so that one may make plain, by marking out
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more general principles till one arrives at the adequacy of the
unhypothesised principle, the end of the intelligible (532a-b2; cf.
533c9-d8), which is the Good (526e, 527e, 5 3 3 b).^2  The nature 
of the Good is presented to us through the imagery of the s u n
called the 'offspring of the Good most nearly made in its likeness'
(506e3-4). As an offspring or the product of that which it is taken
to illustrate, the sun is more than an analogy or an arbitrary 
symbol. It is, in fact, a manifestation or a phenomenal expression 
of the Good, as it exhibits a material principle of unity. It is a 
source of heat essential to growth and may be regarded as the 
cause of the existence of the objects we see. In like manner, Plato
wants us to regard the Good as at once the cause of p h e n o m e n a l
each thing, whatever it is that one wants to disclose at that time. He
clarifies this by referring to his own marking out of E r o s : 'whether it
was right or wrong, at all events it was that which gave his account
lucidity and consistency. The second is that the dialectician must be able 
to cut up everything at its natural joints, not hacking at any part like a 
clumsy butcher. See op.cit. 273el-2; 273d-e; 277cff. However, this second 
part of the diaeretical practice, while it is a kind of deduction is quite
unlike mathematical deduction. Plato is talking more generally about the 
systematic relation of natural things, not about the deducibilly of one 
concept from another. Cf. R. 5, 473cff., 475c7-9, 476a5-9, esp. 573c, 'He 
who can view things in their connection is a dialectician; he who cannot
is not’ See further Laws 12, 968a7 and 965b7-c3; St. 285a-b.
42 ibid., 517a9-c5. and 508d9-509b. The image of the divided Line is 
intended to vivify the intellectual path leading to the apprehension of 
the Good. It shows the related gradations of the intellectual process, as we 
advance from shadowy images through their visible sources, through 
number and mathematics, to the hypothetical but intelligible Forms and
the Form of the Good. The Cave image too is an allegory o f the same
dialectical progress of the soul towards the intelligible limit; from the 
shadowy images cast on the wall o f the cave through the objective 
sources of the images and finally, by the release of the "prisoners" from 
the cave, to the light of the sun. This last is supposed to parallel the
"release" of the soul from the sphere of sense through that of thought
towards the intelligible limit of reason, the Good.
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existence and knowledge. It is therefore beyond phenomenal 
existence and above knowledge, as it is that in which they both 
originate and by which they are united to each other as essential
aspects of one whole. By the aid of this analogy, we are at once
carried to the ultimate source of truth, human consciousness, 
intelligence, and virtuous behaviour.
In a dialectical "vision" of the Good, the philosopher is said to 
contemplate the whole system of the universe, and to become a 
spectator of all time and existence: he has been carried beyond 
the State, beyond the m orality  of wont and use, above the
contradictions of ordinary experience, to the f i n a l  reason  for 
pheno m en al ex is tence . F rom  this d ia lec t ica l  he igh t the 
philosopher is expected to return to g o v e r n .^ 3 Having grasped
a b s o lu te  G ood , and having thereby  reached the lim it of 
in te lligence, he is now in a position to determ ine w h a t  
p a rt icu la rs ,  and how those particu la rs  are re la ted  to and 
contribute to the fulfilment of the Good in the lives of the citizens 
in the body politic. As far as the philosopher-king is concerned, 
his dialectical wisdom frees him from the narrow ambitions and
desires of the transitory life so far as his mortality permits. He 
becomes perfectly  generous and fearless; all petty cares and
grudges have been taken from his heart, as his vision of the Good 
reconciles him to the deepest meaning of life and to all things. So 
that he is lifted beyond the tendency to attribute too great 
im portance to any finite good, relieved as he is from the
R e p .  500d5 'If then, some compulsion is laid upon him ( t i s .. . auto i  
ananke genetai. .  ) to practice stamping on the plastic matter of human 
nature in public and private the patterns he visions there, and not
merely to mold end fashion himself, do you think that he will prove a 
poor craftsman of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic 
v ir tu e ? ’
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passionate impulses which overestimate these finite things: 'For, 
nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of 
a soul that is ever to seek the integrity and wholeness in all things 
human and divine' ( 486a ) . ^ 4  Thus the attainment of the highest 
values of ethics and politics find their ultim ate basis in a spirit 
w hich  c o n te m p la te s  and com prehends  the  u n iv e rse  as a 
teleological system. The presence of such a spirit in a state will 
make all the citizens happy and blessed, as far as their mortality 
permits. For the mass of people in Plato's ideal State, therefore, 
their good or virtue at all times, like all else in the earlier part of 
their lives, must be the product, not of philosophic reflexion but of 
the unconscious influences under which they grow up as members 
in a society, and of a teaching whose scientific basis derives only 
from the fact that they are the legislative directives of putatively 
wise guardians of State. The political ideal which Plato sets before 
us in the R e p u b l i c  is a perfectly unified society in which each 
individual, confining himself strictly to the function of his nature, 
shall, in the exercise of that function, be a pure organ of the 
organism called the State, and in that position contribute to the 
virtue and happiness of the body politic. This is more or less 
Plato's position in what is generally believed to be his last work, 
the L a w s  to which I now turn.
" L a w s "  is an English translation of the Greek nomoi.  Their 
scope includes a piece of legislation, rules, morals, and any system 
of order socially believed and/or practised. The L a w s  of Plato 
therefore advocate a comprehensive legal coverage of nearly all 
human activities. Throughout the work, Plato argues or implies
44 See 517a9-c5.
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that the Sophistic n o m o s - p h u s i s  distinction is false. In book x 
especially, he argues that "art", "wisdom", "law", "purpose", "wish", 
"order", "virtue", "goodness", "happiness", etc., are properties of 
Reason-in-m otion which is the prim ary form  of p h u s i s  (often 
rendered  "nature"), and on w hich  depends all phenom enal 
characteristics. Some Sophists categorise god(s), law, artifice, and 
values as artificial products of human imagination, unrelated to 
true nature in their sense. By arguing for the priority and control 
of divine Reason or spirit over matter, Plato seeks to vindicate the 
rea lity  of re lig ious phenom ena on cosm ic grounds, and to 
establish law as a spiritual item, i.e., as an expression of a rational 
life. So that legislation is the expression, in the human sphere, of 
the rational order which governs the universe as a whole. The 
form of order created by reason is what we call law (713e-714a). 
At 714a and 957c, Plato even suggests an etymological connection 
between n o u s  and n o m o s A ^  Plato's concept of law, therefore, 
is in accord with n a t u r e  if  it is believed to establish on the
political stage the fundamental order corresponding to that which 
obtains in the universe. Such a concept of "nature" is ethical and
religious, and therefore morally satisfying (see L a w s  690b-c).
This makes it clear why Plato thinks that a moral bulwark was
being provided for his city by the belief in the supremacy of a
spiritual world power that works in "alliance" with Reason and 
"educates" every th ing  tow ards righ t and perfec t end. This
interpretation of "nature" conflicts with the Strongman thesis of 
Callicles in the Gorgias  or Thrasymachus in the Republic.  The
State and Law may well be founded on nature, if in nature herself
mental and moral values have a fixed and distinguished place, and
45 See also 632c, 890d, 967d-e.
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if the Good itself has a cosmic status. If the universe were the 
product of material forces indifferent to good and bad, as Plato's
adversaries describe it, it would be futile to postulate a natural
foundation for the just State.
The legislator's duty is to make the citizens realise in their lives 
the divine as revealed in the universe. This means to aim at
prom oting , by correct or genuine legislation, the happiness of
those who live under it, by securing for them both human and 
divine goods. The Athenian announces that the virtues are divine 
goods whose possession is the only guarantee of happiness (631b- 
d). Human goods - health, physical strength, beauty, wealth - 
depend for their realisation on the divine goods of which wisdom 
is the first, then the temperate condition of the soul, then justice, 
then courage  (631b-632d). The end of leg is la tion , it is 
emphasised, is complete virtue (688a-b, 697b-c).
In the S t a t e s m a n , Plato distinguishes betw een original and 
im ita tive  laws *300cff.)^^ Original laws derive from the d i r ec t  
rule of fully rational beings, while imitative ones derive from 
rulers not fully rational. Hence, the rule of law is said to be the 
second best method of government. In Plato's conception of art, 
im ita tion  per  se is not bad. Indeed, it is implied at St .  300c- 
301b, L a w s  713b-714b, that law imitates the rule of reason. But 
for Plato, an artistic production must attain moral, aesthetic and 
technical perfection , and this involves, as Dem iurgic creation 
show s, no t the mere recrea tion  of an appearance  but the 
reproduction, in a different medium, of what a thing is (cf. L a w s  
688bff.). There is an objective standard which a correct or
46 Cf. G.  483bff.; R. 338eff; Theae.  172a, 177c-d; Laws  714bff., 889eff.
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genuine law must satisfy, namely, the attainment of the good of 
the city as a whole (715b), or the establishment in the political 
and human life of a spiritual priority comparable to that which 
Plato has discovered in the universe (967e). In the 7th letter 
Plato emphasises that no good can be expected from laws which 
serve the interests and are pros  hedonen  of a faction.47 But (i) 
how may law achieve its aim of securing the good or virtue of a 
State? and (ii) what is the source of a genuine law?
(i) Law, for Plato, is an instrument of e d u c a t i o n . 4 8 n o w  
education involves training children to be good at what they are 
inclined to pursue in adult life (643b) More generally, education 
is the way to produce good persons (6 4 1 c l)  or "a rightly 
disciplined state of pleasures and pains" (653c6-7). To be good is 
to be virtuous, and to be virtuous is to conduct yourself in 
accordance with the rule of reason. Hence, if the aim of legislation 
is virtue, it implies that law facilitates the rule of reason in us. It 
can do so by directly enhancing our rational power, as per the 
curriculum  for dialectical studies in the R e p u b l i c  and/or by 
sublimating the irrational parts of the soul in order to bring them 
into conformity with the dictates of reason. It is this second 
alternative which law stands the most chance of achieving.
47 Epis t . l ,  337a, 32.7c-d, 757c-d; Cf. Laws  4. 715aff., 726, 727, 728. For the 
intimate relations between the gods and the goods of the soul, cf. 716aff, 
631 bff, 697a-c, 743e;
Cri t ias  120e. Another very characteristic passage is Epist le  8, 355a.
48 Plato's educational principles depend, in the L a w s  as in the R e p u b l i c , 
on his "theory" of moral psychology. The express tripartition of the soul 
in the T i m a e u s , R e p u b l i c  and P h a e d r u s , is intimated at L a w s  863a-864c 
where the Athenian distinguishes three kinds of injustice, arising from 
domination of soul by anger, pleasure, and ignorance. The rational part 
remains the only divine and immortal element in us and the source of 
other virtues (963a, 988b; cf. 713c-714a).
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For in the L a w s , as in the R e p u b l i c , the kind of virtue 
attainable through higher studies is limited to the few who by 
nature and nurture satisfy a minimum intellectual requirement
already too high for the majority of people. A piece of legislation,
however, is addressed to all sorts of people. Hence, the kind of 
political virtue promoted in the L a w s  is one in which the lower 
parts of the soul are to be adjusted to the rule of reason. Laws are
to be used in establishing institutions and promoting kinds of
recrea tiona l activities which have the effect of bringing the 
irra t iona l  parts  in conform ity  with the ra tional self or of 
facilitating the rule of reason in the polity. The emphasis is to 
shape the character of the citizens by educating their desires or 
their feelings of pleasure and pain in the right sort of way in 
order to make them virtuous or law-abiding, So e.g., the Athenian 
demands that the legislator supervise all the activities of the 
citizens, and instruct them as to what is right and wrong by using 
praise and blame, honour and dishonour, as well as by penalising 
m isbehaviour (631b-632d). And preambles are to be provided 
for all pieces of legislation in order to persuade for obedience to 
them. There are also proposals for the institution of drinking 
parties and the promotion of dancing and music. Children, right 
from the beginning, are to be educated with respect to the 
goodness which leads to good citizenship. This will involve 
bringing the feelings of pleasure and pain in the right relation to 
the rational part of their soul which will develop later in life.
Dancing and music are not merely recreational: they are forms of 
self-motion which may or may not be performed correctly, may or 
may not approximate to reason. Thus there are tunes and dance 
form s a sso c ia ted  with d iffe ren t  k inds of character; those
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associated with goodness of soul or body are good, and those 
associated with evil are bad (654e-655b). In consequence of 
Plato's dietetic and nutritive treatment of soul, it is implied at 
655e-656b that if we allow ourselves to enjoy music and dance 
appropriate to bad characters, we will eventually acquire bad 
character ourselves. So music and dance, like poetry, have 
objective standards of correctness. With such a potential for 
co rrup tion , these  k inds of art cannot, there fo re , be left 
uncontrolled (660a-664d). As imitative arts dance and music, for 
e.g., are subject to Plato's criteria of artistic creation: true imitation 
must recreate, in a different medium, what it is to moral, aesthetic 
and technical perfection (688bff.). So the correctness of music and 
dance is said to depend on "equality of quantity and quality" - 
whatever this means, not just on pleasantness (667d). In other 
words, music and dance, if correct, will contribute to making the 
soul good by recreating forms of cosmic order in the soul (cf. 
653c-654a; R.  400a, Ti .  47c-e, 80b). Thus the same forms of 
order expressed in the heavens is manifest in the well constituted 
State, the character of the good man, and in the correct form of 
music and dance. In thus participating in the correct forms of 
motion, we are bringing ourselves closer to the divine order in the 
cosmos. As if to reinforce this, it is further provided that religious 
festivals, procession, cult-divinities, will, at regular intervals enter 
the individual's life, and make him feel at each turn close to the 
d iv ine powers. Appeal is frequently  m ade to worship, cult 
practice, religion - in short, to the divine element in every form in 
order to sanction and sanctify through its vitalising presence, the 
regulations which Plato wishes to see in force. Thus Plato restores
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Greek life in its true form in which politics and religion are 
u n ited .  ^ 9
(ii) W hat is the source of a genuine law? The answer seems to 
be fairly  obvious. Law in the A thenian 's view embodies or 
expresses reason. Judgements of reason embodied in a decree of 
the city  becom es law (644c-d, cf. 645a). In obeying law, 
therefore, we are obeying reason, the im m ortal element in us 
(713c-714b). This must be read together with the oft-repeated 
doctrine that it is a principle of nature that the better must rule 
and the worse obey (726a). If we suppose that Plato has not
abandoned his belief that the virtue or characteristic function of 
reason is to rule by knowledge of Forms, a law per  se is not 
necessarily an expression of reason imbued with Forms (965c8- 
966c). The happiness or virtue of a State would be ideally 
guaran teed , it seem s, by the d irec t ru le  o f fully ra tional
philosopher-rulers who have knowledge of the Form of Good. The 
L a w s , like the R e p u b l i c  and S t a t e s m a n , emphasises the primacy 
of suprem e reason in connection with the ideal to which the
49 See Laws  717a-b, 729eff., 738bff., 740b5-cl, 745b, 771d, 774aff., 803cff., 
828aff. It is noteworthy, however, that Plato unequivocally condemns 
irrational faith or magical views on religion. See Re p .  364b-e; cf. L a w s  
905d-7d. In the L a w s  he prohibits the introduction of unauthorised 
private cults whici are often orgiastic or superstitious and seem, in fact 
to have constituted a real social danger in the fourth century. See L a w s  
909d-910e. Plato also provides severe penalties for practitioners of
necromancy or magical attack - katadesis  - because they are harmful 
socially, not because he believed in their efficacy (933a-e). Right from 
the A p o l o g y  to the L a w s  Plato speaks of "inspiration" ( e n th o u s ia s mo s )
of the seers, poets, etc., but with recognisable irony. Such mental
processes certainly roused his curiosity. But generally he does not take 
them seriously as a source of truth, since they are unable to justify their 
intuitions (cf. Phdr .  248d, 290c; L a ws  908d). Plato, though, gives them a
function in his Stale (Laws  828b; cf. Ti. 71e-72a)
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legislator must aspire. Members of the Nocturnal Council, the 
h ighest constitu tional au thority  in the L a w s , are to follow 
arguably the same curriculum of education as the philosopher- 
kings of the R e p u b l i c .  In the consumation of their education,
they are to have insight into the realm of the One and the Many,
of good and evil, and the organisation of all other detail in the
light of that insight (cf. R .  521c-531d, 531e-534e; L a w s  965b,
966).
But whereas the R e p u b l i c  appears to suggest that sovereignty 
rests with philosopher-king(s), in the L a w s , it rests in the laws, 
not with any individual or a group of them, the suggestion being 
that the rule of law is second best to the direct rule of reason (St. 
300D8ff.). Rules of law lay down general standards for the 
orderly behaviour of persons. In the S t a t e s m a n , it is argued that 
law s, being  genera l,  canno t take a cc o u n t  o f  in d iv idu a l  
circumstances. The ideal would be the unimpeded rule of a wise 
man who could deal appropriately with each case. A State 
governed by law is second best alternative needed only because 
ph ilosophically  wise rulers are not a v a i l a b l e .^ 0 In L a w s  9, 
there are passages which suggest that if  true know ledge and 
reason are present, laws may well be d ispensed with, since 
written laws with their static dogmatism have inevitable short­
c o m in g s .^
The d ifference  between the R e p u b l i c  and the L a w s , i.e., 
between the sovereignty of a philosopher-ruler and the law, may 
be due to one or more reasons: e.g., that (a) the R e p u b l i c  is not 
concerned with the practicality of how the philosopher-king may
50 St. 293ff., 310eff.
51 Laws  769D, 875c-d.
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rule but just how he may arise in the first place, so that the L a w s  
fill in the practical details of the rule of philosopher-kings, the 
curriculum  of whose education, after all, follows the same or 
nearly the same lines as members of the Nocturnal Council; or (b) 
although Plato, while wishing that members of the Nocturnal 
C ouncil will go through the same sort of education  as the
philosopher-king(s), is sceptical about this happening, since the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f this happen ing  p resupp oses  som e au thority  
believ ing  in, w illing and able to carry out the curriculum  
envisaged in the R e p u b l i c .  Since this is practically difficult to 
realise, Plato is content to outline his philosophy of the rule of law 
as the second best alternative. From this point of view, although 
the rule of reason by direct knowledge of Forms is the ideal 
desired, the practical focus of the L a w s  treats right belief as an 
accep tab le  a l te rn a tive  to know ledge (632a, 689a-e , 684a).
Indeed, there is a strong suggestion in the S t a t e s m a n  that laws
are sovereign where right opinion but not wisdom is in power
(301a9-b). The law, therefore, rests on the insight and wisdom -
which would then amount to no more than right belief - of the old, 
experienced persons constituting the Council; or (c) Plato has 
stopped believing that knowledge of Forms is sufficient for virtue; 
or (d) Forms in the L a w s , as in the late  dialogues, mean
something different from what they mean in the middle period.
W herever the truth lies in these possibilities or any others is
difficult to say. However that may be, Plato cannot both claim at
the sarmtame that law is the rule of reason a n d  that the
/
operation of law in the political sphere is second-best. A way 
round this is that Plato 's concept of perfection accommodates
degrees of approximation. This may well be true. For in L a w s  x,
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the supreme rationality of Soul is said to be lawful. And the life 
of reason exhibited by Soul is the standard for human and other 
lives. Consequently, even correct political laws are not identical 
with but are only approximations of the perfect law of Reason-in- 
motion. Likewise, if the distinction between knowledge (of Forms) 
and true opinion is still valid in the L a w s , there must be a 
difference in quality between the rule of law by reason that 
knows Forms and the rule of law by reason that has true opinion. 
This will imply that there are acceptable gradations below the 
perfect standard of virtue expressed by Reason-in-motion. This is 
also suggested by the passage of R .  500d already m entioned, 
according to which the lover of wisdom associating with the divine 
order will h im self become orderly and divine in the measure  
permi t ted to man.  That this may well be the case is reinforced 
by the following argument.
At Phil .  33bl0, it is said that it is improper to suppose that gods 
enjoy pleasure or its opposite. The same doctrine is intimated in 
the Epinomi s  (985a) where it is said that the truly divine is 
above pleasure and pain. But insofar as our em bodim ent is 
concerned, we shall be able to pursue the life of virtue only if it is 
pleasurable. Thus although pleasure is not the Good, it is a 
necessary condition for human life. Virtue is valuable in itself 
because it is the life of reason, but the virtuous life is possible for 
human beings only to the extent that they can take pleasure in 
virtue (L a w s  663b; cf. 733a; 732). In the R e p u b l i c , Socrates 
argues that justice  is intrinsically preferable to injustice (444e- 
445b), and then that the life of the ju s t  man is more truly 
pleasant (580c-587c). In the P h i l e b u s , P la to  indicates that
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pleasure is an essential ingredient of the Good but it is by no 
means the most important, nor the one which really makes life 
good (20c-23a, 64b-67b). Both dialogues appear to imply that 
pleasure is not the same as the Good, and that an intrinsically 
good life is not the same as a pleasurable one. So although, the 
life of god is described as s u p r e m e l y  good, virtuous and happy, 
being a life that approximates most closely to pure Reason, the 
virtue or goodness of a man who embodies reason is not of the 
same degree. There is an acceptable degree of virtue permitted to 
m an .
If am anywhere near the mark, then, politically, the rule of law 
arising from right belief may lead to a degree of goodness or 
happiness of the city as a whole, while that arising from 
knowledge may lead to a greater degree of goodness. Compare in 
this regard, Plato's ranking of States and constitutions as best, 
seco n d  and third, in order of decreasing perfection or goodness 
(L a w s  739). Again in the L a w s , e.g., there is no explicit 
reference to the kind of virtue which, according to the R e p u b l i c , 
can be achieved by the philosopher who apprehends the Good. On 
the other hand, the kind of virtue described in the L a w s  
resem bles that expected of the second-class citizens in the 
R e p u b l i c . Their virtue consists in their capacity to maintain 
throughout all temptation, the principles which one has been 
taught in youth (412c-414a). This, of course, does not require 
know ledge. True belief acquired through right education is 
enough. In the R e p u b l i c , the virtue and happiness of citizens in 
the ideal State arise from the efficient perform ance of their 
specialised skills and the effective contribution to the satisfaction
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of the needs of the State as a whole. As between the political 
classes in the ideal State, however, the virtue and happiness of the 
philosopher who knows the Good would be on a higher level than 
that of the carpenter in the third class (581cff.). Citizens of the 
lower classes act virtuously, not out of insight into the Good, but 
by the unconscious influences they have been brought up in, and 
by obeying the rule of those who have that insight. It seems to be 
suggested in the Laws  too that the citizens can be virtuous if  only 
their desires or passions are disciplined in such a way that they 
obey the law as a matter of habit. It is generally assumed that in 
practice, the virtuous will act, not on his own insight into the 
foundations of good and evil, into the one and the many, but in 
accordance with the law which rests on the insight and wisdom of 
the old and experienced.
The upshot of all this is that, there is an objective standard of 
goodness or happiness, and that it is our function to aspire to this 
standard by education and/or genuine leg is la tion . We must 
devise social and educational institu tions or constitutions, and 
promote kinds of activities with the sole purpose of facilitating the 
rule of reason or law or, in other words, with the purpose of 
bringing our passions or desires into conformity with the dictates 
of our reason. In such institutions or constitutions and activities
not only shall we approxim ate  to the suprem e goodness or
happiness of a star-god, but also, presum ably, we shall attain 
acceptable degree(s) of happiness or goodness permitted to our 
mortality, in our social and political roles. Our efforts in these 
directions may ensure that we are not carelessly given to evil in 
our lives and this may be enough to spare us a series of
transmigrations, and secure, at death, our spiritual {re-)  union
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with our native star (R . 613a-b with Ti .  42). I turn, finally, to 
the third question I raised; in what consists knowledge of Forms? 
It is noteworthy that Plato often correlates knowledge of Forms 
with grasping the truth. And although a truth is not the same as a 
Form, the following account suggests that P lato seems to think 
that to know the Form of anything (x) is to possess the truth about 
it, and this further means the ability to give a f i n a l  explanat ion  of 
why "x" is what i: is.
(3) Plato seems to argue that in knowing Forms we become 
aware of our deepest essence, which is a kind of self-knowledge - 
call it rational self-knowledge. This kind of self-knowledge is 
mediated by the intermediary levels through which we come to 
apprehend Forms. Since god-souls are imbued with Forms, this 
implies that divine know ledge involves d i r e c t  rational self- 
k n o w le d g e .52 Rational self-knowledge involves two legs which 
are respectively  accounted for below: (i) the fundam enta l
assumption or doctrine, often not made explicit though it is there 
all the same, that the same intelligible principles which govern 
and determine the structure of the cosmos are also imprinted in 
our souls; (ii) the consequence that in trying to know Forms or in
5 2 The earliest intimation of mediated self-knowledge is in the Socratic
dialogue, L y s i s ,  where the theme of friendship serves as the starting
point for the study of self-knowledge. Plato argues that we love a friend
because of something good in him. But we often desire one good thing in
view of another. Hence, in order to arrive at the foundation of our
friendship, there must be a first object of friendship (219c-d). In the last
part of the dialogue, it is argued that we desire what we do not possess and
what is lacking (221e). To be deficient in something means to be deprived
of something which is proper (olkeion) to us. For this very reason one
desires a friend in order to be fully oneself, and friends are by nature
proper to us (phusei p'ei oikeioi,  22 le). Thus he implies that friendship
leads to one's essential nature, and to contact with the Good.
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trying to study the governing principles of the cosmos, we are 
thereby coming^know our essential nature.
(i) The assumption that the same fundamental principles which 
govern the cosmos are imprinted in our souls appear in many 
forms in different contexts and in many dialogues. But I shall be 
selective here. The most explicit formulation of this doctrine 
appears in the T i m a e u s , where Plato represents the fundamental 
structure of the soul as mathematically constituted by the Forms 
of Being, Sameness, and Difference, the same principles which 
govern the soul of the cosmos. Although the representation is 
mythical, myths are not vacuous. Plato is accounting for a belief, 
that our a priori  capacity to know that this is one, or that this is 
the s a m e  as  or di f ferent  f rom  that other, etc. is to be explained 
by assuming that our souls are imbued with Forms or essences 
(o u s i a i ) .  This is in tim ated  earlie r  in the R eco llec tion  
th e s is : . . . 'e v e ry  soul has, by reason o f  her na tu re , had 
contemplation of reality' (ta onta, Phdr. 249e). But if, as I have 
suggested earlier on, Platonic philosophical "contemplation" is a 
quality of life rather than "spectatoral" observation of something 
completely external to oneself, the possibility  of Recollecting 
Forms already implies the innatist doctrine of the T i m a e u s .  This 
is also suggested in two ways by the Theae te tus .
F ir s t ,  at Theae.  49aff., we learn that "Socratic midwifery", if 
successful, results in the "psychic" birth of wisdom. But, of course, 
this is impossible unless the patient is h im self pregnant with 
wisdom. Since to be wise is to know Forms or essences (ous ia i ), it 
follows that our soul is already imbued with Forms or essences. 
The second way relates to the more general theme of the dialogue.
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The T h e a e t e t u s  deals with a thesis of the mathematical student 
Theaetetus, that Knowledge is Perception. Plato restates this as 
equivalent to the Protagorean "man-measure" principle, and also 
the Heraclitean theory of flux. According to Plato, Heraclitus
meant that everything is in a continual process of change, and of 
ever becoming other than itself. From this point of view, he tries 
to show that if it is true the consequence will be that nothing can 
exist or can be known and, in fact, no quality or quantity can 
remain even for a moment, and that therefore nothing can be said 
to be. For that which is always changing in every respect of itself 
cannot be known. On the other hand, from the point of view of
the know er, we can neither d istinguish one sensation from
another nor identify it with another. The result is that even 
speech is impossible (183a-b). Heraclitus is refuted. 184bff. 
shows that sensation - but not the pure sensationalism attributed 
to Heraclitus - is possible but only as the basis of knowledge; the 
senses are only instruments through which the soul processes 
sense data into the contents of knowledge. Everything has an 
essence (ousian,\%6?Ll) such as Likeness and Unlikeness, Identity
and Difference, Beautiful and Ugly, Good and Bad, Hardness and 
Softness (186a5-b5). It is the essential nature [of things], and the 
fact that they exist (kai ho ti eston) and their opposition to one 
another, and in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, that 
the soul itself tries to determine for us by comparing them with 
one another (b4-c). Knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the 
process of r e a s o n i n g  about them, since the latter but not the 
form er makes it possible  to grasp the truth (a l F t h e i a s ) and 
essences (o u s i a s , dl-5). That the soul grasps essences, Likeness 
and Unlikeness, Good and Bad, etc., by r e a s o n i n g  about things,
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suggests that the soul is in essen tia l re la tion  to intellig ib le  
essences, and in some relation to sensibles.
The P a r m e n i d e s  carries  this fu r th e r  and suggests  that 
in te llig ib le  Form s and sensib les w ould  not be epis tem ically  
complete w ithout an essential m edia tory  ro le  of soul. The 
argument begins with special reference to the problem of the One 
and the Many. Plato begins the discussion by doubting the cheap 
eristic tricks of the Sophists and the rhetoricians who prove that 
the one is also many by pointing out that the same individual has 
many parts or attributes inspite of his identity. The crux of the 
one-many relation, he argues, relates rather to how the Form of 
Unity, Like or Motion, etc. may also be respectively  Plurality, 
Unlike or Rest, etc. - objects which we apprehend in reasoning, 
128e6-130a4). The dialogue proceeds to show that the result at 
which Socrates would wonder so much cannot actually be realised, 
if (a) Forms are viewed as abstract universals, and (b) we follow 
out the hypothesis of the existence and of the non-existence of the 
One and the Many in all the various senses in which the 
hypothesis can be taken.
First, Plato shows that if  the Forms are taken as common 
elements in various particulars, and yet at the same time as 
independent substances, there will be insoluble difficulties: there 
would have to be a Form for every sensible - hair, mud, dirt, 
etc.(130c). Further, what could be meant by saying that the many 
things "participate" in Forms? Does "participate" involve sharing 
in the Form as a whole or as part? (131a). As an abstract and 
independent substance a Form would be like a sail drawn over 
many objects (131b), and it would be impossible that it should be
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wholly in each of the things that participate in them. Yet, it would 
be absurd to suppose that it was divided among them; for in that 
case, a Form would cease to be a single thing, and would thus be 
meaningless. On the other hand, if  a Form were to correspond 
merely to the common element in many particular objects which, 
in other respects, are different from each other, it would not be 
essentially related to these objects but only accidentally present 
in them. Or, if it were essentially bound up with them, then, it 
must be through some third form (132a). Yet again, if  that third 
Form were only a common element in the first Form and the 
particulars brought under it, it would only be accidentally related 
to both and a fresh Form would be required to establish the 
connexion between them, and so on ad inf ini tum .53 The result 
is the same if we suppose that a Form is a paradigm fixed in the 
nature of things, the other things being images or likenesses 
thereof (132d). For, if likeness requires a Form to explain it, we 
again fall back into the same regress ad  i n f i n i tum.  The
conclusion, then, is that nothing could be explained by taking 
Form s to be abstrac t universals  or comm on elem ents i n
particular things.
But still more important is the relation of Form to soul. If Forms
were taken as objective principles complete in themselves apart
from any relation to our thought, Plato argues that they would be 
nothing for us. They would be completely transcendent and 
removed from our consciousness. Any consciousness that grasps 
them would have no community with our souls (133b-135b2). 
But also we cannot take Forms merely as our thoughts which as
5 3 This is the Third Man Argument so often mentioned by Aristotle who 
takes no notice of the discussions in the Parmenides .
237
such exist in our souls. For otherwise they would be nothing but 
thoughts, and all things will think, since they pa rtic ipa te  in 
thought (132c). Since Forms cannot be taken as concepts existing 
in our minds, i.e., as universal abstractions, nor yet as entities 
existing in absolute independence of mind, we are left to draw 
two conclusions: that (i) insofar as we know anything by Forms, 
they are, in a sense (though not by likeness)54 in the objects 
known through them (see 133a-135b6-c4); (ii) the d istinction  
between thought and being, between soul and Form s, must be 
regarded as a distinction between principles which imply each 
other. A somewhat similar conclusion is reached in the S o p h i s t  
where it is carried a step further.
In the S o p h i s t , the consequences of pure sensationalism  of the 
Heraclitean type and the objective idealism of the Eleatic One are 
drawn, with emphasis on the latter. The assertion of absolute 
unity of Being, insofar as such assertion admits of no difference of 
aspects, makes it impossible to say anything about it. Even to 
affirm that "the One is", implies some distinction between the 
subject and the p red ic a te ,55  w hereas bare id en ti ty  m eans 
nothing at all. Similarly, it is impossible to give meaning to a 
permanence which is without change, movement or activity. Nor 
can absolute motion without rest be conceivable except that which 
combines motion and rest. B e i n g , then - it is concluded - i s  
some t h i ng  else in the soul . .An  as much you th ink  rest and
The P a r m e n i d e s  is not arguing that sensible features do not resemble 
inlelligble Forms - which would contradict the Timao. t f s '  narrative 
according to which the cosmos is a likeness of the Form of Animal. It is 
only arguing that it is not in virtue of likeness that sensible features 
participate in intelligible Forms.
55 Cf. Parm., 142bff.
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motion are embraced by it and you comprehend and observe that 
they participate in existence, you therefore say that they are' 
(250b). Thus Being and Becoming are related; but their relation 
has its completeness in an intelligence - the soul.5 ^
(ii) If the foregoing intimate the T i m a e u s '  doctrine that Forms 
are imprinted in the soul, and constitute the fundamental nature 
of the soul as of the cosmos, a consquence would be that coming to 
know Forms is coming to know your own essential self, since Plato 
identifies the self with the soul. Thus in A l c i b i a d e s  1 - if 
authentically Plato's - it is argued that man is not wholly identical 
with his body, soul being the dominant part (130d). Now soul 
must look at the divine (133c) in order to know itself. Plato 
illustrates what he means by an example: as we see ourselves 
reflected in the pupil of the eye of a friend, so we learn what we 
are and who we are by looking at the divine or god. The doctrine 
presupposes the conviction that soul is akin to the divine or god, 
and furthermore, that a direct introspection of one's own essence 
is not possible. It is implied that rational self-knowledge is the 
terminus of a long road which man is not able to reach at once. 
The text (133c) asserts that when the soul thinks of god it thinks 
itself; the relation between god and the soul is based on the belief 
that g o d , from the point of view of rational self-knowledge, is 
the highest  clari ty o f  thought.  This conclusion is further 
suggested in the Men o .
There, Socrates proposes to enter into  an inquiry into the 
essence (o u s i a ) of virtue with Meno. He professes ignorance of 
this essence and yet rejects all the "empirical" definitions which
56 This conclusion is not meant to depreciate the objectivity of Being or 
Becoming.
M e n o  has proposed. Meno has offered as an account of virtue the 
relative excellence which age, sex, and social c ircum stances 
determ ine for each ind iv idual. For Socrates, how ever, the 
meaning of the question, W hat is virtue? does not require an 
answer that lists kinds of virtue, but a request for the single 
essence of virtue by or by reason of which actions/things are 
virtuous. As the essence required seems quite removed from the 
"empirical" cases of what constitu tes virtue, M eno legitimately 
objects with the question of w hether know ledge is possible. 
Socrates’ reform ulation of the objection is this: a man cannot 
inquire into that which he does not know; for if he knows he does 
not need to inquire, but if not, he cannot inquire; for he does not 
know the very subject about which he has to inquire (80e). This, 
for Socrates, is a demand to explain what is involved in knowing. 
Socrates’ answer, half mythical, is that people who have been 
divinely inspired - priests, priestesses, poets - have declared that 
the soul is immortal, and exists in a cycle of incarnation (birth) 
and disincarnation (death). Having seen the things in this world 
( ta enthade)  and the world beyond (ta en hadou)  in its cycle of 
life, the soul has learned all things. So that it is not surprising that 
it can be r e m i n d e d  of virtue and other things which it knew 
before. Since all nature is akin, there is nothing to prevent 
someone, upon being rem inded of one thing which men call 
learning, from discovering the rest, if  he is courageous and does 
not faint in his search. For all inquiry and learning are then 
recollection (81a9-d).
Thus the soul, on this view, has all the truths in itself from 
eternity. But it has them in an implicit way. Socrates attempts to
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illustrate this by the help of a slave boy whom he questions and, 
gradually through mere questioning, leads him to the discovery of 
the solution to a geometric problem, even though the boy had no 
previous form al training in geometry. For Plato, this is a 
demonstration that all the notions which were applied in the 
solution to the geom etric  p rob lem  were no t m ere log ical 
presuppositions but valid intimations of knowledge of objectively 
existing realities or essences. Therefore, even as one does not 
know, yet one necessarily has true notions of what he does not 
know (85c). Although the soul is said to have learned all things 
both in this and the world beyond, this surely involves no 
contingent matters of fact. In the P h a e d o  and P ha  e d r  u s , 
R e co lle c tio n  (a n a m n e s i s ) is in connection with Forms a s 
universal, intelligible objects of knowledge. However, Recollection 
introduces difficulties of interpretation. For, in Plato, poetry and
philosophy are often indistinguishable. Is Recollection, then, a
mere metaphor or something else? If a metaphor, it would seem 
to imply, in the light of the geometric exercise, that learning (i.e., 
knowing Forms] involves bringing to se lf-consc iousness  the 
universal principles which underlie the manifold particulars of 
our phenom enal world. In learning, therefore , we are not 
imprinting raw data on an otherwise blank soul. Rather we are 
engaged in a process of realising our innate capacity to grasp first 
principles. This metaphorical reading, however, is compatible 
with the m ore trad itional in te rp re ta tion  accord ing  to which 
Recollection is knowledge grounded on objective, independently 
ex is ting , e s sences  (or Form s) w hich  are in o n e -to -one  
correspondence to their reminders in phenomena. Since first 
principles are akm or are in necessary interconnection, we can be
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brough t (perhaps  by our own e ffo rts  or though Socratie  
midwifery), to a complete insight into the whole system of f i r s t  
p r i n c i p l e s , som ew hat in the sam e sense in which the 
in te rco nnec tedn ess  of the a pr ior i  notions in the geometric 
solution were brought to some kind of self-consciousness of the 
boy.
The M e n o ' s  "solution” to the question of how we come to know 
has the consequence of correcting the sharp division between 
knowledge and ignorance drawn in the early Socratic dialogues.
The state of mind called opinion, or sense-perception, is now to be 
viewed as a necessary step which grounds a rite of passage to 
essences. And we see that the interrelationships of our concepts 
are valid intimations of the system of objective realities which the 
soul is imbued with. Consequently, knowledge (of essence) is 
defined as "tethering" or "stablising" opinion by accounting for
the cause (ai t i as  l og ismoi ,  97e-98a) - which suggests that
know ledge of essences is not so much an acquaintance-like 
awareness of some object as the r e a s o n e d  a w a r e n e s s  of the 
cause or principle of the things or actions. True opinion, then, is 
not a falsehood which fails to apprehend the truth. It simply does 
not consist in the f i n a l  explanation of nature in its necessary 
interconnections. The M e n o , then, implies the conclusion that 
starting from sensible rem inders, the soul, by going deeper and 
deeper into  itse lf  in reasoning, brings into self-consciousness 
(rem em brance) e s sences  of phenomena.
In the Phaedrus ,  we learn that by seeing a beautiful object the
soul is rem inded of true beauty. Man has within himself an
element of this divine beauty: 'And if  they have not aforetime
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trodden this path, they now set out upon it learning the way from 
any source that may offer it or finding it for themselves; and as 
they follow up the trace within themselves  of the nature of t h e i r  
own god  their task is made easier in as much as they are 
constrained to fix their gaze upon him', i.e., a friend who is by 
nature disposed to the love of wisdom (252eff.). Plato intimates 
that by looking at a friend, by being together with a friend, 
e n th ou s ia s m o s  is generated which involves a concentration of the 
soul upon itself. This process is qualified as taking place in 
Recollection. At 253a-b, he points out that the lover tries to 
create in the beloved the greatest possible likeness with his own 
god. It would follow that the beloved is not a complete likeness, 
but helps to evoke in the lover the latter's likeness with god, 
which he then wants to create in the beloved. But if this takes 
place in Recollection, it is all the more im portant: for the
" reco l lec t i ve"  recreation of the god within us through the image 
of the beloved is a process towards the highest clarity of thought.
In the text of Ti .  37a-c, Plato assigns to the human soul a 
natural movement which imitates that of Soul; Soul revolves upon 
itself (aute te anakukloumene  pros  hauten).  In this process, 
revolving Soul comes into contact with the objects of its thought 
and pronounces in which respect and how things are the same and 
different. He then intimates that the object known is recognised 
as part  o f  onesel f  or as agreeing with part of one's own being: 
'But when reason is concerned with the rational, and the circle of 
the same moving smoothly declares it, then intelligence and 
knowledge are necessarily achieved. And if anyone affirms that 
in which these two are found to be other than the soul , he will
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say the very opposite of the truth' (37c). At 90a-d, Plato speaks 
of the task man has to cherish "the divine part within himself". 
The best part of man, reason, is akin to the heavens. By studying 
the thoughts and m ovem ents of the ce les tia l  bodies , man 
nourishes his soul and according to its original nature makes it 
into a likeness of that which is thought (90d). Thus it can be said 
that by contemplating the intelligible to which it is akin, reason 
comes to know itself, and actualizes in clarity the deepest essence 
of its nature.
In the E p  i n o m i s , astromonical studies are recom m ended  as 
leading to true wisdom. At 987d-988b, the Athenian expresses 
the hope that the Greeks will learn better the true cult of the 
divine celestial bodies than the non-Greeks from whom they first 
learned it. The Greeks should avail themselves of the oracle of 
Delphi and whi e obedient to their laws not think that it is 
forbidden to study the celestial bodies. Deity (to theion , 988a) is 
not ignorant of human nature. If deity guides man and teaches 
him, man will follow and will learn number and counting. If God 
would not know this, he would not know himself. God, then, 
knows himself and therefore he looks down with favour on the 
man who studies the celestial bodies, because this study brings 
man closer to God. Man must therefore strive for self-knowledge. 
He does so when he desires to know the principles which govern 
the celestial bodies.
From these texts, Plato gives the impression that for him rational 
self-knowledge is the fulfillment of human knowledge, and that 
this is attainable in the highest clarity of thought. Consequently, 
Forms exist as the intelligible conditions which determine and 
define the lim its of clarity  in hum an th o u g h t .^ 7 It is as
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i n t e l l i g ib l e  cond i t i ons  that Forms are known as by vision or
sudden revelation, and are known only by means of logos  rather 
than by means of empirical studies. Thus in the P h a e d o , an 
objection of Cebes' leads Socrates to a short intellectual biography 
according to which, on reading Anaxagoras' tantalising postulate 
that Reason is the ordering principle of all things and on finding 
that by the use to which Reason was put Anaxagoras was unable 
to free h im self from the inadequacy of physical and chemical 
m odels o f  explanation  em ployed by o ther physio logists, he
(Socrates) devised his own method: that of using logoi^%  and 
postulating Forms as hypotheses. Socrates (96bff.) thinks that no 
other model of explanation could give a sufficient reason why 
when one is added to one the one to which it is added becomes 
two, simply by reason of the addition, or that a flower is beautiful 
because of its shape, blooming* pigments (lOOd), etc., or that "A" is 
taller than "B" by a head, when a head is itself just so small 
(lOOe). Socrates was looking for an underlying principle which
would make these processes and explanations both intelligible and 
adequate. The answer, therefore, did not lie in the factors 
invo lved  in the processes. Socrates expected to get from 
Anaxagoras a comprehensive teleological system of the universe, 
which would explain all the particular aspects of existence as 
disposed to "the highest good" or "for the best" by reference to
5 7 Cf. R.  532a"...when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of 
reason and apart from all perceptions to find his way to the very essence 
of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the
nature of the Good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible - ep'
autoi ginetai toi tou noetou telei. Cf. further, 533c9-d8)
It is not easy to translate "logoi"  here. In context, it can mean 
"reasons", "arguments" "theories" or "accounts". Any of these can work 
without damage to the argument that follows.
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Reason (See further, 97e-98a)
Socrates was disappointed, however. He implies that Anaxagoras 
had treated the function of Reason som ew hat m echanically . 
Socrates compares (98b3ff.) Anaxagoras to a person who, having 
began by maintaining that Reason is the cause of Socrates' actions, 
when he tried to expound the cause of Socrates' action went on to 
give a lecture c-n the physiological detail of Socrates' posture, 
assigning ten thousand causes of the physiological kind. He omits 
the "true cause" which is that the Athenians had thought it fit to 
condemn Socrates, and he in turn had thought it better to remain 
in prison. Indeed, Socrates agrees that he could not execute his 
purposes without muscles, bones, sinews, and other bodily parts. 
But to say that he executes his purposes because of them, and that 
this is the manner in which the mind acts and not from his choice 
of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. In other 
words, a t r u e  cause must be a "purpose" explanation: "the
Athenians thought it f i t  to condemn Socrates", "Socrates t h o u g h t  
it best  to rem ain ..."  According to P la ton ic  science, then,
sufficiency and intelligibility are the criteria for a scientifically 
cred ib le  exp lanation . Socrates ' re jec tion  of chem ical and
mechanical explanations seems to be because they never lead to 
the final explanation of things. There is a logical gap between 
mechanical and chemical causes on the one hand, and f i n a l  causes 
on the o t h e r , ^  such that however farther and farther the 
former were cariied, they would not end in the latter. Socrates 
implies that the attempt to explain the causes of his prison
5 9 if  Aristotle's distinctions of causes apply to Plato at all, a final cause is, 
for Plato, at once also a formal and efficient, though never a material 
cause.
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situation by mechanical/chemical causes would lead to an infinite 
regress, and that sufficient explanations are final causes of the 
rational or purposive kind. By resorting to l o g o i  and Forms as 
hypotheses, he im plies that Forms perform  this purposive or 
teleological role in the cosmos, and that l o g o i  are the route to 
Form s.
In the P h a e d r u s  and S y m p o s i u m , philosophical vision of Forms 
is likened to a sublime mystery equivalent to religious initiation. 
At S y m p .  210eff., Diotima speaks of the final phase of Socrates' 
initiation into the mysteries of Love as a sudden beholding of 
something wonderful, i.e., divine beauty itse lf  - suggesting a 
com parison with the e p o p t e i a  of the E leusin ian  m ysteries. 
Consequently, although the philosophical logos  functions as a rite 
of passage to the vision of Forms, Forms them selves are not 
something uttered ( l o g o u m e n o n ). There is a distinction between 
the Form itself and the l o g o s  which refers to it. The mortal 
human being makes his approach to divine reality  through the 
l o g o s , but the Form s them selves transcend hum an, linguistic 
grasp. Socratic philosophy is an attempt to develop one's powers 
of discerning intellectually  those universal forms common to all 
the various instances and to fix habitually one's vision of them as 
the firm foundation  for the life o f a r e t e .  The means of 
accomplishing this was d i a l e g e i n , discussion of a certain rigorous 
sort by use of logo i .  However, Socratic forms are not linguistic 
entities, nor concepts but ex tra-linguistic  rea lities  inherent  in 
things or persons, and which words ultim ately name. In the 
middle period, Form s are presen t in, are partic ipated  in by, 
communicate with, or are the causes of, sensible things.60 But
60 Sec P h d o .  100c; P a r m .  129a; E u d .  280b2; Ly.  216d4; Phi l .  16b2; R.
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the existential status of Forms is m e ta p h y s ic a l ,  and therefore 
Forms are not coeval or co-extensive with what they are causes of
or explain. From this point of view, the S y m p o s i u m  qualifies the
apprehension  of the Form of beauty as neither l o g o s  nor 
e p i s t e m e  (211a).61 Beauty is apprehended in a quasi-mystical, 
but nonetheless, intellectual vision, which is beyond all language 
and discursive thought. In another dimension - reference to the 
R e p u b l i c  - knowledge of the Good is a synoptic vision, a seeing 
how the various specific goods of life are to be ordered 
hierarchically into a harmonious whole. The vision of the Good is 
the seeing of all the separate goods of life - appetitive, spirited,
rational, in a single systematic, and integral vision of life. Thus 
although the vision of the Form is attained through words, it is not 
simply conveyed in words. Words are at the sametime the 
necessary means whereby the vision of the Form is attained and, 
as it were, the limit or barrier which needs to be transcended in
507dl2; Meno 70a3, Soph. 247a8; G. 560d3; Theae. 158c2.
A text of the Seventh Letter (342a-343a) distinguishes five levels of 
knowledge, the first three of which are means of acquiring knowledge -
viz., "a name" (o n o m a ), "a description" ( l o g o s ) ,  "an i m a g e "  
(eidolon) ;  the fourth is "a knowledge ( ep i s t eme)  of the object"; the fifth 
is "the actual object of knowledge which is a true reality (auto to gnoston 
kai aTethos on). Plato then sets forth that e p i s t e m e , nous al'ethes and 
d o x a  are on the fourth level (342c); of these three types of knowledge 
n o u s  is by kinship and resemblance closest to the fifth. In this 
enumeration, Plato sees a continuity between knowledge in the knowing 
agent and the object of knowledge; nous  is the comprehensive grasp of 
the intelligible. Yet, there is a higher level of knowledge than this full 
understanding (343d). It is tempting to read in this text the possibility 
that at the highest level the distinction between knowledge and its object 
vanishes. This strengthens our earlier observation that Forms and (pure) 
Reason (nous)  aie possibly obverse sides of the same coin, or that Reason 
is the subjective aspect of Forms. Analytically, Plato needs a distinction, 
but not an identity, of Forms and Reason.
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r a t io n a l  v i s i o n . 62 
So far,  w e  have  seen tha t  P la ton ic  gods are  mot ion-gods .  But  the 
d iv in e  m o t io n  is ne i the r  p h y s ica l  no r  ch em ica l ,  a l though  it is the 
c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  l a t t e r .  F u r t h e r ,  d i v i n e  m o t i o n  e x h ib i t s  the  
p ro p e r t i e s  o f  F o r m s  - u n iq u e n es s ,  o rder ,  u n i fo rm i ty ,  t im e lessness ,  
g o o d n e s s ,  v i r t u e ,  e tc .  P l a t o n i c  p i e ty ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c o n s i s t s  in 
a t tem pts  to r e p ro d u c e  d iv in e  m o t io n  in ou r  souls  (as p e r  the late 
d ia logues)  or (- in words  cons is ten t  with  the  M id d le  d ia logues  -) it 
cons is ts  in the  k n o w le d g e  o f  F o rm s .  E i th e r  way,  re l ig ios i ty  is by 
w ay  o f  l o g o i , r a th e r  than  em p i r i c a l  s tud ies ,  a l th o u g h ,  in a truly
6 2 This  P lat on ic  con cep t  o f  p h i l o so p h i ca l  l o g o s  rests on a log ica l ly  prior 
assu mpt ion about the nature o f  language  and its re lat ionship  to reality - 
an ass um pt ion  c o m m o n  to Greek culture,  v iz . ,  that words  are names  (or 
s i gns)  and that their fun ct ion  is to na m e  or s ig ni fy  s o m e  extra- l iguis t ic
real i ty.  Thi s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  words  as  n a m e s  im p l i e s  that real i t ies are
i n t e l l i g i b l e  for  w ha t  the y  are i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  the  hu m a n  la ng ua ge .
This  is e v id ent  from the then current n o m o s - p h u s i s  de bat e  on na m es
( onomat a ) .  Given the concept ion  o f  language  as a syste m o f  names,  the  
quest io n  natural ly arise w he the r  the word s ig n i f ie s  a th ing  by a natural  
r ig ht ne ss  ( p h u s i s , or thotZs) ,  or whether  it do es  so s im pl y  as a matter o f  
arbitrary c o n v e n t i o n  (no mo  s).  But  to ask whether  the nam e fitted or 
matched the nature o f  the th ing  pr esup po ses  that the nature is s o m e h o w  
already i n te l l ig ib l e  in i t se lf .  T he  C r a t y l u s '  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  "names" is 
in s t ru c t iv e  in th is  respect .  B o th  nature  and c o n v e n t i o n  theor ies  are
e x p lo r e d  d i a l e c t i c a l l y  to the  po in t  w h ere  each  the ory  breaks  d o w n  to
a b s u r d i t ie s .  H a v i n g  r e a c h e d  the  c o n c l u s i o n  that  n e i t h e r  the or y  is  
s uf f i c ie nt  by  i t s e l f  to ac cou n t  for the re lat ion o f  w o rd s  to the objects  
na m ed  or s ig n i f ie d ,  S ocra te s  s ta le s  h is  f irm c o n v i c t i o n  that,  w h ic h e v e r
theory  is u l t im ate ly  true, th i ng s  may  be k n o w n  in and by  t h e m s e lv e s  
( auta di ' auton , 4 3 8 e 7 ;  dV auton, 4 3 9 a 6 )  w i t h ou t  nam es ;  n am es  are no  
sure  g u i d e  to the  truth o f  t h i n g s  ( 4 3 8 d 7 - 8 ) ;  n a m e s  are u l t im a te ly  
i rre levant  to inquiry  into real th ing s  (ta onta, 4 3 9 b 5 ) ,  into  ab so lu te  
beauty  or g o o d ,  or any other  ab sol ut e  e x i s t e n c e s  ( 4 3 9 c 8 - d l ) .  Thus  for  
Plat o  (or  S o c r a te s ) ,  l o g o i  (or more  proper ly,  o no m a t  a)  refer to ( i .e. ,  
n am e ,  s i g n i f y )  forms,  yet  at the sa m e  t im e  the form s transcend human
la n g u a g e .
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j u s t  S ta te  those  incap ab le  o f  r e l ig ion  by  p h i lo so p h ic a l  l o g o s  can 
avail  them selves  o f  the d i rec t  ru le  o f  r ea so n  or, as second-bes t ,  of 
the  ru le  o f  law.  Thus  it s eem s  tha t  P la to n ic  p ie ty  d o e s  not
a c c o m m o d a te  the  p e r s o n a l  r e l ig io n  o f  the  t r a d i t io n a l  ve in .  T he
cu lt ic  co ncep t ion  o f  god in the  t rad i t iona l  r e l ig ious  sense  invo lves  
a p e r so n  w i th  w h o m  o th e r  p e r so n s  m a y  h a v e  in t im a te  r e l ig io u s  
co n tac t .  P l a t o ’s m o t io n - g o d s  a p p e a r  to h a v e  v e ry  l i t t l e  to do  
d i re c t ly  in  t e rm s  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  m a n .  T he
p e r s o n a l i t y  or  im p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  P la to ' s  god  is e x p re s s e d  in the 
ra t iona l i ty ,  p ropo r t ions  and ry thm s  o f  the  a s t ro n o m ica l  m o t io n s  of 
the  heaven ly  bodies.  Yet P la to  is p rep a red  to ass ign the n a m es  of 
the  t rad i t iona l  gods  to his p l a n e t a ry  gods ,  to call  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  
s tudies  the true  " in it ia t ion”, and to desc r ibe  the v is ion  o f  F o r m s  as 
the "true myste ries" .  The ques t ion  arises:  how does  P la to  conv ince  
h i m s e l f  t h a t  he  ha s  p r o v i d e d  an a d e q u a t e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  
trad it ional re l ig ion ,  O ly m p ian  or E leu s in ia n ?  In pa r t icu la r ,  given 
the basic  na tu re  o f  god as a "motion  o f  R eason" ,  how  does  P la to  
sat isfy  h im se l f  that such a god cares fo r  or is in te res ted  in hum an 
affa irs?  H o w  m ay  such a god be said  to d ispense  d iv ine  ju s t ice?  
A n d  w h a t  fo l l o w s  f r o m  a f a i lu re  to avai l  o n e s e l f  o f  ( i)  the
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  l o g o s  by w a y  o f  g rasp ing  F o rm s  or  (ii) the  d i rec t  
ru le  o f  reason  or the  rule  o f  law  in a j u s t  Sta te?  I d iscuss  these  
q u e s t io n s  be low .
5 Divine justice. Providence. Eschatologv. and Evil 
P la to  seems to say tha t  G o d ’s p re sen ce  in the un ive rse  p ro v id e s  a 
prov iden t ia l  f r am e w o rk  o f  care  for our  des i res ,  hopes  and dest iny .  
G o d ’s care ar ises by (i) def in it ion  o f  "his" na tu re  as a causal  p o w e r
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which  is e ssen t ia l ly  good,  tog e th e r  with the P la to n ic  a s s u m p t io n  
tha t  the p ro d u c t  of  that  which  is good is n e ce s sa r i ly  go o d  (77. 
30a);  and (ii) the ju s t  adm in is t ra t ion  o f  all th ings .  (i) and  (ii) 
c anno t  be d iscussed  in abso lu te  separa t ion ,  s ince  G o d 's  c ausa l i ty  
and  goodness  is shown in the  ju s t  a r rangem en t  o f  all th ings  and 
vice  versa.
P la to  ( R . ii 377c-ii i)  seeks to guarantee  the essentia l  g oodness  o f  
gods by the change lessness  and perfec t ion  o f  the ir  charac te r .  So 
he exc ludes  change  of  shape  f rom  the co n ce p t  o f  god and  also 
dec la re s  that  igno rance ,  l ies,  and all m a n n e r  o f  d e c e p t io n  are 
unworthy  of  d iv ine  beings.  The gods are said to be in the  m os t  
perfect  state and there is noth ing  they do not a l ready  p osse ss  by 
virtue of their  very nature.  Since god's status is best , it is absurd  
to suppose  that "he" will give it up. Ignorance too,  canno t  possib ly  
have a place in the concept of  god, since ignorance  will im pa i r  the 
fu l lness  of  the i r  v ir tue  and ex ce l len t  g o o d n e s s . ^ 3  j n addi t ion ,  
the self-control  of  god is comple te .  The gods can neither indulge  
in such undignif ied  laments  as in Homer ,  nor  abandon  th em se lves  
to unrestra ined  laughter.  They  will be super ior to sexual pass ions ,  
and they cannot  be swayed by bribes  or p e r s u a s io n .^ 4  ]n L a w s  
x, it is argued that to be so swayed impl ies ignorance ,  inabil i ty  or 
vice - charac te r is t ics  which do not enter the def in i t ion  o f  god as 
motion of Reason  (901 e f f .) Reason  in the gods will a lso  be in
6 3 That god should be s imple ,  constant  and unch ang ing  s e e m s  to be the 
ground o f  its essential,  go odn ess .  Note  that "simplicity",  constancy", and 
"unchangeabil i ly" are formal properties o f  Forms too.  For Plato virtue or 
goodness  is a unity and a kind o f  order, and therefore every  virtue can be 
s d  up as consl i lulcd by one form whereas v ice  is manifold and disorder.
64 The be l ie f  that the gods can be squared is, in L a w s  x, the third o f  t h c 
bel ie fs  which the impious  hold.  To suppose  that they can be de f l ec ted  
from their respons ib i l i t ies  by bribery is to rate them lo w e r  than s h e e p ­
d o g s .
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und ispu ted  com m and ;  and the rela tion be tw een  reason and desi re  
will  co r respond  to the ideal  condit ion of  the soul which we find 
desc r ibed  in R.  iv. By these  remarks  P la to  seeks to dem ons t ra te  
at leas t ,  that  i r r a t iona l i ty ,  a rb i t ra r iness ,  m ora l  p e rv e r s io n ,  and 
an th ropom orph ism  are not par t  of  the essent ia l  na ture  of  god.
D o  the gods  care  for m ank ind?  In L a w s  x, P la to  a rgues  to 
an sw er  a hypo the t ica l  a rgum ent  of  the  a theis t  and im pious ,  tha t  
(a) gods do not exist , that (b) even if  they exist ,  they do no t  care 
for us, re fe rence  to the apparent  lack of  jus t ice  in the world which 
is ev id en ced  by the p rospe r i ty  and a p p a ren t  h app iness  o f  the
wicked ,  or that  (c) gods can be squared.  (a) and (c) have  been
touched on above. In answer to (b) it is pointed out (903b-d)  that 
God takes  care  of every th ing  inc lud ing  hum an beings;  that  men 
are the possess ions  of the g o d s , and that  the gods would  not 
there fore  neglec t  them,  since  they have the adminis t ra t ion  of  all 
th ings  "as the i r  p ro p e r  and b eco m in g  task"  (900d) .  In the
E p i n o m i s  and T i m a e u s ,  we learn that  the p r im acy  of ra tional 
s e l f - m o v e m e n t  in the  c o s m o s  e x p l a i n s  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
generation,  growth  and destruct ion of  all things inc luding the food
f
we eat.  Also,  the tr iumphant  ra tionali ty o f  the god-souls  in their  
h e a v e n l y  c i r c u i t s  e n a b l e s  o u r  g o d - e n d o w e d  c a p a c i t y  to 
unders tand  and co m p u te  with standards  o f  in te ll ig ib i l i ty  p rov ided  
by the ce les t ia l  c locks  f rom  which d e r iv e  the n u m b e r  ser ies ,  
s tandards  o f  t ime, the seasons,  calendar,  etc (990b; Ti  38c,  39b-c) 
and above  all, a standard  of  l ife exh ib i ted  by s tarry  behav iour .  
Sti l l ,  s ince  no personal  r e la t io n sh ip  in the  t rad i t iona l  sense  is 
a sse r ted  be tw een  gods  and men,  the gods  may be said to be
65 L a w s  644d-e;  803-4 ,  902b-c;  906a.  This doctrine was  proc la imed earlier
in the P h a e d o  (62b6)
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u nconce rned  with human affairs. But this is not true;  the gods 
have  every  tr ivial  thing for their  a t tention.  K n o w in g  all things,  
they  must k now  that detai ls  matter (902c-903a; cf. C r i t i a s  109b): 
there  are d iv ine  m oni to rs  o f  every  detail  o f  w h a tev e r  we do or 
suffer ( L a w s ,  903b-d; Ti  . 4 1 d - e )
W h y  then do the wicked prosper?  To this the S t range r  in the 
L a w s  rep lies  (903bff. )  that  the aim which "the King"  set h imself  
in his d iv ine  g o v e rn m e n t  is the p re se rva t ion  and v i r tue  of the 
whole ' ,  and that each of us. as a part of  the cosmos , is oriented to 
the  h ap p in es s  or spi r i tua l  w e l l -be ing ,  (e u d a i m o n i a , c6) of the 
w ho le  for w h ich  the par t  exists.  W e exis t  for the  w ho le  as 
d r a ma t i s  p e r s o n a e :  we are ro le -p layers  in the c osm os ,  and our 
duty  is to play our  roles  well (803c-804b).  The  cosm os  being an 
orderly  system, not a sphere in which anyth ing may com e  out of 
anything,  the system of  divine government  is simple:  each man is 
a ss igned  the s ta t ion appropr ia te  to his c h a r ac te r  at an ) ’ given 
period of his life, and in this station suffers his jus t  reward,  that of 
associating with others like himself. In the case of  the wicked this 
am oun ts  to pu n ish m en t .  The  pun ish m en t  o f  the w icked  whose  
prosperi ty  is a scandal to the pious is to be found in the friends 
they make.  Both on earth and between each of  our l ives things 
are so d i sposed  that  as a man desires  to l ive,  so he  finds  his
appropr ia te  stat ion,  and he suffers in that stat ion his appropria te  
treatment from those who share in it with him. The object ive  at 
which this a ims is the  maximisa t ion  of  the tr iumph o f  v irtue  and 
the defeat  of  vice in the cosmos as a whole.  It is implied ,  then,
that a man 's  prosper i ty  is not to be assessed  by the quanti ty  and
va r ie ty  o f  m a te r ia l  g o o d s  he en jo y s ,  but by the  s ta tus  and
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c i rcu m stan ces  o f  his soul's  exis tence.
It is not P la to ' s  v iew,  then,  tha t  the gods  ac tua l ly  d i rec t  our  
actions.  N o r  does  he sugges t  that they g ive  us our deserts  before
our l ife is com ple ted .  P la to  seems to set human life in a global
sy s te m  in w h ic h  the  goo d  and evil  h av e  im p e r s o n a l  log ica l -
on to log ica l  func t ions .  Th is  re fe rs  to the  fact  that  the  basis  o f
P la to ' s  a s se r t io n  tha t  d iv in e  ju s t i c e  and p ro v id e n c e  w a tch  ove r  
e v e ry  i n d i v i d u a l ’s l ife and  take  no t ice  o f  his ac t ion  is in his
t e l e o lo g ic a l  c o n c e p t  of  o f  the  c o s m o s . ^  In P la to ’s theory  of  
m o t i o n ,  tha t  w h ic h  is m o v e d  is d e t e r m i n e d ,  w h i l e  w e ,  as
p a r t i c i p a n t s  in r a t i o n a l  s e l f - m o t i o n ,  a r e  s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d .  
Consequen t ly ,  eve rym an  lives as he wishes  (903d5).  Global ly ,  the 
ra t iona l i ty  of  the m ot ions  of  Soul,  and the essentia l  goodness  of  
R e a s o n  e n s u r e  tha t  the  l a s t in g  g e o m e t r i c  and m a th e m a t i c a l l y
express ib le  laws of  the co sm o s  provide  a cosmic  virtue  that does  
not ad m i t  any a rb i t r a ry  in te rv e n t io n  - e .g . ,  t h u n d e rb o l t s  f rom  
Z e u s .  A d  h o c  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  w o u ld  be n e c e s s a r y  fo r  the  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  v i r tu e  o n ly  in a d i s o r d e r ly  w o r ld .  In the  
P h i l e b u s  (28d),  we are assured that  the sum of  things - what we- 
call the un iverse  - is controlled  not by a pow er  which is irrational,
b l in d ,  or by m e r e  c h a n c e ,  but by R e a s o n  and a w o n d r o u s
reg u la t in g  In te l l igence .  T hus ,  in an o rder ly  world  such  as ours
Plato docs  not fall into a fal lacy o f  composi t ion  here; he does  not mean  
that what is good for the whole is also good for the individual (903c) .  This  
woul d be a fa l la cy  i f  he had argued,  "if the w h o le  is happy then the
individual  is happy". But there is no such arguing in the L a w s ,  only a
doctr inaire assert ion that the arrangements in the c o s m o s  were  so desired  
and d e s i g n e d  by God  that the ha ppi ness  o f  the indiv idual  is in the  
happi ness  o f  the w ho le .  So  too the R e p u b l i c ,  the ha pp in ess  o f  the  
indiv idual  c i t izen  con s is t s  in his  e f f e c t iv e  contribut ion,  accordi ng  to his  
mettle,  to the virtue and happiness  o f  the whole  polity (7?. 4 1 9 - 4 2 0 c ) .
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th ings  hav e  been  so a r ra n g ed  tha t  w ic k e d n e s s  is s e l f - th w a r t in g  
th rough  the p u n ish m e n ts  and f rus t ra t ions  w h ich  the w icked  in fl ic t  
on each other.  Again ,  in the P h i l e b u s  (30b)  God has so d isposed  
o f  th ings  tha t  the re su l t ing  fa i rness  o f  the  co sm o s  c o n s t i tu te s  a 
s y s t e m  w h ic h  s e l f - c o r r e c t s  p h y s i c a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i a  and  p s y c h ic  
in ju s t ic e s .  At L a w s  7 1 5 -16 ,  it is sa id  tha t  god 's  w a y s  are 
"acco rd ing  to na ture" ,  and d iv ine  v e n g ea n c e  consis ts  only  in the 
fact  tha t  the  w icked  m an  is "depr ived  of  gods" ,  so tha t  d isas te rs  
which over take  him are not to be ascribed to them.
Afte r  dea l ing  with the in te llectual  roots o f  impie ty ,  the  A then ian  
in the L a w s  p ro p o s e s  a p p ro p r i a t e  s e n te n c es  for the  p u n i s h m e n t  
of  its fru it s ,  and p ro ceed s  to an act  w h ich  p roh ib i ts  all p r iva te  
p l a c e s  o f  w o r s h ip ,  the  p u n i s h m e n t  fo r  g ra v e  s e n te n c e s  be ing  
death.  The  reason  for this severi ty  is tha t  the c o m m o n  tendency
of  m en  in bad  or goo d  fo r tu n e  to i n v e n t  p r iv a te  r e l i g io u s
obse rvances  e n co u rag es  the belief that h o w e v e r  w icked one  is, it 
will a lways be poss ib le  to find means  of propr ia tion.  Pr ivate  cults , 
in fact,  mil i t a te  agains t  the truimph of  cosm ic  virtue; for the parts 
are not there for their  own good nor  is the whole  for the good of 
the par ts ,  but the  pa r ts  are  there  for the  whole ,  and the  only  
cri te rion by which we should jud g e  the fate  and the e xper ience  of  
the parts is the ir  contr ibu tion  or lack of  it to the perfect ion o f  the 
who le .  G od  does  not conce rn  i t s e l f  with  phys ica l  or  m a te r ia l  
th ings  but with soul a l o n e . ^  T o  treat  souls  accord ing  to the ir  
qua l i ty  and the i r  meri ts  and to g ive  them  a status  c o r re sp o n d in g  
to the deg ree  o f  the i r  goodness  is the only  func t ion  su i tab le  for 
god in the cosm os  in which the abso lu te  prior i ty  o f  Soul in every
respect has been proved  and the good Soul has been shown to be
67 See esp. 903dff .
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in pow er .  M an 's  own wish or c h o ice  or h is  r e a c t io n  to the
influences  of  o ther souls de te rm ines  his s ta tu s .68  By what  looks 
like a law of  psychic  gravitat ion and att ract ion w o r th ie r  sou ls  will 
r i se  to the  astral  areas ,  w h i le  those  o f  the  o p p o s i t e  w il l  s ink 
do w n w ard s  to H a d e s  or even deeper  (904b-e) .  Thus  p ro v id e n c e  
manifests i tsel f  in the very a r rangem ent  o f  the  cosm os ,  and  in the 
care and jus t  administ ra tion of the universe  o f  souls.
For  Pla to ,  how ever ,  d iv ine  care  and ju s t  a d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  all
things,  in the te leological  schem e  in which  they  are  ex e rc i sed ,  is 
cons is ten t  with the ex i s t ence  o f  evil .  In the  R e p u b l i c , in a 
p ream ble  to a curr icu lum  for the educa t ion  o f  the  y o u n g ,  P la to
in timates  that a good god will be jus t ,  h a rm o n io u s  and  p e ac e fu l ,  
and not revengeful .  Nor  can god w an ton ly  do ha rm  to anyone .
That  is, he cannot,  by def in it ion  o f  "his" na tu re ,  be said to be
re sp o n s ib le  for any harm to man.  It is c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the
supreme goodness  of  god to effect  only the wel l -be ing  o f  all o ther 
creatures ,  and to cause  only what is p leasant  and good in hum an  
exper ience.  God is not the cause  of  every th ing ,  ce r ta in ly  no t  of  
evil, but only of what is g o o d . 69 For m is fo r tunes  and su f fe r ings ,
a d i f feren t  cause  will have  to be found .  O r  r a th e r  a d e e p e r  
unders tand ing  of  the  function  of m is fo r tunes  in h u m a n  li fe  m ay
rev ea l  tha t  th e re  a re  b l e s s in g s  and  b e n e f i t s  fo r  the  t ru ly
im por tan t  ph ase s  o f  hum an  e x is t en ce  even  in w h a t  s e e m s  an
u n m i t i g a t e d  e v i l . ^ O  Plato  is here m ore  anx ious  to a b so lv e  the
gods  f rom  the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  ev i l ,  and  to c o n f i n e  th e i r
68 903d5,  904bff. ,  d4ff.
69  ’]t is neither useful nor true to lalk o f  the gods  as a source  o f  evil '  ( R . 
380b-c; cf. 386c)
70 See R 379 c-380c .
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tr ea tm ent  o f  man to the production of what is good. The fact that 
good men fare badly while  the bad do well  is no  conclus ive  p roof  
aga in s t  e i the r  the ex is tence  of  gods  or the i r  benevo len t  care  of  
men.
But at T h e a e .  176a,  Socrates tells Theodorus ;  'Evil  can never  be 
d o n e  aw ay  with ,  for the  good  m us t  a lw ay s  have  its con t ra ry ' .  
P la to ' s  l a n g u ag e  seems som et im es ,  as in the  P h a e d o , to equate  
evil  wi th  body ,  and so m et im es  - w h ich  is the  in te rp re ta t ion  I 
favou r  - to m ake  body the condition  of evil (since generally,  moral 
v a lu e s  are  a p ro p e r ty  of  the  sou l) .  W h a t e v e r  the  c o r r e c t  
in te rp re ta t io n ,  s ince  body does  no t  depend  for its ex is tence  on 
Soul  or R eason ,  it fo llows that  evil or the condi t ion  of evil can 
never  be done  away with. A soul is evil or bad in propor tion to 
the  a m o u n t  o f  i r r a t io n a l i ty  it is sub jec t  to; and body  is an 
i r r ed u c ib le  c o n d i t io n  of  i r ra t iona l i ty .  In the  L a w s ,  R e a s o n  
s u c c e e d s  in its p u rp o s e s  by fu r n i s h in g  the  u n iv e r se  with  a 
vir tuous,  happy soul. In associating with Reason, Soul controls all 
things  to a r ight  and happy end (897b).  In the P h i l e b u s  R eason  
is in control  of  the cosmos . In the T i m a e n s  R eason 's  p o w er  is 
ch ecked  by (mater ia l )  Necess i ty  which it pe rsuades  and adapts  to 
i ts  t e leo log ica l  pu rposes .  The  bodi ly  e lem en ts  have  the i r  own 
ten d en c ie s .  B u t  in the  c o sm o s  the i r  n a tu re  and tendency  are 
n o th in g  but the  geom et r ica l  s t ruc tu re  o f  the i r  re spec t ive  a tom s ,  
and c o n s t r u c t i v e  R e a s o n  a p p ea rs  in the  f ina l  ana lys is  to be 
r e sp o n s ib le  for the ir  reaction.  For  d iv ine  R eason  works  for the 
b e s t , and  p a r t  o f  the  p r o v i d e n t i a l  p r o g r a m m e  c o n s i s t s  in 
bes tow ing  def in ite  a tomic  shapes on body.  These  shapes are not 
r a n d o m ly  c h o se n  at all; they  are  the  m o s t  r e g u la r  and m ost  
beau t i fu l  tha t  e x i s t . A n d  it is for the  bes t  possib le  perfect ion
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of  the whole  that they were so constructed.
T h e  p h a se  o f  na tu re  in w h ich  the  tw o  broad  a n t a g o n i s t i c  
e lem en ts  - R eason  and N ecess i ty  - c o nsp icuous ly  m eet ,  is man. 
M an  has been created,  not im m edia te ly  by the D em iurge ,  but by 
subo rd ina te  gods  who are his he lpers  and the  e x ecu to r s  o f  his
intentions.  Into his nature has gone,  on the one hand, a part ic le  of 
sou l ,  h o m o g e n e o u s  wi th  tha t  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  and  
comple te ly  harmonious  subs tance of which Soul was made.  On the 
o ther hand, there are the mor ta l  parts of soul which are the  seat 
o f  p a ss ions ,  em ot ions  and the l ike,  as a lso  his f le sh ,  bones ,  
muscles ,  blood and all else that be long to his physical  nature.  The 
phys ica l  part  has been created  out of the four  e lem en ts .  Thus
the i r  ex p er iences  and reac t ions  will be d e te rm ined  by the  sam e  
laws to which the physical  e lem ents  are subject  everywhere .
P h y s ica l  n eces s i ty  a lso d e t e r m in e s  sense  p e rc e p t io n .  T h e s e
perceptions  are likely to affect  man and to dis turb the normal  and
d es i rab le  w ork in g  of the be t te r  part  - the d iv ine  part  o f  his 
n os o u l . 7 -  W ith  respect to his appeti tes  and desi res ,  the organs  
m inis te r ing  to them have been carefu l ly  placed in those  par ts  of 
the  b o d y  w h e r e  they  are he ld  in c h e c k  by o th e r s  m o r e
im m ed ia te ly  under  the control  o f  Reason.  Yet all these  in fe r io r
parts may gain strength at the expense  of  his noble r  part.  Other  
adverse  effects  may be rep roduced  by physica l  su ffe r ings ,  or by 
any kind of  short-comings  or affectation of  body. But goodness  is 
in a cco rdance  with divine Reason working  for the pe r fec t ion  that 
human souls should be treated accord ing  to their  deserts ,  and that 
a co r re spondence  should be effected  between their  na ture  and the
71 See 53b; 53d-e; also 56cff.
72 42a; 43a-44c; 86b-87b; Cf. 69cff.
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c i rc u m s ta n c e s  o f  the ir  ou tward  e x i s t e n c e . ^ 3 So in the creation of 
the  hum an  body ,  it has been possib le ,  and care  has been taken 
that  it should  w ork  no m ore  harm than is inevi table .  This  view 
la rge ly  de te rm in es  the parts  o f  our animal structure ;  the locat ion  
o f  the organs,  and their function.  According  to the T i m a e u s , then, 
G od 's  goodness  accounts  for the  p resence  of  Soul,  de te rm ines  the 
shape  of  the  cosm os  as a who le  and the part icula rs  in it, cer tain 
im p o r tan t  fea tures  in the phys ics  o f  the heaven,  the nu m b er  and 
quan t i ta t ive  re la tion  of  the e lem en ts  from which the parts of the
universe  are made,  and finally,  the shape,  location,  and function of 
the various  organs  of  the body.
P la to  speaks  of diseases  of  the soul caused  by the state o f  the
body (86b).  But man,  for tunate ly ,  is also susceptib le  to inf luences  
o f  a n o t h e r  and  b e t t e r  k ind  - such  as the  p h i l o s o  p h ic a l  
co n tem p la t io n  of  the order  of  the universe ,  as t ronomica l  studies,  
and the h a r m o n y  of  mus ic .  These  b e t te r  in f luences  tend to 
s t r e n g th en  the pa r t  of  the ind iv idua l  soul w h ich  is ak in  and 
h o m o g e n e o u s  to the soul o f  the cosmos .  Thus  man may be a
se rv an t  o f  his phys ica l  na tu re ,  or he m ay  r ise  ab o v e  pu re ly  
p h y s i c a l  n e c e s s i t y ,  and w i th in  the  l im i t s  o f  his  i n d iv id u a l
c a p a c i t i e s  c o n t r i b u t e  to the  v ic to ry  o f  R ea so n  ove r  m a te r ia l  
N e c e s s i ty ,  if  he  m akes  the best  use o f  the  d iv ine  p a r t ic le  in 
h i m . ^ 4
Just ice  in the care of the gods extends to eschato logy. W hat  we 
call death is, for Plato ,  simply  the d i s s o c i a t i o n  of  soul from its 
e m b o d i m e n t , ^  whi le  soul i t se l f  cannot  poss ib ly  d i e . ^  In the
73 See  42aff . ,  45af f. ,  69d; 70a; and esp. 71aff.
74 86b-89c; 89d-90d
75 77.81d-e; P h d o . 6 5 c - d, 67c-d,  83a-b
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E p i n o m i s  (986c-d),  we observe  that  those who,  dur ing  mortal  life 
e n d ea v o u r  to reproduce  in their  soul the o rde r  and rhy thm s  of  the 
celes tia l  m ovem ents  will jo in  in the unity of  Reason after what we 
call  death.  And Pla to  be l ieves  that souls  which  fail to ach ieve  
p s y c h ic  un ion  with  R ea so n  a n im a te  a s u cc e ss io n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
p h y s i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t s  (P h d o . 81 e; P J i d r .  2 4 8 c -2 4 9 c ;  L a w s  
904e) .  Th is  is often p re sen ted  in O rp h ic -P y th a g o r e a n  ve rb iag e  
and m y th o lo g y ,  hence  P la to ' s  l a n g u a g e  o f  "H ades"  "abode  of  
virtue" ,  "purification",  "initiat ion", "flight" of  soul, etc.
T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a ba lance  e f f e c t ed  in a f te r - l i f e ,  and  m o re  
g enera l ly ,  the  doc tr ine  of  the soul 's  success ive  l ives  are c lear ly  
adapta t ions  o f  the tenets of  Greek  myste ry  rel igion.  Eschato logica l  
them es  of  the soul appear at the  end of  the  G o r g i a s ,  R e p u b l i c  
and P h a e d o  after logical a rguments .  In L a w s  x, they appear as a 
logical  sequel to Plato's  philosophical  cosmology. The pure  of  soul 
will be rewarded , the impure  punished. Such a creed leads to the 
c o n f id e n c e  tha t  w h a te v e r  is u n s a t i s f a c to ry  in the  r e l a t io n s h ip  
be tw een  man 's  meri ts  and his exper iences  in this world  will  be 
m ade  good af ter his death.  This be lief supplies  the basis for the 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l  m y th s  in the  G o r g i a s  and P h a e d o .  In the 
R e p u b l i c , w here  the general  l ines of  the myth  at the end of  the 
book  fo l lows  that  in the G o r g i a s  and the P h a e d o , the  p r im ary  
conce rn  is not j u d g e m e n t  o f  the  death  but the  cho ice  that  each  
soul has  to m a k e  o f  i ts  nex t  in c a r n a t i o n .  T h e r e  are  tw o  
n o tew o r th y  features.  The first  is the ro le  p layed  in the myth  by 
N ecess i ty  and her three  daughters ,  the Fa tes.  Ceaseless ly  spinning 
the  h e a v e n s  with  the ir  hands ,  these  gr im d a u g h te r s  a lso  b ind 
upon  each  soul the des t iny  it has p icked ,  and they al lo t  it its
76 M e n o  81b-c; R.  610d6-611e3;  P h d r .  2 4 5c -246 a2 .
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d a e m o n  to guard it and fulfil  what it has chosen (cf. 7 T . 4 1 0 e ;  
L a w s , 903b).  The  second fea tu re  is the  warn ing  given by the 
he ra ld  w ho  superv ises  the  souls '  choices :  ' the re spons ib i l i ty  lies 
with  you as you choose; God is not to blame'  (617d-e).  The  point
m a d e  of  these  two fea tures  o f  the  myth  is that  the  cho ices  we
m a k e  depend  on our u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  l ife.  So tha t  it is vital ,
above  all th ings ,  to have  kno w led g e  of  good and evil.  The  fates
are  there  to sym bo l ise  the  inev i tab i l i ty  o f  the c o n seq u en ces  we 
br ing  upon ourse lves  by our actions,  and it is no doubt for the 
sam e  reasons  that  the souls are warned  tha t  the gods are not to 
b lame. In fact ,  our dest in ies  are jo in t ly  de termined  by our own 
ac t ions  ( L a w s ,  903d),  and by the universal  laws of  the cosmos. 
Excep t  insofa r as God may have determined those laws no part is 
p layed  by God in the whole  matter .  Just  before  the myth o f  the 
R e p u b l i c  (612-13) ,  we read of the jus t  or v ir tuous  man being 
p leas ing  and of the unjust  man being offensive  to the gods. The 
jus t  man is also a benef ic iary  of  various other things and goods, so 
that he is never  neglected by the gods; in disease  and poverty ,  all 
things will f inally prove good for him in life and in death.  Thus 
we  are r em o te ly  in f luenced  in our  indiv idual dest iny  by a God 
w h o  has m ade  a genera l  d ispos i t ion  of  all things.  Since God's 
d isposi t ions  are good,  it fo llows that  ul t imate ly ,  it largely depends  
on us.
In the T i m a e u s ,  the immorta l  part of  man is not a compound  of 
fire,  water,  air and earth but a harmony of  numbers .  A theory of 
the mora li ty  o f  rewards  and pun ishm en ts  is given in which it is 
m e a n t  tha t  we  b r in g  u p o n  o u r s e lv e s  ou r  own d e s t i n y  in 
accordance  with the ine luctable  laws that God has laid down when
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he persuaded the primal chaos  to confo rm  as c lose ly  as it could  to 
the  e ternal  exem plars  (41eff . ) .  The  gods w h o  c rea ted  m an  have  
done  their  best  with in  the p oss ib i l i t ie s  a f fo rd ed  by N e c e s s i ty  to 
facil i tate the rule  of  his ra tiona l part .  But w h e th e r  this par t  which 
be longs  in the  te leo log ica l  s c h e m e  or the  o thers  t h ro u g h  w h ich  
man is tied to the laws of  physica l  Necess i ty  will  e m erg e  superior,  
is left to the indiv idual w ho  decides  in and th rough  the  cou rse  of 
life, and his decision will de te rm ine  the status of  his soul afte r life 
(90eff.).
But what,  after  all, does Pla to  mean by "af ter -l i fe"?  And w ha t  is 
Hades?  Indeed P la to  often uses a l anguage  of  p lace  to ind ica te  
w h e r e  an in te ll ig ib le  soul or Reason ( n o u s )  m ay  s e e  i n t e l l ig ib l e  
F o r m s  and b e c o m e  w ise  ( p h r o n e s i s /  s o p h i a ) .  T h e  soul,  in 
d i a l e c t i c a l  s tu d ie s ,  t akes  wi ngs  which bear it to the p lace  of  the 
gods where it has vision of Forms  ( P h d r .  249c ,  2 4 7 c -2 4 8 ,  2 4 6b6-  
d2).  Form s  are  charac te r i sed  as ex is t ing  en toi  noe t o i  t o p o i , in 
an intel l ig ible p lace  or realm (R.  508c). Here,  Reason ( n o u s )  and 
its in te l l ig ib le  ob jec t s  ( to n o o u m c n a )  a re  c o n t r a s t e d  wi th  the  
sens ib le  rea lm  ( en  toi  horat oi ) ,  vision and its vis ibles.  B e low  the 
sensible realm is "Hades".  But consider T h e a e .  176 a -b ;
they [sc. the evil]  have  no p l a c e  in the d iv in e  w or ld  bu t  they 
mus t  need  haunt  t h i s  r e g i o n  o f  our mortal  na ture .  This  is why 
we should  m ak e  all speed to take f l i g h t  from this world  to t h e  
o t h e r , and that means becom ing  like the div ine so far as we  can, 
and that again is to become holy with wisdom.
Clearly ,  P la to  identi fies  "there" ( e k e i s e )  - the p lace  o f  the gods,  as 
opposed to "here" - the place  of morta ls ,  with b eco m in g  good and 
with the condit ion of  becom ing  piously  wise.  At Ti .  62cff.  (with 
32cff.),  e.g., he argues  that the cosmos  is a g lobe  c om pr is ing  every
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a t m o s p h e r e  an d  c o n d i t i o n ,  and  th a t  t h e r e  is  no  r e a l i t y
c o r r e sp o n d in g  to "up and dow n" ,  wh ich  rea l ly  b e lo n g s  to the
la n g u a g e  o f  p e rc e p tu a l  re la t iv i ty .  T h a t  is, the  a s t r o n o m ic a l  
heavens  m ay  be a b o v e  us, but it does not fo llow that  there  is an 
a b o v e  and b e l o w , a h e r e  or t h e r e  s im p l i c i t e r  in ou r  c i r c u la r  
cosmos ,  in d ependen t ly  o f  a perceiver.  T he  physica l  t rapp ings  of  
the ir  c o n ce p t io n  no tw i th s tan d in g ,  Fo rm s ,  a l th o u g h  ob jec t ive ,  are 
bodiless ,  u n ex ten d ed ,  and are the re fore  no t  lo ca tab le  en t i t ie s  as 
such. Consequent ly ,  we  do not study, but com e  to know,  Forms; 
Forms  are not out there ,  l ike sensible  pa r t icu la rs ,  to be studied;  
they are what we  com e  to know  when we r e a s o n  to w ard s  w h a t  
things  are for,  ra the r  than mere ly  p e rce ive  those  th ings .  F o rm s  
are g ra sped  by a k ind  o f  ra t iona l  in tu i t io n  a t t a in ed  in the 
o p t im u m  c o n d i t i o n  o f  the  sou l .^  7 As  they  are n eces sa r i ly  
in te rrela ted .  Fo rm s  as objects of kno w led g e  const i tu te  the system 
of in te ll ig ib le  cond i t ions  which define the op t im um  state o f  the 
soul. If  the "div ine  place"  or "realm of  Form s"  is said to be 
"beyond  the h e av e n s " ,  this is b e cau se  the  sy s tem  of  F o r m s  
const i tu te  the i n t e l l i g i b l e  b a s i s  of the cosmos . Accord ingly ,  to be 
divinely wise,  such as the gods are, is s imply a quali ta t ive  state or 
co n d i t io n  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  in t he  c o s mo s ,  in which  the  e ssen t ia l  
na ture  o f  the soul is com m ensurab le  with the  in te ll ig ib le  basis  of  
the cosmos.  This  is the state of perfect ion for all souls.  It is 
ch a rac te r i s ed  by u n p e r tu rb a b le  r a t io n a l i ty  d e f in ed  in te rm s  o f  
rotary or circular mot ion.  The "mortal place"  is, by contras t ,  a life 
characte ri sed by a degree  of irrationali ty.  O ur  failure to enhance
77 Cf M e n o  85c-d,  86b; T h c a e .  183aff.; 18 6a l -b ,  d l - 5 ;  P a r m .  12 8 c 6 - 130a4;  
S o p h .  250a7ff).
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the  ra tiona l i ty  of  our soul whi le  we l ive occas ions  H a d e s  on our 
dea th ,  w here  "Hades"  m ean s  a state o f  e x i s t e n c e  in the co sm o s  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a soul w h ic h ,  b e c a u s e  o f  m o r a l - i n t e l l e c t u a l  
f a i l u r e ,  b e c o m e s  l o w e r  f o r m s  o f  l i f e  un t i l  c u re d  by  the  
m in is t ra t ions  o f  the cosm ic  o rde r  (cf. P h d o .  81dff.; P h d r .  246b6 ;  
7 7 . 4 2 ) . 78 The  m e taphor  o f  the "fl ight o f  soul" is p roxy  for  the 
e las t ic  capac i ty  o f  soul to p ro g r e s s  or r e t ro g r e s s  r a t io n a l ly  and 
th rough  this, mora l ly ,  by its own pu rsu i t s  and dec is ions .  P la to ,  
there fore ,  seems to have  no pa t ience  with  the notion  that  the act
o f  in i t i a t io n  in to  the m y s t e r i e s  p e r  se  g u a r a n t e e s  p l e a s a n t  
e x p e r i e n c e s  a f te r  dea th ,  and m ay  e f fa ce  e th ic a l  s h o r t - c o m in g s .  
T rue  in i t ia t ion  is r a t iona l  e n d e a v o u r  to l ive  a c c o r d in g  to the
d ic ta tes  o f  re a so n ,  to be a t tu n ed  to the  in t e l l ig ib l e  c o n d i t io n s  
which cons t i tu te  the d iv ine  fo u n d a t io n  of  the o rde r  and ra t iona l
motions  in our cosmos.
6 S u m m a r y
P la to ’s p h i lo so p h y  of  re l ig ion  has been constructed out o f  th ree
basic factors - Forms, soul, and body. The  fundam enta l  pr inc ip les  
of  the universe  conce ived  as a cosm os  is a system of  pa rad igm at ic ,
Plato is apparent ly in cons is tent ,  as when in the P h a e d o  ( 8 0 d 5 ) ,  he  
a s s o c i a t e s  '"Hades" in the t rue sense, o f  the word '  with the noble ,  pure
and invis ible  "realm" o f  gods  [or Forms],  whi le  in the myth at the end o f
the same dialogue  (107d) ,  "Hades" is used in a context  o f  the traditional  
sense o f  a literal underworld.  But is Plalo really inconsis tent?  Yes  and
no. No,  if  the quali f ication o f  80d5 - in the t rue s ens e  o f  the w o r d  - 
impl i es  that the traditional understanding  o f  Hade s  which means  l iteral ly  
an underworld  int imates  a truth not fu l ly  grasped;  and that wh at  is
real 1 ly meant by "Hades" is a quali tat ive  c o n d i t i o n  or s t a t e  o f  e x is t e n c e
rather than a place of  existence.  But Yes,  for if "Hades" in the t rue sense  
o f  the w o r d  conn ot es  a noble ,  pure and in v is ib le  stale o f  e x is t e n c e ,  it
cannot at the same t ime c o n n o te  an ignoble ,  impure and v i s i b l e  s tale o f
ex i s t en ce  arising from moral - inte l lectual  fai lure o f  soul .
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d iv ine  Form s.  Form s  are those  rea l i t ies  in te rm s  o f  w h ich  any  
even t  or p h en o m en o n  is p e r f e c t l y  t rue ,  o rd e r ly ,  good ,  b eau t i fu l ,  
in te l l ig ib le ,  hap p y ,  w ise ,  ju s t ,  e qua l ,  co ld ,  e tc .  T o  s e r v e  as 
s tanda rds  of  p e r fec t ion ,  F o r m s  m u s t  be,  i n t e r  a l i a , i m m u t a b l e ,  
im m ate r ia l ,  and in te ll ig ib le .  But s ince  tha t  o f  w h ic h  F o r m s  are 
pr incip les  and causes  is the chang ing ,  bod i ly  sphere,  d iv ine  R eason  
is r e q u i r e d  as the  m e d ia l  a g e n t  w h o ,  by  k n o w i n g  F o r m s ,  
a r t icu la tes  " h im s e l f ” in the  o th e rw is e  c h a o t i c  p h y s ica l  sp h e re  in 
"his" aspect as a regu la t ive  and c o n s t ru c t iv e  p r in c ip le  o f  m ot ion .  
R ea so n 's  m o t io n  in the  c o s m o s  is c a l l ed  Sou l ,  and  is m o re  
t ru im phan t  in the a s t ronom ica l  than the  s u b lu n a r  sphere ;  fo r  the  
f i e ry  a t m o s p h e r e  is p e r f e c t l y  c o n d u c i v e  to  r e c e i v i n g  th e  
paradigmat ic  propert ies  of Forms.  This is exh ib i ted  in the ro ta ry  
and c i rcu la r  m ot ions  of  the a s t ronom ica l  be ings  - the  s ta rs  and 
p l a n e t s  - m o t i o n s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by i n v a r i a n c e ,  u n i f o r m i t y ,
o rder liness ,  t im e lessness ,  and m a th em at ica l ly  e x p re s s ib le  laws.  It 
is from the a s t ronom ica l  sphere  that  the p a r a d ig m a t i c  p ro p e r t i e s  
of  Forms are t ransmit ted  to the sub lunar  sphere.  In this way, the  
d iv ine  pe rm ea te s  the  cosm os .  S ince  it does  so by its m o t io n ,  
P l a to ' s  c o s m o l o g y  is th u s  c o n t i n u o u s  w i th  h is  P r e s o c r a t i c
p r e d e c e s s o r s .
D iv ine  Reason is cal led God. D er iva t ive ly ,  co sm ic  soul,  and all 
those count less  m ot ions  of  Reason  which in h a b i t  the a s t ronom ica l
sph  e re .  T h u s  P l a t o ' s  g o d s  a re  m o t i o n - g o d s ,  an d  t h e i r
charac te r i s t ic  m ark  is su p re m e  ra t iona l i ty .  Th is  is ex h ib i te d  in 
the ir  c i rcu la r  and ro ta ry  m o t io n s ,  m o t io n s  w h ic h  c o n s t i tu t e  full 
se lf - real isa tion  or s e l f -know ledge .  The i r  ra t io n a l i ty ,  as a lso  the i r  
h a p p i n e s s ,  b l e s s e d n e s s ,  e tc . ,  is d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e i r  c l o s e
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association with Forms.  It is also from associa tion with Form s  that 
the  gods  im p a r t  ju s t i c e ,  ca re ,  t e m p e ra n c e ,  g o o d n e ss ,  and  o ther  
s tan d a rd -es tab l i sh in g  p rope r t i e s  o f  F o rm s  to the sub lunar  sphere.
Reason  in m ot ion  is less t r iumphant  in the m ore  reca lc i t ran t  and 
c h a o t i c  s u b l u n a r  sphere ,  the  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n h a b i t e d  by h u m a n  
souls.  As pa r t ic ipan ts  in m o t ion  o f  R eason ,  hum an souls  have  a
na tu ra l  a f f in i ty  to the  F o rm s ;  they  tend to the  F o rm  o f  G ood ,  
to w a rd s  ful l  s e l f - r e a l i s a t io n  in the p e r m a n e n t  h a p p in es s  o f  the 
gods.  C o n seq u en t ly ,  the  task o f  hum an  life is to en g ag e  in or 
p rom ote  those activi t ies  which  will enhance  our  ra tiona li ty.  Since 
F o r m s  are  i n t e l l i g i b l e s ,  the  d e s i r e d  r a t i o n a l  l if e  is l a r g e ly  
a t ta inab le  th rough  theore t ica l  s tudies  o f  the sort  that p ro m o te  a 
p r i o r i  r e a so n in g  of in c re a s in g  abs t rac t ion  and  un ive rsa l i ty ,  and 
aw ay  f rom  the p a r t i c u l a r  and v a r iab le  w h ich  c h a r a c t e r i s e  our 
e n v i r o n m e n t ,  unti l  w e  are  a b le  to u t te r  w o rd s  w h ic h  will  
const i tu te  abso lu te  truth, or a philosophical  l o g o s ,  a suffic ient  and 
final reason of why things are what they are.
If  this is too d e m a n d in g ,  P la to ' s  c o sm o s  is v i r t u e - f r i e n d ly  at 
d i f f e ren t  levels .  G od  has p ro v id ed  s u f f ic ie n t  g u id a n ce  in the 
p h en o m en a l  wor ld  for us to succeed  in o ther ,  less in te l lec tua l ly  
ascet ic  ways .  G iven the af fin ity  between God and Form s,  Pla to 's  
God may be said to be like Descar tes '  God in the Third Medita tions  
in that both are hypothes ised  as a p r incip le  of  suff ic ient reason ,  as 
a n e c e s s a r y  be in g  in c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  c e r t a in  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  
p h e n o m e n a .  B u t  un l ik e  D e sc a r t e s '  God  w h ic h  is i n te n d e d  to 
exp la in  su f f ic ien t ly  an a g e n t ’s ac tua l  p o s se s s io n  o f  a p a r t i c u la r  
concept (e.g., in fini ty),  Pla to  hypo thes ised  both Forms and God as 
necessary  s imply  for es tab l ish ing  the condi t ions  in virtue o f  which 
we po ten t ia l ly  p osse ss  all co n cep ts ,  i .e. ,  po s se s s  the  m e an s  for
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fo rm in g  true  op in io n s  with  regard  to all p h e n o m e n a l  forms of  
ex is tence,  in religion,  ethics,  polit ics.  In the P h i l e b u s  Plato  spells 
ou t  the co g n i t iv e  and practica l  func t ions  of v is ib le  s tandards  or 
measures ;  they are objects of  true opin ions  and  of the appl ied arts 
a n d  c r a f t s  ( l i k e  a c c o u n t i n g ,  5 5 d - e ,  6 2 b - c ,  61 b 1 -2 ) ,  w h i l e
i n t e l l i g i b l e  s t a n d a r d s  are  o b j e c t s  o f  r e a s o n  and  the  pu re ly  
theore t ic  sc iences  such as nu m b er  theory  (57d, 58d , 61d-e ,  66a-
b). True  opin ion allows us to succeed at our projects in the world 
by guess ing  correct ly  the right course  of  action (R . vi, 506c),  and 
f rom  the po in t  of  view of  success ,  this may be enough  ( M e  n o  
98b-c ).  For opin ion ,  as also knowledge ,  is for Plato  as much a 
m at te r  o f  p ragm at ic s  as of semant ics .  Indeed, it is a matter of 
d e t e r m i n i n g  ho w  we can  ge t a lo n g  in the  w o r ld  than a 
d e te r m in a t io n  o f  p ropos i t iona l  accuracy .  Thus  the p re sence  of  
s t an d a rd s  in the p h e n o m en a l  wor ld  m akes  the world  better by
cons t i tu t ing  its intel l ig ibi l i ty;  and they allow us to make accurate 
and usefu l iden t i f ica t ions  and ju s t i f i c a t ions ,  and to d e te rm ine  in 
w ha t  d i rec t ion  we may live, how well  or worse  off. So if, as I
c la im ,  the  m ark  o f  P la tonic  re l ig ion  is in ac t iv i ty  o r ien ted  to 
enhance  ra tionali ty ,  then, even if we fail to attain to the status of 
a p h i lo so p h ic a l ly  wise  person, we may never the le s s  be spared a 
ser ies  of  t ransmigra t ions  on death,  if we have genuinely  done our 
best  tow ards  a tt a in ing  true  op in ion  or con t r ibu ted  to the ru le  of  
r ea son  in our  societies.  For, we would ,  in our small  way, have
co n t r ib u te d  to the ra tiona l sovere ign ty  of  cosm ic  soul, or  to the 
o m n ip o te n c e  o f  cosm ic  virtue.
H o w  Aris to tle  stands to the p receding  phi losophies  of re ligion is 




1 A r i s t o t l e ’s re l ig ious  in h e r i t a n c e
The prev ious  chapte rs  show that Greek philosophical  sc ience  since 
Thales  cu lmina tes  in the existence of  d i v i n e  f irst  princ ip les  which 
necessa r i ly  exis t  as the  u l t imate  p resupposi t ions  in an accoun t  of  
the co sm o s  or cer ta in  fea tu res  o f  the cosm os .  As e x p lan a to ry  
r e a l i t i e s ,  f i r s t  p r in c ip le s  are  c au sa l ly  c o n c e iv e d ,  and  in the  
co sm o lo g ica l  accoun ts  which necess i ta te  them,  this c au sa l i ty  is 
p r inc ipa l ly  expressed  in terms of motion.  But if  the  co sm o s  is 
a cc o u n te d  for  by h y p o th e s i s in g  or in fe r r in g  the  e x i s t e n c e  of  
d i v i n e  first principles ,  it would seem to fol low that re lig ion has a 
pro found  cla im on, and provides  the metaphysica l  f r am ew o rk  for, 
the ra tional specu la t ions  of Greek  ph i lo so p h ica l  sc ience .  This  
applies no less to Aristotle.
Aris to t le  begins  his philosophy  in an a rguably  empir ic i s t  mood .  
His obvious  tendency  is to analyse ,  to dis t inguish ,  to re so lve  his 
da ta  in to  sep a ra te  ca tegor ies ,  to fix each ca tego ry  by a c lear  
definit ion  in contras t  to all the others,  and finally,  to account  for 
the w h o le  as fa r as poss ib le  in te rms  of  the  pa r t s  that  are 
e ssen t ia l ly  exp l ica to ry  of  i t . 1 He begins by forging the concep t  
o f  a subs tance  (o u s i a ), which he takes to be a pr inc ip le  ( a r c h e )  
and a cause  (a i t i a ). U n ive rsa ls  func t ion  only  c o n c e p tu a l ly  to 
e x p l a i n  p a r t i c u l a r s . 2 In this, he leads us to think that , agains t
1 A r i s i o l l e ' s  b i o l o g i c a l / z o o l o g i c a l  r e s e a r c h e s  remain  h i g h l y  e m p ir ic a l  
and arc 10 be d is t inguished from both his phi losophical  sp ecul at i on s  on 
these  researches  and the more  traditional areas o f  p h i l os op hy .  The se  
latter are what is represented here.
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Pla to ,  he se l f -consc ious ly  seeks  the one  fo rm  not b eyond  but i n  
the  mate r ia l  many,  and that  he seeks  it not by abs t r ac t ing  f rom  
exper ience  but by an analysis  of it. He thus  begins  by taking the 
indiv idua l  th ing as that  which  is real: a p a r t icu la r  "this" (e.g. ,  a 
horse,  tree,  etc) is what cons t i tu tes  a substance.
In the P h y s i c s , A r i s to t le  d ra w s  v a r io u s  d i s t in c t io n s  o f  c au se ,  
app a ren t ly  in r e sp ec t  o f  the i r  log ica l  fu n c t io n s .  T h ey  are  all 
r e d u c ib le  to four ;  nam ely ,  fo rm a l ,  f ina l ,  e f f i c i e n t  and  m a te r ia l  
causes ,  a l though  he says  tha t  in n a tu re  the  f i r s t  th r e e  o f ten  
c o in c id e  (1 9 8 a 2 2 f f . ) .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  in the  s am e  w o rk ,  he  is
b e g in n in g  to see that  n a tu re  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  a c c o m m o d a t e s  tw o  
causes ,  the formal and the m ate r ia l  c a u s e d  T h e  m a te r ia l  c a u s e  
is s o m e h o w  a lw a y s  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  f r o m  the  f o r m a l  c a u s e , 4 
a l though  it is not the reby  im p l ie d  that they  are  o n to lo g ic a l ly  
s ep a ra te ,  i .e . ,  as c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  d e sp i t e  A r i s to t l e ' s  t e n d e n c y  to
i l l u s t r a t e  t he  fo rm -m a t te r  d i s t i n c t i o n  with c o m p o s i t iv e  th ings  like
a h o u s e  and  t he  b l o c k s  c o n s t i t u t i n g  it o r  a syllable  const i tu ted  by 
l e t t e r s . ^  In m any  c o n tex t s  form and m a t te r  a p p e a r  to be 
pr im ari ly  analyt ical  ca tegor ies :  fo rm as a p red ica t iv e  r e f e r e n ce  to
a de te rm ina te  state of  ex is tence ,  m a t te r  as tha t  wh ich  is ac tua l ly  
capab le  of  rea l i s ing  that  d e t e r m in a t e  s t a t e .6 In this sam e  work
2 Me t a .  1 0 38 bl - ] ( )39 b3 -19
3 'And s ince nature is tw o-fo ld ,  nature as matter and nature as form, the  
latter is an end.. .  the cause as that for which,  must  be the latter* (P h y .
199 a3 0-3 3) .  Also: 'Whenever  there is a change  som ethi ng  chan ges  by the 
a ge nc y  o f  so m eth in g  to so m e t h in g .  But the th ing  wh ich c h a n g e s  is 
matter and the thing to which is the form' ( M e t a .  1 0 6 9 b 3 6 - 1 0 7 0 a 3 ;  cf.  op.  
cit. 1032a 13-20).
4 'Such and such a form in this flesh and these bones,  this is Call ias  or 
Socrates' ( Me t a .  1034a5-7j.
5 P h y .  188b 17, 195a 16-23
6 Cf. Me t a .  1045b7-22;  1048a36-b6,  1049a2ff.
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( P h y s i c s ) ,  how ever ,  the  concep t ion  o f  "nature"  as that  wh ich  has 
an i n h e r e n t  p r i n c i p l e  of c h a n g e  ( 1 9 9 b  16-17)  is, in a p p a r e n t  
i n c o h e r e n c e ,  j u x t a p o s e d  w i th  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an i m m o v a b l e  
m o v in g  cau se  which  is n o n - n a t u r a l  and  w h o se  c ausa l i ty  takes  
p r e c e d e n c e  ove r  n a t u r e .7
In the M e t a p h y s i c s  and e l se w h e re ,  the re  is an e m p h a s i s  on 
tak ing  subs tance  no t  as a pa r t icu la r  "this" but as "what  it was  to 
be"  ( to ti en e i n a i ) , 8 th e  i m p e r f e c t  t e n s e  ( e n )  p lu s  the  
p r e d i c a t i v e  in f in i t iv e  ( e i n a i )  s ignify ing  not past  act iv ity  or state 
but t imeless ,  d y n am ic  essence .  This concep t ion  of  subs tance  has 
m e ta p h y s i c a l  c o n n o t a t i o n s ,  and c o n ta in s  a ce r ta in  d u a l i s m :  it 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s  b e tw e e n  a "th is"  p a r t i c u l a r  (e .g . ,  m a n )  and  the 
e s s e n c e  o f  th is  p a r t i c u l a r  (m an ) ,  b e tw ee n ,  i .e. ,  the  p ro p e r t i e s  
which  be long  to a pa r t icu la r  in virtue o f  its essential  na ture ,  and 
the accidents  which co m e  to it from the par ticu la r  charac te r  o f  its 
m a t t e r  or  i ts  e x te r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  with  o th e r  th in g s .^  With  a 
cer ta in  qua l i f ica t ion ,  therefore ,  we seem to end, as in Plato ,  with 
an a p p a ren t  con f l ic t  b e tw een  the v is ib ly  or co n t in g e n t ly  given 
par t icu la r ,  and its e te rnal essence:
7 P h y .  198a30 -b4;  ’. . . N o w  the pr inc ip les  which cause  mot ion in a natural 
way are two,  o f  which one  is not natural as it has no principles o f  motion  
in i t self .  O f  this k ind is wha tever  causes  m o v e m e n t ,  not be ing  i t s e l f  
m o v e d ,  such as that w h ic h  is c o m p l e t e l y  u n c h a n g e a b l e  and first  
substa nce  and the e s s e n c e  o f  a thing, i.e., the form. For this is the end 
for the sake o f  which'.
 ^ M e t a ,  vii ,  1031 b6ff.  1 say "emphasis" because  even in the O r g a n o n , 
Ari sto t le  re c o g n i s e s  t w o  criteria for substance:  a particular subject ,  and 
es se nc e  (or what-is- it)  (cf.  T o p .  1 0 3 b 2 1 -9)
9 E.g . ,  be ing  musica l  can be predicated (presumab ly  only )  o f  a human
being ,  but il is not pari o f  the e s s e n c e  o f  a man that he is musica l .  
Simi lar ly  with "being white",  "being black", etc. See  further P o s t .  An.  
73b4- 5 ,  b8-10 ,  83a24-31;  T o p .  102b4-6 ,  b20-26 ,  1 0 3 b l7 - 1 9 ,  P h y .  18 6 b l 8-21;  
M e t a  10 2 6 b 3 1 -33,  1 0 2 5 a l 4 - 1 5 ,  1 0 2 9 b l4 - 1 5 .
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The  exponen ts  o f  the F o r m s  are  par t ly  r igh t  in the i r  a cc o u n t  
w hen  they  m ake  Fo rm s  sepa ra te ,  but they  are  p a r t ly  w ro n g  
since by Form they mean the one over  the many. T he  reason  for 
th is  is tha t  they c a n n o t  e x p la in  w h a t  are  the  i m p e r i s h a b l e  
su b s t a n c e s  o f  th is  k ind  w h ic h  ex is t  b e s id e s  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
s ens ib le  su b s ta n c es . . .H o w ev e r ,  I p re s u m e  tha t  even  i f  w e  had
n e v e r  seen  the  s tars ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  th e re  w o u ld  be e te r n a l  
s u b s ta n c e s  b e s id e s  the se  w h ich  we k n o w  . . . ( M e t a .  1 0 4 0 b 2 8 -
1 0 4 1 a 3 )
Even if the [eternal]  stars had never  been seen, still log ic  and 
e p i s t em o lo g y  w ould  lead us to aw are n e ss  o f  the  e x i s t e n c e  of  
e t e r n a l  s u b s t a n c e s  b e s id e s  s e n s ib l e  ones .  T h e  q u a l i f i e d  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  A r i s to t l e  with  P la to  is tha t  a l t h o u g h  bo th  
reco g n ise  the ex i s t en ce  of  e te rna l  e s s en ces  ( o u s i a i )  or  fo rm s  
besides  sensible  ones,  Aris to t le  is at pa ins  to po in t  out tha t  his
eternal  essences  or fo rms are not on to log ica l ly  separa te  P la ton ic
F o r m s ,  but e s s e n c e s  i n  and of  the sens ib les .  T he re  is an 
a rgum ent  to the effect  that the ex is tence  of e te rnal e s s en ces  is 
n e c e s sa ry  to ex p la in  the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  k n o w l e d g e  and  the  
continuity  and ident i ty  of change  in sens ib le  subs tances  (999a25-  
b l9 ) ,  and that eternal substances  are forms as essences  in and of 
s e n s ib le s :
If there is nothing apart from individuals,  there will be no object  
o f  thought  but all th ings  will be the ob jec t  o f  sense . . .Fu r the r ,  
no th ing  would  be e ternal  no r  im m o v a b le .  F o r  all p e r i s h ab le  
th ings  pe r ish  and  are in m o v e m e n t .  B u t  i f  there  is n o th ing
eternal ,  ne ither  can  there  be a p rocess  o f  com ing  to be . . .For  if  
neither matter nor subs tance is, no thing will be at all. And since 
this is impossible ,  there mus t  be someth ing  besides  the concre te  
thing, viz., the shape  or form
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H o w e v e r ,  this  apparen t  conf l ic t  or d is t in c t io n  be tw een  eternal 
e s s e n c e  and  its c o n t in g e n t  a c tu a l i s a t ion  is no t  p e r ip h e ra l  nor  
peculiar to Aristotle.  Nor  is it a f limsy ontological  quirk. Rather,  it 
is l o g i c a l l y  c o n t i n u o u s  w i th  o r  f i r m l y  g r o u n d e d  in the  
m e t a p h y s i c a l - r e l i g i o u s  f r a m e w o r k  o f  t h o u g h t  w h ic h  A r i s to t l e  
inhe r i ted  f rom  his p r e d e c e s s o r s .10 N a ive  re l ig ious  consc iousness  
i n t u i t s  t h a t  th e  i m p e r f e c t  and  f in i te ,  t h e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  and 
d e p e n d e n t  p r e s u p p o s e ,  a re  e x p la in e d  or  c o m p l i m e n t e d  by, a 
d iv ine  d im ens ion  of  reali ty which consti tu tes  the  "sphere" of the 
e ternal ,  pe r fec t ,  ever las t ing ,  se l f -suff ic ien t  and  causa l ly  supreme.  
Th is  is c o n f i r m e d  by r ea so n  or logic  and  e p i s t e m o lo g y :  the 
P resoc ra t ic s ,  Socra tes  and Pla to  have shown severa l ly ,  tha t  any 
ra t iona l ly  acco u n tab le  kno w led g e  o f  space- t im e  sense data  points  
to d i s t in c t iv e ,  d iv ine  causes  and p r in c ip le s  w h ich  are e te rna l ,  
supreme,  and logica lly  sel f-suffic ient .  Thus  ph i losophica l  science 
co n f i rm s  what naive re l ig ious  con sc io u sn ess  in tu it s .  Aris to t le ' s  
inher itance  of this religious frame of  thought is conspicuous  at two 
leve l s :  at the m i c r o c o s m i c  level it is m o s t  c o n s p ic u o u s  in
Aristotle ' s  analys is  of  the subs tance of man; at the cosmic  level it 
is to be found in his conception of  theology. Let  me expound on 
each of these  success ively .
On the subs tance  of  man,  de An.  ii, 1, defines  soul as ' substance 
( o u s i a ) as fo rm  (e i d  o s ) of  a natura l  body  (.v d  m a ) w h ic h  
p o t e n t i a l l y  ( d u n a m e i )  has  l ife;  and s u b s t a n c e  is a c tu a l i ty  
( e n t e  l e c h e i a ) ' .  T h i s  a w k w a r d - s o u n d i n g  m e a n i n g  o f  soul is 
i l lus tra ted  by the function  of an axe: the [characte ri s t ic !  func tion
^  ll is noi necessary  that Aristot le be aware o f  this inheri tance o r  the 
scope  o f  it. However ,  s ince  he makes numerous a l lus ions  to the rel igious  
thought o f  the ancients,  only  the latter alternative could be true.
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of  an axe - [the capacity to actually fell, chop or cut, e.g., a tree] - 
is its soul; 'it is what it was  f o r  it to be an ins t rum ent  of the  kind,  
o the rw ise  it would  no longer  be an axe, ex cep t  h o m o n y m o u s ly '  
( 4 10b  1 0 ) . 11 Now, what consti tutes 'what it was  for a man to be?' 
Accord ing  to Aristotle, man par tic ipates  gener ically  in life. He  is a 
socia l  and pol i t ica l  a n i m a l . 12 But the chief o f  his d i f f e r e n t i a  is 
r a t i o n a l i t y . 13 This means that a man's [characterist ic]  function  is 
to live a life guided by r e a s o n .  But de An.  iii 5ff. d i s t ingu ishes  
a c t i v e  r e a s o n  w h ich  is s ep a ra te  (c h o  r i s t  o s ) ,  i m p a s s i v e  
( a p  at  l i e s ) ,  unmixed ( a m i  g e s ) .  e ternal  (a i d i o n ) and im m o r t a l  
( a t  h a n a t o n ), and w hose  e ssence  is ac tua l i ty  or s e l f - fu l f i l l ing  
a c t iv i ty  ( e n e r g e i a ) ^ 4 from p a s s i v e  r e a s o n  ( p a t h e t i k o s  n o u s )  
w h ich  is pe r i shab le ,  m ixed  and po ten t ia l .  In his a cc o u n t  of 
cogni t ion  ( 4 3 0 a l0 -1 9 ) ,  act ive reason is said to "make all th ings" 
( p o i e i n  p a n t a ) ,  w h i le  p a s s iv e  r e a so n  " b e c o m e s  all th in g s"  
( g i ne s t ha i  pant a) .  The meaning  of  "making" is clarified as a state 
o f  e p i s t e m ic  i l lu m in a t io n  by a n a lo g y  to l igh t  w h ich  m a k e s  
potentia l  co lours  into actual colours .  This sugges ts  at leas t  two 
things.
1 1 "The capacity to actually fell,  etc.", is supplied to complement  what is 
fully be ing meant in this passage.  It is implied that there are degrees  of  
functional  perfomance ,  but lack o f  a certain minimal capacity to perform
- such as be ing in a certain state o f  bluntness,  which impairs the axe's  
instrumental  capacity to actually fell,  cut or chop a tree, would consti tute  
a loss o f  its soul.
12 Hi s t ory  o f  Animal s  488a; N E  11 6 9 b l7 f f .
The  definit ion of  l ife in the de  A n i m a  d i s t inguishes  three types o f  l i fe
- nutritive; sens i t ive  and rational l ife - in order o f  increasing  perfection,  
each su c c e s s i v e  l i fe  encapsulat ing the previous  one.
14 " E n e r g e i a "  is a va lued,  n o n -k in e l i c  act ivi ty o f  se l f -r ea l i sa t io n  and 
se l f - fu l f i l lment  which occurs t imclcss ly  because  the end o f  the act ivity is 
realised in the activity i tself  ( sec M e t a .  1048 b 18-35; N E  1 1 7 4 a l 4 - b 8 ,  b9; 
de An.  415b8-9 ;  de Sensu  44 6 b 3 -5 ) .  Translated as actuality,  e n e r g c i a  
must  mean "realisation".
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First ,  the l ight analogy sugges ts  that ac t ive  reason is the  very 
condi t ion  o f  thought,  jus t  as the p resence  of  l ight is a condi t ion  
that  makes  perception possible .  This sugges tion does not hang on 
the analogy  alone: the at tr ibut ion to act ive  reason  o f  separa teness
or s e p a ra b i l i ty ,  im p ass iv i ty ,  u n m ix e d n e s s ,  e te rn i ty ,  im m o r ta l i ty ,
and  e s se n t ia l  ac tua l i ty  or s e l f - fu l f i l l ing  ac t iv i ty ,  en ta i l s ,  g iven  
A r is to t le ’s metaphysics ,  that a l though active  reason  is opera t ive  in
us, its status is m e t  a physical ,  and that it is a kind of  cause  or 
p r i n c i p l e  ( h e n c e ,  "p o i e  i n " ) .  But  in A r is to t le ,  as in his 
p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  the  m c /« p h y s ic a l ,  v iz . ,  the  e s s e n t i a l l y  a c tu a l ,  
e te rn a l ,  im m o r t a l ,  r e a l i ty  is the  f u n d a m e n t a l  g ro u n d  o f  the  
physical ,  viz., the potential ,  contingent,  and perishable ,  e t c . 15
Secondly ,  the l ight analogy sugges ts  that active  reason is or is 
the  c o n d i t i o n  o f  i n t u i t i o n 1  ^ or  truth.  Ac t ive  reason  is an 
e s s e n t i a l l y  e n e r g e i a  reali ty.  But e n e r g e i a  is a se l f - fu l f i l l ing  
activity which has its end in itself. The end of thinking activity is 
truth. Thus,  jus t  as the light in a sense is or makes us see what
1 There is sonic striking parallel with Plato's Good l ikened to the sun (in 
the R e p u b l i c ) .  For ihc sun is a material principle o f  unity which is, 
int er  al ia,  not only a source o f  heat essential  to growth but also a source
o f  light essential  to sight. Accordingly,  it may be regarded as the cause
and pr i nc ip l e  o f  k n o w l e d g e .  But as a cause  and pr in c ip le  o f  the  
k n o w l e d g e ,  the Good must be dist inct  from what it causes  and is a 
principle of. Hence  its m e t a p h y s i c a l  status. For a metaphys ica l  reading  
sec Hamlyn's (1968,  p. 140) notes on de An.  4 3 0 a l 0 ;  Clark (1975,  V.3.20f f .) ;  
cf. Wcdin's  (1 9 8 8 ,  p 179) natural ist ic reading o f  productive mind "as
nothing  more  than the activity alone o f  ep iso de s  o f  individual  thinking".  
Wcdin c i ther ignor es  or is unaware  o f  the m e tap hy s ic a l  gr oun di ng  so  
character is t ic o f  ult imate explanat ions  in Greek phi lo sop hica l  s c i e n c e  in
general ,  and in Aris tote l ian sc i e n c e  in this  part icular  co nt ex t .  His  
attempts to explain away the metaphys ica l  attributes o f  product ive mind 
o f  which " a t h a n a t o n "  (immortal) is one ,  is not, 1 think, convinc ing .
1 6 1 use  "intui tion" for  b e l i e f s  that hold  withou t  any in ferent ia l
j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
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there  is to be seen,  so active  reason ,  in a sense,  is the truth or
m ak es  us r ea l i se  what there  is to be k n o w n .  A c t iv e  reason  
opera tes  to rea l ise  or ac tua l i se  th ink ing  and the  end of  th inking.
A r i s to t l e  says  tha t  ’in the  in d iv id u a l  p o t e n t i a l  k n o w l e d g e  has  
pr ior i ty  in t ime, but speak ing  abso lu te ly  it has  no such pr ior i ty;  
for tha t  w h ich  b e c o m e s  g row s  ou t  o f  tha t  w h ich  ac tua l ly  i s ’ 
(431a).  "What  actually  is",  is in Aris to t le ,  t raceab le  to the pure
form of d ivine in tell igence.  Thus the associa tion  of  pass ive  reason 
with becoming ,  and the m e tap h y s ic s  of act ive reason ,  com bine  to
yie ld  the  im p l i c a t io n  tha t  the  f o r m e r  is c o n c e r n e d  with  the 
o rd ina ry  p ro ces ses  o f  th o u g h t  w h ich  m ay  be said  to begin  or 
e n d : 17 to have a m e m o ry ,  to im ag ine ,  to en g ag e  in d iscu rs ive  
thinking, are processes  of thought that m ay  well be said to perish 
because  they begin and end,  and also  b ecau se  the i r  co n ten t  is 
const i tu ted  by the imager) '  of  m a t e r i a l  fo rm s  r ece iv ed  th rough  
p e r c e p t i o n . 18 On the other hand, the th inking act iv ity  i t se lf  has a
metaphysica l  d i m e n s i o n  by which our potentia l  for g rasp ing  first  
pr inciples  and for in tuit ing the truth is, in Clark7s words ,  ’realised 
by r e c e i v i n g  the l ight which e te rnally  is consc ious  R ea l i ty ’ (op. cit 
V.3.23).  If this sounds good, the opera tion in us of  nous  p o ie t i k o s  
would seem to suggest  a para l le l i sm with the opera tion  o f  n o u s  in 
the O r g a n o n . For  there,  n o u s , d i s t in g u i s h ed  f rom  e p i s t e m e , is
that  by which we g rasp  the i n d e m o n s t r a b l e  f i r s t  p r in c ip le s  o f
dem ons t ra t ion .  At the s am e  time n o u s  is e i the r  unde rs tood  as
the p roduc t  of  or as a c c o m p a n y in g  in d u c t io n  or the  in fe ren t ia l  
p rocesses  of dem ons t ra t ion  (cf. Post.  An .  100b3-12) .  Aris to te l ian
17 See Ham lyn’s notes on 430a 18
18 ibid. 43 2a3 -10 ,  429b35ff .
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sc ience  w ould  therefore  seem to reco g n ise  two  in sep a rab le  but 
d i s t i n c t  c o g n i t i v e  fu n c t io n s :  the  d e m o n s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e  of
sc ience  and the idea of  pure  intuit ion of  reason as the cr i terion of 
t ru th  and  k n o w le d g e .  T h e s e  a p p e a r  to be  c o m p l e m e n t a r y ;  
dem ons t ra t ion  requires in tu it ion  from start to e n d . 19
T h e  phys ica l -m etaphys ica l  strains in hum an na tu re  connoted  by 
the d is t inc t ion  between act ive  and pass ive  reason  have again  an
in t e r e s t i n g  p a ra l le l i sm  with  the  E t h i c s '  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  
theore t ica l  reason  (s o p h i a ) and practical  reason (jy h r  one  s i s ). The 
latter,  which requires a kind of  intuitive reason, is necessary  for a 
fully ordered h u m a n  life, while  the highest  exerc ise  of intui t ive  
r e a so n ,  s o p h i a , is required  for a full rea l isa t ion  of  the divine
aspec t  of our life. If this is true, it would seem, therefore ,  that
unde r ly in g  the d if fe rence  be tween  d em o n s t ra t iv e  k n o w le d g e  and 
in t u i t i o n ,  b e tw ee n  p h r o n e s i s  and s o p h i a . is m an 's  co m plex  
na tu re  as c o n s t i tu t iv e  of an e te rn a l ,  d iv in e  e s s e n ce ,  and a 
princ iple  of contingency .
In the E t h i c s , we learn  that m an 's  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  fun c t io n  
( e r g o n )  is to realise fully his potential  as a rational being. In the 
highest  sense this means  to become, as far  as  p o s s ib le , im m or ta l  
and divine ,  with a corresponding  divine pleasure  and happiness:
But  the activity of  reason,  which is contempla tive,  seems both to 
be super ior in worth and to aim at no end beyond i tself. . .and all
A demonstrat ive  sc ienc e  is an axiomat iscd deduct ive system,  a kind of  
syl log ism (Sec Pr.  An.  25b30,  41 b 1; Pos t .  An.  71 b 18). Cf. 'But we  say that 
ne i th er  is all un de rs tandi ng  d em o n s t r a t iv e  but in the c a s e  o f  the 
immedi ates  it is non-demonstrablc  and that this is necessary  is evident:  
for il is necessary to understand the things which arc prior and on which  
the demonstration depends. . .  it is necessary that these immediates  be non-  
de m o n s tr a b lc . . . t h e r e  is not onl y  understanding  but s o m e  pr inc ip le  o f  
understanding  by which we  b eco m e  fami l iar with the def ini t ions '  ( P o s t .  
An .  71 b 19-24; also 100al5-b4) .
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the  o the r  a t t r ibu tes  a sc r ibed  to the  b le ssed  m an  are ev iden t ly  
those connec ted  with this activity,  it fo llows tha t  this will be the 
com ple te  h app ines s  for man . . .But  such  a l ife would  be too high 
for man; for it is not insofar as he is a man that  he will live so, 
but insofa r  as something  d ivine  is present  in him.. .  we must ,  so 
far as we can,  m ake  ourse lves  im m or ta l  and  stra in every  nerve  
to l ive  in a c c o r d a n c e  w i th  the bes t  th ing  in u s ; . . . fo r  m an ,  
the re fore ,  the  l i fe  accord ing  to reason  is the  best  and p leasan t ,  
s ince  reason  m o re  than any th ing  e lse  is man. This life is also 
the happies t  ( N E  1 1 7 7 b l 6 - 1 1 78a7) .
In en jo in ing  us to im m or ta l i se  ourse lves  by the d iv ine  activi ty  of 
con tem p la t io n ,  Aris to t le  is not c la im ing  that we l i te ra lly  becom e  
god in that activity ,  which  will entail  a non -ea r th ly  ex i s t en c e .20 
Im m orta l i ty  for man is the c o n su m m ate  exerc ise  o f  reason, which 
is o u r  d i v i n e  and  c h i e f  s p e c i e s - d e f i n i n g  p r o p e r t y .  In 
con tem pla t ion  our life becom es  god-l ike,  because  it is engaged  in 
those activit ies which is god's unquali fiedly .  At N E  1 1 5 3 b 2 5 - 3 2 ,  
it is said that all creatures  pursue  p leasure ,  b ecause  all have by 
na ture  s o m eth in g  div ine  in th e m .21 A man's r a t i o n a l  desire for 
p leasu re  and happ iness  is rooted  in his p a r t ic ipa t ion  in div in ity .  
Thus  at E E  1248a25ff . ,  Aris to t le  deals  with the quest ion  of the
- () There is a diff icult  passage at de An.  4 3 0a22-2 5 :  'In separation it is just 
what it is. and this alone is immortal and eternal. But we  do not remember  
because this is unaffected,  whereas  pass ive  intel lect  is per ishable . . . ’ This  
seems  to suggest  that n o u s  or active reason is the part o f  the soul which  
survi ves  us, and then, it survives  im persona l ly ,  i .e . ,  i f  all a f fect ion s  - 
memory,  lov in g ,  hating,  d isc urs ive  reason,  perish with the individual.
- ] This  is a large claim.  Perhaps "by nature" or the universal  quantifier  
"all" (creatures)  requires some elaboration.  Hitherto,  it is the presence  of  
reason in an animal which seem s to def ine  it as a participant in divinity.  
But i f  all creatures are moved by God as a final cause  through the divine  
motions o f  the heavens ,  then, presumably ,  in this se n se  or spec i f ica l ly  in 
the s en se  in w h ic h  all l i v in g  things perpetuate the ir  s p e c i e s  through  
c o n t in u o u s  pr opa gat ion ,  all creatures  can be said to m o v e  towards  a 
s imi la r  end,  d iv in e  p leasure ,  a l though they wi l l  part ic ipate  in this  in 
different  de g r e e s  c o rresp on di ng  to the ir  di f ferent  natures.
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rise of desi re  of the right thing in man: chance  cannot  be its cause.  
Rather,  it is G o d ;22 for the divine  mus t  be  said to be  the origin of 
thought,  deliberat ion and desire  for the righ t thing,  in as far as the 
h u m a n  is r o o t e d  in s o m e t h i n g  v a s t e r  t h a n  i t s e l f ;  th is  
en co m p a ss in g  reali ty  pe rv ad es  and in f lu en ces  i t .23 The  d iv ine  is 
the cause o f  m ovem ent  in the cosmos ,  so a lso o f  m o v e m e n t  in us. 
These  texts express  the dua l is t ic  d im en s io n s  o f  life:  the  theore t ic  
or con tem pla t ive  life is beyond the m easu re  o f  hum ani ty ;  for it is 
the life of God - so to speak - ra ther  than of  man ( N E  1 1 7 8b8-  
24). Yet, from another poin t  of v iew, it is the life of  man ,  being 
the ch ief  i tem of his spec ies-def in ing  propert ies .
To fulfil his essence  a man requ i re s  both the use o f  p rac t ica l  
w i s d o m  (p h r  o n e  s i s )  and  p h i l o s o p h i c  w i s d o m  ( s o p h i a ) .  
P h r  o n e  s i s  is r e q u i re d  to w o rk  to w a rd s  one 's  id ea l  in the 
con t ingen t  matters  of ind iv idua l  hum an  ex is tence ,  and u n d e r  the 
influence of pass ions  of the soul which are not fu lly  sub jec t  to 
reason (cf. E E  1249b5ff. j .  A fully ordered pract ical  life gives  the 
grea tes t  oppo r tu n i ty  for s o p h i a  (E E  1249b  16 f f .; N E  1 1 7 7 a l 2 -  
18. 114 5 a 6 - 11). But p h r o i i e s i s  does  not invo lve  the exerc ise  of 
pure reason  on its app ro p r ia te  objec ts .  R a the r ,  tw o  th ings  are 
involved:  from the sub jec t ive  poin t o f  view it m eans  the exerc ise  
of  reason to govern the pass ions  and to give  some unity and order 
to the inner life of  man as a complex being who is a com pound  of 
the d iv ine  and the m o r t a l .24 F rom  an ob jec t ive  poin t o f  view, 
this a lso  m eans  the contro l  o f  the  c o n d i t io n s  p re sen te d  by the
1 shall use "God" in contrast to "gods" to imply a d if ference  between a 
supreme god and subordinate gods  or "god" used gcncrical ly .
This is supportive of  the de. Ani ma' a  m etap hys ic a l  gr o u n d in g  o f  human  
th in k in g  a c t iv i t y
24 Cf. Pol .  1287a30; NE  1178a9-22.
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e n v i ro n m e n t  of  the life of  man in order to gain the oppor tun i ty  
for the exerc ise  of  his highest  qua li t ies  (cf. N E  1143b 1 -3). In 
both respec ts ,  these spheres  of life - ethics and poli tics - have  to 
gu ide  a man in deal ing with par t icu la r  facts of  his exis tence,  and 
have  to take  account o f  external  condi t ions  and, therefore ,  of  an 
e l e m e n t  o f  c o n t in g e n c y  w h ich  c a n n o t  be b r o u g h t  w i th in  the  
sphere  of  pure reason.
I n d e e d ,  one  m ay  a rg u e  tha t  in s o f a r  as s o p h i a  i n v o l v e s
c o n t e m p l a t i o n  ( i h e o r i a ) of necessa ry ,  u n chang ing ,  e ternal ,  self- 
conta ined  and noble objects - e.g. , the divine and the fixed stars - 
the  p h r o n i m o s  can  r i s e  to the  c o n t e m p l a t i v e  l e v e l  by 
c o n te m p la t in g ,  in one t im eless  w ho le ,  the fo rm or u n c h an g in g  
p a t t e rn  o f  a c h a n g e a b le  t h i n g . T h e  p h r o n i m o s , can  e.g. ,
c o n t e m p l a t e  the  h u m an  sp ec ie s ,  an d /o r  the  genera l  ends  of 
human life insofar as these are defined by the species;  and he can 
see his ends  as spec i f ica t ions  of  sp ec ie s -d e f in in g  po ten t ia l i t ie s ,  
e i ther  in intuit ion at the beginning  of scienti f ic explant ion  or in 
t h e  o r  i a ,  i.e. , ju s t  for the sake of  th ink ing .  N ever the le ss ,  it
r em a in s  unc lea r  how the c o n tem p la t iv e  re f lec t ion  of species  or 
ends  can generate  a more precise  dec is ion-p rocedure  for one who 
charac te r i s t ica l ly  grasps  the ends of  human life in his pa r t icu la r  
choices ,  actions;  one  whose  know ledge  of  the good is expressed in 
the appropr ia te  act ion,  done  in the  right way, and in the mean 
that  suits  each si tuation (cf. N E  1144b  1 -1145a l l ) .  And i f  this
level of  contempla tion does  not increase  practical  wisdom by a jo t ,  
it r em a ins  tha t  p l i r o n e s i s  c an n o t  g u a ra n tee  s o p h i a .  Indeed ,  
p h r  o n e  s i s  does  not even ari se  from a theore t ica l  capac i ty  to
25 c f . /V £  1139a6-8; Me t a .  1 0 3 5 b 3 - 1 0 3 6 a l , 1030a 6-103 1a l4 ;  G C  336b25ff .
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demonstrate and explain:
s ince  k n o w le d g e  (e p i s t e m e ) invo lves  d e m o n s t ra t io n  bu t  the re  is 
no d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  th in g s  w h o s e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s  can  be  
o therwise ,  and  s ince  it is im p o ss ib le  to de l ibe ra te  a b o u t  th ings  
that  are  o f  necess i ty ,  p ra c t ic a l  w i s d o m  c a n n o t  be  k n o w le d g e ,  
because  tha t  which can be d one  is c ap a b le  o f  be ing  o the rw ise ;  
not art because  act ion and  m ak in g  are  d i f fe ren t  k in d s  o f  thing.  
It remains ,  then,  that it is a true  and  rea so n ed  state  o f  capac i ty  
to act with regards  to the th ings  that  are  good or bad for man.  
For  while  mak ing  has an end other than i tself , act ion cannot;  for 
good action i tself  is an end ( NE  1 1 4 0 a 3 3 - b 7 ) .
Aris to t le  seems to be a rgu ing  that "the true  and r ea so n ed  state 
of capac i ty  to act" is not a p ro d u c t  of  a theore t ica l  capac i ty  to 
ex p la in  and  d e m o n s t r a t e  ( e p i s t e m e ) , 26 but o f  the  u n c o n sc io u s  
action  o f  reason  socia l ly  d e v e lo p e d  or in s t i tu t io n a l ly  h ab i tu a ted .  
The sub jec t -m at te r  of  prac t ica l  w isd o m  is the fact  o f  mora l  and 
poli t ica l  life; the u n c o n sc io u s  c o m e s  b e fo re  the c o n s c io u s ,  the 
par t icu la r  app l ica t ion  of  moral and poli t ica l  pr inc ip les  is pr ior  to 
the i r  d i s t in c t  r e c o g n i t i o n  as g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s . 2 7 T h e re fo re ,  
al though,  reason ing  is involved  in, and is im por tan t  to, exce l lence  
in po l i t ica l  and e th ica l  co n d u c t ,  it is on ly  the  one  w h o ,  by 
par t ic ipa t ion  in the c o m m o n  life o f  the  c o m m u n i ty  has  had his 
na tu re  d e v e lo p e d ,  is cap ab le  of  r i s ing  to k n o w le d g e  in e th ica l  
pr inc ip les  and o f  m ak ing  any sense  o f  them w hen  they  are  set 
before  him (see 1 1 4 2 a l l - 1 5 ) .  The  value  o f  e thical  and poli t ical
26 Aris toi lc seems  to contruc e p i s t e m e  primarily as an attribute o f  persons  
rather than o f  proposi t ions  or a system o f  propos it ions .
27 Cf. '. . .the truth in practical  matters is d iscerned from the facts o f  life;  
for these are the dec is ive  factor. We must therefore survey what w e  have  
already said, bringing it to the test o f  the facts o f  life, and i f  it harmonises  
with the facts w e  musi accepl  it, but i f  it c la sh es  with them w e  must  
suppose it to be mere theory' ( NE  1179a 19-23 ) .
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sc ience  is to bring to c lear full consc iousness  the principles which 
under lie  the unreasoned ethics  of  the ord inary  good man or good 
cit izen.  Even the s ta tesman, in order to meet the larger  demands  
o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  and  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  m u s t  no t  m e re ly  k n o w  the 
g rounds  upon  which the state in general  and this par t icu la r  state 
are based; he m us t  be imbued, in his pr ivate life, with the data of 
life. This  alone will enable  him to analyse the nature  of  man and 
e x am in e  the par t icu lar  vices  which need to be repressed by good 
legislat ion {ibid. ,  1180b29ff.).
The p h r o n i m o s '  k n o w le d g e  is c h a rac te r i s t i c a l ly  ex p re s sed  in 
pa r t icu la r  choices  and actions,  not by mechanical ly  apply ing rules 
or w o rk in g  out a sy l log ism .  But p rac t ica l  sy l log ism ,  as the 
a r t icu la t ion  of  the p h r o n i m o s '  k n o w le d g e ,  shows that w hereas  
pure sc ience  has to deal with necessa ry  and universal  pr inc ip les  
and what can be deduced there from, there is in practical  wisdom 
an e lement of real cont ingency which cannot be universal ised and 
then dem ons t ra ted .  We are, in practical  wisdom, dealing with a 
particular act to be done,  and a part icular end to be achieved, and 
this can be apprehended by a sort of "practical" intuit ion which is 
expressed  in the action itself,  and which cannot be produced in us 
by te ach ing  or by any pure ly  inte llectual  process .  Thus practical  
w isd o m  can nev e r  be ra ised  in to  pure  sc ience,  and p h r  o n e  s i s  
does  not necess i ta te  s o p h i a .  Aris to tle ,  unlike  Plato,  makes  no 
a ttempt to con n ec t  the ethical  and the poli t ical  life as essentia lly 
con t inuous  with the  h ighest  exercise  of  reason, al though in the d e  
A n i m a  he says that all l iving things desi re  to share in the eternal 
and the d iv ine  and  that al l  ac t i v i t y  is in view of the divine  
( 4 1 5 a 2 6 - b 7 ) .  T h e r e  is o t h e r w i s e  no d i r e c t  p o s s ib i l i t y  of
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c o n n ec t in g  the  re la t ive  tru ths  o f  e th ic s  and  p o l i t i c s  w i th  the  
a b so lu te  p r in c ip le s  o f  m e ta p h y s ic s .  C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,  A r i s to t l e  
does  not r e c o n c i l e  the  tw o  r e a so n s  - the  p e r i s h a b l e  and  the 
eternal reason - into a central  s e l f  to which all the activit ies o f  a 
man are to be re ferred as the u n ique  and n e ce s sa r i ly  c on t inuous  
life of  that man.
But if  the re la tive truths o f  ethics and pol i t ics  are  not essentia l ly  
c o n t in u o u s  with  the ab so lu te  p r in c ip le s  o f  m e ta p h y s i c s ,  and  if  
cogn i t ion  o f  the la t te r  co ns t i tu tes  the  r e a l i s a t io n  o f  our  d iv ine  
essence ,  then,  a l though  poli t ica l  and  e th ica l  ac t iv i t i e s ,  p ro p e r ly  
o rgan ised  and p e r fo rm ed ,  m ay  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  our  
p o t e n c i e s  q u a  h u m a n  be ings  and m a y  c o n s t i t u t e  a sor t  of  
e n d  a i m a n i a , yet they would have little or n o th ing  to do with the 
specific d ifference in which we share in the d iv ine .  W ere  s o p h i a  
e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n t i n u o u s  w i th  p h r o n F s i s ,  as they  are not 
d is t inguished  in Plato and S o c ra te s ,2  ^ the poss ib i l i ty  would  exist  
for deg rees  of  po p u la r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the d iv in e  ac t iv i ty  or 
re ligion of  s o p h i a .  Thus Aris to tle  seems to lay dow n na r ro w er  
and stricter condi tions for realis ing our d iv ine  self. If this is true, 
the o p e ra t iv e  a s s u m p t io n s  here  wil l  be c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  key  
fea tu re s  o f  " O ly m p ia n "  r e l i g io n ,  v iz . ,  the  p e r c e i v e d  ra d ic a l  
d ispar i ty  be tw een  the l ife of  man and  tha t  o f  g o d , 29 and the
belief that ethics and poli tics are not features  of  d iv ine  life (cf. N E
Socrates too, like Plato in the middle d ia lo gue s ,  had a high intel lectual  
standard lor piety. But insofar as, for them,  ethical  and polit ical  l i fe are
integral to inte l lectual  l i fe,  their p i ou s  man can be le s s  a sce t i c  than 
Aristotle's.  In the L a w s ,  for instance,  the soul is inte l lectual ly  open to 
divine participation from many spheres o f  life; in musi c ,  fes t ivals ,  c ih ics ,
pol i t ics ,  as tronomy,  ph i lo sop hi ca l  d ia le c t i c s .
This disparity between god and man is expressed  in the s tatement that
God and man cannot be p h i l o i  { EE  1244b 14-19 ,  N E  1 1 5 8 b 3 0 - 3 5 ) ,  a l though  
this is contradicicd at E E  1238b 18-20, b27; cf. N E  1163 b 1 -5
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1 1 7 8 b 8 f f . )
A l though  the rel ig ion of  s o p h i a  in the E t h i c s  is coheren t  with 
that  of  the  M e t a p h y s i c s ,  it is far  too  in co m p le te  a v iew  of 
A r i s to te l i a n  re l ig ion ,  if  we  take  o the r  tex ts  in to  cons ide ra t ion .  
A p p a r e n t ly ,  A r i s to t l e  has  a lso  a ty p ic a l ly  t rad i t iona l  v iew  of  
r e l ig io n ,  w h ic h  is not ne ce s sa r i ly  i n c o m p a t ib l e  with  his  m ore  
p h i lo soph ica l  v iew  of  re ligion ,  a l though these  di fferent v iews are 
not welded  into  a more or less coheren t phi losophy  of  religion.  In 
P o l .  133 6b 1 5 -19 ,  fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  A r i s t o t l e  p e r m i t s  r e l i g i o u s  
fest ivals  in his concept of the ideal state. He also takes it as self- 
e v id e n t  tha t  the  t rad i t iona l  gods  should  be w orsh ip p ed  ( T o p . 
105a5) .  Indeed ,  A r is to t le  h im s e l f  e x p la in s  re l ig ion  f rom  two 
sources .  The  first  is the con tem plat ion  of  the m ovem ents  of the 
h e a v e n l y  b o d ie s  (de Ph i l o  fr. 12-13W). He  may then have 
v iewed  the heavenly  bodies and their  activi ty  as the most divine 
th ing  of which man has exper ience .  A r is to t le ’s second source of 
re l ig ion  is the prophetic  pow er  of  the soul in dreams.  Aris to tle  
a d o p te d  the t r a d i t io n a l  te rm  " d a i m o  n"  the  d iv ine  media l  
charac te r ,  when he wrote  that "dreams are not sent by God.. .  but 
are d a i m o n i a ,  for na ture  is d a i m o n i a , but not t h e i a  (de Di v .  
4 6 3 b l 3 ) .  He uses the same term to ascribe inspiration to someone 
( E E  1214a24).  It may be objec ted  that  Aris to tle  is at pains  in 
th e se  pa s sa g es  to exp la in  d re a m s  and in sp i ra t io n  f rom natural  
causes  (cf. de Div.  464a6ff.) . This is true. But it should not mean 
that  what  we deem  "natural causes" should not, for Aristotle,  have  
d iv ine  charac te r  as well. Speaking about the quest ion whether  we 
can b e co m e  good  "by na tu re" ,  A r i s to t le  rem arks :  ' that  which
31* Cf. Euripides' H e l e n , 11367,  T r o a d .  5 5 -56 5 ,  M e d .  1391,  Plato's S y m p .  
202c -2 03 a ,  R.  392a, L a w s  717b.
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b e lo n g s  to n a t u r e  ev iden t ly  does  not d e p en d  on us,  but as a 
resu l t  o f  som e  d iv ine  causes  is p re sen t  in those  w ho  are  truly 
f o r t u n a t e '  (N E 1179b21 ,  a lso  E E  1 2 4 8 a 2 6 - 3 5 ) . 3 1 It is not
im probab le ,  there fore ,  that  A r is to t le  c o n ce iv e d  insp i ra t ion  as both 
na tu ra l  and d iv ine .  A c co rd in g ly ,  w hen  he says  tha t  p o e t ry  is 
insp ired  by God ( e n t h e o s ) or that  som e  u t te rances  of  the anc ients  
are "div inely  said" (t h e i o s ), we  have no reason  to doubt tha t  he is 
speaking  from a convic t ion which  could  well be his own. In all 
these cases,  he may be taken to mean that  the  d ivine  is im m anen t  
in the natural world.  From this point  of  view, Aris to te lian  religion 
need not be whol ly  const i tu ted  by s o p h i a .  S o p h i a  would  be the 
highest  express ion  of  piety and, if  the d iv ine  is p resen t  in nature,  
ce leb ra t ion  of re l ig ious  fes t iva ls  w ould  be am o n g  o ther  activ it ie s  
w hose  p ro p e r  o rgan isa t ion  could  cons t i tu te  lower ,  bu t  accep tab le  
degrees  of  piety.  Such an open -ended  app roach  to p ious  activi ty  
would be close to Plato in the L a w s .  So much for the microcosmic  
level at which A r i s to t l e ’s " sc ience"  of  man is g ro u n d e d  in the 
re l ig ious  m e taphys ic s  of p reced ing  thought .
T h e  s e c o n d  leve l  at w h ic h  A r i s t o t l e  i n h e r i t s  f r o m  his 
p redecesso rs  the re lig ious  f r am e  of  r e f e re n c e  a cco rd in g  to which  
the fu n d am en ta l  ground  o f  all th ings  is a d iv in e  c au se  and  a 
p r inc ip le  is the  cosm ic  level .  A r i s to t le  had d raw n  sharp  l ines 
between the sciences  in the O r g a n o n , ins is t ing  that  each subject-  
m at te r  be dealt  with accord ing  to its own p r inc ip le  and m ethod .  
But in the M e t a p h y s i c s  ( 1 0 2 6 a 6 f f . ) ,  h e  e m b r a c e s  a u n iv e r s a l  
sc ience  o f  be ing q u a  b e in g ,32 and re p re se n ts  the  u n iv e r se  as a
31 A n t ic ip a t io n s  o f  the equat ion  o f  "nature" and d i v i n e  d etermin at ion  
occur in Plato e.g., A p .  22b; P h d r .  240a9,  b2; L a w s  642c ,  682a.
32 Cf. Me t a .  1003b 12-22.
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t e l e o lo g ic a l  w h o l e 33 which finds its pr inc ip le  in the pure  form of 
Reason which is called God (M e t a  xii). The M e t a p h y s i c s  con ta ins  
the subs tance of  Aristotle 's  lectures  on the u l t imate  concep t ions  of 
ph i lo so p h y .  Three  spec i f ic  nam es  are  e m p lo y e d  to d e n o te  the 
k ind  of  phi losophy pursued there: "Theology" ,  "Wisdom",  or "First  
P h i l o s o p h y " .
W h y  "first" philosophy?  A possib le  an sw er  invites  re fe rence  to 
Aris to t le ' s  c lass if icat ion o f  "sc iences"  in the  N E  where  the most 
fundam enta l  d is t inction of forms o f  k n o w le d g e  is drawn between
theoretical  or specula tive  ( t h e o r i a ) a n d  practical  sciences.  These  
d i f fe r  in their  sub jec t -m at te r ,  a im and fo rm a l  logical  charac te r .  
The aim of t h e o r i a  is d is in te res ted  co n tem p la t io n  or r ecogn i t ion  
of truths which are what they are indep en d en t ly  of our personal  
voli t ion.  Its end is to k n o w .  The  purpose  o f  prac tica l  sc ience,
e.g..  poli t ics  and ethics,  on the contra ry ,  is to devise  ru les  for 
success fu l  in te r fe rence  with the cou rse  o f  e ven ts ,  to p roduce  
re su l ts  which,  but for our in te rv en t io n ,  w ou ld  not have  com e  
about.  Its end is t o d o  and t o m a k e  s o m e th in g .  H ence  ari ses  
the co r re spond ing  d i f fe rence  in the ob jec ts  s tud ied  by the two 
branches of phii osophy. The objects of t h e o r i a  are what Aris to tle  
ca l l s ,  to me  e n d o c h o m e n a  a l i o s  echein  - t h in g s  tha t  c a n n o t  
poss ib ly  be otherwise;  truths and re la tions  ind ep en d en t  of human 
voli t ion for their existence,  and call ing m ere ly  for recogni t ion  on 
our part. Practical  science has to do with re la tions  which human
3 3  Th e t e l e o l o g y  o f  the u n iv erse  is a general  th em e  whi ch  recurs  
e x t e n s i v e l y  outs ide  the M e t a p h y s i c s .  See e.g. ,  P h y .  199a 9-3 0 ;  P . A .
639b 11 IT. In P h y .  viii 8, Aristotle argues that it is absurd to suppose  that 
purpose is not present in nature s imply be cau se  we  do not observe  the 
agent  de l iberat ing.  He i l lustrates  this point  wi th  a doctor  do ctor ing
h i m s e l f .
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act ion  can and has to modify  - con t ingenc ies  or things which can 
p o s s i b l y  be o th e r w i s e  - ta e n d & c h o m e n a  a l i o s  e c h e i n  (N E  
1 1 4 0 a 3 3 - b 7 ) .  T h e n  a r i ses  a lo g ica l  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  the 
conc lus ions  of specula tive and those of practical  science.  Those  of 
the fo r m e r  are  r ig id ly  universal  tru ths w h ich  are  deducib le  with 
log ica l  necess i ty  f rom sel f -evident,  ax iom at ic  pr incip les .  Those  of 
the la t te r  are general  ru les ,  no t str ic t ly  un iversa l  truths,  as they 
re la te  to things which can be otherwise.  "Practical" truths or rules 
hold  good in m os t  cases  - hos  epi  to p o l u , and are l iable  to 
o ccas iona l  excep t ions .
T h e o re t i c  s c ien ce ,  for A r is to t le ,  fa l l s  in to  th ree  d is t inc t  and 
re la t iv e ly  in d e p en d e n t  b ranches ,  each with  its own characte r is t ic  
subjec t  of  s tudy, and its own ax iom at ic  p r inc ip les .  The logical 
basis  o f  the d iv i s ion  of the theore t ic  s c ien ces  in Aris to t le  is 
ex p la in ed  at M e l a .  1 0 2 6 a l0 - 3 2  by re f e r e n c e  to the scope and 
c lass  of  en t i t ie s  which  each  deals  with .  F i r s t  p h i lo sophy  or 
th e o lo g y  dea l s  with ob jec ts  which  are e te rn a l ,  im m u ta b le  and 
ha v e  s e p a r a b l e  and i n d e p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e  ( c / w r i s t o n  k a t h '  
h a u t o ) f A The  objects  of m athem at ics  are,  accord ing  to Aristotle,  
t h i n g s  w h i c h  h a v e  no  i n d e p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e  e x c e p t  as 
m o d i f i c a t io n s  or numerica l  p roper t ie s  o f  m ate r ia l  objects  (e.g.,  a 
horse).  A plane,  e.g. ,  is a lways  the boundary  o f  a certain solid, 
physical  body. But for purposes  o f  p lane geom et ry  it may not be 
n ece ssa ry  to take  this into  cons ide ra t ion .  Phys ic s ,  on the other 
hand,  deals  with objects  which have  no ex is t ence  separable  from 
m a t t e r ,  no t  b e in g  d e v o id  o f  m o t io n .  T h e  o b jec t s  o f  f irst
34 For re feren ce s  to the character isa t ions  o f  the status o f  objects  o f  
t h eol og y  as separable and independent ly ex is tent ,  see  page  one  o f  chapter  
o n e .
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phil o sophy ,  how ever ,  are both  separa te ,  d e v o id  o f  m a t te r  and, a
f o r t i o r i , o f  m o t io n .  In m a t h e m a t i c s  th e  b r a n c h e s  a re  no t
c o o rd in a t e ;  g e o m e t r y  and a s t r o n o m y  a re  c o n f i n e d  to  spec ia l  
c lasses  of  enti t ies,  but universal  m a them at i c s  - i.e. , a r i thmet ic ,  the 
p r in c ip le s  o f  which  are p re s u p p o s e d  by  e v e r y  fo rm  o f  spec ia l
m athem at ics  - embraces  them all ( M e t a .  982a26) .  S imilar ly ,  first 
ph i lo so p h y  is log ica l ly  p r io r  to the  o th e r  s c ien ces  on the  same 
g round  on w h ich  a r i th m e t ic  is p r io r  to g e o m e t e r y ;  i ts  in it ia l
a s su m p t io n s  are s imple r  and less c o m p l i c a t e d  than  the i rs .  In
mathem at ics  we consider  objects  - po in ts ,  l ines ,  surfaces ,  n um ber  
- w h ich  are m o t ion le s s  and im m u ta b le ,  i .e . ,  ap a r t  f ro m  their
physical  embodim en ts ;  whereas  in phys ics  w e  s tudy  objec ts  which 
possess  the double  quali f ica tion of  be ing  e m b o d ie d  in m a t te r  and
being,  potentia lly  at least, in motion .  H ence ,  the p re suppos i t ions  
of  mathematics  are far s impler than those of p h y s ic s .35
On the other hand, we s tudy Being,  not as the phys ic i s t  does,  
in s o fa r  as it is c o m p o s e d  of  b o d ie s  in m o t io n  or as the
m a th em at ic ian  does ,  insofa r  as it p o s se s se s  n u m b e r  and spat ia l  
form, but in all its generali ty;  we invest igate  what it means  to b e , 
and w ha t  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw ee n  b e in g s  are  d e d u c i b l e  f r o m  the 
f u n d a m e n ta l  c o n d i t io n  that  they  all a r e . In this sense  first 
ph i lo so p h y  or theo logy  has a h ig h e r  d e g re e  o f  u n iv e r s a l i ty  in 
scope than the o ther specula tive  sciences  which  it m ay  be  said to 
e m b r a c e . 36 The  p ro p o s i t io n s  o f  a p h y s i c i s t  are  s p ec i f i c a l ly
35 It was on this ground that Plato,  in the educat ional  s c h e m e  o f  R . vii ,  
contended that the study o f  arithmetic and ge om etr y  - plane  and sol id - 
should precede that o f  kinemat ics  and astronomy.
Plato had taught that all the sc ien ces  arc in the end ded uct ions  from a 
s ingle  set o f  ult imate principles which it is the bu s in ess  o f  the supreme  
s c i e n c e  o f  d ia le c t i c  to d i s c o v e r  and f o r m u la t e  ( R . v i ,  51 Ob-5 l i d ) .  
H o w ever .  Plato d is t in gui she s  d ia lect ic  from m a th e m a t i c s ,  and both from
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a p p l i c a b l e  to b o d ie s  in m o t i o n ; 37 th o se  o f  m a t h e m a t i c s  are 
sp ec i f ic a l ly  app l icab le  to n u m e ra b le  or spatia l  fo rm s  of  bodies .  
B u t  the  un iv e rsa l  p r in c ip le s  o f  f i r s t  p h i lo s o p h y  are  a p p l i c ab le
a like  to e ternal ,  sepa rab le  and im m u ta b le  en t i t ies ,  to e ternal  and 
im m u ta b le  but no t  separab le  en t i t ies ,  a n d  to c h an g e a b le  ent i t ies ,  
since each of  these  three is someth ing  of  which  you can say tha t  it 
is  or has b e i n g .  These  universal  p r inc ip le s  are  said to be d iv ine  
{ M e t a .  1026a  16-19).  The ch ie f  o f  these  is God,  the im m ate r ia l  
and  i m m u t a b l e  s o u r c e  o f  the  v i ta l  m o v e m e n t s  and  th e i r  
nu m erab i l i ty  in the universe .  H ence ,  the a p p ro p r ia te n es s  o f  the
n a m e  " theo logy"  or "sc ience  o f  God"  as a s y n o n y m  for f irst  
phi! o sophy .  H ence ,  too.  "W isd o m "  ( s o p h i a )  as the nobles t  and 
highest  state of  knowledge  appropr ia te  to the cognit ion o f  God.
In mak ing  God prior to any o ther  kind of  being. Aris to t le  thus 
holds  that the com ple te  exp lana t ion  of  any p rocess  p re s u p p o se s  
God as an e te rn a l ,  im m a te r i a l  and im m u ta b le  first  c au se  or
princip le .  The doctr ine  of God,  therefore ,  becom es  the necessa ry  
c r o w n  and c u l m i n a t i o n  of all the s c i e n c e s  - p h y s i c a l  and
m athem at ica l .  But then he th inks  that the bus iness  of  theo logy  
com es  to consis t  in the analys is  of  subs tances  into  the ir  essentia l  
e lem ents .  These  e lem en ts  consti tu te ,  in Aris to te l ian  language ,  the 
c a u s e s  or f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s  of  Being. Thus  it becom es  poss ib le  to 
desc r ibe  theo logy  as the sc ience  of the causes  and pr inc ip les  of 
being q u a  being.  Aris to t le  also a rgues  tha t  there  are two ways  
only  in which a sc ience  can be div ine; (i) if  it is p ecu l ia r ly  the 
possess ion  of  God, and (ii) if it is concerned  with d iv ine  matte rs .
ph ys ic a l  s tudies .  So  thai there is,  after all ,  a greater  r e s e m b la n c e  
between Aristotle and Plato than se em s  at first sight.
Aristotle has a narrow v ie w  o f  physics .
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He conc ludes  that his concep t ion  o f  theo logy  is true because  (iii) 
al l  b e l i e v e  that  God is one o f  the causes  (a i t i a i ) and a k ind of
p r in c ip le  (a r c h e ), a n d  that ( iv) God is the sole or ch ief  possessor
o f  th is  sort  o f  k n o w le d g e  { M e t a .  9 8 3 a 5 f f . ) .  Thus  f ro m  the 
fo rego ing ,  Ar is to t le  too, l ike  his p re d e ce sso rs ,  conce ives  G od  not 
only  as a cause  and p r inc ip le ,  but a lso  as the  rea l i ty  w h ich  is 
u l t im a te ly  p re supposed  in an accoun t  o f  the universe .  D o es  this 
g e n e ra l  c o n c e p tu a l i s a t i o n  o f  God sa t i s fy  the  t rad i t iona l  set  of  
c o n d i t io n s  of  d iv in i ty?  I an sw e r  tha t  it does  m ore  than sati sfy 
these condit ions .  Let us proceed  from books of  the M e t a p h y s i c s  
p reced ing  the philosophical  e lucidation o f  God in book xii.
2 T rad i t i ona l  elements of  Ari s to t le ' s  God in M e t a ,  i-xi
One of the earl iest  remarks  about  God is culled from Greek poetry.  
The  b a c k g r o u n d  is d e ep ly  ro o te d  in t r ad i t io n a l  r e l i g io u s  and
mythologica l  belief.  The point is to exempl i fy  the state of  absolute 
f r ee d o m  of  God. Ar is to t le  quo tes  f rom S im o n id es ,  'God a lone  
s h o u l d  h a v e  th is  p r i v i l e g e ' ,  in o r d e r  to e m p h a s i s e  the
cond i t iona l i ty  o f  human life in con t rad is t inc t ion  to God's  absolu te  
freedom from all conditions.  God is free in the sense that  he exists 
fo r  his  own sake  and  no t  for a n o th e r .  G od  is thus  self-  
s u f f i c i e n t . 3  ^ The  quota tion is also used to i l lustrate the high rank
of  m e taphys ic s  as a sc ience  ex is t ing  for its own sake and not for
som e  u t i l i t a r ian  end: m e ta p h y s i c s  a lo n e  a m o n g  the  s c ie n c es  is 
d iv ine ,  for it a lone  has God am ong  the causes  of  which it treats,  
and is p reem inen t ly  the freest  and h ighes t  k ind  of  kno w led g e  that 
God should  possess  (9 8 2 b 2 9 - 9 8 3 a l  0); 'hence ,  the possess ion  of  it
3 8 Cf. de Ca e l o  2 7 9 a 2 0 ,  where  w e  learn that the d iv i ne  real i t ies  ex i s t ing  
be yond the outermost  mot ion o f  the h eaven s  l ive  t he be s t  and the most
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  o f  l ives.
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(sc. m e taphys ica l  know ledge)  m igh t  be ju s t ly  r e g a rd ed  as beyond  
hum an  pow er ;  for in m any  w ays  h u m an  n a tu re  is in b o ndage '  
(982b29-30) .  At 9 9 7 b l 0  Ar is to tle  r id icu les  the  not ion  that  makes  
gods  e ternal humans.  The  d i f fe rence  b e tw ee n  the  na tu re  o f  God 
and man is l ikewise  stressed at 1008a24 by the use o f  the  two as 
exam ples  in g rounding  first  p r inc ip les  o f  d em ons t ra t ion .
T h e se  passages  em phas ise  a d i s t inc t ion  b e tw ee n  the n a tu re  and 
charac te r i s t ic s  o f  man and God in c o n n ec t io n  with f r e e d o m  and 
know ledge  of first principles.  Thus  k n o w le d g e  of f irst  p rinc ip les  
w ou ld  seem  to imply  d iv ine  k n o w le d g e  in the agent.  D iv ine  
k n o w le d g e ,  acco rd in g ly ,  is im p l ic i t l y  r e g a r d e d  as p r e e m in e n t ly  
that of  God, but also it is someth ing  we do  or can par t ic ipa te  in. 
Fur ther ,  the notion of God and the div ine  are assoc ia ted  with the 
most em inen t  and most honourab le  of all th ings  (983a4-5) .  This 
spiri t  of  reverence  is consti tu ted  by d iv ine  ideal i ty  or pe r fec t ion  
to which is added suprem acy:  if m e ta p h y s ic s  is so m eth in g  that 
be longs properly  to God, men might be tem pted  to feel tha t  they 
should  not approach  it for fear of  b r ing ing  upon th e m se lv e s  the 
divine  vengeance.  The object ion is that  the d iv ine  is not jea lous .  
Th is  is p re s u m ed  s e l f -e v id en t ,  to the  e x t e n t  tha t  p o e t s  w ho 
im ag in e  the oppos i te  are not to be t rus ted .  R a th e r  they  lay 
themselves  open to the proverbial  charge  that  bards  often lie. So, 
just  as the Platonic demiurge  was free from jea lousy  in or ig inating 
the c o sm o s  ( T i .  29e),  so too A r i s to t l e  im p l i e s  tha t ,  s u p re m e  
k n o w le d g e  as ide ,  goodness  and g e n e r o s i ty  are  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f  
the  d iv ine .  A r i s to t le  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  in E m p e d o c l e s  " the  m os t  
b lessed  God" (1000a25ff . ) ,  who a lone  is not p ro d u ced  by strife 
f rom  the " long- l ived  gods"  (a32 )  w ho  are  so p r o d u c e d .  His
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conce rn  here  is to safeguard  suprem e k n o w le d g e  in God (b3-9),
w h i le  p o lem ica l ly  asser t ing  that this c o n c lu s io n  is not coheren t  
with  the E m p ed o c le an  premises :  'H ence  it fo l lows  on his theory 
that  God most blessed is less wise than all the  others;  for he does 
no t  k n o w  all the  e lem en ts ;  for he has  in h im  no St r ife ,  and 
k n o w le d g e  is o f  l ike  by the like' . At 1 0 2 6 a l5 - 3 2  the d iv ine  is 
trea ted  as the  objec t  of  the h ighes t  or theo log ica l  sc ience.  The 
ob jec t  consis ts  in things separate from m at te r  and im m obi le  ( a l5 -  
16). These  are the causes  of  what are  "v is ib le  am ong  thi ngs
d iv ine"  ( a 18) and are  characte ri sed as e ternal  ( a l7 ) .  The divine
ex is t s  in this s epara te  and im m obi le  na tu re ,  and is the h ighest  
kind ( g e n o s )  of  reali ty  ( a l9 -22 ) .  A ccord ing ly ,  it is the pr im ary
ins tance  of be ing. This  account  o f  the  d iv in e  is pa ra l le led  at 
10 6 4 a 3 7 - b l 4.
To  summarise .  Aris to tle 's  conception of God satisfies the basic 
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  d iv in i ty  a l ready  laid out - ( c ausa l )  su p re m ac y ,  
idea l i ty  or pe r fec t ion ,  se l f -su f f ic iency ,  im m or ta l i ty ;  and th is ,  so 
far, links Aris tot le  very closely to his predecessors .  For him too 
the fundamenta l  basis of all things is a d ivine reali ty (called God)
- as that which  is u lt imate ly  p re supposed  in an account  o f  the 
universe.  God is a cause and a principle ,  of a free and sovereign 
nature,  most  eminen t  and most honourable .  God is something  that 
men may tend to fear,  though in truth "his" nature  is free  of 
j e a l o u s y .  D i v i n e  n a tu r e  has  to be k e p t  p u r g e d  o f  all 
a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m ,  e x c e p t  th a t ,  l i k e  h u m a n s  it p o s s e s s e s  
k now ledge ,  though un l ike  them, it possesses  the  highest  k ind  of 
know ledge ,  and is the object  of  the highest  science.  It is eternal,  
and is one of  the first  causes  of  things,  indeed  the supreme cause
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and pr inc ip le  of  divine things visible to us. As a first cause,  it is 
separa te  from m at te r  and is ent ire ly  im m ob i le ,  and is the primary 
ins tance  o f  be ing , though its pu re  im m a te r ia l i ty  does  not prevent 
its be ing manifes t  in things which appear  to us. I turn now to the 
full ph i losoph ica l  exam ina t ion  of  God in book  xii,  beg inn ing  with 
the  6th chapter .
3 B o o k  xii, c h a p t e r  6
The explicit  descr ipt ion of  God is given main ly  in chapters  7 and 9. 
Bu t  the  g r o u n d w o r k  is la id  out in c h a p t e r  6. An a l ready  
e s tab l i shed  f r am e w o rk  of  t r ipar t i te  su b s tan ces  is used.  Tw o of 
the types  are phys ica l  and o b se rv ab le  to the senses .  O f  these, 
type  (i) which are sub lunary  enti t ies  such as p lan ts  and animals ,  
is p e r i shab le .  T ype  (ii),  the h e av e n ly  bod ies ,  is im p er ishab le .  
Type  (iii) is ne i ther  per i shab le  nor o b s e r v a b le 39 Accordingly ,  its 
ex is tence  must be establi shed. Aris to tle  a rgues  for it from motion 
and time.
He beg ins  by a s su m in g  that  m o t io n ,  and t im e  - which  is a 
m easure  of  motion - are e te rna l .4 *3 For if we suppose  t ime to be 
genera ted ,  it fo llows that before  that there  was no t ime. But the 
ve ry  te rm  "befo re"  im p l i e s  t im e.  T h e  s a m e  ap p l ie s  to the
3 9 1 0 6 9 a 3 0 f f .  The  triparti tion o f  s u b s t a n c e s  r e c a l l s  the d iv is io n  of
s c i e n c e s  as c o n cern ed  with u n m o v ed  th i ngs ,  m o v i n g  but im pe ri sh ab le  
things,  and per ishable things at P h y .  198a29-31 .  But it docs  not fit the 
tripartite d iv is io n  o f  ph i lo so p h y  into t h e o l o g y ,  m a th e m a t i c s  and phys ics  
earlier at M e t a .  1 064a29 f f .  In Plato's c o s m o l o g y ,  the same le ve ls  o f  
reality arc to be found,  although he does  not spe c i f ic a l l y  draw attention to
it. Xcnocra te s  too  is reported to have  taught a iriparl it ion o f  reality,
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  b e t w e e n  the o b je c t s  o f  n o u s ,  the objects  o f  d o x a  (the
celes tial  beings)  and scns ib lcs .  The object  o f  d o x a  arc both sens ib le  and
intel l igible (fr. 5H; Adv .  Mat h,  vii ,  147).
40 Cf. Phy.  2 1 9b 1 -3.
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dest ruct ion  of t ime .41 If  t ime is eternal motion is eternal. And of 
m ot ion  only spat ia l ,42 c ircu lar  m o t io n 43 is e ternal .44 As motion 
and t ime p re su p p o se  subs tance  w h ich  is p r i m a r y  in regard  to 
them, the subs tance has to be eternal.  Since the  substance  has to 
cause the motion,  it has to be actual .  A nd  i f  it has to cause the 
mot ion  e te rnally ,  it has  to be e ssen t ia l ly  ac tua l  (e n e r g e i a ), i.e., 
without any  po ten t ia l i ty  in itself;  fo r  any  po ten t ia l i ty  in it as a 
subs tance  w ould  m ake  it su scep t ib le  to c h a n g e  and u n a b le  to
41 Aristotle's v i ew  on the eternity o f  t ime is based on his be l i e f  that t ime
exists in instants; each instant has the character o f  a mean,  for it marks  
the bcgining o f  a new and the end o f  a previous  l ime.  If so there never  
was an absolute end or beginning.  Accord ingly ,  t ime and be ing would be 
intrinsically cont inuous.  Cf. 2 2 2 a l 0 f f .
42  Al though this is not made expl ic i t  in contex t ,  for Aris tot le ,  spatial  
motion impl ies physical  substances.  See  further, dc Ca e l o  2 7 9 a l 5 .  What 
holds  true o f  l ime holds  o f  mot ion,  and what holds  o f  mot ion holds ol  
substance ,  s ince  for Aristotle ,  what is pre dicated  o f  an acc ident  a lso  
applies to its substance. Cf. P h y .  2 5 1 b l 8 f f .  In de  Ca e l o  2 7 0 a l 7 - 2 1 ,  lie 
argues lhat an eternal body is outs ide  the realm o f  contraries,  for its 
c ircular mot ion has no  contrary. At op. cit. ii 3 we  enco unt er  the 
f o l l o w in g  reasoning:  the divine  must  have  a perpetual  act ivi ty .  The
heavens  arc divine.  Hence  they have  a circular body so as to be able
a lw ay s  to m o v e  with c ircular mo t ion.  H e n c e  in this cont ex t ,  spatial  
motion (motion kat a t opon,  1071 b 11 -12 . )  impl ies  phys ical  substance.
43 Circular motion would seem to derive from the doctrine in the de  Ca e l o  
(286b 10-11)  according to which: 'the shape o f  the heaven is o f  necess i ty  
spherical.  For that is the shape appropriate to its substance and also by
natural pr ima cy’. Aris totle is not, 1 think, making any c laim for spatial  
s p h e r i c a l i t y .  The  natural p r im a c y  and the  s u b s t a n c e  w h i c h  is
ap propr iat e  to s p h e r i c a l i t y  arc to be u n d e r s t o o d  as c o n d i t i o n s ,  
respective ly ,  for circular motion and substance  in circular motion.
44  Cf. P h y .  251 a 8 f f . , where the argument that m o v e m e n t  is eternal starts 
from the definit ion o f  movement  as the actualisation o f  the m ova ble  q u a  
movable:  if  things capable o f  be ing  moved would  have  been at rest before  
be ing  in m ov em en t ,  a change  had occurred b efore  the sup po sed first  
cha ng e .  L i k e w i s e ,  m o v e m e n t  is im p e r i s h a b l e ,  b e c a u s e  i f  it we re  
discontinued,  there would be a change after the last change.  On the other  
hand, P h y .  vi i i ,  6 argues for cont inuous  m o v e m e n t  from the assumption  
that movement  is always.
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acco u n t  for the  e te rn ity  and ac tua l i ty  o f  the m o v e m e n t ,45 with 
the co n seq u en ce  that eternal motion might never  have  been. It is 
a l so  c o n c lu d e d  that subs tances  with essen t ia l  ac tua l i ty  mus t  be 
im m a te r ia l ,  the  assum pt ion  being that m ate r ia l i ty  is the  basis of 
p o t e n t i a l i t y .
T h i s  a r g u m e n t  f rom  e te rna l  m o t io n  and t im e  c o n c lu d e s  that  
th e re  m us t  ex is t  e te rna l ,  im m u ta b le  and im m a te r ia l  s u b s t a n c e s  
w h ich  are essen t ia l ly  actual ,  a l though  the chap te r  began  with a 
p r o m i s e  to p ro v e  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  an e te rna l  and im m u tab le  
s u b s t a n c e  - in the  s ingu la r .  The a p p a ren t  in c o n s i s t e n c y  is 
o cca s io n ed ,  I suppose ,  by Ar is to tle ' s  am biguous  use o f  o u s i a  in 
M e l a  xii to re fer  to e ither  a level of real i ty  or an ontological  
en t i ty .  The  conc lu s io n  is the re fo re  con tex tu a l ly  cons i s ten t ,  if 
Aris to tle  has in mind not only the pr ime mover but also movers  of 
the celestial  spheres,  as subsequent discussions  indicate.  That this 
is the case  is suppor ted  by the fo l low ing  e x p la n a t io n  of  the 
observed  mot ions  in the cosmos  which,  for Aristotle ,  are basically 
tw o ;  e t e r n a l ,  c i r c u l a r  m o t io n ,  and v a r ie ty  o f  m o t io n  as in 
genera t ion  and dest ruct ion .  Hence ,  at least two k inds  of eternal 
s u b s tan ces  are requ ired  to expla in  the p e r p e t u a l  v a r i e t y  in the 
c o sm o s :
...the same things have a lways existed,  passing through a cycle or
Ari sto t l e  c lear ly  rejects a c o s m o l o g i c a l  sys tem l ike A n a x a g o r a s ’ which  
p os i t s  R eason as a pr inciple  which introduces order into an otherwise  
haphazard world or Plato's (mythica l )  account  o f  l i m e  in the T i m a c u s .  
For Aristotle ,  Anaxagorcan Reason is an actuality but not complet e ly  so.
It is an actuality with a potential ity to organise.  Yet such a potentiality  
can no t  l o g i c a l l y  expla in  the de  f a c t o  eternity o f  perpetual  variety in 
c o s m i c  mot ion,  as he secs it. Platonic  Forms as first principles  arc, in 
A ristot l e ’s v i ew ,  worse  candidates since he sees  them as static entities with 
no productive function ( Me t a .  9 90b 9f f . ,  1071 b 13-17.
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in a cc o rd an ce  with some o ther  p r inc ip le .  If  then,  the re  is a
cons tan t  cycle,  something must  a lways  remain  acting in the sam e  
way;  and if  there  is to be generation and des t ruc t ion ,  som eth ing  
else  which is always acting in d i f ferent  ways.  This  mus t  act  in 
one way in virtue of  i tself  and in another  in v ir tue o f  som eth ing  
else - ei ther of the third agent or the first. But it mus t  be o f  the 
first  ( to p r o t o n ); for this must in turn be the cause  both o f  the  
third and o f  the second . . . s ince  it was  the  c au se  o f  p e rp e tu a l  
motion ,  and something else is the cause  of var ie ty,  both toge the r  
m ak e  the cause  of  perpetual  var ie ty .46
T w o  pr inc ip les  of  explanation  are  invo lved  here ,  and the re  is a
third  rea l i ty  which they are p o s tu la ted  to exp la in .  Th is  thi rd  
rea l i ty  is the sub lunar  world .  The  a rgum en t  im p l ie s  tha t  the se  
tr ipar t i te  rea li t ies  are in a sys tem at ic  causal  re la t ion  o f  re la t ive
se l f -de te rm ina t ion .  The com plex  p ropos i t ion ,  ' If then there  is a
constan t cycle,  something must a lways  remain  acting in the  same 
way; a n d  if there is to be genera t ion  and des t ruct ion ,  som eth ing  
else which is a lways acting in d if ferent ways' ,  is am b iguous  and 
abstract.  The cause of the constant cycle  could be the first mover.  
Afte r  all, the chapte r  has not ra ised any question  of  p lu ra l i ty  of  
movers ,  and noth ing  in the a rgum ent  makes  us suspec t  there  are 
several .  In view of the fact that e ternal ,  immater ia l  subs tance  is 
an essent ia l  and comple te  actua li ty w i thout  any po ten t ia l i ty ,  there  
seem s  to be no m ore  m e ta p h y s ic a l  g ro u n d s  for p lu ra l i ty  and 
d i f f e ren t ia t io n .  A l te rna t ive ly  - and I f a vou r  th is  - s ince  the 
a r g u m e n t  is h igh ly  abs t rac ted  f rom  any c o n c r e te  r e f e r e n c e ,  a 
fo rward  re fe rence  to chapter 8 sugges ts  that  a f irst  m over ,  which 
is absolu te ly  se lf -dete rmined,  and the sphere  of the fixed stars or 
t h e i r  m o v e r s  as d e p e n d e n t  on th e  f i r s t  m o v e r ,  m a y  be  
r e s p e c t iv e ly  re fe r red  to here  as " the first" and "the s ec o n d " ,
46 1072a2-19.
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a l th o u g h  sp e c i f i c a l ly ,  the  cause  o f  g e n e r a t io n  and des t ruc t ion  
w o u ld  be  the sun which  has its own year ly  orbi t  in the ecliptic 
and  a da ily  ro ta tion  round the earth which is expla ined  in turn by 
re fe re n ce  to the ro ta t ion  o f  the sphere  o f  the  fixed stars.47 Both 
the "first" and the "second" princ ip les  de te rm ine  perpetual  variety 
charac te r i s t i c  o f  p h e n o m en a l  ex is tence  in the sub lunar  sphere.
4 Book xii, 7
A g a in s t  this  b a c k g r o u n d  of  c h a p te r  six,  the first  par t  of  the 
e nsu ing  chap te r  (7) ident if ies  the basic c ircular motion as that of 
the e ternal  f irst  or oute rmost  heaven, p laced in a context of levels 
of  rea l i ty  in order  o f  re la tive  se l f -de te rm ina t ion :  'and since that 
which  is m oved  while  it moves  is in te rmedia te ,  there is something 
w h ich  m oves  w i thou t  being m oved ,  som eth ing  e ternal  which is 
both subs tance  and sel f -ful f i l l ing act iv ity  or actuali ty  ( c n e r g e i a ) .  
Some in timation of this appears at de Mot u  An.  699b31ff . ,  where 
it is said that it would  be thought strange w'ere the origin of [all] 
m o v e m e n ts  ins ide  [the heaven].  This is i l lustra ted by a quotation 
from the I l i a d  (viii, 20-22):  ’No, you will not pull Zeus, the highest 
of  all, from heaven to the plain,  no,  not even if  you toiled right 
hard; co m e  you, all you gods and goddesses!  Set hands  to the 
c h a i n ’. Jaege r  (1947)  drew  at tention to f ragm ents  25 and 26 of 
X enophanes :  'A lways  he remains  in the same place,  not moving  at 
all, nor  indeed,  is it fi t t ing to go here or there at different times; 
but w i thou t  toil he shakes all things  by the will of his mind'.  By 
q u o t i n g  f rom  the  I l i a d , A r i s t o t l e  g r a t e f u l l y  a c k n o w l e d g e s  
an t ic ipa t ion  of  his "unmoved mover" .  But also,  he could  not be
4 7  The G C .  ii 10 ex pl a in s  in greater detail  h o w  [the sun] is caus ing  
generation and corruption. Cf. Ti .  36b-d.
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unaware  o f  how Xenophanes  came c lose  to the  same idea.  Let us 
go back to the text under considera tion.
T he  fi rst  heaven ,  A r is to t le  is c la im in g ,  is e te rna l ,  and has  a 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  m o v e r  th a t  im p a r t s  m o t io n  w i th o u t  u n d e r g o i n g  
change. It is in this way that objects  o f  thought  and desi re  cause  
m o t io n ,  wi th  k n o w le d g e  the  bas ic  c a u s e  and  p r e s u p p o s e d  by 
d e s i r e . 4  ^ A cco rd ing ly ,  the m o v e r  o f  the  fi rst  heaven  im p a r t s  
mot ion  as the object  of desire,  and th rough the m o v e m e n t  o f  the 
first  heaven accounts  for the var ie ty  in cosm ic  motion.  But  the 
su p e r io r  m o v e r  is co m p le te ly  ac tua l ,  and  th e re fo re  n e c e s sa r i ly  
existent ,  and in this way good. In virtue of  being good,  it is the 
first  p r in c ip le  upon which  the heaven  ( o n  r a n o s )  and na tu re  
( p h u s i s )  depend (c r e t a i . 1 0 7 2 a 2 1- b l 4).
Ever  since Em pedocles  pressed the trad it ional god, A p hrod i te  (= 
P h i  I i<i), into ph i losoph ica l  serv ice  in partial  ex p lan a t io n  of the 
p rocesses  and m ovem ents  in the cosm os ,  "des ire"  had becom e  a 
topic of philosophical  explora tion.  Plato deals  with the concept of 
des i re  in the P h a e d r u s and S y m p o s i u m  w h e re  E r o s , a 
d a i m  o n i o n ,  appea rs  as the cen tra l  fo rce  w h ich  m e d ia te s  the
phenom ena l  and the divine,  and which takes on several  fo rms  and
This supports EE  1 2 4 8 a 2 5 f f . ,  where God is said to be the object o f  all 
desires. Jn de An.  iii 9 (432b26ff . )  and 10, Aristot le invest igates  what the 
sources o f  motion in animals arc. He  concludes  that ihc object o f  desire,  
to o r c k l i k o n , is primary: it is the starling point o f  activity o f  the rational
{ t o  l o g i s t i k o n)  part o f  the soul.  This exc lud es  the active  or theoretical
inte l le ct  from in i t ia t ing  des ire ,  apparent ly in co n s i s t en t  with M e t a  xii 
where  n o e t o n  is the starting point o f  all desire.  Perhaps the M e t a  xii 
context  e n v i s a g e s  n o u s  o f  the ce lest ial  real i ties and not human thought.
Indeed, in the de Ani ma ,  Aristotle admits some inf luence  o f  the intel lect  
on desire,  not in the order o f  e ff icient  but o f  formal causal i ty.  It still  
remains that on this issue there is so m e  dif ference  between M e t a  xii and 
de  Ani ma.
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realises different ends.  Yet, as he points  out in Dio tima 's  speech, 
E r o s  points  to Forms,  and the c o m m o n  ob jec t  of  all E r o s  is to 
possess  for ever  the Good. In all its forms,  E r o s  reaches  out for 
som eth ing  beyond.  Genera lly ,  sens ib le  th ings  are rep re sen ted  by 
P la to  as y e a r n in g  for (o r e g e t a  i , P h d  o , 7 5 a 2 )  i m m a t e r i a l ,
pa rad igmat ic  Forms.  The cause of  the ri se  o f  desire  is the belief 
that sensib le  things are an image of  true rea li ty ,  Forms;  therefore  
they turn to it (ibid. 74d). The basic function,  the basic desire  of  
all th ings  is to reach the Form in which  they  par take ,  i .e.,  to 
becom e  its perfect  image. This desi re  is at the origin o f  the ir  
activity.  One may also explain this in terms o f  s u n g e n e i a : k in sh ip  
with  F o r m s  is the u l t im a te  g r o u n d  for d e s i r e  and s t r iv in g .  
A d m i t t e d ly ,  "par t ic ipa t ion" ,  "k insh ip"  are o b s c u r e  m e ta p h o r s  in
Pla to .
But how ever  inadequate  Plato 's  exp lana t ion  of  the rise of  desi re  
may seem ,  the way in which A r i s to t le ' s  f i r s t  m o v e r  im p a r t s  
m o t ion  to the un ive rse  is even m o re  o b s c u r e  or r a th e r  too
sophist icated.  All we can say is that final causa l i ty  seems to be 
the only type of  causa l i ty  a t t r ibu ted  to the fi rs t  m over .  The
second and mate ria l  mover,  the first  heaven ,  a l though  it has a
p r im ary  locom ot ion  ( phora  pr o t e )  which is an actuali ty or a self- 
fu l f i l l ing  ac t iv i ty  ( e n e r g e i a ), it does  not im par t  mot ion  in this 
unm o v ed  fash ion ,  but ra the r  by be ing  m o v ed  (10 7 2 b 4 f f . ) .4 ^ A
Cf. GC.  3 2 3 a 3 0 - 3 3  where  Aris tot le  br ings the e x a m p le  o f  our b e in g  
grieved by so m e o n e  to il lustrate the relation be tw een a final cause  and
what it immediate ly  causes.  In such a case  w e  say that this person
touches  us, although we do not touch him.  There  is not the s l ighest
indication at this point that the first mover  would have  to be in place  in
order to move .  The concept o f  the first mover  here goes  beyond that o f  
Phy.  267a2 1-b 9,  which advances a doctrine o f  the first m ov er  as be ing  at 
the circumference o f  the world, and ass igns  ef f icient  causal i ty to it. More
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t y p e  o f  c a u s a l i t y  o th e r  than  fina l  c a u s a l i t y  is a c c o r d i n g l y  
sugges ted  for it. In a subsequent  context the heavenly  bodies  are 
e x p r e s s ly  c h a rac te r i s ed  as d iv ine  ( 1 0 7 4 a 3 0 - 3 1 ) .50 For their  sake 
all cosm ic  locomotion  takes  place  (a25-31).  In this way they too 
have  the ro le  o f  final causes.
T h e  t r ipa r t i te  re la t ion  of  (a) unm oved  m over - (b )  m oved  m over-  
(c) m o v e d ,  m ay  a lso  in t im a te  a spec i f ic  theory  c o n ce rn in g  the
s truc tu re  o f  real i ty  by way of an analysis of  movement.  First ly,  if 
this is true ,  not only will Aris to tle  conce ive  (a) as an absolu tely  
n e c e s s a r y  ex is ten t ,  but a lso  (b) is in te rm e d ia te  { m e s o n )  in the 
sense  that it shares in the proper ties  o f  (a) - in its ident ical  and 
c o n t in u o u s  act iv ity ,  and those of  (b) - m ovem ent .  A r i s to t l e  does  
not ex p la in  w hy  the final  causa l i ty  of  the first  m over  d irec tly  
r e su l t s  in the c i rcu la r  mot ion  of the first  heaven .  The  heaven
{ o u r a n o s ) and the world of change ( p h u s i s )  are said to (l i terally) 
hang ( e r e l a i )  from the first m over  (1 0 7 2 b l4 ) ,  imply ing  that both 
o u r a n o s  and p h u s i s  tend  to w a rd s  the f i r s t  m o v e r ,  p h u s i s
p r e s u m a b l y  i n d i r e c t l y  t h r o u g h  o u r a n o s , so tha t  whi le  
con t inuous ,  c i rcu lar  motion of the first heaven imitates  the perfect  
e n e r g e i a  o f  the  first  m ove r ,  su b lu n a r  th ings  tend to c i rcu la r  
m o t io n ,  as the  p e rp e tu i ty  and c o n t in u i ty  o f  c o m in g - to - b e  and 
des t ruc t ion  o f  all th ings  is said to approx im ate  eternal being (G C 
3 3 6 b 2 5 f f . )
S e c o n d ly ,  s ince  the  fi rst  m o v e r  m oves  by be ing  des i red ,  and 
s ince  des i re  fo l lows  upon thought,  it w ou ld  seem that only things
will  be said on this issue o f  final causality later.
For the d ivin i ty  and preceding co nc ept io ns  o f  "heaven", sec de  Ca e l o
2 7 8 b l 0 - 2 1 .  At 284a 11, Aristotle writes: 'the ancients gave  to the gods  the 
h e a v e n  and upper  p la ce  as b e in g  a lone  imm ort al ,  and our present  
argument  tes t i f i es  that it is ungencrated and indestructible' .
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with reason  or soul can d i rec t ly  des i re  the first  m o v e r .51 T h a t  
celes tia l  be ings  w ou ld  have  to be in te l l igen t  is sugges ted  by the 
fact  that what  they are supposed  to des i re  is spec i f ied  as Reason 
( N o u s ,  1072b20) .  A ccord ing ly ,  as in P la to 's  co sm o lo g y ,  c i rcu lar  
(and ro ta ry)  mot ion  would  be a high deg ree  o f  ra tional behaviour ;  
o th e r  k in d s  o f  m o t io n  w o u ld  r a n g e  f r o m  le ss  i n t e l l i g e n t  to 
i r ra t ional  or non- ra t iona l  behav iour .  On the  o th e r  hand ,  to say 
that  ce le s t ia l  be ings  should  be e n so u le d  in te l l ig e n t  be ings  does  
not, strictly speaking, follow for Aris to tle ;  for if  the first m o v e r  is 
T h o u g h t ,  m o v e s  by be ing  d e s i r e d ,  and  if  d e s i r e  p re s u p p o s e s  
th o u g h t ,  the co n d i t io n  for the d e s id e r a t i v e  m o t iv a t io n  fo r  all 
things,  lunar or sublunar ,  is satisf ied by the ve ry  ex is tence  o f  the 
first mover.  Thus  at G C .  3 3 7 a l - 7 ,  su b lu n a r  e l e m e n ts  w h ich  are 
certain ly  not ensouled  are said to imita te  the cycl ica l  m o v e m e n t  of 
the celestial bodies.  But if  they can do so w i thou t  being ensouled,  
one would assume that the heaven can also im ita te  the perfect ion  
of  the first mover  without being ensouled.
H o w ev e r ,  the s t ronges t  reason  for im p u t in g  in te l l ig e n c e  to the 
celestial  be ings is that they are express ly  d iv ine  reali t ies and they
are al luded to as gods (1074ab2-3) .  The  d iv ine  is, o f  course ,  an
agen t ,  and gods  are  in te l l igen t  b e in g s .  By be ing  bo d i ly  and 
intell igent,  they are thus ensouled.  If  so celes tia l  beings would  be 
se lf -movers  by virtue of  their  souls.  And if  tha t  is what they are, 
there seems to be no more  need for them to be moved ,  expecia lly  
so if soul q u a  causal  p o w er  is im m or ta l  and, for Aris to tle ,  eternal.
51 In the de  C a e l o , there are indications  o f  a doctr ine  according to which
the first heaven is a body forever a l ive  and e n d o w e d  with mind (cf.
2 9 2 a l 9 - 2 1 j .  At 2 7 9 a 2 8 - 3 0 :  ’from it der ive  ( e r e t a i )  the be ing and life
whic h other th ings,  s o m e  more  or les s  a r t ic ul a te ly  but others f eebl y  
e n j o y ' .
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If  A r i s to t l e  wants  to a rgue  tha t  c e le s t i a l  b e in g s  r e q u i r e  an 
unm oved  mover  because  by being bodily they have  a potentia li ty ,  
so that  the i r  ex i s t en ce  p re s u p p o se s  the  p u re  a c tu a l i ty  o f  an 
unm oved  m over ,  it is a good ob jec t ion  to say tha t  the  m ov ing  
causes  of  the  celest ia l  be ings  are  th e m se lv e s  e t e r n a l ly  ex is ten t.  
N o r  can he argue  that soul is, by  def in i t ion ,  an e m b o d ie d  se l f ­
m over ,  and therefore  a potentia li ty.  F o r  one  who ,  l ike  Aris to tle ,  
believes  that the cosmos is eternal, such a rgum ent  is not available,  
at least  in respect of soul q u a  se l f -m over .  So w hy  should  that 
which is eternal ly  se lf -moving require  som eth ing  e lse  to m ove  it? 
In all essentia ls ,  Plato  provides  a vis ible doctr ina l  backg round  for 
A r i s t o t l e ’s t r i p a r t i t e  th e o ry  of  m o t i o n . 52 B u t  P la to  avoids  
A r i s to t l e ’s p rob lem  because  he de f ine s  s e l f - m o v in g  m o t io n s  as 
motions  of Reason (God).
The  id en t i f ica t ion  of  p r im ary  s u b s tan ce  with  R e a s o n  ( N o u s ,  
1072b20) called God (1072b25) .  the nature  of  w h o se  activ ity  is 
def ined  as a kind of motion,  is ano ther  in t im a t ion  o f  Aris to tle 's  
indeb tedness  to his predecessors .  Inso fa r  as R ea so n  is the first 
cau se  of  all m o t io n s ,  ra t iona l  a c t iv i ty  b e c o m e s  th e  s tanda rd  
m e as u re  to which  ev e ry th in g  - ce le s t i a l  or s u b lu n a r ,  s t r ives .  
Moreover ,  as Reason is, in Plato,  part  or an aspect o f  the system of 
d ivine first principles ,  so too Aris to tle  implies  that  R eason  is one, 
though the ch ie f  of d ivine first p r inc ip le s  ( M e t a .  983a8-9) .  In 
the p resen t  context ,  Aris to tle  m en t ions  that the  first  ob jec ts  ( t a  
p r o t a )  o f  d e s i r e  and  t h o u g h t  are  the  s a m e  ( 1 0 7 2 a 2 6 f f . ) .  
E l se w h e re  in the corpus ,  s u p ra m u n d an e  p r in c ip le s  are  m en t ioned  
w h ic h  e v o k e  P la to n ic  F o rm s:  the  P h a  e d r  u s  had ta lked  of
5  ^ This applies to the S t a t  c s m a  n , L a w  s , T i m a c  u s , P  h i t  c b u  s , and the 
E p i n o m i s
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c o l o u r l e s s ,  s h a p e l e s s ,  i n t a n g i b l e ,  i m m a t e r i a l  d iv in e  r e a l i t i e s  
( F o r m s )  e x i s t in g  "beyond  the h e av e n s"  w h e re  no poe t  has yet  
sung.  A r i s to t le  in turn writes:  'It is c lea r  that  there  is ne ither 
p lace  nor  void  nor t ime ou ts ide the heaven .  H e n c e  the t h i ngs
t h e r e  are o f  such a nature  as not to occupy  any place,  nor does
time age them, nor is there any change  in any o f  the things which 
l ie  b e y o n d  the  o u te rm o s t  m o t ion ;  they  c o n t in u e  th ro u g h  the ir  
e n t i r e  d u ra t io n  u n a l te rab le  and u n m o d i f i ed ,  l iv ing  the best  and 
the most  sel f-sufficient of lives'. Aris to tle  does  not explain how or 
w hy  the th ings  beyond the heavens  are a l iv e .5  ^ Did he already 
have  here  the idea of immateria l  first m ove rs?  It is not easy to
say.  H o w e v e r  that  may be, he too holds  the P la tonic  thesis that
the heaven  and its d iv ine  reali t ies  which tradit ion calls  gods are
subord ina te  to some ult imate,  first principle(s) .
There  A also Aristotle ' s  identification o f  the supreme pr incip le  in 
the category  of t he  good (to ka/ot i ):54
D e  C a t l o  2 7 9 a1 8.  It would seem that o f  Plato's first pr inc iples  only
Reason can be said to have or to be life. But it can be argued otherwise,
s ince  mot ion is strongly associated with l ife,  and the Form o f  mot ion is
one  o f  Plato's key Forms. Moreover,  we  have in the P h a e d o  (106 d4 )  a
Form o f  l i fe which so m e h o w  resurfaces in the T i m a e u s  as the Form of  
Animal.  In the Sophi s t  (249) ,  Plato r idicules the friends o f  Forms who  
c o n c e i v e  o f  For ms  as static,  l i f e le s s  first pr in c ip le s .  This  would  not 
ne cessa r i ly  mean that Forms arc al ive,  but his concept ion  o f  com pl ete  or
perfect  be in g  ( to p a n t e l o s  on)  as inc luding  soul ,  mind and l i fe  suggest  
that at least Forms arc in a necessary relation with the Form o f  l ife or 
m o v c m c n t .
54 ] 0 7 2 a 2 S f f .  "The good" confl ic ts  with E E  1 2 1 8a 30 ,  according  to which
o n e  cannot  say that all things des ire  s o m e  one g o o d ,  because  each is
s e e k i n g  its ow n  spec ia l  good .  Ap parent ly  A r is to t le  is arguing  here  
against the Platonic doctrine o f  the Good.  Yet one  wonders  whether this 
text docs  not conf lic t with the final causal i ty o f  N o u s  who is loved by 
other things.  According  to E E  12 1 8a30 the first m over  could at the most  
be the good o f  one class o f  beings,  e .g. ,  o f  the first heaven.
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T h e  p r im ary  object  o f  desire  and the in te l l ig ib le  (n o e t o n ) are 
the  same. For  it is the apparen t  good that is the ob jec t  of 
ap p e t i t e  (e p i t h u m e t o n ) and the real  good that is the object  of 
r a t i o n a l  will  (bo  u l e  t o n ). N o w  th o u g h t  is m o v ed  by the
in te l l ig e n c e  and one  o f  the ser ies  o f  co n t ra r ie s  is e ssen t ia l ly  
i n t e l l i g ib l e .  In th a t  s e r i e s 55 s u b s t a n c e  s t a n d s  f i r s t ,  and
su b s ta n c e  tha t  is s im p le  (h a p l e ) and exis ts  in t im e less  self- 
fu lf i l l ing activity" (kat'  energeian).
A ris to t le ' s  doc t r ine  o f  dual desires ,  and the i r  c o r re sponden t  dual 
objects ,  the apparent and real good, is predica ted  on the basis of 
man 's  m or ta l - im m orta l  duali ty.  The d is t inc t ion  between the real
and apparen t  good is Socrat ic  (See  Ap .  30b; G .  4 6 6 b - 4 6 8 d ) . 5 6 
T he  real  good is sp i r i tua l ,  the  a p p a r en t  good  m a te r ia l  (E E
1218b32-34 ) .  A r is to t le  uses " k a l o n "  instead of "agathon".  A t  
G A 731b24-27 ,  to k a l on  and to t he i on  are said to be the cause
of  what is bette r  in th ings  which admit  of  them. But why t o  
k a l o n ' ?  P r im ar i ly ,  ka l os  m eans  "beau t i fu l" ,  but is p rac t ica l ly  
ind is t ingu ishab le  from a g a t h o s .  Tradit ionally a ka l os  k aga t hos  is 
a n o b le  man ,  a m an  of  p rac t ica l  e x c e l l e n c e ,  and p rac t ica l  
e x c e l l e n c e  is a s so c ia ted  with go o d n ess  (not necessa r i ly  "moral 
goodness" ) .  In the philosophical  tradi t ion,  k a l o s  is very strongly 
a s s o c i a t e d  with  t a x i s , "order" and d e r iv a t iv e ly ,  o f  k o s in o s 
( o r d e r ly  s y s t e m ) .57 At least this is true o f  Plato,  and we shall see 
that  it is l ikewise true of  Aristotle. Pla to  also predicates  a r i s t o n  
o f  divine Reason and uses " k a l os "  to characte ri se  the perfect ion of
55 Aristot le  recognises  two series,  l ists or co lum ns o f  contraries similar to 
t h o s e  o f  the Py th ago rean s:  One,  the p o s i t i v e ,  con ta in s  be in g ,  unity ,  
sub stance ,  etc.; the Other is neg at ive ,  and conta ins  not -be i ng ,  plurality,  
n o n - s u b s t a n c e ,  etc.  T he  n e g a t iv e  terms arc i n t e l l i g i b l e  o n ly  with  
reference  to the pos i t ive .
56 Sec further N E  1113a23, E E .  1235b25-28.
57 Cf. 1078a31.
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"h is "  c a u s a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  A r i s t o t l e  too  p r e d i c a t e s  "bes t"  
( a  r i  s t  o /?)58 o f  d iv ine  Reason ( 1 0 7 2 b l ) ,  and equa te s  it to a 
s u b s t a n t i v i s e d  k a l o n  in order  to m a k e  it, l ike Pla to  in the
S y m p o s i u m , an ob jec t  w or thy  o f  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  c o n te m p la t io n ,  
des i re  or love.  So that by to k a l o n  A r i s to t l e  cou ld  a l so  be 
fo l lowing  Pla to  in associating the rationa l desi re  for first pr inc ip les  
r a th e r  than  for  fo o d  and such o th e r  th ings  w i th  the h ig h e s t
qua l i ty  o f  life, which is in te llectual  (and also  mora l,  for Plato) .  
This will be consis tent with the Et hi cs '  assoc ia t ion  of  s o p h i a  with 
the contemplation of God.
Given  the equat ion  of to ka l on  to N o u s , and the fact that  the
latter is the f i n a l  cause of all m ovem ents  in the cosmos (1072b2-  
3.  b l4 ) ,  to k a l o n  could  be used here  as a com p reh en s iv e  notion
r a n g i n g  f rom  the im p l ic a t io n  tha t  the  u n iv e r s e  is o rde  r iy .  
a e s t h e t i c a l l y ,  t e l e o l o g i c a l l y  and  m o r a l l y  o r g a n i s e d  to the  
implica tion  that so organised,  the parts o f  the universe  desire  to 
be k a l o s .  if not rational, for its own sake (note in this connection 
the phrase  ( 1 0 7 2 a 35).  "to kalon kai  to dV auto hai reton"  which  
may be read "The Good and that which is desirab le  in i tself") .  
From the human point of view, that  which dese rves  to be chosen 
for its own sake is spiritual well -being or happiness  (e u d a i m o n i a , 
N E  1097a30-34) ,  and this consis ts  in the con tem pla t ion  o f  God. 
C onsequen t ly ,  the equation of to ka l on  to N o u s  is apt for Platonic 
p ie ty  - viz. ,  ac t iv i ty  or iented to the  co g n i t io n  of  d iv ine  first  
p r i n c i p l e s .
A r is to t le  goes  on (1072b2ff. )  to d is t ingu ish  two senses  o f  the 
final cause as an object  of  desire:  (i) as the good for something, 
and (ii) as the good which is the end of  some action,  (ii) but not (i) 
a p p l i e s  to im m o v a b le  objects .  In co n tex t ,  it is d i f f icu l t  to
5 8 According to Phy.  194a30,  only the best can be a final cause.
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unders tand  A r is to t le ’s in tention in m ak ing  this d is t inc tion .  But a 
parallel  text at E E  1249b 14ff. may be of help: God rules not in the 
sense that he issues commands ,  but in that  he is an end. This is 
fu r ther  c lar if ied  by the statement that  the te rm "end" has a dual 
meaning ,  viz. that "for the sake of" and that "in the in te rest  of". 
Since  God does  not need anything, he  cannot  be an end  in the 
lat ter  sense.  In the book xii passage  under  cons idera t ion ,  God is 
said to be t h e  Good  and a final  cause .  T he  a s s u m p t io n  is,
therefore,  that God as a final cause  does not d irec t  th ings  "in his 
own in terest",  since he is comple te ly  se l f -su f f ic ien t ,59 but as that 
for the sake of  which.  Thus the life of  pure reason is, in the final 
analysis ,  that which is desirable  for its own sake; it is the life 
whose  end is in the very activities which realise it.
F ro m  th is  r e l i g io u s  po in t  of  v iew  A r i s to t l e  d e s c r ib e s  the
e n e r g e i a  of  Reason as the best and the pleasantest  life (d i a g o g e ):
and its life (d i a g o g e ) is such as the best we enjoy but for a short 
moment  of time. For it is ever in this state - which we cannot be 
and its e n e r g e i a  is a lso p leasure  {he  d o n e )  and  t h e r e f o r e  
waking, perception and thinking are the most pleasant.
" D i a g o g e "  has the ord inary  sense of  "pass ing t ime".  In P o l .
1334a 16 the term has the sense of certain activit ies of  our leisure
time in which we indulge  because we enjoy them,  as for ins tance,
s tudy and in te rcourse  with friends.  At 1338a 10 it is assoc ia ted  
with scho le  ( le isure) ,  and at 1339b  17-19, it is c o n n ec te d  with 
h a p p in e s s  and  p le a s u re .  At M e t a .  9 8 1 b l 6 f f .  and  9 8 2 b 2 3 ,  
A r i s to t le  d i s t in g u i s h e s  be tw een  th ings  n e c e s sa ry  fo r  l ife (and
5 9  Thai  God is s c l f - s u f f i c i c n i ,  we have n ote d ,  is on e  o f  the c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
d iv in i t y  and is a t h e m e  w hi ch  recurs in Greek  p h i l o s o p h y  and l i terature.  
S e e ,  e .g . ,  EE 1 2 4 9 b l 5 ;  de Caelo 2 7 9 a 2 2 .  Cf.  X e n o p h a n e s  A 3 2 ;  P a rm en id es  
B8,  33; Euripides H.F.  1346-7;  Xenophon Memo. 1, 6, 10; Ti . 33d,  34b.
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efforts  needed to acqui re  or ensure  them) and man 's  life, pursu it s ,  
studies,  once  these basic needs  have  been fu lf i l led.  This  second 
state is called di agoge  and is a ssoc ia ted  with h e d o n e  ( 9 8 1  b 2 2 ) .  
The  asser t ion that man's noblest  pas t ime or act iv ity  is that  o f  God,  
that  the nob les t  hum an  acts will show  som e s imila r i ty  with  the 
act iv ity  of  God, is apparen tly  based on an analogy  which a ssum es  
the re lig ious  contrast  be tween the l ife of  man and of  God by using 
the human condit ion as the basic model on which  to im ag ine  the 
ideali ty of God, and on the convict ion that man shares in Reason.
At E E  ii 1, A r is to t le  d i s t in g u ish es  b e tw een  va r ious  types  o f  
ac t iv i ty ,  viz. ,  work  which p ro d u c e s  s o m eth in g  and work  which  
consis ts  in the use of a faculty.  It is the lat ter  which consti tu tes  
m a n 's  h ig h e s t  ac t iv i ty  ( 1 2 1 9 a l  4 f f . ) .  A r i s to t l e  m a in ta in s  that  
p leasu re  is an act iv i ty  (P r o t r ., Dur ing  (=D) 87). In N E  x, he 
seems to have modif ied  his theory of  the identi fica tion of  act iv ity  
and pleasure  of  N E  vii 13. For in N E  x 4, he asserts only that 
p l e a s u r e  a c c o m p a n i e s .  c o m p l e t e s .  or i n t e n s i f i e s  a c t i v i t y .  
Therefore  the text of  M e t a .  1072517, which desc r ibes  God 's  lile 
as p l e a s u r e  (kai  h e d o n e  he e n e r g e i a  t o u t ou ) ,  need no t  be 
u nde rs tood  as a f f i rm ing  com p le te  iden t i ty  be tw een  p leasu re  and 
activity.  One could take it as m ean ing  that p leasu re  accom pan ies  
activity .  In P r o t r . ,  D87 ,  A r i s to t l e  w r i te s  tha t  "per fec t  and 
un im peded  activity cer ta in ly  conta ins  in i tse lf  del ight,  so that  the 
act iv ity  of  th inking must be the mos t  pleasant  o f  all". Obvious ly  
Aris to tle  here does not mean p leasure  de rived from sensa tion (cf. 
N E  1154b25-28) .  Plato ' s  concep t ion  of  h e d o n e  is di fferent ,  and
prevents  him from ascrib ing it to G o d .6° O f  some im por tance  is 
the ins ight  that  p le a s u re  has a s u p ra - t e m p o ra l  d im e n s io n ,  and 
that we share in the life of God.
60 e.g. Epi n.  985a.
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Tha t  man  is incapable  of  sus ta ined and un in t e r rup t ed  act ivi ty is 
a t h e m e  w h i c h  r e cu rs  in A r i s t o t l e , 61 and  b a s i c a l l y  r e f l ec t s  
t r ad i t iona l  be l i e f  a ccord ing  to which ,  a l t ho ug h  gods  share  wi th 
h u ma n s  the s ame  proper t i e s  of  l i fe l ike th ink ing ,  and enjoy the 
s ame  psy ch o l o g i ca l  states  l ike p l eas u r e  and happ iness ,  they have  
these  p rope r t i e s  and enjoy  these s tates  in a super l a t i ve  deg r ee . 62 
God,  says Plato at L a w s  716c-d,  is the meas ure  of  all things.  For  
him,  the funct ion of  l ife is to be co me  god- l ike ,  and this means  to 
b e co me  t ruly wise  (T h e a e . 176a).  A ful ly ra t ional  life coincides  
with the happies t  and mora l ly  the best  life, and this also consists  
in the a p p r e h e n s i o n  of  d iv ine  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s .  In the  late 
d i a logues ,  a l t hough  this doc t r ine  is not  a b an do n e d ,  ra t ional i ty is
def ined in t e rms  of  mot ion.  Ci rcu la r  mot ion ,  i.e. ,  the supremely 
i n t e l l i g e n t  l i fe of  the d iv ine ,  c e l e s t i a l  b e in g s ,  b e c o m e s  the
p r o x i m a t e  s t a n d a r d  by w h i ch  s u b l u n a r  b e i n g s  ma y  a t t a in  
i mmor t a l i t y  and divini ty.  True piety,  therefore ,  comes  to consist  
in having (and perhaps ,  der iva t ive ly ,  in seek ing)  a ful ly rat ional
life. And this involves  a state of  mind  which  is commensu r a t e
with the e ternal  pat terns  of  the celes t ia l  mot ions .  Aris tot le  too 
conce ive s  in te l lectual  act ivi ty as the ch i e f  charac te r i s t i c  funct ion 
of  man,  and a ful ly rat ional  life - which co inc ides  with the most  
p l easu re  and h a p p in es s  - as the  s t an d a rd  for  i mmo r t a l i t y  and
di v i n i t y .  Bu t  Ar i s to t e l i a n  i m m o r t a l i t y  for  man  is, we  have  
m e n t i o n e d ,  l ife s u f f i c i en t l y  g o d - l i k e  wi th no i mp l i c a t i o n  for  
Pla tonic  mi dd l e  per iod non-ea r th ly  ex i s t ence .  However ,  Ar is tot le  
fo l l ows  Pl a to  in conce i v i ng  a ful ly ra t ional  l i fe as const i tuted by
k n o w l e d g e  o f  d i v i n e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s  and  as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a
61 A7:  I I 7 5 a 3 - 4 ;  c f .  1 1 7 7 b  1 6fT.  a l r e a d y  a l l u d e d  to.
6 2 Cf. Pindar’s 6th N e m c a n  O d e , whe re  m en,  a l though o f  a c o m m o n
parentage with the gods ,  arc as nothing  in com par iso n with the eternal
abiding  o f  the latter.
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cor respondi ng  sort of divine happiness .
Since  i mmovab l e  act ivi ty and a super la t ive  degree  of  e n e r g e i a  
be long only to the divine life of  pure Reas on ,  it fol lows that  the 
s tandard funct ion of  man as a rat ional  be ing is e n e r g e i a  of  the
super l a t i ve  sort ,  a l though,  as a sub lunar  be ing ,  our  p r o x i m a t e  
s t anda rd  of  l i fe is the d ivine ,  int e l l igent  a c t i v i t y  of  the  fi rst  
heaven.  If becoming at tuned to the eternal  pa t t e rns  of  the divine,  
celes t ial  mot ions  is what  const i tutes  "con t empl a t i on  of  God"  for 
Aristot le,  then, he was fully ant icipated by Pla to  who  set the same 
s t andard  of  piety for man in his late d i a l ogues .  For  c i rcular  
mot ion  is presumed to induce a highly ra t ional  l ife in which the 
p r inc ip les  cons t i tu t ive  of  soul b ecome  ful ly c o m m e n s u r a t e  with 
the divine,  first pr inciples  which govern the h eav e ns .63
Since the value of  c i rcular  mot ion der ives ,  it seems,  f rom its
being rational and also from its being a high degree  of  e n e r g e i a , 
we may ask: in what  consis t s  the e n e r g e i a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to 
N o e t i c  pleasure? The answer  lies in Aris tot le ' s  use of  human life
as the basic model  in terms of which the na ture  of  God may  be 
conceived.  The use of  such model  is deeply  rooted in tradi t ional  
r e l i g ious  t hought ,  as we have  a l r eady noted.  Fi rs t ,  Ar i s to t l e  
a ssumes  his bel ief  that pleasure  is a predica te  of  human act ivi ty.  
Th i s  is c o m b i n e d  wi th both  ma n ' s  f u n d a m e n t a l  de s i r e  for  
k n o w l e d g e  { M e l a .  980a3;  N E ,  10 9 6 b  17) ,  and  the h i gh l y  
eva lua t ive  concept ion  of  the kind of  k n o w l e dg e  that  seeks  first
63 Ordinarily meanin g  "seeing", "observing", part icularly the sp ec ta c le  of  
f e s t iv i t i es  in honour  o f  the gods ,  Plato's p h i l o so p h i ca l  transposi t ion o f  
t h e o r i a  may a lso be expressed as the rational v i s io n  o f  d i v in e  first
principles or derivately as the l ife dedicated to the "contemplation" o f  the 
F o r m s  ( c f .  R.  486a ,  5 1 7 d ) In Aristotle too,  the term s igni f ies  in the 
highest  sense  phi losophica l  contemplat ion the object o f  which is above  
all knowable  (P r o t r ., D86) .  This contemplation is also a kind o f  intuition 
rather than study or discursive reasoning ( sec  de An.  4 3 Ob 1 7 f f ) .
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pr i nc i p l e s  { s o p h i a ) .  He  then argues  that  th inking at tains the best  
o f  objec t s  ( subs t ance) ,  and the h ighes t  k ind of  t h ink ing  at tains it 
in the h ighes t  degree  (107218-20) .  God  or  divine things  are taken 
to be  the s u p r e m e  ob j ec t ( s )  of  c o n t e m p l a t i v e  k n o w l e d g e  ( N E  
1 1 7 7 b 2 6 - 1 17 8 a 7 ;  M e t a  xii)  and its con t empl a t i on  is said to be 
the best  and the mos t  p leasant  life. Thus ,  in conce iv ing  God as at 
once  the su p r e me  object  o f  k n o w l e d ge  and as i t se l f  pure  thinking 
act ivi ty,  Ar i s to t l e  easi ly moves  to assoc ia te  God wi th the best  and 
the mos t  p l easan t  l ife or act ivi ty.  Actual  h um a n  th inking is life. 
This  is projec ted onto the divine level ,  and the highest  kind of  life 
is given to God (10 72b l 4 - 26 ) .  But  there is a qual i f icat ion.  At  N E  
1178 b 8 -23,  it is said that  God cannot  have a vi r tuous  act ivi ty,  say 
of  j u s t i c e ,  l i be ra l i t y ,  or  t e m p e r an c e ,  bu t  is o n l y  e n g a g e d  in 
c o n t e m p l a t i o n . 64 Aristot le ' s  God has nothing external  to "himself" 
to c o n t em p l a t e .  Ac c o r d i n g l y ,  d i v i ne  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  desc r i be s  a
qua l i t y  o f  l i fe r a the r  than a " s pec t a t o r i a l "  v i e wi n g  of  object s  
e x i s t i n g  i ndependen t ! ) '  o f  a r a t iona l  agent .  If G o d ’s l i fe is 
c o n t e m p l a t i v e ,  and i f  c o n t em pl a t i on  desc r i be s  a qua l i ty  o f  l ife,  
Aris tot le can say that  the life of  God is an ident i ty of  n o e s i s  and 
n o e t o n ,  of  thinking and that which is thought .  It will fol low that 
d i v i n e  t h i nk i ng  is e t e rna l ,  s e l f - c o n t e m p a t i n g  l i fe (he  t h e o r i a , 
1072b24- 26 ) .  G o d ’s e n e r g e i a  is,  t he r e f o r e ,  s e l f - c o n t e mp l a t i o n  
a c t i v i t y . 65
C ons e que n t l y ,  at 1072b  18 f f ., the act ivi ty assoc ia ted wi th God is 
desc r ibed  as a th inking  that  thinks  i t s e l f .  This  is descr ibed as a 
s tate of  e x i s t enc e  in which  Reason  pa r t i c ipa t es  in ( m e t a l e p s i n )
6 4 This dist inction was not made by Socrates for whom the key properly of  
God is s o p h i a , and Socratic s o p h i a  is a moral - intel lectual  state or activity  
o f  the soul.
65 Cf. N E  1 1 7 4 b 2 0 ,  11 53a 1, 11 77a 16-27 .  E l s e w h e r e  Aris tot le  writes that 
pure thinking is most  perfect  and most  honourable.
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and t o u c h e s  ( t h i n g a n o n ) the i n te l l ig ib l e  ( n o e t o n ) , 66 so that it 
b e co me s  ident ica l  with i t .67 Kno wl ed g e  in Aris tot le ,  as in Plato,  
i n v o l v e s  a k i n d  of  s e l f - a w a r e n e s s  ( s u n a i s t  h e  n o m e  n o  i , N  E  
1170b4) .  And  this is impl i ed  in say ing  e i t he r  that  God  thinks  
"h imse l f "  or  tha t  n o e s i s  and n o e t o n  are  the same .  Thi s  also 
impl i e s  that  s e l f -knowl edge  is the s up re me  a c h i ev e men t  and goal  
o f  in t e l l ec t ua l  a c t i v i t y . 68 Aris tot le  t akes  up this impor tant  theme 
o f  Pla to ' s  ph i l osophy ,  adopt ing  Plato ' s  ins ight s  o f  s e l f -knowledge  
for his account  of  divine se l f -knowledge,  and us ing his account  of 
f r i endship as a start ing point .  More  on this will  be said later.
Present ly ,  let us note that  in a rguing to the ex i s t ence  of  supreme 
Reason  as the first  cause  o f  all m o v e m e n t s  Ar i s to t l e  f o l l ows  a 
p h i l o s o ph i c  t radi t ion p reced i ng  Plato.  X e n o p h a n e s  (B25)  made  
God rule the wor ld  by the t hough t  o f  his  Mind.  E mpedoc le s '  
s p h e r e - G o d  is a holy  mind  a lone  wh o  dar t s  across  the whole  
c os m o s .  A n a x a g o r a s  took ph i l o so ph i ca l  t h e o l o g y  a no t h e r  s tep 
fo r ward  when  he pos tu la t ed  Reason as the source  o f  the cosmic
order.  He conce ived  Reason as the finest  and pures t  of  all things.
66  In Plaio h a p t c s t h a i  ch a r a c te r is e s  man's  a p p r e h e n s io n  o f  i n t e l l i g i b l e  
Forms.  This  app rehe ns io n oc cur s  whe n the soul  (p s u e  h e )  is in an 
inte l l i g ib le  state - n o u s .  As  we have  already observed in the previous
ehaptcr,  certain texts o f  Plato speak o f  cogni t ion o f  Forms as a vi sion,  and 
a sudden i l luminat ion  o f  the soul.  The  c o g n i t iv e  e xpe r ie nc e  is one  of  
rational intuition or ralional vision.  Sec  P h d o .  65b, R.  490b3.  Cf. Ti .  37a  
)^7 That God is an object  o f  k n o w le d g e  ( no ' c . l on) ,  im p l i e s  the Socrat ic  
doctrine  that being  is know ing:  to k n o w  virtue is to be  virtuous.  This
doctr ine  has its roots in Parmenides'  B3 according  to which to be  and t o
t h i n k  arc the same.  But the kind o f  d i v in e  k n o w i n g  Aris tot le  has in
mind is act ive ,  s e l f - c o n l e m p l a l i v c  k n o w i n g ,  a s e l f - c o n ta in in g  activi ty.
Heracl i tus was the first to transpose the De lphic  motto - Kn ow T h y s e l f  - 
onto the phi lo sop hica l  level  o f  k n o w le d g e  o f  d iv in e  reality which is also  
the fundamental  reality o f  the universe  ( B 1 1 6 ) .
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It con t ro l s  in par t i cular  ever y t h i ng  wh i ch  has  l ife.  In ma k in g  
Reason  someth ing  dist inct  f rom the e l em en t s  An a xa go r a s  was  well  
on his wa y  to a c on ce p t i o n  o f  a n o n - m a t e r i a l  r ea l i t y .  H e  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  R ea so n  as i n d e p e n d e n t  ( a u t o k r a t e s ) ,  ex i s t i ng  by 
i t se l f  (m o n o s  aut os  epi  e o t o u ), h av i ng  k n o w l e d g e  o f  e v e r y t h i n g  
(B12) .  A p p a r en t l y ,  he t h o ug h t  o f  R e a s o n ,  w h o  a l s o  o rde r s  
( d i e  k o s m e s c )  eve r y th ing ,  as u n i que ,  d i v i n e  and  b o u n d l e s s  in 
space  and t ime.  Again,  Anaxagoras ,  l ike his p r e de ce ss o r s ,  ma de  
his a r c  h e  (Reason)  a l iving rea l i ty  and a p r i n c i p l e  o f  mot ion .  
Reason permeates  the universe by con t ro l l i ng  it, and is i mm a n e n t  
in l iving things.  Diogenes  of  Apol lonia  argues  f rom the order  and 
t e l eo l o g i c a l  f e a t u re s  o f  the c o s m o s  to t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an 
i n t e l l i g e n t ,  d i v i n e  a r c / i e  w h o  c o n t r o l s ,  s t e e r s  a nd  o r d e r s  
every th ing  for the best  (B3.  5). Thus  the p r e ced e n t  o f  a divine,  
rat ional  a r c h e  of all things is well establ ished.
Let  us go back to our  present  text .  Ar i s t o t l e  ( 1 0 7 2 b 2 7 f f . )  
expl ici t ly ascribes life to God.  argues that the act ivi ty of  thought  is 
life and that God is that act ivi ty but God' s  l ife is eternal  (a i d i o s , 
a i d n ) , 69 con t inuous  (s u n e c h e s ), and mos t  good ( a r i s t o n ) .  "For 
that  is what  God is", he concludes  (10 7 2 b l 4-30) .  Cf.  D i ogenes  of  
Apol lonia :  'For this very thing seems to me  to be a god. . . '  (B5).  
Ar i s to t l e ' s  c onc l us i on  indicates  that  he is w o r k i n g  in c o nsc io us  
r e f e r en ce  to p re c ed i n g  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  G od .  G r e e k  t r ad i t i on ,  
re l ig ious  or phi losophical ,  ascr ibes  dea th l es s  l ife ( a l h a n a t o s )  and 
goodness  to gods or the divine,  and insofar  as God is the first  or is
69 Plato uses a i d i o s  to s igni fy not only the eternal be ing  o f  the Forms but 
also that o f  the divine  stars ( P h i l .  66a; Ti .  37e ,  40b) .  A i d n  in Home r  
s igni f ies  vitality and a duration o f  l ife that is cont inuous .  Plato uses  the 
term to denote  t imeless  eternity,  and so fo l l o w s  the Eleat ics ,  the first to 
argue sp ec i f i ca l ly  for the attribution o f  c h a n g e l e s s  and t i m e l e s s  duration  
to Being  (cf. Parmenides B5,  8).
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a mo n g  the first  causes  of  all things,  the universe  becomes  a l iving 
s y s t e m  o f  o r g an i c  par t s  wh ich  h av e  spec i f i c  f u n c t i on s  in it. 
A l r e a d y  in P l a to  the  g oo d n e ss  o f  God  is a x i oma t i c .  In the 
R e p u b l i c  ( 379- 383)  Plato cr i t icises  the way in which Greek poets 
desc r ibe  the gods  and argues  that  the gods  mus t  o f  necess i ty  be 
i n te l l igent  and jus t  and cannot  do ha rm to anyone.  In the same 
work ,  the G ood  is the supreme founda t ion  of  being,  the mode l  of  
order  for the wor ld and the supreme end of  all act ivi ty.  (Cf.  G . 
499e) .  In the T i m a e u s , the D em i u r g e  who  is e ssent i a l ly  good,  
de s i r es  that  all th ings  should  r e s e m b l e  "h imsel f "  as much  as 
poss ible  (29e.  30c).
Ar i s tot le  ends  the chapter  by deny ing  of  the first subs tance  any 
a t t r i bu t e s  wh ic h  i mp l y  ma te r i a l i t y  and t he re fo r e  i mp e r f ec t i on .  
First  subs t ance  has no magn i tude  ( a n e u  m e g e t h o s ). is impass ive  
{ ap  at  h c s ) and unal terable  ( a n a l l o i n t o n ) ;  ' for all other  kinds  of 
mot ion  are pos ter ior  to spatial  m o t i o n ’. It is also not "par t ible" 
( a w e r e s )  and is indivisible ( a d i a e r e l o n ) \  ' for it causes  mot ion for 
an infini te t ime,  and nothing finite has an infini te potent ial i ty;  and 
the re fo re ,  s ince  every  ma g n i t u d e  is e i t he r  f ini te  or inf ini te ,  it 
c a n n o t  h av e  f i n i t e  m a g n i t u d e ,  and  it c a n n o t  h a ve  i n f i n i t e  
m a g n i t u d e  b e ca us e  there is no such thing at all ' .  Here  is an
a rgument  r ou gh ly  presented.  Ar i s tot le ,  who  assoc ia tes  magn i t ude  
with body,  seems  to argue that  the first pr inc iple  has no (bodi ly)  
size or magn i tude  at all. For  suppose  that  it has size.  Then it is 
e i t he r  f ini te  or  inf ini te.  A body  o f  inf ini te  s ize  is, for  him,  
i m p o s s i b l e . 7^ It cannot  have f ini te size s ince a f ini te magni tude  
does  not  possess  the energy  to cause  inf ini te  mot ion  in inf ini te
7 6 Reason s  for tlicrc being no infinite body were discussed in de  C a e l o  1, 
5-7. Cf. Ph y .  iii 5; 2 0 8 a 9 - l l
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t ime.  F i r s t  s ub s t an c e  c aus es  i n f in i t e  m o t i o n  in i n f in i t e  t ime.
The re fo r e  it is not  a f ini te ma gn i t u de  e i t he r . 71 There fore  it has
no magni tude ,  i.e., body at all. If  it has no ma g n i t u d e  it has  no 
p a r t s  ( a m e r e s ), and  i f  it ha s  no  p a r t s  it  is i n d i v i s i b l e
(a d i a e r e t o n ) J 2
F i r s t  s u b s t a n c e  is i m p a s s i v e  ( a p a t h e  s )  a n d  u n c h a n g e a b l e  
( a n a l l o i o t  on) .  By "apat hes"  Ar i s to t l e  mos t  p r o b a b l y  means  that  
the first  being is not  suscept ible  of  any inf luence  f rom the outside,  
such as heat or cold,  etc. ,  and therefore it does  not  age or feel pain,
etc; and this in turn impl ies  that it is not  exposed  to c o r r u p t i o n . ' ^
For  the at t r ibut ion of  a p a t h e s  to the first  being cf.  Mel i ssus  fr. 7 
( a n t e  a l y e i  an t e  a n i a s t h a i ) \  P l a t o ’s T i .  33a-b .  At  de  An .
4 0 8 b 2 9 - 3 0 .  n o u s  is said to be impass ive ,  and G C  335b 2 9  states
that things  wi thout  mat ter  are impass ive .  First  be ing is also said
to be changeless .  The reason given,  which is that  all other  kinds 
of  mot ion  are subject  to spatial  mo v em e n t ,  is unclear .  But it 
p r e suppose s  Ar i s to t l e ' s  theory of  c h a n g e  in the  P h y s i c s  wh i ch  
fo l l ows  Plato' s ,  accord ing  to which all qua l i t a t ive  changes  depend  
proximate ly  on pr imary,  local mot ion,  the perfect  form of  which is 
c i r cu l a r  mot ion .  Ar i s to t l e ' s  point  s eems  to be that ,  s ince  first  
subs tance  does  not undergo  any local change  ( k i n e s i s ) ,  it does  not 
alter at all. A k i n e t o s ,  therefore,  exc ludes  local  mo v eme n t .
71 Jaeger ( 1 9 4 7 )  thinks that these l ines  are intended as a refutation o f
P r e s o c r a l i c  c o n c e p t i o n s  whi ch  as cr ib e  in f i n i t y  to the  d i v i n e  (as  in
An axi m and er ,  M e l i s s u s ,  Anaxagoras)
7 -  Cf .  de An.  4 0 7 a 9 .  A r i s t o t l e  s a y s  t hat  r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  n o t  c o n t i n u o u s
i n t h e  s e n s e  in w h i c h  a m a g n i t u d e  is.
7 3 Cf. 326a  1; M e t a .  1 0 1 9a25ff .  That a p a t h e s  d o c s  not e x c l u d e  local
movement:  cf. de Cac l o  2 7 0 1 3 ff .
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5 Book  xii, 9
W h e r e a s  c h a p t e r  8 a sks  and a n s w e r s  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  the
pos s i b i l i t y  o f  a p lura l i t y  of  i m m a t e r i a l  s u b s t a n c e s ,  c h a p t e r  9 
r e turns  to immate r i a l  subs t ance  a l r eady  e s t a b l i s h e d  in chap t e r  7 
as an eternal  thinking.  Accordingly,  I di scuss  c h ap t e r  9 here as a 
logical  sequel  to chapter  7 and discuss chap te r  8 later.
Ch ap t e r  9 (1074b  15-10 7 5 a l  6) opens  wi th  the a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t  
that  there are di ff icul t ies  about  the c once p t i on  o f  Rea so n  as the 
d iv in es t  of  th ings  k nown  to u s . 74 It is f u r t he r  a s sumed  that
Reason  must  essent ia l ly  be th inking,  o t he rw i s e  it wou l d  be no 
bet ter  than one  who is s leeping.  In Greek  p r o t r ep t i ca l  l i terature 
the t h em e  o f  be ing  a s l ee p  f r e q u e n t l y  o c c u r s ,  and  s l eep  is
c o n s i d e r e d  u n d e s i r a b l e .  H e r a c l i t u s  u r g e s  m e n  to b e s t i r  
t hems e l ves  f rom s lumber  and live a w ak i n g  l ife wh i ch  uni tes  
t hem to the rat ional  L o g o s ,  the e ternal  t ruth.  In the L a w s
(808b5-6)  Plato also writes that a man who  is a s l eep  is no bet ter  
than a corpse.  Aristot le too has some negat ive  v i ews  about  sleep.  
In P r o t r .  D101,  he w'rites that sleep,  h owever  p l easan t  it is, is not 
a th ing  to c h oo se  because  it r e m o v e s  us f r o m  the t r u t h . 7 6
According  to D80 only he who is w'aking is t ruly al ive.  Sleep is 
related to the low'er part of  man,  i.e., to his vege t a t i ve  f unc t ion .76
74 Literally the text reads "the divincsl  o f  v i sible  things" ( p h a i n o m e n o n  
t h e i o t a t o  n).  "T a p h a i n o m c n a "  in A r i s to t le  m e a n s  "v is ib le  things",  
"observed facts", and sometimes,  "the commo n v iew ot the people".  Sec G. 
E. L. Owen,  in Barnes,  Schof ie ld,  and Sorabji ( 1975 ,  pi  12-126) .  At first
sight this is strange,  s ince Aris totle b e l i e v e s  that reason" is immater ial  
and invis ib le .  But,  like Plato before  him,  A r is t ot le  c a l l s  the h e avenl y  
bodies  which arc divine  entit ies  and w h o s e  m ot io n s  arc rational "visible".
Cf. P h y .  196a34; M e t a .  10 6 9 a 3 0 - 3 1. Thus the text max refer to reason
vis ib le  in the behaviour o f  the heavenly bodies  and/or in human life.
76 But on the pleasure which sleep affords, sec P o l .  1339a 14-21 
76 E E  12 19b 1 8 ff., 1216a3ff.
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For  Ar i s to t l e ,  as for Herac l i tus  and Pla to,  it is p r ec i se l y  the 
absence  of  scient i f ic knowledge  and rat ional  se l f - awareness  which 
m a kes  s leep somet h ing  imper fec t  and u nd e s i r ab l e . 77 Other  texts 
br ing out the posi t ive aspect  of sleep,  viz. ,  that  in sleep the soul 
becomes  isolated from the world,  and may  enter  into contact  with 
the d i v i n e .78 Aris tot le  s t rongly assoc ia t es  happ iness  or p l easure
with activity,  and activity is compared to a waking life. Thus  he is 
again using human life as a model  on the basis of  which to explain 
the nature of  divine life. In this context ,  he may  be drawing on
the prot rept ical  l i terature as also on the phi losophical  background
of the S o p h i s t  248e-249b,  where  Pla to  main ta ins  that  per fec t  or 
c o mp le t e  Be i ng  (to pan t e l os  on)  is somet h ing  el se  beyond  Res t  
and Mot ion,  and necessari ly has life and reason .7^
In d e t e r mi n i ng  the nature of  the act ivi ty  o f  s up r eme  Reason ,  
Aristot le proceeds  by exclusion:  ei ther  Reason (i) does  not  think at 
all ( m e i l e n )  or (ii) thinks but thinks  someth ing  other  than i tself  
or (iii) thinks i tself  as its object .  (i) is excluded by the doct r ine  
that the act ivi ty of  th inking is Reason ' s  puta t ive  vene r ab i l i t y . 8 ^ 
(i i )  is l i ke wi se  exc luded ;  a c c o r d i n g  to Ar i s t o t l e ' s  t h e o r y  of
cogni t ion ,  if it thinks something other  than i tself,  that other  will 
de te rmine  its essence,  so that it will  be a potent ial i ty ( d u n a m i s ) , 
cont ra ry  to its nature as pure actual i ty.  It fo l l ows  also that  it 
would  not be the best substance,  s ince it would  der ive  its being
77 C W N E  10 9 5 b 3 2 - 3 3 ,  1 0 9 8b 3- 1099a2 ,  U 0 2 b 4 - 7 ;  de An.  4 1 2 a2 3-26 ,  M e t a .
10 7 2 b l 7
7  ^ Cf. de Phi los,  fr. 12a. Also Aeschylus,  Eu m.  104.
7  ^ Cf. P h i l ,  l i d ,  where Plato uses  h c x i s  and d u n a m i s  to assoc iate ,  in 
context ,  happiness with the active quality o f  life.
^  Here again som e conn ec t ion  with the S o p h i s t  is made probable .
"S c m n o n " in b 18 evokes  S o p h i s t  2 4 9 a ,  where Plato  writes  that the  
supreme reality cannot be venerable and holy i f  it is devoid o f  n o u s .
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h o n o u r a b l e  [t i m i  o n )  f rom the act  of  t h inking .  The  overal l  
conc lus ion  is. at least ,  that  the best  subs t ance  is e ssent i a l ly  an 
actual  thinking,  and that it does not think of  things outs ide itself.  
P l a t o  s o m e t i m e s  a sc r i be s  be ing  t i m i o s  to the qual i ty  o f  the 
p r o d u c t  o f  Rea son ' s  act ivi ty (e.g. ,  P h i l .  30b).  But  since it is a 
P l a t on i c  a x i om that  the qua l i ty  of  the  p r o du c t  ma n i f e s t s  the 
charac te r  of  its cause  (77 . 30a),  it p r e supposes  that  the supreme 
p r i nc i p l e  is t i m i o s .  L i kewise ,  Ar i s to t l e  app l i es  the t e rm to 
i mpe r i s hab l e  being,  and to e u d a i m o n i a  ( N E  l l O l b l l ) .  C f  d  e
A n .  402a:  .V £  1102a 1. At M e t a .  983a5 t i m i o s  de no t es  the
highest  and the most  divine form of knowledge,  and in 1074b29 it 
is an a t t r ibute  of  Reason .  In the present  context ,  it s igni f ies
ontological  perfect ion which commands  our respect .  The first two 
a l t e rna t ives  hav ing  been exc luded ,  Ar i s to t l e  no w turns  to the
third. Here too Aristot le proceeds by exclusion,  but inelegant ly as
though (ii) above has not been el iminated.
The real al ternat ives  are presented in an i r regular  diaeres is ,  and 
may be r econs t ruc ted  as fol low:  (i) Reason thinks  i t se l f  or (ii)
R eason  th inks  s ome t h i ng  else.  If (i i ),  then,  ( i ia)  it t h inks  
someth ing  which is a lways  di fferent ,  and (i ib) r andoml y  now the 
good now the worst  or (iic) a lways the same and of  the highest
things,  which are e i ther  (iid) changing or (i ie) changeless .  The
conc lus ion  indi rect ly  aff i rms (i) by assoc ia t ing  it with (i ic) and
(iie) as implying the exclusion of (ii) and (iid). (ii) is also excluded 
b eca us e  it i nvo l ves  (i ia) which impl i e s  ( i ib)  and (i id).  The 
a r g u me n t  beg ins  by saying that  Reas on  c an n o t  e ng ag e  in the 
process  of  th inking ( d i a n o e i s t h a i )  some things ( e n i d n )  but only 
that which is most  divine,  honourable  and does  not change . 81 For
^  D i a n o e i s t h a i  s i g n i f i e s  the pr ocess  o f  th inking in which ana lys i s ,
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the  c ha ng e  ( m e t a b o l e , k i n e s i s ) 82 wil l  be  for  the worst .  This  
d e p e n d s  on two  bas ic  a s s u mp t i o n s :  t ha t  R e a s o n  is a p e r f e c t
ins t ance  of  being and that  any k i n e s i s  or m e t a b o l e  wi l l  de t rac t  
f rom its per fec t ion;  and that  c hange  is f r o m  one  qua l i t y  to its 
oppos i te ,  and vice  versa.  This  lat ter  r evea l s  both the ins tabi l i ty,  
l imi t a t i on  and internal  con t r a r i e t y  o f  c h a n g e a b l e  t h ings .  T h e se  
are to be excluded f rom the nature of  Reason.  It is fur ther  argued 
tha t  s i nce  m e t a b o l e  and k i n e s i s  i n v o l v e  p o t e n t i a l i t y ,  t h e  
cont inui ty  of  noet ic  th ink ing  would be l abor ious  and its e s s ence  
d e t e r m i n e d  by its ex t e r na l  ob j ec t  wh i ch  w ou l d  t hen  be m o r e  
honourable .  Fat igue too is to be excluded  f rom the nature  of  God,  
as Xe nophanes  has long argued (frr.  25,  26) .  Ar i s to t l e  s eems  to 
say that the first be ing is free f rom change ,  defec t s  or  toil  and 
pain - a f fec t ions  of  mor ta l  e x i s t e n c e , ^  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  Me l i s s us  
B2.  4, x  L i k ewi se  it is free f r om pas s iv i t y .  S o m e  Gr eek  
ph i l o s ophe r s  of  wh o m  E m p e d o c l e s  is o u t s t an d i n g  he ld  tha t  in 
sensat ion,  the perc ipient  is pass ive,  and rece ives  s ome t h i ng  f rom 
the object .  Aris tot le ' s  concep t  of  c ogn i t i ve  pass iv i ty  is c lose  to 
E m p e d o c l e s '  but  d i f f e r e n t . ^ 4 In the de A n i m a ,  cogn i t i on  is not  
pass ivi ty  as such but  an act ivi ty o f  se l f - rea l i sa t ion occas i oned  by 
the p e r c ep t i v e  r e l a t i on  o f  the p e r c i p i e n t  wi t h  the  o b j e c t  o f  
p e r c e p t i o n  ( 4 1 7 b 6 - 7 ) .  In h u m a n  t h i n k i n g  t o o  s o m e t h i n g  
ana logous  occurs :  when h uman  reason  rea l i ses  i t sel f ,  it does  so
s y n t h e s i s ,  i n f e r e n c e ,  j u d g e m e n t ,  arc used,  w h e r e a s  n o e i n  is a direct  
grasp or rational vision o f  the essence  o f  things.  Cf. de  An.  4 0 8 b 2 4 f f .
8 ^ M c t a b o l c  covers  c o m in g  to be and pas ing  away,  whi le  k i n e s i s  c o v e r s  
alteration,  augmentat ion ,  and decrease.  A n y  o f  the se  is e x c lu d e d  from 
first su bs tanc e .
83 Cf. de Cuel o  2 8 4 a l4 f f .
84 Cf. de Sensu 439 a l3 ;  de An.  418a3
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with sens ible  forms rece ived  in s en se -p er ce p t i o n  (403a8) .  The  
form or sensible  form which provides  the occas ion for  the exerci se  
of  human reason is thought  of  as, in a sense ,  de t e r min ing  reason
by br inging it to actual i ty f rom what  it was  in potent ia l ly  (de An.
429a l 3 f f . ) .  Given that  div ine  thinking is essent ia l ly  an actual i ty,  
it fol lows that it is comple te ly  se l f -de te rmined and impass ive .  It
fo l l ows  also that  God,  by being a pure  form,  th inks  i t se l f  only.  
Th i s  thi rd d e gr ee  t h i nk i ng  ac t i v i ty  is pu t  p e r i p h r a s t i c a l l y  as 
th inking  of  thinking,  ( noes i s  n o e s e o s . 1 0 7 4 b 3 5 ) . 85 'Since it is
the best of  beings'  (to krci t i s ton) , 86 and its act ivi ty is unchang ing  
and eternal ,  God thinks the best  thing - "itself" - e ternal ly .87
Given  the f o r ego ing ,  Ar i s t o t l e ’s next  m o v e  ( 1 0 7 4 a 3 6)  wh i ch  
appears  to repeat  issues al ready argued,  is logical ly surpris ing.  It
is not so surpris ing if it is seen as ra i s ing fur ther  quest ions  about  
the nature of  divine  s e l f -knowledge .  He says  that  k n o w l e d g e  
( e p i s t e m e ) .  p e r c e p t i o n  (a i s t h e s i s ), o p i n i o n  ( d o x a ) ,  and  
u n d e r s t an d i ng  (d i a n o i a ) 88 seem to be a lways  of  someth ing  else,
85 Cf. de. An. .  4 1 3b32-33.
] 0 7 4 b35. Xenophanes  used "k r a t i s t o n" lo characterise God as the most
powerful  o f  beings.  In Plato's d ia logues  the term not only s igni f ies  the
most perfect being but also the most powerful  ( T i  40a; L a w s  895b).  The
term is very suited to stress that the first be ing is not influenced by other  
things.  It is also a verbal reminder o f  the re l ig iou s  background o f  the 
conception of  God as a supreme power.
87 M e t a .  10 7 4 b 3 3 - 10 7 5 a l 0. R. Norman ( 1 9 6 9 ) ,  "Aristot le' s Phi l oso phc r-  
God",  P k r o n e  s i s .  xiv,  p. 6 3 -7 4 ,  m ain ta ins  that in "thinking i t self",  
Ari sto t l e  'is s im pl y  d esc r ib in g  the sa m e  a c t iv i t y  that human m in ds  
perform when they engage  in abstract thought' .  But Norman's  thinking  
that the first mover  is 'a sort o f  heavenly  Narcissus ,  who looks round for 
the perfect ion he w ishes  to contemplate ,  f inds  no th ing  to rival his own  
s e l f  presupposes  that the first m ove r  can first k n o w  things other than 
i tself .  However ,  the very opposi te  o f  Norman's  presuppos i t ion  is what  
Aristotle is at pains to establish: divine k n o w le d g e  is self -contained.
88  The  enumerat ion  o f  these  types  o f  c o g n i t i o n  recal l s  the le v e ls  o f
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and only  concomi tan t l y  of  themselves  (cf. de An.  429b5-9) .  One 
poss ib le  reason for this move  is the Platonic view that  man,  unl ike 
d e i t y ,  d o e s  no t  h a ve  d i r e c t  s e l f - k n o w l e d g e :  r a t i o n a l  sel f -
k n o w l e d g e  is media t ed  by l o g o s , whe rea s  God,  the ph i l o sophe r  
p a r  e x c e l l e n c e , is the rea l i ty  which is by def ini t ion an eternal  
k n o w e r  o f  intel l igible Forms  (77. 28a).
Ar i s to t l e  ra i ses  fur ther  the quest ion that  if, as seems  to be the 
case ,  th ink ing  and the objec t  of  thought  are d i f f erent ,  in what
cons i s t s  the we l l -be ing  (to eu)  of  divine thinking?  This quest ion 
is o b s c u r e ,  but  it p r e s u p p o s e s  a w e l l - d e v e l o p e d  theo r y  of
happ ines s  accord ing  to which to be happy  also cons i s t s  in being 
k n o wn  by others .  At E E  1 2 4 5 b 14-19,  A r i s to t l e  wr i t e s  that
f r i endship  is an essent ial  e lement  of  human happiness ,  because by 
k n o wi n g  o ther  people  they become  ful ly aware  of  t h ems e l v e s . 8 9 
On the b a s i s  of  this bel ief ,  Ar i s tot l e  deve l oped  his theory  of
a n t  i p h i l i i i . i.e.. of  mutual  re la t ionship and i n t imacy . 9( )  One must  
not only love but also be loved,  and f r iends should know their
m u t u a l  f e e l i ngs .  Over  and agains t  an op in ion  which made  
f r i en d sh i p  be nev o l en ce ,  Ar i s to t l e  po in ted  out  that  f r i endsh ip  is
c o m m u n i o n .  In the S y m p o s i u m , P l a t o  i m p l i e s  that  t rue
f r iendship,  born out  of  divine madness ,  is a spiri tual  union of  two 
souls  in search of  wisdom.  In the case of  God,  Aristot le seems to 
argue,  there is a special  problem because for him a n t i p h i l i a  does
not seem possible.  For  in dei ty to know and to be known coincide,  
and thus also to love and be loved.  At  E E  vii 12, it appears  that 
the t ruly happy  man does  not  need fr iends.  Thi s  is par t icular ly
cogni t ion on Plato's divided line in the R e p u b l i c .  Cf. also P a r m .  142a
89 Cf. N E  1170a32-b
90 E E  12 3 6 a ]4-15 ,  b3-4
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mani fes t  in the case of  God.  This concept ion of  God,  about  which 
we  shal l  speak later,  appar en t ly  ra i ses  s e r ious  mora l  ques t ions  
abou t  G o d ’s relat ion to the world.  The  text  next  rei terates  what  
had  g o n e  before :  it a m o un t s  to s h o wi n g  tha t  even  in some  
p r oduc t i ve  sciences  which di s regard  mat t e r  the objec t  of  thought  
is an e ssence  (o u s i a ), wh i l e  in the s p e c u l a t i v e  sc i ences ,  the 
fo r mula  and the act of  thinking are one.  The  impl ici t  conclusion is 
that  d iv ine  th inking is of  a pure  kind far  r e m o v ed  f rom mat ter ,  
and that  it is the same as the object  of  thought .  Therefore ,  God' s  
w e l l - b e i ng  is s e l f -conta ined .  The  last  but  i n t e r e s t i ng  a p o r i a  
ra i sed about  the nature of  divine  th inking is whe t he r  its object ,  
viz..  itself,  is composi te  ( s u n t h e t o n ) .
In answer ,  it is implied that if the object  of  thought  is composi te,  
the  t h i n k i n g  mi n d  is a p o t e n t i a l i t y ,  and i n v o l v e s  d i s cu r s i ve  
r easoning  or. as Aris tot le puts it. thinks by moving  f rom one part 
of  the whole to another .  This,  it seems,  is character i s t ic  of us as 
compos i t e  beings.  But,  in contrast ,  God' s  thinking,  which is pure
form,  does  not  i nvolve  infe rence ,  j u d g e m e n t  or  analys i s ;  it is 
space less  absolu t e  insight  of  eternal  durat ion:  ' just  as the human
thinking  or that of  composi te  beings is in a cer tain space of  t ime
(for it at tains the good which is other than itself, not  in this or that
t ime,  but in the whole  period of  t ime),  so is absolute  sel f - thinking 
in e terni ty '  (] 0 7 5 a 1 1). In this passage ,  Ar i s to t l e  a ssumes  that  
s u p r e m e  g o od n es s  or  happ i nes s  (to eu  or to ar i s t on)  is rat ional  
act ivi ty  o f  the sort  whose  highest  and eternal  express ion  is God.  
If this recal l s  the defini t ion of  happiness  in N E  10 9 8 a l  6 - 1 6 - 2 0 ,  
then the ma in  con t r a s t  be twee n  the t h i nk i ng  o f  c o mp o s i t e l y  
r a t i o n a l  b e i n g s  and  d i v i n e  s e l f - t h i n k i n g  is t ha t ,  a l t h o u g h
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i n d i v i s i b l e  m i n d s  a r e  i n v o l v e d  in b o t h  c a s e s ,  it t a k e s  t h e  h u m a n  
m i n d  a l i f e t i m e  o f  t he  h i g h e s t  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a c t i v i t y  o f  w h i c h  it is 
c a p a b l e  t o  a t t a i n  d i v i n e  h a p p i n e s s  ( c f .  N E  1 1 7 7 b 2 5 ),  w h e r e a s  
d i v i n e  a c t i v i t y  is p e r  se  e t e r n a l l y  a  h a p p y  l i f e ,  s i n c e  i t s  v e r y  
n a t u r e  is a b s o l u t e l y  f r e e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  c o m p o n e n t  w h i c h  m i g h t  
i m p e d e  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  i t s  t h i n k i n g  a c t i v i t y  a n d  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  
t h o u g h t . 91
Is d i v i n e  n oe t on  t he n  a b a r e  u n i t  o r  s o m e t h i n g  e l s e ?  D o e s  t he  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a g e n t  a n d  o b j e c t  o f  t h o u g h t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  
" t h i n k i n g  o f  t h i n k i n g "  i s  o b j e c t l e s s ?  A t  1 0 7 2 a 3 2 f f .  d i v i n e  
T h i n k i n g  ( n o e s i s )  is s a id  to be  s i m p l e  (h a p l e ), a l t h o u g h  t h i s  is 
f u r t h e r  e x p l a i n e d  as  i n v o l v i n g  n o t  n u m e r i c a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  - n o t  
t he  O n e  - w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  to an o n t o l o g y  a t t r i b u t e d  to  P l a t o  by  
A r i s t o t l e  - bu t  a s t a t e  o f  e x i s t e n c e .  At  M e l a .  1 0 5 9 b 3 5  t ha t  w h i c h  
is s i m p l e r  is s a i d  t o  be  m o r e  o f  a p r i n c i p l e  t h a n  t h a t  w h i c h  is 
n o t . 9 -  S o m e  i l l u m i n a t i o n  o f  thi s  p r o b l e m  is p r o v i d e d  b y  t he  d e  
A n i m a  ( 4 3 0 b  1 4 ) ,  w h e r e  A r i s t o t l e  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  
k n o w l e d g e  as  i n d i v i s i b l e ,  n o t  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  b u t  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  in 
f o r m ,  a n d  is g r a s p e d  in an  i n d i v i s i b l e  t i m e  w i t h  an  i n d i v i s i b l e  pa r t  
o f  t h e  sou l .  Ye t ,  l e a v i n g  o u t  o f  a c c o u n t  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  a s p e c t  o f  
t h i n g s  a l t o g e t h e r  in o r d e r  t o  r e a c h  t h e i r  u n i t y  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  
m a k e  s u c h  u n i t y  e m p t y  a n d  a b s t r a c t .  S u c h  an  a c c o u n t  w o u l d  be  
s e c u r i n g  u n i t y  no t  b y  s y n t h e s i s  bu t  b y  t h e  o m i s s i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  
a n d  m u l t i p l i c i t y .  I f  o n e  s h o u l d  p r o c e e d  f u r t h e r  in t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  
s i m p l i c i t y  wi l l  n o t  b e  t ha t  o f  a w h o l e  w h i c h  is  u n d i v i d e d  b e c a u s e
91 Cf. Pol .  13 23 b2 0- 24 .
9 2 \ \/c enc ou nt er  "hap In us" in c o n n e c t io n  with A n a x a g o r a s '  theory o f
R eason {dc An.  405a  16-17).  The alomists may have made use o f  the term 
by asserting that s imple  atoms arc the ult imate e l em en ts  o f  reality (A135).  
A l t h o u g h  the term is not prominent  in Plato,  a f e w  s ign i f icant  texts  
occur. E.g.,  in R.  380d, God is said to be h a p l o u s .
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n o  p a r t  o f  it  is c o n c e i v a b l e  w i t h o u t  t h e  r e s t ,  b u t  t h a t  o f  a  b a r e
i d e n t i t y  w h i c h  is o n e  w i t h  i t s e l f  b e c a u s e  it  h a s  n o  c o n t e n t  at  al l .  
T h i s  e x c l u s i o n  o f  t he  q u a n t i t a t i v e  f r o m  t h e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  p u r e  f o r m  
c r e a t e s  a s u s p i c i o n  t ha t  A r i s t o t l e  is  s e e k i n g  a u n i t y  b y  w a y  o f  
a b s t r a c t i o n .  T h i s  s u s p i c i o n  is  c o n f i r m e d  b y  w h a t  h e  s a y s  in t he  
o b s c u r e  c o n t e x t  o f  t he  f o l l o w i n g  p a s s a g e  ( 4 3 0 b 2 2 f f . )  in w h i c h  he  
s e e m s  t o  b e  a n s w e r i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  p u r e  f o r m s  c a n n o t  be  
s i m p l e  b e c a u s e  t h e y  h a v e  n e g a t i v e s  o r  o p p o s i t e s  w h i c h  a r e  
a p p r e h e n d e d  by  t he  act  o f  r e a s o n i n g  by  w h i c h  w e  g r a s p  t h e  f o r m s
t h e m s e l v e s .  A r i s t o t l e  w o u l d  h a v e  to a n s w e r ,  c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i t h  h i s  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  c o g n i t i o n ,  t ha t  t he  o p p o s i t e s  or  n e g a t i v e s  o f  t h e  p u r e  
f o r m s  e x i s t  o n l y  in the  p h e n o m e n a l  w o r l d ,  in t he  r e g i o n  o f  m a t t e r
a n d  c h a n g e .  H e n c e  a l s o  p a s s i v e  r e a s o n  a p p r e h e n d s  t h e  n e g a t i v e s
o r  o p p o s i t e s  o f  t he  f o r m s  a l o n g  wi t h  t h e m ,  i n s o f a r  as  it h a s  a 
m a t e r i a l  o r  s e n s i b l e  ba s i s  a nd  t h e r e f o r e  i t s e l f  b e l o n g s  to t h e  w o r l d
o f  c h a n g e .  But  fo r  the  e s s e n t i a l l y  a c t i ve  r e a s o n  n o  s uc h  o p p o s i t i o n
o r  n e g a t i o n  c a n  e x i s t .  It h a s  n o  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  m a t t e r ,  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e  n o  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .  In i t s  p u r e  i n t u i t i v e
e n e r g y ,  it is s i m p l y  p o s i t i v e  o r  a f f i r m a t i v e  o f  i t s e l f  a nd  h a s  n o t  to 
dea l  wi t h  the  n e g a t i v e  e v e n  as  a p o s s i b i l t y .
I f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  is  t rue ,  t h e n ,  w h i l e  w e  m a y  c o n c e d e  t h a t  t h e
c r i t i c a l  p a s s a g e  is o b s c u r e ,  w e  c a n  r e a s o n  a b l g  e x p e c t  A r i s t o t l e  to 
m e a n  t h a t  al l  o p p o s i t i o n  o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  in t h o u g h t  a r e  m e r e l y  
r e l a t i v e ,  a n d  t ha t  t h e y  i m p l y  t he  u n i t y  o f  t he  r e a s o n  w h i c h  g r a s p s  
t h e m  as  a w h o l e .  O n  thi s  v i e w ,  A r i s t o t l e  wi l l  n o t  be  d i s m i s s i n g
n e g a t i o n  a n d  o p p o s i t i o n  a s  u n r e a l  o r  a s  n o t  i n v o l v e d  in p u r e
t h o u g h t .  He  wi l l  o n l y  be  c o n t e n d i n g  t ha t  t h e y  a r e  n e v e r  to be
t a k e n  as  a b s o l u t e  n e g a t i o n  or  o p p o s i t i o n .  T h e  o b j e c t i o n  to t h i s  is
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t ha t ,  in hi s  w h o l e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t he  L a w  o f  C o n t r a c d i c t i o n ,  A r i s t o t l e  
s e e m s  to l a y  a l l  t h e  e m p h a s i s  u p o n  t h e  m u t u a l  e x c l u s i v e n e s s  o f  
t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  a n d  t h e  n e g a t i v e . ^  M o r e o v e r ,  n o t i c e  t h e  
c o m p a r i s o n  w h i c h  A r i s t o t l e  d r a w s  ( 4 3 0 b 2 6 f f . )  b e t w e e n  t h e  
i n t u i t i o n  b y  w h i c h  r e a s o n  a p p r e h e n d s  t h e  p u r e  f o r m s  o f  t h i n g s ,  
a n d  t h e  a p p r e h e n s i o n  b y  t h e  s p e c i a l  s e n s e ( s )  o f  t h e  " s p e c i a l  
o b j e c t "  ( t ou  i d i o u )  - i m p l y i n g  t ha t  s uch  a p p r e h e n s i o n  is a s i m p l e ,  
i n d i v i s i b l e  a c t  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  al l  j u d g e m e n t  o r  i n f e r e n c e ,  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e  e x e m p t  f r o m  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e r r o r .  A r i s t o t l e  s e e m s  to 
f o r g e t  t ha t  e v e n  t h e  " s p e c i a l  s e n s i b l e s "  c a n n o t  be a p p r e h e n d e d  
w i t h o u t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  or  w i t h o u t  m e n t a l  p r o c e s s e s .  P e r h a p s ,  it  is 
s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  t o  o b j e c t  t ha t  t he  d e  A n i m a  d e a l s  w i t h  h u m a n  
r e a s o n  and no t  t he  p u r e  r e a s o n  o f  Go d .
A n y h o w ,  t he  M e t a  xii t ext  a p p e a r s  to e x c l u d e  f r o m  G o d  a n y  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h i n g s  w h i c h  are  not  " h i m s e l f " ,  f o r  thi s  w o u l d  m a k e  
G o d  p a s s i v e  a n d  d e p e n d e n t  on t h i n g s  o u t s i d e  i t s e l f .  A g a i n ,  in 
A r i s t o t l e ' s  d i v i s i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  i n t o  v a r i o u s  s c i e n c e s  o f  
i n c r e a s i n g  u n i v e r s a l i t y  a n d  a b s t r a c t i o n  - p h y s i c s ,  m a t h e m a t i c s ,  
t h e o l o g y  - s u p r e m e  k n o w l e d g e  r e m a i n s  e n t i r e l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
t h e  a p p r e h e n s i o n  o f  i m m a t e r i a l  a n d  e t e r n a l  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  a n d  
d o e s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l v e  t h e i r  c a u s a l i t y  in as  f a r  as  t h e y  
p r o d u c e  c e r t a i n  e f f e c t s .  I f  this  is so,  t he  f i r s t  b e i n g  as k n o w e r  o f  
i t s e l f  w o u l d  n o t  e v e n  k n o w  a b o u t  t he  w o r l d .  S u c h  an i n f e r e n c e ,  
on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  is a s t o n i s h i n g ,  s i n c e  it  w o u l d  t ak e  a w a y  f r o m
9 3 The re  are t h ree  for m s  - ( i )  o n t o l o g i c a l ,  ( i i )  l o g i c a l  and ( i i i )
p sy cho lo gi ca l  - in whi ch  Aristotle formulates his Law o f  Contradiction in 
the M e t a p h y s i c s :  (i) The same property cannot be long and not be long to 
a s ing le  object  at the same time ( 1 0 0 5 b l 9 - 2 0 ) ;  (i i)  Two contradictory  
p rop os i t io n s  cannot  be true at the same l i m e  (101 l b l 3 - 1 4 ) ;  ( i i i )  Tw o  
b e l i e f s  which an sw e r  to two  contradictory sen te nc es  cannot exist at the 
sam e time in a s ing le  consc iousness  ( 1 005 b23-24) .
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t h e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h ,  as  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  o t h e r  t h i n g s  
it s h o u l d  p o s s e s s .  M o r e o v e r ,  c e r t a i n  t e x t s  c l e a r l y  i m p l y  t h a t  t he
s u p r e m e  b e i n g  m u s t  h a v e  k n o w l e d g e  o f  al l  t h i n g s .  T o  r e m i n d  
o u r s e l v e s ,  A r i s t o t l e  h a d  s t a t e d  t ha t  G o d  is t he  c a u s e  o f  all  t h i n g s
a n d  a p r i n c i p l e ,  a n d  s o p h i a  is s a i d  to b e l o n g  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  G o d .  
B u t  s o p h i a , f o r  al l  w e  k n o w ,  i m p l i e s  a  s t a t e  o f  m i n d  w h i c h  k n o w s  
f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s .  T h i s  w o u l d  s u g g e s t  t ha t  i f  G o d  k n o w s  " h i m s e l f " ,  
h e  k n o w s  al l  t h i  n g s  as  t h e i r  p r i n c i p l e .  W e  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  
A r i s t o t l e  r i d i c u l e s  E m p e d o c l e s  f o r  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  h i s  s u p r e m e
s p h e r e - G o d  is n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  w i s e  b e c a u s e  i t s  n a t u r e  e x c l u d e s  o n e  
o f  E m p e d o c l e s ’ f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  S t r i f e .  F r o m  t h e s e  t ex t s ,  it s e e m s
t ha t  n e i t h e r  t he  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  d i v i n e  t h i n k i n g  n o r  t he  i d e n t i t y  o f  
n o u s  and  n o e t o n  n e c e s s i t a t e s  e x c l u s i o n  o f  al l  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t he  
w o r l d  f r o m  G o d .  B u t  t he  i s s u e  is c o m p l i c a t e d  a n d  wi l l  be
d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  in t he  f ina l  s ec t i on .
N o w  t he  n a t u r e  o f  G o d  ha s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  as  l i fe a n d  t h o u g h t .
T h o u g h t  is r e g a r d e d  as  t he  m o r e  k n o w n  t o  us .  f o r  t h i n k i n g  is 
g i v e n  as  t he  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  l i fe  in t h e  i m m a t e r i a l  
s u b s t a n c e .  W h a t  r e a s o n  i s  g i v e n  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a c t u a l  
t h i n k i n g  in t h i s  s u b s t a n c e ? ^ 4 T h e  a n s w e r  h a s  to be n e g a t i v e  as
f a r  as  t he  M e t a p h y s i c s  i t s e l f  is c o n c e r n e d .  B u t  t he  d i s c u s s i o n
s u m s  u p .  a n d  q u i t e  e v i d e n t l y  p r e s u p p o s e s  A r i s t o t l e ' s  o v e r a l l  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  c o g n i t i o n  as a r t i c u l a t e d  in t he  d e  Ani n i a .  T h e r e ,  as 
w e  r e m e m b e r ,  c o g n i t i o n  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  r e c e p t i o n  o f  a  f o r m  
w i t h o u t  i t s  m a t t e r . A  f o r m  in m a t t e r  m e a n s  a m a t e r i a l  t h i n g .
9 4  ] ( )7 2 b2 3 . In Plato's S o p h i s t  ( 2 4 8 c - 2 4 9 a ) ,  the p r ese n ce  o f  thought  in
p e r f e c t  b e i n g  is a c c e p t e d  as  t h o u g h  u n a v o i d a b l e ,  and f r o m it t he  p r e s e n c e  
o f  l i f e  is s h o w n  to fo l low,  as it fo l lows  for Aristotle.  But no reason for the 
ne c e s s a r y  p r e s e n c e  o f  thought  is stated by Plato  ex c e p t  an em ot ion a l  
reaction against its absence.
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I t  e x i s t s  in m a t t e r  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  b e i n g  p e r c e i v e d  o r  k n o w n .  
F o r m  w i t h o u t  m a t t e r ,  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  m e a n s  c o g n i t i o n .  W h e r e  it  
e x i s t s ,  i t  k n o w s .  It is a t h i n k i n g .  N e g a t i v e l y ,  it i s  d e s c r i b e d  as  
i m m a t e r i a l .  B u t  p o s i t i v e l y ,  i t  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  in  t e r m s  o f  t h e  
c o g n i t i o n  o f  w h i c h  o n e  is r e f l e x i v e l y  a w a r e  a s  o n e  k n o w s  a n d  
t h i n k s .  T h i s  p o s i t i v e  s ide  o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  n o t i o n  o f  i m m a t e r i a l  b e i n g  
e x p l a i n s  w h y ,  a g a i n s t  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  h i s  g e n e r a l  d o c t r i n e  o f  
c o g n i t i o n ,  h e  c a n  s o  e a s i l y  t a k e  f o r  g r a n t e d  t h a t  i m m a t e r i a l  
s u b s t a n c e  is c o g n i t i v e  and  on that  ba s i s  s h o w  t h a t  it  i s  l i v i n g  a n d  
d e d u c e  the  t y p e  o f  l i v i ng  it e n j o y s .
6 B o o k  xi i ,  8
W i t h  i m m a t e r i a l  s u b s t a n c e  e s t a b l i s h e d  in t h i s  w a y ,  c h a p t e r  8 a s k s  
w h e t h e r  t he r e  is j u s t  one  s uc h  s u b s t a n c e  o r  m o r e  t h a n  o n e ,  a n d  i f  
m o r e ,  h o w  m a n y .  T h e  a n s w e r  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  i n t e r n a l l y  
i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  a n d  it is a m o o t  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h i s  c h a p t e r  as  a 
w h o l e  or  a pa r t  o f  it r e a l l y  b e l o n g s  t o  b o o k  x i i . 96  T h e  a n s w e r  
a c c o r d i n g  to t he  f i r s t  pa r t  o f  the c h a p t e r  is t h a t  it d e p e n d s  o n  t he  
n u m b e r  o f  o r i g i n a l  m o t i o n s  o b s e r v a b l e  in t h e  h e a v e n s .  A c c o r d i n g  
to  o n e  a s t r o n o m e r  ( E u d o x u s )  t w e n t y - s i x  w o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  a n o t h e r  ( C a l l i p p u s )  t h i r t y - t h r e e ,  w h i l e  f u r t h e r  
p r e c i s i o n s  b r i n g  t he  e x a c t  n u m b e r  to f i f t y - f i v e  o r  a t  l e a s t ,  f o r t y -  
s e v e n .  A p l u r a l i t y  o f  e t e r n a l  (a i d i o u s ), i m m o v a b l e  ( a k i n e t o u s )
De  An.  424 a  17-24; 425b 23 -2 6 ;  432a4-9 .  Thou gh one  could not perce ive  
the sens ib le  form except  as embedded in matter: Tor even  i f  percept ion is 
o f  "the such" and not o f  indiv iduals ,  yet one  n e c e s s a r i ly  p e r c e i v e s  an 
individual,  and at a definite place and t ime’ ( P o s t .  A n .  8 7 b 2 8 - 3 0 ) .
By some this passage has been considered an insert that do es  not cohere  
with the rest o f  the chapter, e.g. ,  Jaeger (1934 ,  chp. 14). In de fe nc e  o f  the 
coherence  o f  the chapter as a whole,  sec  Phil ip Merlan ( 1 946 ,  p . 12)
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a n d  i m m a t e r i a l  ( a n e u  m e g e t h o u s )  s u b s t a n c e s  i s  a c c o r d i n g l y  
r e q u i r e d  ( 1 0 7 3 a 3 8 - b l ).
In t h e  n e x t  s e n t e n c e ,  A r i s t o t l e  s a y s  t h a t  t h e r e  is a c e r t a i n  
r e l a t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  m o v e r s  s u c h  t ha t  o n e  is f i r s t ,  a n o t h e r  s e c o n d ,
a n d  s o  o n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to t h e  o r d e r  o f  t h e  m o t i o n s  o f  t h e
h e a v e n l y  b o d i e s .  A r i s t o t l e  d o e s  n o t  d i s c u s s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
w h e t h e r  t h e  55  m o v e r s  f o r m  as  m a n y  d i s t i n c t l y  t h i n k i n g  r e a l i t i e s  
b e s i d e s  t h e  f i r s t  m o v e r  o r  a r e  f o r m a l  e l e m e n t s  in i t  o r  a r e
s o m e t h i n g  d i f f e r e n t .  N o r  d o e s  he d i s c u s s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  
t he  m o v e r s  o f  t h e  h e a v e n l y  s ph e r e s  and  b o d i e s  a r e  in r e l a t i o n  o f  
e f f i c i e n t  c a u s a l i t y  w i t h  w h a t  t hey  m o v e ,  as  is a p p a r e n t l y  t h e  c a s e  
in P h y .  vi i i ,  a n d  i f  so w h e t h e r  t he y  a r e  l o c a l l y  p r e s e n t  in t he
s p h e r e s  a n d  b o d i e s  o r  w h e t h e r  t h e y  t o o  m o v e  a s  b e i n g  d e s i r e d .
W h a t  is f a i r l y  c l e a r  is t hat  an o r d i na l  r e l a t i o n  is i n s e r t e d  a m o n g  
the  u m m o v e d  m o v e r s  i n v o l v i n g  a h i e r a r c h y  o f  f i na l  c a u s a l i t y ;  the
h i g h e r  m o v e r  s e r v i n g  as  a t e l  o s  ( an  e n d )  f o r ^ l o w e r . 9 ^ T h e  
u n m o v e d  m o v e r s  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi t h  b e i n g s  t h a t  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  
i m p a s s i v e  a n d  a r e  in e n d u r i n g  c o n d i t i o n  o f  g o o d n e s s 9 ** - and
97 Ow ens  (1950 ,  pp. 3 1 9- 337) ,  argues that the 55 mo vers  have a distinct  
substance o f  their own which,  onto logica l ly ,  is on the same level  as the 
first mover. On the other hand, K. Ochler (1968),  in G n o m o n  40,  641 -6 53 ,
thinks that the other movers arc on a lower level  than the first mover.  So
too Clark (1975,  V.3.14f f . ) ,  who poinis out that whereas  the Prime Mover  
and the p lanetary  m o v e r s  are both c ha rac ter is ed  as i m m o v a b l e  in
t h e m s e lv e s ,  the former but not the latter is said to be, in addi t ion,  
immovab le  accidental ly.  By cal l ing the planetary movers  "lesser movers"  
( sec t ion  14),  lie impl i es  that the d i f ference  in characterisat ion g iv e s  a 
status to the Pr ime m over  which is superior to the planetary movers;  
hence ,  these  other movers  arc subordinate to the Pr ime Mover.
' . . . ton a r i s t ou  t e t uc hc kui on lelos. . . '  The text uses  a perfect participle  
tense  for what 1 irans lalc  as be ing in an "enduring  co n d i t io n  o f
go o d n e s s " .  A r is to t l e  do cs  not,  1 b e l i e v e ,  intend to say that these
im m o v a b l e  su bs tanc es  acquire their g o o d n e s s ,  whi ch  wo uld  im pl y  that
they arc not eternal actualities.
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t h e s e  a r e  t h e  g r o u n d s  f o r  t h e i r  b e i n g  t e l e , i . e . ,  f i n a l  c a u s e s  
(1 0 7 4 a 2 0 - 2 2 ) .  1 0 7 4 a l 8 - 2 4  a n d  a 2 8  s e e m  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  a
s u b l u n a r  m o t i o n  m u s t  d e p e n d  on a c e l e s t i a l  m o t i o n  as  i t s  m o v e r  
a n d  e n d ,  a n d  al l  m o t i o n s  m u s t  h a v e  t h e  m o t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a r s  as
t h e i r  m o v e r  a n d  t h a t  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  w h i c h  t h e y  m o v e  ( a l t h o u g h  
1 0 7 4 a 2 5 - 2 8  i n c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  p e r h a p s  by  a s l i p ,  m a k e s  t h e  m o v e d  
t he  e n d  o f  t he  m o v e r ) .  S i n c e  f i na l  c a u s a l i t y  is i n v o k e d  to  b l o c k  
t he  t h r e a t  o f  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  in c a u s a t i o n  ( 1 0 7 4 a 3 0 ) ,  it w o u l d  be  
r e a s o n a b l e  to i n f e r  - w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  to t he  o r d i n a l  r e l a t i o n s  - t ha t  
a l l  t h e  s e p a r a t e  m o v e r s ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e y  a r e ,  a r e  f i n a l l y  a n d  
f o r m a l l y  m o v e d  b y  o n e  u n m o v e d  m o v e r  a s  t h e i r  t e l o s .  
S o m e h o w ,  t h i s  m o v e  wi l l  h a r m o n i s e  t h i s  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  c h a p t e r  
w i t h  t he  a r g u m e n t  in t he  s e c o n d  pa r t  a n d  a l s o  w i t h  t he  p r e c e d i n g
a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a p t e r s .
T h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  t he  c h a p t e r  b e g i n s  ( 1 0 7 4 a 3 2 f f . )  by  a s s e r t i n g  
t ha t  t he  h e a v e n  ( o n  r a n  o s )  is o n e  u n i v e r s e ,  no t  m u l t i p l i e d  l i k e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  in a s p e c i e s ,  a nd  a r g u e s  to the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a f o r m a l l y  
a n d  n u m e r i c a l l y  u n i q u e "  f i r s t  m o v e r .  T h e  a r g u m e n t ,  s o m e  o f
w h o s e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a r e ,  in c o n t e x t ,  u n a r t i c u l a t e d  A r i s t o t e l i a n  
d o c t r i n e s ,  is r e s t a t e d  s o m e w h a t  as  f o l l o w s :
( 3 )  M a t t e r  is a p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n  J "
( 2 )  F o r m  is a p r i n c i p l e  o f  uni ty .
( 3 )  I f  th e r e  is a p l u r a l i t y  o f  xs  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  p r i n c i p l e s  wi l l  
f o r m a l l y  be o n e  in k i n d .  T h e r e f o r e ,
( 4 )  al l  t h e  h e a v e n s  a r e  f o r m a l l y  o n e  h e a v e n  ( b y  2 a n d  3) .
99 10 7 0 a 3 1 -39. Cf. also P h y .  259a6-15 .
1(,-) See M e l a .  101 6a 32 -3 3 ,  1 0 3 5 b30-3 1. Whi le  often taking matter to be a 
pri nc ip l e  o f  in d iv id u at i on ,  Aris tot le  e l s e w h e r e  appears to cons id er  form 
the principle o f  individuation; e.g. ,  M e l a .  999 b21,  1038b 13.
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T h e r e f o r e ,
( 5 )  T h e r e  i s  o n l y  o n e  h e a v e n !  ( 1 0 7 4 a 3 1 ) ,  by  (1)  - (4) .
( 6 )  T h a t  w h i c h  is e t e r na l l y  a n d  c o n t i n u o u s l y  m o v i n g  is o n e . 101
( 7 )  T h e  h e a v e n  i s  c o n t i n u o u s l y  a n d  e t e r n a l l y  m o v i n g .  T h e r e f o r e ,
(8 )  T h e r e  is  o n l y  o n e  h e a v e n !  by  (6)  a n d  (7) .
( 9 )  I t e m  ( 7 )  i m p l i e s  t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  (a)  f i r s t  m o v e r ( s ) .
( 1 0 )  F i r s t  m o v e r s  a r e  i m m a t e r i a l .  T h e r e f o r e ,
( 1 1 )  T h e r e  is f o r m a l l y  o n e  f i r s t  m o v e r  ( 1 0 7 4 a 3 5 ) ,  b y  2 a n d  3
( 5 )  a n d  ( 8 )  a r e  i n v a l i d .  A r i s t o t l e  c o u l d  o n l y  v a l i d l y  s a y  t ha t
t h e r e  is.  i n f o r m , o n l y  one  h e a v e n .  F o r m  is a c a u s e .  Bu t  the
is
h e a v e n  h a s  a m a t e r i a l  c o m p o n e n t  a nd  so^ p o s s i b l y  m a n y .  B u t  e v e n  
i f  m a t e r i a l l y  m a n y ,  there  wi l l  be  a s i n g l e  f o r m  o f  h e a v e n s .  At  a ny  
r a t e ,  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t ha t  p l u r a l i t y  i n v o l v e s  m a t t e r  is i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  v i e w  t ha t  t h e r e  a r e  55  i m m a t e r i a l  m o v e r s ;  f o r  t he  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  f o r m  as  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n i t y  a nd  t he  a b s e n c e  o f
m a t e r i a l  c o m p o n e n t  i m p l y  t ha t  all  i m m a t e r i a l  m o v e r s  a r e  o n e . 1"  
F r o m  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  w e  m a y  a r g u e  t ha t  t he  t w o  p a r t s  o f  
c h a p t e r  8 a r e  n o t  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t he  k i n d  o f
a r g u m e n t  t h a t  w o u l d  v a l i d a t e  t he  i n f e r e n c e  t hat  t he r e  is o n l y  one  
f i r s t  m o v e r ,  t h o u g h  I shal l  a s s u m e  s u c h  a u n i q u e  f i r s t  m o v e r  f r o m  
a f o r m a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w . 1"
191 An argument from motion for a unique  first mover  is also offered at 
G C .  3 3 7 a l  7-22: ’But i f  there is to be movement ,  there must be something  
which initiates it; i f  there is to be movement always,  there must a lways  be 
s o m e th in g  which init iates it; i f  the movement  is to be cont inuous  what  
in i t i a t e s  it must  be s in g le ,  u n m o v e d ,  ungene ra tcd ,  and in capa bl e  o f  
al teration; and i f  the circular m o v em en ts  are more than one ,  they must  
all o f  them, in spite o f  their plurality,  be in som e way subordinated to a
single principle’. Cf. de Car l o  2 7 9 a 9 - l l .
1 97  Aris to t le  and Plato are subject to the perennial  quest ion o f  how an 
i m m a t e r i a l  m o v e r  c a u se s  eternal  and c o n t i n u o u s  m o t io n  o f  the
a p p a r e n t ly  mater ia l  he ave n.
It would  be poss ib le  to argue that the quest ion o f  the authenticity o f
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A r i s t o t l e  w a s  a n x i o u s  t o  s a v e  t h e  p h e n o m e n a  o f  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  
c e l e s t i a l  m o v e m e n t s .  B u t  h a v i n g  c a u s t i c a l l y  d i s m i s s e d  P l a t o n i c  
F o r m s ,  h e  c a n v a s s e s  n o  p l a u s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
w h i c h  g o v e r n  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  m o t i o n s .  I n  P l a t o ' s  T i m a e u s ,  t he  
g o v e r n i n g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  c o s m o s ,  c o s m i c - s o u l ,  is c o n s t i t u t i v e  o f  
t h e  g r e a t e s t  k i n d s  o f  F o r m s :  B e i n g ,  S a m e n e s s  a n d  D i f f e r e n c e .  T h e  
s t a r s  a n d  p l a n e t s  are  d i v i n e  r e a l i t i e s  w h o  e m b o d y  t h e  p e r f e c t i o n  
o f  c o s m i c - s o u l  in t h e i r  c i r c u l a r  a n d  r o t a r y  m o t i o n s ;  a n d  al l  t h e  
v a r i o u s  c e l e s t i a l  m o t i o n s  a r e  r e d u c i b l e  t o  S a m e n e s s  a n d  
D i f f e r e n c e .  T h u s  t he  g r e a t  v a r i e t y  a n d  o r d e r l y  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  the  
h e a v e n l y  m o t i o n s  s o m e  o f  w h i c h  g i v e  r i s e  t o  t he  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  
m a r k s  - s e a s o n s ,  w e a t h e r ,  t he  c a l e n d e r  m o n t h ,  t he  y e a r ,  d a y  a n d  
n i g h t  - a re  al l  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by  t r a c i n g  t h e i r  f u n d a m e n t a l  c a u s e s
to d i v i n e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s .  It is u n c l e a r  h o w A r i s t o t l e ' s  f o r m a l l y  
u n i q u e  f i r s t  m o v e r  r e l a t e s  to t he  d i f f e r e n t  p l a n e t a r y  m o v e r s ,  or  
by w h a t  n a t u r e  it e x p l a i n s  all the v a r i e t i e s  o f  c e l e s t i a l  m o t i o n s .
B y  " o n r a n o s "  A r i s t o t l e  p r o b a b l y  m e a n s  the  f i r s t  h e a v e n ,  i .e. ,  the  
s p h e r e  o f  t he  f i x e d  s t a r s ,  bu t  a l s o  e v e r y t h i n g  i n c l u d e d  wdthin  the 
e x t r e m i t y  o f  i ts c o n c e i v e d  c i r c u m f e r e n c e  as  in d e  C a e l o  ( 2 7 8 b  10-  
21) .  H e r e  h e a v e n  is c o n s i d e r e d  as  t he  v e h i c l e  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  
t h e  f i r s t  m o v e r ,  t he  a r g u m e n t  b e i n g  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  m o v e r  is o n e  
a n d  h a s  a n e v e r - c h a n g i n g  a c t i v i t y  w i t h  o n l y  o n e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t ;  t he
m o v e m e n t  o f  t he  f i r s t  h e a v e n . 1 "
chapter 8 must refer to the chapter as a who le ,  which se em s  to emb ody  
just one argument  with an Aristotel ian concl us i on o f  a f inite  world and a 
finite first mover .  There is a presumption for regarding  the quest ion o f  
plurality o f  first movers  as hypothet ica l ,  ev en  as d ia lect ica l ;  first assume  
a plurality o f  first movers - which are pure forms - and then deduce their 
formal incongrui ty;  for their c x i s t c n e c  threatens  the appearance  o f  the 
third man, i.e. ,  if  pure form is a principle o f  unity.
104 D e  Ca e l o  i, 8 and 9 also deal with the question o f  the plurality o f  worlds,
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C h a p t e r  8 e n d s  wi t h  an e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n c i e n t  m y t h o l o g i c a l  
t r a d i t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  to  w h i c h  "t h e s e  a r e  g o d s  a n d  t h e  d i v i n e  
p e r m e a t e s  (p e r i e c h e i ) t he  w h o l e  o f  n a t u r e "  ( 1 0 7 4 b 2 - 3 ) . ] 05 S i n c e  
t h e  d i v i n e  is a l i ve ,  t he  u n i v e r s e  is a n i m a t e  i f  it is p e r m e a t e d  by  
t h e  d i v i n e  (cf .  d e  C a e l o  2 8 5 a 2 9 - 3 0 )  a c o n c l u s i o n  c o m m o n  t o  t he  
P r e s o c r a t i c s  a n d  P l a t o .  In t h e  c l a u s e  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t he  
d e m o n s t r a t i v e  p r o n o u n ,  " t h e s e "  ( h o u t o i )  is m a s c u l i n e ,  a p p a r e n t l y  
by  a t t r a c t i o n  to t he  p r e c e d i n g  m a s c u l i n e  p r e d i c a t e  " g o d s "  ( t h e o i ).  
O n  t h i s  a c c o u n t  i t s  a n t e c e d e n t  i s  n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  o b v i o u s  
g r a m m a t i c a l l y .  It c o u l d  be  t h e  n e u t e r  " d i v i n e  b o d i e s "  at 
1 0 7 4 a 3 0 - 3 1  ( t h e i o n  t i  s o m a  t o n )  o r  t he  f e m i n i n e  " m a n y "  in 
r e f e r e n c e  to t he  "f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e "  { a r c h e )  o f  e a c h  o f  s uch  b o d y  at 
a 3 3 .  It c o u l d  a c c o r d i n g l y  m e a n ,  as  f a r  as  t h e  g r a m m a r  is 
c o n c e r n e d ,  e i t h e r  the h e a v e n l y  b o d i e s  or  t he  s e p a r a t e  m o v e r s .  It 
s e e m s  t a k e n  up  a g a i n  in t h e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  m e n t i o n e d  " f i r s t
s u b s t a n c e s "  at 1 0 7 4 b 9  ( tas prot as) .  T h e  t r a d i t i o n  that  t he  "f i rs t
s u b s t a n c e s "  a re  g o d s  ( b 9) ,  A r i s t o t l e  c o n c l u d e s ,  ha s  a k e r n e l  o f  
e n d u r i n g  t r u t h .  T h i s  wi l l  be  t he  t r u t h  n o w  m a d e  m a n i f e s t  by  
A r i s t o t e l i a n  f i r s t  p h i l o s o p h y .  H o w e v e r ,  s u c h  a t r a d i t i o n ,  as P l a t o  
i m p l i e s  in h i s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c o s m o l o g y ,  r e f e r s  to t he  h e a v e n l y
and advance a number o f  arguments against this assumption.  Plato at Ti. 
31 a  argues  for one  v is ib le  un iv e r se  from the s t a n d a r d - e s t a b l i s h i n g
properly o f  uniqueness o f  the Form (o f  An im al)  in which the c o s m o s
part icipates and from the Form-sensible  participation thesis.
1 0 5  j ] l c  v iew  that the divine "encompasses  all and steers all things" is 
regarded by Aristotle as go ing back to Anaximander and as common to the 
Greek phi losophers  o f  nature. Se e  P h y .  2 0 3 b 5 -15.  "Permeates",  rather 
than "en co mpa sses" ,  is more  e x p r e s s i v e  o f  the intended m e a n i n g  o f  
" p e r i e c h e i " .  s ince  the divine  a r c h e  o f  all things is e f f e c t i v e l y  the
e s s e n c e  o f  all things and thus permeates  them.  This meaning ,  as my
int roduc t ion  s u g g e s t s ,  has its roots in tradi tional reg ion,  wh ere  the
universe originated from a divine source and is i tself  full o f  the divine.
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b o d i e s  o r  to t h e  c e l e s t i a l  s p h e r e  a n d  no t  to s u p r a - c e l e s t i a l  r e a l i t y  
w h i c h ,  in P l a t o ,  is r e p r e s e n t e d  by  t he  F o r m s  a n d  in A r i s t o t l e  by  
N o u s .  T o  t h e s e  s u p r a - c e l e s t i a l  r e a l i t i e s ,  t h e  h e a v e n  a n d  i t s  
i n h a b i t i n g  g o d s  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  s u b o r d i n a t e .  A c c o r d i n g l y  t h e  n o t i o n  
o f  " f i r s t  s u b s t a n c e s "  s h o u l d  c o n s i s t  in t he  c e l e s t i a l  b e i n g s  a n d  t he i r  
m o v i n g  f o r c e s ,  e x c l u d i n g  N o u s J ®6 N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  is t a k e n  as  
i m p l y i n g  t ha t  t h e s e  s u b s t a n c e s  a r e  i n t e l l i g e n t  b e i n g s  w h o  d e s i r e  
t he  p e r f e c t i o n  o f  t he  f i rst  m o v e r .  A n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m  a n d  t h e  l i ke  
a r e .  a g a i n ,  e x p l i c i t l y  r e j e c t e d  ( b 5 - 1 0 ) .  w h i l e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t h e  
d i v i n e  m e e t s  t he  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r e l i g i o n  as  s o m e t h i n g  
t ha t  p e r v a d e s  all  n a t u r e .  T h e  t e r m " g o d " ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s e e m s  a p p l i e d  
h e r e  e x p r e s s l y  to t he  m a t e r i a l  h e a v e n s  a n d  t h e i r  m o t i v a t i n g
f o r c e s ,  a nd  bo t h  h a v e  the s t a tus  o f  i n t e l l i ge n t  b e i n g s .
7 H o o k  \ i i ,  10
T h e  c o n c l u d i n g  c h a p t e r  10 d e a l s  wi t h  the  p r i n c i p a l  i s s u e  o f  h o w  
t he  n a t u r e  o f  t he  u n i v e r s e  {he ton ho l ou  p h u s i s )  ha s  ( e c h e i  ) 
t he  G o o d  {to a g a t h o n )  or  t he  s u p r e m e  G o o d  ( to a r i s t o n )  -
w h e t h e r  as  t h e  o r d e r  o r  r a n k  ( t a x i s )  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s e  o r  as  
s o m e t h i n g  s e p a r a t e  ( k e c h o r e s m e n o n  ti) a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  ( a u t o  
ka t h '  h a u t o ) . 1()7 T h e  a n s w e r  l ies pa r t l y  in e i t h e r  d i s j u n c t .  T h i s  is
1 H e s io d  c o n s id e r e d  the h ea ven s  the d w e l l i n g  p la ce  o f  the gods  
( The  o g o  n y , 126-128) .  However,  i f  the ancients Aristotle has in mind pre­
date Hes iod,  then it is highly doubtful whether Aristotle  is right, s ince,
a l th o u g h  the stars and plane ts  may ha v e  been lo ng  a c k n o w l e d g e d  
d i v i n i t i e s ,  they  we re  not probably  a s so c ia ted  with g o d s  o f  pop ular
rel igion until in classical  times.  On the other hand, i f  Aristot le means  
that the ancien ts  ident i f ied gods  with the primary natural forces ,  he 
would be right.
"auto kat l i '  haut o"  in context evokes  the o nt o l ogy  o f  Platonic Forms,  
and in particular the Good in R.  vi and vii.
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i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  t h e  a n a l o g y  o f  an a r m y  a n d  i t s  g e n e r a l :  " f o r  t he  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t he  a r m y  d e p e n d s  p a r t l y  on  t h e  o r d e r  a n d  p a r t l y  on 
the  g e n e r a l ,  bu t  c h i e f l y  on t he  l at t er .  B e c a u s e  h e  d o e s  no t  d e p e n d  
on  t h e  o r d e r  b u t  t h e  o r d e r  d e p e n d s  o n  ( d i a  t o u t o n )  h i m  
( 1 0 7 5 a l 4 - 1 6 ) .  T h e  P y t h a g o r e a n s  h a d  l a i d  g r e a t  s t r e s s  on  t h e  
o r d e r  i n h e r e n t  in t h e  c o s m o s .  T h i s  o r d e r  i s  t h e  m o d e l  t o  w h i c h  
m a n  m u s t  c o n f o r m  hi s  l i f e ,  h i s  h o u s e  a n d  h i s  c i t y . 108 In hi s  
G o r g i a s  ( 5 0 6 d - e ) ,  P l a t o  d e v e l o p s  t h i s  P y t h a g o r e a n  d o c t r i n e  a n d  
m a k e s  it  h i s  o w n .  At  Ti .  30a ,  P l a t o  d e s c r i b e s  t a x i s  as  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  G o d ' s  ac t i v i t y ,  a v i e w e c h o e d  in de  P h i l o s o p h i a , fr.  19c Ross :  'it 
is p r o p e r  to G o d  to  turn d i s o r d e r  i n t o  o r der ' .  A t  E E  1 2 1 8 a 2 0 - 2 4 .  
A r i s t o t l e  c o n n e c t s  o r d e r  w i t h  r e s t  a n d  s a y s  t h a t  t h i n g s  a r e  
b e a u t i f u l  b e c a u s e  o f  t he i r  o r de r .  S i nc e ,  o f  t h e  t h i n g s  w e  p e r c e i v e ,  
t h o s e  w h i c h  a r e  g o o d  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  o r d e r  a n d  r e s t ,  
u n c h a n g i n g  t h i n g s  wi l l  be so e v e n  m o r e .
T h e s e  v i e w s  o f  t he  G o o d  are  c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  the  v i e w  in the 
c h a p t e r  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  viz. .  t he  G o o d  o f  t he  u n i v e r s e  m i g h t  
a l s o  be bo t h  i ts i m m a n e n t  o r d e r  a n d  i t s  " t r a n s c e n d e n t "  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  o r d e r ,  but  p r i n c i p a l l y  t he  lat ter ,  j u s t  as t he  g o o d  o f  an a r m y  l ies 
in t h e  g e n e r a l  a n d  in t he  o r d e r  a n d  d i s c i p l i n e  o f  t he  a rm) ' ,  but  
m o r e  so  in t he  f o r m e r  t ha n  in t he  l a t t e r ,  s i n c e  a g e n e r a l  q u a  
c o m m a n d e r  e m b o d i e s  the  o r d e r  o f  h i s  a r m y .  A s i m i l a r  m i l i t a r y  
i l l u s t r a t i o n  is f o u n d  in d e  Phi l o ,  fr.  12 ( R o s s ) ,  in w h i c h  Ar i s t o t l e  
d e s c r i b e s  h o w  an o b s e r v e r  on M o u n t  I d a  w o u l d  s ee  t he  a r m y  o f  
t h e  G r e e k s  a d v a n c e  in m a r v e l l o u s  o r d e r  in t h e  p l a i n  b e l o w ,  a n d  
c o n c l u d e  t ha t  a g e n e r a l  m u s t  h a v e  a r r a n g e d  it in thi s  w a y .  T h e r e  
i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t he  a n a l o g y ,  as  w i t h  n e a r l y  all 
a n a l o g i e s .  T h e  n o t i o n  o f  a g e n e r a l  d e n o t e s  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l
Iamblichus,  Vi ta Pyt h.  48
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e m b o d i m e n t  o f  a n  o r d e r  o f  r e l a t i o n s  w h o s e  a c t u a l i t y  is t h e  d e  
f a c t o  p r e s e n c e  o f  a n  a r m y ,  w h i c h  i s  a s y s t e m a t i c  u n i t  o f
i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  w h i c h  o n e  is a c o m m a n d e r .  N o w  A r i s t o t l e  d e s c r i b e s
t h e  e s s e n t i a l  s o u r c e  o f  o r d e r  a s  s o m e t h i n g  s e p a r a t e  
( k e c h d r i s m e n o n  ti)  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  (aut o  h a t h ’ haut o) .  I n d e e d ,
a g e n e r a l  is o n t o l o g i c a l l y  s e p a r a b l e  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  in t h e  s e n s e
t ha t  h e  is n o t  in t he  r a n k  a n d  f i l e  o f  s o l d i e r s ,  o r  h e  c a n  b e  k i l l e d  
w h i l e  hi s  a r m y  r e m a i n  i n t a c t  f o r  a t i m e  o r  h i s  a r m y  c a n  b e  r o u t e d  
w h i l e  he  r e m a i n s .  W o u l d  t h i s  a p p l y  t o  f i r s t  m o v e r  a n d  t h e  
u n i v e r s e ?  H a r d l y .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t ) '  j u s t  r a i s e d  t a k e s  A r i s t o t l e  to
h a v e  a p h y s i c a l i s t  a s s u m p t i o n  in i n v o k i n g  t he  a n a l o g y ;  v i z . ,  t h a t  
he h a s  in m i n d  t h e  p h y s i c a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t he  a r m y ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  
t h i n g s .  A n  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h i s  m a y  n o t  t he  c a s e  m a y  be  g l e a n e d  
f r o m  o n e  o f  the c l o s i n g  p a s s a g e s  o f  t he  c h a p t e r :
F u r t h e r ,  i f  t h e r e  is n o t h i n g  e l s e  b e s i d e s  s e n s i b l e  t h i n g s ,  (t a
a i s t h e t a )  t h e r e  wi l l  be n o  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e  ( a r c h e ), n o  o r d e r  
{taxi s) ,  no  g e n e r a t i o n  {genes i s ) ,  a nd  no  c e l e s t i a l  m o t i o n s . . . 10^
T h a t  i s ,  s e n s i b l e  t h i n g s  in t he  c o s m o s  a r e  s u c h  t ha t  t he r e  m u s t  be  
s o m e t h i n g  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e m  i f  t h e i r  o r d e r ,  m o t i o n  a n d  g e n e r a t i o n  
a r e  t o  be  a c c o u n t e d  f o r .  "Arche"  a m b i g u o u s l y  m e a n s  " r u l e " ,  
" s o u r c e " ,  " b e g i n n i n g "  o r  " c a u s e " .  N o  s e n s e  s e e m s  e x c l u d e d  h e r e ,  
e x c e p t  t ha t  i f  m a t t e r  a n d  f o r m  a r e  e t e r n a l  e x i s t e n t s ,  a r c h e  q u a
c a u s e  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  e x i s t e n c e  is e x c l u d e d .  A s s o c i a t i n g  a r c h e  wi t h  
t a x i s  a n d  g e n e s i s ,  t h e n ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  
g e n e r a t i v e  a n d  o r d e r l y  r e l a t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  t h i n g s  in t h e  c o s m o s  
l o g i c a l l y  p r e s u p p o s e  a d i s t i n c t  r e a l i t y  w h i c h  is an a c t u a l i t y ,  g i v e n  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t y  o f  t h e  s e n s i b l e  t h i n g s . 110 In A r i s t o t l e ’s j a r g o n ,
109 Op. cil. 1075b25-29.
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t h e n ,  t he  f i r s t  m o v e r  w o u l d  be  w h a t  it is f o r  t h e  c o s m o s  to  b e  s uc h  
as  i t  is;  it is l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r  to,  e n t a i l s  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o r  f o r m  of ,  
a n d  o n t o l o g i c a l l y  c o m p l e t e s ,  p h e m o n e n a l  e x i s t e n c e . 111
W e r e  t ha t  to b e  t he  c a s e ,  t he  m o r a l  o f  t h e  a r m y  a n a l o g y  w o u l d  
b e  t h i s :  j u s t  as  a  g e n e r a l  q u a  c o m m a n d e r  i m p l i e s  t h e  o r d e r  o f  
r e l a t i o n s  a n d  m o v e m e n t s  o f  p r e e x i s t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n s t i t u t i n g  
a n  a r m y  o f  w h i c h  h e  is t he  c h i e f  m e m b e r ,  s o  t o o  t he  f i r s t  m o v e r  
i m p l i e s  t h e  d y n a m i c  o r d e r ,  i . e . ,  t h e  f o r m a l  a n d  f i na l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
t he  c o s m o s  o f  w h i c h  "he" is the  c h i e f  par t .  In thi s  w a y ,  all e x i s t i n g  
t h i n g s  f o r m  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  s y s t e m :
Al l  t h i n g s ,  b o t h  f i s he s  a n d  b i r d s  a n d  p l a n t s  a r e  o r d e r e d  t o g e t h e r  
in s o m e  w a y  bu t  no t  in t he  s a m e  w a y :  a n d  t he  w h o l e  s y s t e m  is
n o t  s u c h  t ha t  t he r e  is n o  r e l a t i on  b e t w e e n  o n e  t h i n g  a n d  a n o t h e r .
T h e r e  is a d e f i n i t e  c o n n e c t i o n .  T h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  is l ike t ha t  in a 
h o u s e h o l d  w h e r e  t he  f r e e  p e r s o n s  h a v e  al l  o r  m o s t  o f  t h e i r  
a c t i o n s  p r e - o r d a i n e d  f o r  t h e m ,  w h e r e a s  t he  s l a v e s  a n d  a n i m a l s  
h a v e  l i t t l e  c o m m o n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a n d  ac t  f o r  t he  m o s t  p a r t  at 
r a n d o m :  f o r  t he  n a t u r e  o f  e a c h  c l a s s  is a p r i n c i p l e  s u c h  as  we  
h a v e  d e s c r i b e d .  I m e a n ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t ha t  e v e r y t h i n g  m u s t ,  at  
l e a s t ,  c o m e  t o  a d i s s o l u t i o n ,  a n d  s i m i l a r l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  
r e s p e c t s  in w h i c h  e v e r y t h i n g  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  g o o d  o f  t he  
w h o l e . . . / / / * ?  g o o d  is in t he  t r u e s t  s e n s e  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  a l l  
t h i n g s . 1 1 2
S o m e th in g  like this inference is drawn by Aris tot le  h im se l f  e l sewher e  
in the case  o f  " g e n e s i s " :  ’For all percept ib le  th ings  perish and arc in 
movement .  But that which conies to be and that from which it co m es  to be 
must be something;  and the ultimate term in the series cannot have  come  
to be, since the series has a limit and since nothing can come 10 be out of
that which is no t ’ fM e t a . 999b5-9) .  This sounds  like an argument from
logica l  regress ion to a first principle.
1 1 T he se  intimate condit ions of  primacy consistent with those laid down in 
M e t a .  7, where substance is said to be primary (i) in formula,  (ii)  in 
order o f  k n ow le d ge  and (iii)  in time. To be primary in kn ow ledge  also  
means  to be the final truth, and "in time" impl ies  the logical  priority o f  a 
principle to that o f  which it is a principle.
112 Ibid.,  1075a 15-38.  Aris totle’s statement that 'the Good is in the truest
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T h e  a p p a r e n t  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  t h i n g s  h a v e ,  in t he  l o n g - r u n ,  a s i n g l e ,  
i n t e r n a l l y  m o r a l ,  a e s t h e t i c  o r  t e l e o l o g i c a l  c o h e s i o n . 1 1 -^ Bu t  
a l t h o u g h  al l  t h i n g s  h a v e  b e e n  o r d e r e d  a n d  s e t  in a n  o r g a n i s e d  
w h o l e ,  t h e y  a r e  s o  o r d e r e d  in d i f f e r e n t  w a y s ;  ' f o r  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
e a c h  c l a s s  i s  a  p r i n c i p l e ' .  I t  is a l s o  i m p l i e d  t ha t  c e r t a i n  p a r t s  o f  
t h e  c o s m o s  c o n t r i b u t e  l e s s  to t h e  c o m m o n  g o o d  t h a n  o t h e r s .  T h e  
h o u s e h o l d  a n a l o g y  is d i f f i c u l t .  B u t  i t  m a y  be  s e e n  as  an o b l i q u e  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  A r i s t o t l e ' s  t r i p a r t i t e  l e v e l s  o f  r e a l i t y .  T h e  a n a l o g y  
c o n t a i n s  A r i s t o t l e ’s i d e a  o f  t h e  e v o l u t i o n a r y  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  s t u d i e s  m e n t i o n e d  in c h a p t e r  o n e  o f  t he  M e t a p h y s i c s . 
T h e r e  ( 9 8 0 a 2 8 f f . ) ,  it w a s  s u r m i s e d  t ha t  t he  s c i e n c e  t ha t  s p e c u l a t e s  
a b o u t  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s  is p o s s i b l e  in a c o n d i t i o n  o f  l e i s u r e l y  
e x i s t e n c e .  H e n c e ,  it e m e r g e s  w h e r e  s c i e n c e s  f o r  the  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
s u b s i s t e n c e  n e e d s  h a v e  b e e n  a d e q u a t e l y  d e v e l o p e d  to m e e t  t he  
e x i g e n c i e s  o f  l ife.  O n l y  a b o v e  this  l evel  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  is m e n t a l  
e n e r g y  a v a i l a b l e  fo r  h i g h e r  t h o u g h t s  a b o u t  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s .  T h i s  
w o u l d  s u g g e s t ,  in o u r  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t ,  t h a t  f r e e  a g e n t s ,  l i k e  
m a s t e r s ,  a r e  t h o s e  w h o ,  h a v i n g  l e i s u r e ,  a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  h i g h e r  
t h o u g h t s ,  a n d  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  p a r a d o x i c a l l y  c o n s t r a i n e d  to  d e v o t e  
a t t e n t i o n  t he  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p u r s u i t  o f  f i x e d  p r i n c i p l e s  l i ke  t h e  G o o d ,  
w h i l e  s l a v e s  w o r k  to ful f i l  b a s i c  bu t  f l e e t i n g  n e e d s ,  a n d  h e n c e  a re  
i n v o l v e d  in r a n d o m  a c t i v i t i e s .  E a c h  c l a s s  o f  b e i n g  c o n t r i b u t e s  to
s e n s e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  all th ings '  ( 1 0 7 5 a 3 8 )  and his  apparent  
ident if icat ion o f  the Good with the first being  sho w s,  am ong  other things,  
the extent to which he was  wo rki ng  in c o n s c i o u s  ref erence  to Plato's  
thought and/or Acade mic  discuss ions .  Cf. P h d o  99c5-6:  'that it is the Good  
or Binding  that genuine ly  docs bind and hold all th ings logc ihcr ,  they do 
not bel ieve  at all'.
jn Greek culture what is good,  orderly and beaut iful  arc, in the final  
analysi s,  inseparable.  At least this is Plato's v iew .
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the good of  the whole  in pursuing  wha t  are appar en t ly  d i s t inc t
ends.
As  an i l lus t rat ion of  Aris tot le ' s  theological  c osmos ,  the mas t er -  
s lave analogy,  l ike that  of  the c o m ma n de r  and the army,  is not  
apt.  But  if we ignore the diff icul t ies,  the point  is to in t imate  the 
s t ructural  and causal  h ierarchy be tween the first  mover ,  celest ial
and s ub l una r  real i t ies,  and to indica te  the va lue  o f  con t r ibu t ion
made  by each of  these real i t ies to the goodness  and order  of  the 
cosmos :  the celest ial  real i t ies are,  it seems,  in eff icient  and final 
causal i ty to sublunar  things by being at t racted to the e n e r g e i a  of 
t he  f i r s t  m o v e r .  Thus  the r e l a t i on  b e t w e e n  the t e r ms  is 
systemat ic  and orderly.  But  by their  respect ive natures,  it is clear  
that in order  of  causal  value the first mover ,  by being pr ior  to all 
comes  first ,  then the celest ial  real i t ies,  then sub lunar y  real i t ies.  
From this point  of  view,  it is clear  how the c osmos  conta ins  the 
Good :  it does  so in vi r tue of  its a t t rac t ion to the s up r eme
per fec t ion of  the Good through the celest ial  sphere.  Since the 
object  of  desi re  is pure Reason,  the at t ract ion of  the c osmos  is 
orderly and systemat ic.  What  is not  clear is why  or whether  these 
a rmy  and housho ld  analogies  are meant  to show that  the first 
m ove r  exists  or mus t  exist  as k e c h o r i s me n o n  ti kai  au t o  ka t h '  
h a u t o . I shall  argue  short ly,  to the effect  that  the exis tent ia l  
s t a t us  o f  the f i rst  m o v e r  is d e r i ved  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  the 
a na lo g i e s .
In the second hal f  of  the chapter ,  Aris tot le shows to what  extent  
theor ies  of  first  pr inciples ,  di f ferent  f rom his own,  are mis taken.  
It cons i s t s  of  two parts.  The first  sect ion ( 1 0 7 5 a 2 5 - b l 6) deals
with theories  which posit  cont rary pr inciples  as the last ground of
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being.  In the second  sect ion ( b l 6 - 1 0 7 6 a 4 )  Ar i s tot le  impl ies  that
this t ype  o f  theory  cannot  explain why there is a lways  becoming  
in the cosmos ,  unless  his thesis that  there mus t  be something else 
bes ides  the cont ra r i es  is adopted.  In this par t  the sentences  are 
terse,  and it is di ff icul t  to unders t and which or  whose  doct r ine  is 
en v i sa g e d .  But  there  are a few point s  o f  t heo log ica l  interest ,  
t h o u g h  t h e se  t oo  are  dea l t  wi th  p e r f u n c to r i l y .  One  of  the 
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  E m p e d o c l e s  is that  he m a k e s  St r i f e  an e ternal  
pr inciple .  It is sugges ted that  the eterni ty of  Strife is imposs ible  
b e c a u s e  it is an evil .  It is not  c lear  at first  why Ari s tot le  
co n s i de r s  this  impos s i b l e  and cont rad ic tory .  Howeve r ,  for  him,  
evi l  is not  s o me t h i n g  which  exi s t s  by i t sel f ,  but  a de fec t  of  
c o n t i n g e n t  t h ings .  Evi l  is a c h a r ac t e r i s a t i on  of  one of  the 
c on t r a r i e s  of  c han g e ,  such as des t r uc t i on  { M e t a .  1 0 5 1 a 4 - 2 2 ) .  
Hence  it cannot  a lways  be. Aris tot le  impl ies ,  therefore ,  that his 
f i rst  s u b s t a nc e ,  wh i ch  he a s soc i a t e s  wi th the Go od ,  has no 
o p p o s i n g  p r i nc i p l e ,  con t r a ry  to Pla to  for  w h o m  body is the 
p r i nc ip l e  of  i r r a t ional  n e c e s s i t y , 114 and a condi t ion of  evil w'hich
d iv ine  Reason  mus t  pe r suade  towards  order  and goodness  for  a 
cosmos  to be.
F r o m  the  t e l e o l o g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  viewy A r i s t o t l e  c a s t i g a t e s  
E m p e d o c l e s ’ L o v e  and Str i fe,  and A n a x a g o r a s ’ Reason .  Thes e  
c o s m o l o g i e s  pos tu l a t e  first pr inc iples  w'hich have  a potent ial i ty to
act,  and so of fend the test  of  pure actual i ty.  Al so  those first 
p r inc ip l e s  are so conce ived  that  the Good  b ecomes  ex t raneous  to
them,  and this int imates  a fai lure on their  par t  to see that  ’the art
of  m e d ic i ne  is, in some  sense,  hea l t h ’ ( 1 0 7 5 b 1 0). This  medical  
a n a l o g y  has  the t e nd en c y  of  a t t r ibu t ing  a k ind  o f  e f f i cac ious
114 Ti .  47cff.
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causal i ty to the Good:  for the idea of  heal th is the effect ive  cause  
f rom which  or iginates  a doctor ' s  art  and which  enab les  h im to 
under take  the t reatment  of  his pat ients.  It is then impl ied that  it 
is p r e c i se ly  the g o od n es s  o f  the  f i r s t  b e in g  f ro m wh i c h  all 
movement s  in the cosmos  or iginate,  and in which  all cosmi c  order  
is precontained.  Does  this imply eff icient  causal i ty  on the par t  of  
God?  This  quest ion will  be re-opened in the next  sect ion.
Apar t  f rom teleology,  Aris tot le also argues  f rom formal  necess i ty  
for  the f ini tude  of  the un ive r s e  and a ga in s t  t heo r i e s  o f  f i rst  
pr inciples  that imply infini te regress :
... in vi r tue of  what  are numbers ,  the soul  and the body or in
general ,  the form and the object ,  one? It is the mov i ng  cause 
that  makes  them one ... those who  ma k e  ma themat i ca l  n u mb e r
first pr inciples,  and go on generat ing one subs tance  after  another  
and find different  pr inciples  for each one. . .give us a great  many  
govern ing  principles ... The rule o f  the ma ny  is not  good.  'Let
t h e r e  be  o n e  r u l e r '  ( 1 0 7 5 b 3 5 - l 0 7 6 b 4 ) .
"Let there be one ruler" is quoted f rom 11. ii, 204.  Discuss ions  of 
the theory that number s  are the highest  level  of  real i ty and that 
each success ive  level  o f  real i ty has its own  p r inc ip l e s  oc cu r  at 
M e t a . 1090a7-16.  b 13-21 and 10 2 8 b 2 1 -24 where  he adds  that  it
was held by Speus ippss .  According  to Ar is tot le ,  Speus ipus ,  aware  
of  the d i f f icul t i es  o f  the theory of  F o r ms ,  a b a n d o n ed  Pl a ton ic
Forms  but held that number s  are the subs i s t ent  ent i t i es ,  a rgued
that number s  do not  have any causal  inf luence  upon other  thi ngs,
and that  the o ther  l evel s  of  rea l i ty  - spat ial  m a g n i t u d e ,  soul ,
sensible things - each exist  by themselves .  Each success ive  level
is more  perfect  than the preceding one,  so that  they may be said 
to be only analogical ly similar to each other.  Aris tot le  calls this,  a
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poor l y  c omp o s e d  play (e p e i s o d i o d c ). He  bel ieves  that  uni ty of 
pu rpose  is impar ted by the Good as a rul ing cause  (a r c h e ) \  and 
logical  necess i ty  ensures  that  the d i f f erent  l evel s  o f  rea l i ty  of
wh i ch  form,  mat ter ,  soul ,  and n u mb e r  are e l e me n t s  are bound 
together  into a structural  fini tude.  All things are one if, f rom our 
di scuss ions  so far, essences of  things relate to the first mover  in a 
sy s t ema t i c  way .  Let  us s um m a r i s e  and e x a m i n e  br i e f ly  the 
resul ts  of  our discussions of  M e t a  xii.
8 S u m m a ry
As we have seen.  M e t a ,  xii con t a i ns  a h i gh ly  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
a rgument  to the existence and nature of god(s) .  The  terms "god" 
and "divine"  are appl ied to both the heavenly  bodies  and their
movers ,  to the first  mover  and,  it would also seem,  to thought  
u n i v e r s a l l y . 11  ^ The visible cosmos  compr i ses  both sublunar  and 
ce l e s t i a l  spher es  which are pe rme a t ed  by i m m a t e r i a l ,  d iv ine
s u b s t a n c e  on wh i c h  they  d e p e n d  as t h e i r  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e
( 1 0 72 b l  4).  H en ce  they pa r t i c ipa t e  in the  d i v i n e . 116 The 
t radi t ional  background of  Ar i s to t l e ’s theology,  which  is basical ly  
not  di f ferent  f rom Plato' s,  is ul t imately the basi s  of  this thesis.  
But  Ar i s to t l e  conce ives  divine  nature  as pu re  cogn i t i on  which 
amounts  to eternal  sel f -contemplat ion.  This is the highest  life; for
115 1 0 7 4 b l > 1 6 .  Cf. etc An.  40Sb29-30  and E N . 1 1 77a 1 2 -1 6.
^ 6  Cicero,  de Nat .  Deo. ,  1, 13, 33, sees confusion in Aristotle in his d e
P l i i l o . :  'for now lie ascribes all divinity to mind,  no w  lie says that the 
world itself  is a god ... now the movement o f  the world ... Then,  he says  the 
heal o f  the heavens  is a god,  not realising that the heavens  arc a part of
the world,  which lie has h im se l f  e lsewhere  called a god'. But Cicero is
presumably  unaware that "god", for the Greeks,  is a predicat ive  notion
that appl ies  to any reality which sat isf ies a set o f  condi t io ns  inc lud ing  
causal  supr emacy,  e ternal i ly ,  immortal i ty ,  per fect ion
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it is desc r ibed  as the happies t  and pleasantes t  form of  exi s t ence.  
Divine  nature  is free f rom jealousy and is essent ial ly good,  for  God 
is t he  Good.  In its highest  instance it is separate f rom mat ter  and 
t he re fore  compl e t e l y  devoid of  potent ial i ty.  On the basis of  the 
analys i s  of  cogni t ion ,  a separate  form is shown to be in its very 
na ture  a t h inking  of  thinking,  unable to change  its thought  to any 
o ther  object .  God is r egarded  as a ru l i ng p o w er  that is mos t
honourab l e ,  and the pr imary cause  of  things in the cosmos.  God 
causes  mot ion  by way of  final  causal i ty di rect ly,  but through the 
mot ion  of  the first heaven it is the eff icient  cause of all fur ther
e f f e c t s  p r o d u c e d .  These  p h i l o s op h ic a l  n o t i o ns  of  God  are 
p r e sen t e d  as ident i ca l  wi th the kernel  of  Greek  r e l ig ious  and 
my t h o l o g i c a l  t radi t ions .
The first move r  causes  movements  and changes  in the cosmos  by 
being loved and desired.  Aristot le seems to specify final causal i ty 
as the only causa l i ty  f i t t ing for God.  But are other  types  of
causa l i t y  e xc l uded  because they are not men t ioned?  No reason 
seems given in the text why pure actual i ty cannot  funct ion as an
ef f i c i ent  cause ,  except  that it is an Aris tote l ian doct r ine that  the 
ac tua l i t y  o f  the eff ic ient  cause  is in the thing unde rgo i ng  the 
a c t i o n . 117 If  so, it would mean that the first mover  would ,  as
eff icient  cause,  have its actual i ty outside itself.  This  would  be in
cont rad ic t ion  to its nature as pure ac tua l i ty .11 x The new actual i ty
brought  about  by its act ivi ty lies therefore  outside i tself as cause.
117 de An.  426a5-6; M e t a .  1050a30-31; 1066a26-34 ( = P h y .  120 2al 3-b22 )
118 p / i y _  2 5 5 a l - b 2 4 .  The action o f  an e f f ic ient  cause is regarded as a 
perfect ion  that is a lways  present and that produces its effect upon contact  
will) the p a s  s u m  and the remova l  o f  h in dr anc es .  T h i n k i n g  is
s p e c i f i c a l l y  inc luded among the act ivit ies that take p lace  at once  on the
removal  o f  the hindrance (b3-5; 22-23) .
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I f  t he  f i r s t  m o v e r  w e r e  an e f f i c i e n t  c a u s e ,  t h e n ,  i t - w o u l d  be  in 
p o t e n t i a l i t y  t o  s o m e t h i n g  e l s e .  T h e  e m p h a s i s  in l o c a t i n g  t h e  
c a u s a l i t y  o f  t h e  f i r s t  m o v e r  s o l e l y  in b e i n g  l o v e d  a n d  d e s i r e d  
s e e m s  t o  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  w h a t  i s  o r d i n a r i l y  
u n d e r s t o o d  as  t he  c a u s e  o f  m o v e m e n t  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n , 119 i .e. ,  t he  
e f f i c i e n t  c a u s e ,  d o e s  no t  e n t e r  t he  p i c t u r e  h e r e . 120
T h e  h e a v e n l y  bod ie s  are held to be i m m o r t a l  and e ternal .  
Consequen t ly ,  there is no quest ion of  looking for  an eff icient  and 
final cause to account  for their  product ion.  Both the mat t e r  and 
f o r m  o f  t he<e b e i n g s  as well as sublunar  things  are p resupposed  
{ M e t a .  1 0 3 4 b 7 -1 6. 10 6 9 b 3 5 ). S u b l u n a r  t h i ngs  are p r o d u c e d
t h r o u g h  c h a n g e ,  h a v in g  the i r  e f f i c i en t  c a u s e s  in both the 
i m m e d i a t e  agen t s  - internal  or ex ternal ,  as for  ins t ance  man 
e n g e n d e r s  m a n .  a n d  the h e a v e n l y  bodies .  E l sewher e  we  learn 
that i n a n i m a t e  b o d i e s  exist  f or  the sake o f  l iving things ,  and
p l a n t s  a n d  a n i m a l s  f or  the sake of  m a n . 121 T h rough  the 
per pe i ua t i « ' i i  o f  t he i r  s p e c i e s  t hey  attain the divine.  Changeable  
th ings ,  s u c h  as e a r t h  and fire,  are de sc r i bed  as imi ta t ing  the
i m p e r i s h a b l e  ones ,  namely ,  ’the sun and stars  and the whole  
h ea ve n ’ ( 1 0 5 0 b 2 2 - 2 9 ). But the texts make it qui te clear  that this
The d o c t r i n e  o f  separate intellect in de An.430a 10-19 ,  raises a di f f icul ty  
in this re ga rd .  There ihc language used to describe  the inf luence o f  this 
inte l lect  o n  the pa ss iv e  intel lect is the language  o f  e f f ic ient  causal i ty.
T h e  n o t i o n  is t e m p e r e d ,  however,  by the description o f  the "producing" as 
a s tate:  ... t here  is a n o t h e r  which is what  it is by vi r t ue  o f  producing all
things; t hi s  is a sort o f  positive state like light; for in a sense light makes  
potential  colours  into actual colours' (a 15-17).  Aristot le  docs  not seem to 
have  any means  o f  expla in ing  how the causal contact is made between  
separate,  immaterial  substance and material substance.
17(1 P h y .  259a6-X.  The primary ef f ic ient  m o v e r  is contradis t ingu ishe d
from the primary cause  of  motion by way o f  final causality at P h y .  243a-  
4.
121 Pol .  1256b 15-22.
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imi ta t ion  or par t i c ipa t ion takes  p l ace  i nsofa r  as the l ower  things  
s t r ive  to a t t a in  as best  they can the  p e r m a n e n c e  and ac t i v i ty  
exhib i t ed  by the d ivine  b e i n g s . 122 It seems,  therefore ,  that  God is 
not  an internal  cons t i tuent  of  o ther  natures;  not  as a mater ia l  and 
intr insic formal  cause,  but  as pure ly and solely a final  cause.
D oe s  Ar i s to t l e  real ly in tend this con c l u s i o n ?  If  he  i n t ends  it, 
does  he succeed  in the exc lus ive  a t t r ibut ion o f  final  causa l i t y  to 
God? Or  is he merely inconsistent? Or  did he undergo  a change  in 
be l i e f s  b e t we e n  M e t a ,  xii and o ther  t r ea t i s es  i n c lu d i ng  o ther  
par t s  o f  the M e t a p h y s i c s '? O ne  c a n n o t  h o p e  to g ive  any 
sa t i s fac tory  answers  to these ques t i ons  on the basis  of  the texts.  
Ce r t a i n l y  ma t e r i a l i t y  is ruled out  o f  G o d ' s  n a t u r e  by s t rong  
a rgument .  But  can eff icient  and formal  causa l i t y  be compl e t e l y  
ruled out? Is not the first mover  a pure f o r m  of  Reason?  That  a 
first move r  may not be purely a final  cause  and may also be in 
ef f ic ient  contac t  with the wor ld  is i n t i ma t ed  in the P h y s i c s , 
wher e  the m o v e r  o f  the f i rst  h e a v e n  is e s t a b l i s h e d  at the 
c i r c u m f e r e n c e  of  the sphe r i ca l l y  c on ce i ve d  u n i ve r s e .  At G C 
323a30-33 ,  Aris tot le  explains  final  causa l i ty  by saying:  'Hence ,  if 
anyth ing  impar t s  mot ion wi thout  i t se l f  being mo v e d ,  it may  touch 
the m o v e d  and yet  i t se l f  be t ouc hed  by n o t h i ng ;  for  we  say 
so me t i mes  that  the man who  gr i eves  t ouches  us,  but  we  do  not  
touch him' .  Could a change in a psychologica l  state generated in a 
sympa t h i s i ng  agent  be an ef f ic ient  ef fect?  At  de Cae l o  2 71 a 33 ,  
Ar i s to t l e  s om e t im e s  speaks  as i f  na tu re  is a d iv ine ,  i m m a n e n t  
force:  "God and nature  (p h u s i s ) c reate  no th i ng  that  has not  its 
use"; cf. P A .  645a9l f .  where  na ture  is c once i ved  as an immanen t
122 See G C.  336b27-3 37a 7.
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force which underl ies the order of  the world (cf. also Po l .  132a32,
N E  1153532) .  In the theology of  M e t a  xii,  the divine  is said to 
p e rvade  (p e r i e c h e i ) the whole  wor ld,  which  is imposs i b l e  for  a 
strictly t ranscendent  God (1074b3) .  Cf. GC.  336b31,  where  God is 
said to h ave  ' fu l f i l l ed  (s u m p l e r o s e ) the  p e r f e c t i o n  of  the
u n i v e r s e . . .  t h a t  p e r p e t u a l  c o m i n g - t o - b e  be  t h e  c l o s e s t  
approx ima t ion  to eternal  being' .  The  emphas i s  is on "ful f i l led".
There  is also Aris tot le ' s  concep t  of  the Good  i l lus t ra ted by the
analogy of  the general  and the army.  The nature  of  the universe  
is said to e c h e i  the Good,  which chief ly  d ep en d s  on the first  
mover  jus t  as the order  of  the army depends ,  dia t out on,  chief ly  
on the general .  Now "dia t out on"  could mean order  " e f f e c t e d  b y  
h i m " ,  i.e., the general ,  so that e c h e i  could mean "embody" .  At  
1075510,  ph i losophe r s  who pos tu la t e  a first  p r inc ip le  such that  
the Good becomes  ext raneous  to its nature - Anaxagora s  and the 
like - are cri t icised by Aristot le for fai l ing to see that "the art of 
medicine is, in some sense,  health".  This analogy implies that the 
Good is ef f icacious.  From these texts,  a probable  conclus ion is 
poss ib le ;  namel y ,  that  Ar i s to t l e  ma y  have  c o n c e i v ed  God as 
bringing about  the order  of the cosmos  pr imar i ly  as the object  of 
the wor ld ' s  desi re and secondar i ly  as a r egula t ive ,  i.e., ef f icient ,  
force; but this eff icient  aspect  need not be God ' s  essent ial  nature 
but the aspect  connect ing "him" to the cosmos ,  if  indeed 'all thi ngs 
have by na ture  s o me t h i n g  d i v i ne  in t h e m ’ ( N E  1 1 5 3 5 3 2 ) .  
P r es uma bl y ,  an ef f i c i ent  a spec t  o f  God exp la i ns  h o w  the first  
mover  engender s  c i rcular  and rotary mot ion  of  the first  heaven,  
which is a part of  nature.  However ,  given Aristot le ' s  concept ion of 
eff icient  causal i ty,  and of  his ins is tence that  God is pure actual i ty 
and abso lu t e  pe r fec t ion ,  this p robab le  c onc l us ion  is in need of
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f u r the r  j us t i f i ca t i on  
N o w  the first  move r  exerci ses  its causal i ty  through being loved 
or des i r ed .  Since  in the text (1072a26-b3 )  vol i t ion presupposes  
t hough t ,  the  heavenly  bodies  moved  by the first  move r  are mos t  
p r o b a b l y  e n s o u l e d , 123 especial ly because they are gods.  But  soul 
is by  d e f i n i t i o n  " s e l f - m o v e r "  ( de  C a e l o ,  2 7 5 b 2 5 - 2 6 )  and ,
therefore ,  as the immobi l e  part  of  the se l f -moving being it is the 
p r i m a r y  m o v e r  in the order  o f  e f f i c ient  c a u s a l i t y . 124 As self- 
m ov i ng  movers ,  the exis tence of  souls confl icts  with the principle
that  w h a t e v e r  mo ve s  is moved  by another .  Indeed in the cl e 
C a e l o , A r i s t o t l e  held the P l a t on i c  v i ew that  s e l f - m o v e m e n t  
exp l a i ns  the r evo l u t i ons  of  the celes t ial  bodies .  At any rate,
where  the body is eternal  and deathless ,  as is the case with the 
celes t ia l  s e l f -move r s ,  the ef f ic ient  causal i ty  r equ i r ed  for  cosmic  
mo t i on  is the reby  e t e rna l l y  g u a r a n t e e d . 123 And because every 
sublunar  mot ion is for the sake of  a heavenly body (10 7 4 a 25 - 3 1), 
these bodies  too funct ion as final causes.  But Aristot le claims that 
a pure ly  actual  first mover ,  who is pure cogni t ion,  is still required.
S ince  k n o wl e dg e  o f  anything else includes  se l f -consc iousness  of 
the k no we r ,  i f  the sphere  souls k now the first  move r  they will
thereby k n ow  themselves .  But  there seems to be no clear  answer  
to the ques t i on  whe t he r  their  knowl edge  ex t ends  to things below 
them.  Celes t ia l  be ings  have potent ia l i ty  for  l ocomot ion ,  though
Aristoi lc ' s  assertions that the heavens arc ensouled  may be seen at d e  
C a e l o  285a29-30;  292aJ8-21 .
] ~4 P h y .  2 5 7 a 3 2 - 2 5 8 a 2 7 .  Cf. 2 59a32 -b3 .  On the Platonic  background, sec  
L a w s  x, 894b-897c; cf. Aristotle’s Phy .  2 6 5 b 3 2 - 2 6 6 a 2  
1 The continued exerc ise  o f  the superior ef f icient  causal i ty o f  heavenly  
bod ies  on every  sublunar change  may be found asserted in G C .  3 3 6 a31 - 
b9, and M e t a .  1071 a l 3 - 1 7
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not  for  a l t e r a t i o n  or  s u b s t a n t i a l  c h a n g e .  C a n  t hey  ha ve
potent ia l i ty  for  the r ecept ion of  new cogni t iona l  forms ,  s ince their  
na ture  is not  comp l e t e  ac tua l i t y?  The  text  of fers  no pos i t ive  
indica t ion that  Ar i s tot le  ass igns  it to them.  No r  is there a hint 
about  the way in which they k no w  the first mover .
Related to the above is the p rob lem of  the scope  and di rect ion of  
God' s  own  knowledge .  Does  God  k now the c o s m o s  for  Aris tot le?  
The text is at pains to show that the first move r  is a knowing  of  its 
own self,  and that  for  it to k n o w  any t h i ng  el se  wou l d  mean  a 
change,  and a change for  the worse.  Unl ike a human knower .  God 
as pure  form does  not  have the capac i t y  to r ece i ve  new forms
wi thout  ma t t e r  and wi th them as i n s t r umen t s  to i s sue  into new 
acts of  c og n i t i o n . 126 Because  of  its comple te  actual i ty it is l imited
to its own form and consequent ly  to cogni t ion of i tself  alone.  But
if the first mover  is the primary instance of  being,  would  it not,  in 
k n o w i n g  i t s e l f  t h e r e b y  know all s e c o n d a r y  i n s t a n c e s  that  
ex emp l i f y  and imi tate  it? Does  it not as a primary'  i ns t ance  
c on t a i n  all the p e r f e c t i o n s  tha t  are mere l y  s ha r ed  by the 
secondary ins tances? Ear ly in the M e t a p h y s i c s .  Aris to t l e  ass igns  
s o p h i a  to God,  i.e., knowl edge  of  first  pr inc iples .  May  this not  
mean that God as an ident i ty of  n o e s i s  and n o e t o n  is a unique  
instance of  all first pr inc iples?  Would  not  this  fo l low if Aris tot le  
also r idicules  E m p e d o c l e s ’ sup r eme  God ( "mos t  blessed God")  for  
being less wise  than the l esser  " long- l ived  gods"  b ecaus e  the 
nature of  fo rmer  ca tegor ica l ly  exc ludes  one  o f  the  first  pr inciples ,  
Str ife? This  problem may  be tackled indi rec t ly  by explor ing  again 
the not ion of  God as n o e t o n .  What  is mean t  by the ident i f icat ion 
of n o u s  or n o e s i s  and n o e t o n ?
1 -6  On forms as insirumcnis o f  cogni tion,  see de An.  4 3 2 a l - 3 ,  40 8 b  14-15
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To beg in  with ,  it is n o tew orthy  that the m o d e l  for Aristot le ' s  
c o n cep t io n  o f  the m o d u s  o p e r a n d i  o f  the d iv in e  in te l lect  is the 
relation o f  human reason to its object .  N o w  the ideal  o f  human  
reason is nothing but the truth, the e s s e n c e  o f  things  expressed  in 
a log ica l  sy s tem  o f  forms and relat ions.  If  I am right,  n o e t o n  
expresses  the content  o f  reason.  Then, as in Plato,  so in Aristotle;  
n o u s  is not an in te l lect  as a faculty ,  but the in s ight  o f  absolute  
truth which  c o m e s  to man l ike a reve la t ion .  But  then the truth, 
even  a b s o lu t e  truth, is not an outer  or a l i en  o b j e c t  in to  
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  with  w h ic h  a m in d  br in gs  i t s e l f ,  but rather  
s om eth in g  internal to reason and e x p r e s s i v e  o f  its nature.  If  
m>e t on  is the ideal o f  rational activity,  then, in attaining it, reason  
only realises  i tself.  For n o e t o n  w ould  be the content  o f  thought  
w hich  g i v e s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  its v a lu e  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  T h e  
op era t ion  o f  reason  is s o m e w h a t  e q u i v a l e n t  to e x p e r i e n c e d  
rational order and organisation o f  things .  In reason ing ,  therefore,  
we register  an aw areness  o f  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  thought as ex i s t in g  
am ong  other  th ings  in certain re la t ions .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  d iv in e  
intel lect would  be a supreme kind o f  awareness  o f  the ex i s ten ce  o f
a definite e s s e n c e  - thought,  and rationality in the order o f  thi ngs.
From one point o f  v iew ,  this awareness  would  not be the same as 
human or personal s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s  for the reason that in d iv in e  
thinking,  the s e l f  and the n o t - se l f ,  th inking and the content  o f
thought, would  be identif ied.  From another point o f  v ie w ,  d iv ine
s e l f -a w a r e n e s s  w o u l d  be l ike  human e x p e r i e n c e  in o n e  o f  its  
f leet ing and abort ive m om ents  o f  our thought  w hen  w e  are least  
aware o f  the fact o f  our ow n ref lect ion .  With God the m om en t  
would be eternal and co m p le te .  But the eternal for us,  as for
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Aris tot le ,  is that which  exists  outside t ime,  like the modern laws  
of  nature w hich  express  the eternal m on oton ie s ,  logical  sequences  
and re la t ion s  perta in ing  to p r o c e s s e s  o f  en d le s s  reiteration and 
tem pora l  s u c c e s s i o n s .
Indeed ,  the natural law s  o f  s c ie n c e  are e x e m p l i f i e d  in s p a c e ­
t im e,  but their v i ta l i ty  is drawn from a sphere quite outs ide  
sp ace - t im e ,  from the sphere o f  logica l  order and eternal relations.  
And this  is e x a c t ly  the sphere where  the Greeks  are incl ined  to 
locate divini ty .  The ex istence  o f  such a sphere is an expression of  
our ten den cy  to rise above  one and all m om en ts  into a world of
lo g i c a l  s e q u e n c e s  and perm anent  asp ec ts  e x i s t i n g  in no one
instant,  but good for and applicable to all moments .  Such a world 
could be the mind of God. If so its contents,  that is, itself,  would  
be a l o g i c a l  content  o f  pure thought.  Aris tot le ' s  God could
t h e r e fo r e  be the r e a l i s a t io n  o f  the form al  c o n d i t i o n s ,  the
i n t e l l i g i b l e  order ,  the a b so lu te  truth o f  th ings  i n c o m p l e t e l y
reasoned  out by us. guarantee ing its ex i s ten ce  as a fact already  
there in its c o m p l e t e n e s s ,  but prior l o g i c a l ly  to its inadequate  
e m b o d im e n t  in particular th ings  and its im p erfec t  operation in 
human reasons.
This  read ing  c o h e r e s  with much  in A r i s t o t l e ’s tripartit ion o f  
s c i e n c e s  noted earl ier.  To remind ou r s e lv e s .  Theoret ica l  or 
s p ecu la t iv e  s c i e n c e s  - physics ,  mathematics  and th eo logy  - were  
divided on the basis o f  the scope and class o f  entit ies  which they 
deal w i th .  T h e o l o g y  d ea ls  with  o b je c t s  w h ich  are eternal ,
im m u ta b le  and have  independent  and separable  ex i s ten ce .  The  
o b jec ts  o f  m a th e m a t ic s  are th ings  which  have  no independent
e x i s t e n c e  e x c e p t  as m o d i f i c a t i o n s  or n u m er ica l  propert ie s  o f  
material  objects .  P h ys ic s  on the other hand, dea ls  with objects
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which have no ex i s ten ce  separable from matter. T h eo lo g y  is prior 
to, and has a h igher  degree o f  scope  than, the other specu lat ive  
s c i e n c e s  b e c a u s e  th e  d i v i n e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e o l o g y  are  
presupposed  by mathematical  and physica l  sc ien ce .  A cco rd in g ly ,  
all the m o v e m e n t s  in the c o s m o s  and their  n u m e r a b i l i t y  
presuppose God as the vital and immaterial source.  T h e o lo g y  is 
thus an a ccou n t  o f  what  it means to b e , and w hat  r e la t ion s
b e tw een  th ings  are d ed u c ib le  from the fun dam enta l  c o n d i t io n s  
that they all a r e .  It is in this sense  that the c h ie f  object  o f
theology - that which  is called God - is the ult imate presupposit ion  
in an account o f  the cosmos .
I suspect  that this is what Aristotle would  like to say - i f  his 
j ibes against Platonic Forms are to be credible.  But does  he really  
succeed? I think that, by the force o f  his own language,  he does  
not. The reading above  of  n o e t o n  and the tripartition o f  sc ience  
is most probably  true. But the tripartition so read,  l ike the  
construal o f  n o e t o n , largely depends on taking the "separable and
independent  ex i s tence"  o f  the object  of  th e o lo g y  as " l o g i c a l l y
separable ex istence".  If  this were so,  "logical" separation would  
not,  on Aris tot le' s  own terms, dist inguish  the object  o f  th e o lo g y  
from those  o f  m ath em at ic s  and p h y s ic s .  W e  have seen  that 
A r is to t l e  d o e s  d i s t in g u i s h  b e tw e e n  "conceptual"  or "logica l"  
separation and "ontological" or "physical" separation.  The object of  
th eo logy  is on to log ica l ly  separate. Add to this the fact that God's  
activity is characterised as a self-th inking thinking.  H o w  then can 
or does  such a d iv ine  reality explain what it means for things t o  
b e .  H ow  is such a God the fundamental  condit ion  o f  things  as 
they a r e l  Are w e  to think o f  animate and inanimate m ot ions  in
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the s u b lu n a r  s p h e re  as s p e c i e s  or d e g r e e s  o f  s e l f - t h in k in g  
th inking? And is this necessar i ly  guaranteed by the first mover's  
ex i s t ing  o n to lo g ic a l ly  separate from the v i s ib le  c o s m o s ?
A nother  v i e w  o f  this prob lem  is this. For  A ris tot le ,  all forms  
except  the d iv ine  form o f  theoretical  reason are forms o f  sensible  
p a r t i c u l a r s .  P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  f o r m s  o f  s e n s i b l e  
particulars are not pure thought,  but are a c c o m p a n ie d  by imagery.  
Apart from the particulars in which  they inhere and the imagery  
which g iv e s  them content,  they are forms o f  nothing and are void.  
Their re levance ,  then, is drawn from a kind o f  exp er ien ce  which in 
its turn is relevant  on ly  to a material substratum. H ence ,  they  
cannot  be the appropriate  objects  o f  a d iv in e  or o f  any other  
d i s e m b o d ie d ,  pure in t e l l i g e n c e .  H e n c e ,  in so far  as heaven  and 
nature are em bodied .  God cannot know’ them. Thus by seeming to 
co m p le te ly  isolate d iv ine  mind from all knowdedge,  certainly from 
all know ledge  o f  the phenom enal  world,  and probably  from the 
logical  universe ,  Aris totle 's  o therwise  acute analy t ica l  approach to 
t h e o lo g y  y i e ld s ,  apparent ly ,  a r e l i g i o u s l y  e m a s c u la t e d  supreme  
God - w h o  cannot love ,  desire or care for the universe.  Arguably,  
by id en t i fy in g  God with the G ood ,  A ris to t le  c la im s  that God is 
es s e n t ia l l y  g ood .  And the id ent i f ica t ion  o f  n o e s i s  and n o e t o n  
entails a lso  that love  and the object  o f  love ,  care and the object  of  
care co inc ide  in God. But there are tw o object ions:  (i) i f  n o e t o n  
and no ' e s i s ,  hence  lov ing  and being loved co in c id e  in God, it does  
not follow' that the scop e  o f  God's love  is the universe;  and (ii) i f  
voli t ional  states depend upon k n o w l e d g e  as upon a first principle,  
lack o f  knowdedge o f  the c o s m o s  will  entail a b s e n c e  o f  love and 
desire on the part o f  God,  and this wil l  further entail  absence  o f
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concern,  care and providence  for the world.
E l s e w h e r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  A r i s to t l e  takes  G od 's  p r o v i d e n c e  for  
g r a n t e d :
N o w  he w h o  exercises  his intel lect  and cultivates  it seems to be 
both in the best state and most dear to the gods.  For i f  the gods  
have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have,  it 
w ould  be reasonable  both that they should del ight  in that which  
w as  m o s t  akin to them and that they should reward those  w h o  
lo v e  and honour this most ... And that all these attributes belong  
most  o f  all to the w ise  man is manifest.  He,  therefore,  is dearest  
to the gods .  And he w ho  is that wil l  presumably  be also the 
happiest  { N E  1 1 7 9 a 2 3 -3 2 ) .
Is Aristot le  merely  reporting a traditional belief ,  in a hypothetical  
and im personal way? If yes ,  is it not a remarkable co inc id en ce
that this tradition coheres  with Aristot le 's  ow n c o n cep t io n  o f  
human reason as the divine element most akin to the gods? Cf. in 
this regard an earlier passage  ( 1 099b  11 f f .): 'Now' if there is any 
gift o f  the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness  should be 
god -g iven  ... inasmuch as it is the best' ... even if  not god-given . . .  
that w'hich is the prize and end of  exce l lence  s eem s  to be the best 
thing and s o m e th in g  go d - l ik e  and b l e s s e d ’. I see  no ser ious
problem with the possibl ity  that Aris totle  is personally  commit ted  
to tradition in this context. The real issue is, o f  course,  how' divine  
providence  can be the dispensation of  the God o f  M e t a ,  xii w'hich, 
as a s e l f - c o n ta in e d  rational activ ity,  has neither knowdedge nor 
v o l i t io n  tow ards  the c o s m o s  from w hich  "he" is o n t o lo g ic a l ly
separate.  And the account of  the heavenly  bodies offers no cogent  
grounds  for either asserting or d en y in g  re lations  o f  these kinds  
tow'ards sublunar things.
But d o e s  God really need to know,  hence  lo v e  or care for the
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cosm os?  Aristot le  can argue that God's k n o w l e d g e ,  h en ce  his lo v e  
of  and care for the cosm os  is contained in his very e x i s ten ce  as the 
final cause  o f  the heavens and nature. B y  k n o w i n g  "himself" God  
is aware o f  his  own nature as the G ood ,  the first principle and the 
t e l o s  o f  the c o s m o s ,  who by eternal ly  caring and lo v i n g  h im s e l f  
at tracts  to h is  g o o d n e s s ,  p e r f e c t i o n ,  i d e a l i t y ,  s u p r e m a c y ,  
eternality. If x and y depend on A and A alone for their survival ,  
and for w hatever  good things they have ,  A cannot  be accu sed  o f  
insensit ivity or carelessness even if  A is not aware o f  x and y. But  
i f  A has k n o w le d g e  o f  himself ,  he has k n o w l e d g e  o f  h im s e l f  as a 
charitable supporter. Of  course all this does  not necess i ta te  God as
a s e l f - c o n t e m p la t i n g  and o n t o l o g i c a l l y  separate  rea l i ty .  W hat  
reasons ,  then,  are being g iven  for this  apparent p e cu l ia r i ty  or 
novelty o f  God's character?
P a ra d o x ica l ly ,  the reasons  are not ch ie f ly  due to A r is to t le ' s  
acumen for log ica l  or p h i losoph ica l  an a lys is .  Rather,  they  are 
ch ie f ly  due to traditional  re l ig ion .  If this w ere  true A r is to t le  
w o u ld  be m o r e  r e l i g i o u s l y - m i n d e d  than h is  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
predecessors .  Aristotle 's  lo g i c a l -p h i lo s o p h ic a l  a n a ly s e s  are forged
around his  four  c a u s e s  and a f in i t e  n u m b e r  o f  c o n c e p t u a l  
c a t e g o r i e s :  o u s i a , c n t e l e c h e i a , d u n a / n i s ,  e n e r g e i a ,  k i n e s i s .
Ou s i a ,  e n e r g e i a  and c n t e l e c h e i a  are p r im a r i ly  a t tr ibutes  or 
properties o f  God. But they are, at any rate, shared in by ce lest ia l  
and sublunary things  to som e  degree .  S o  these  attributes  and
p r o p e r t i e s  d o  n o t  by t h e m s e l v e s  e x p l a i n  w h y  G o d  is  
k e c h o r i s m e n o n  kai  aut o  k a t h ' h a u t o  and h a u t o n  noe i .  W ould
this be expla ined by the fact that God is a final cause?  A ga in ,  the 
answer is an emphat ic ,  No.  N oth ing  in Aris tot le' s  corpus  su gges ts
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that a final cause must necessar ily  be a se lf- th inking thinking and 
an immater ia l ,  separate and independent ly  ex ist ing  reality. What  
remains ,  then? The e v id e n c e  points un am biguous ly  to traditional  
r e l ig io n .
To  begin  with,  w e  have seen that God's nature is  specif ied  as 
No u s  (R eason ) ,  w hich ,  in Aristot le means  pure cogn it ion ,  a vital 
state or act iv i ty  o f  e x i s t e n c e  in which  n o e s i s  and n o e t o n , the 
agent and objec t  o f  k n o w l e d g e  are iden t i f ied .  A lready ,  this  
con cep t ion  o f  God im pl ies  the traditional contrast  between  God  
and man: man h a s  reason,  but man is not  pure,  in te l l ig ib le  and 
intuit ive reason,  which is what God is. What reason does  Aristotle  
provide for this contrast? Consider this passage:
...For if it (sc. divine Reason)  thinks nothing,  where is its dignity  
( to s e m n o n ) ! ... And if  it thinks,  but som eth ing  e l se  is superior  
( k u r i o n )  to it ([i .e. ,  i f  it depends on something e l seJ ) - then since  
its e s s e n c e  ( o u s i a )  w ould  not be th inking  but a capac i ty  
( l i u n a m i s ) ,  it cannot be the best reality ( ar i s t e  o u s i a ) . . .  F o r  
ch an ge  ( m e t a b o l e )  would be for the worse ( d i e  i r o n ) ,  and this 
would be already a m ovem ent  ( k i n e s i s ) .  First, then, i f it is not 
t h i n k i n g  ( n o e s i s )  but a cap ac i ty  [to th ink),  it w ould  be 
reason ab le  to s u p p o s e  that the con t inu ity  o f  its th inking is 
wearisome to it. Secondly ,  something else - the object o f  thought  
- would  ev ident ly  be more precious ( t i m i o t e r o n )  than n o u s \  for 
both thinking and the act o f  thinking would be long  even  to the 
worst o f  thoughts .  Therefore if  this is to be avo ided  (and it 
ou g h t . . . )  the act  o f  th inking cannot  be the bes t  o f  th ings .  
T h e r e f o r e  Reason thinks itself,  i f  it is that which is the best 
( k r a l i s t o n )  ( Me t a ,  xii 9, 1074b 15ff .)
The argument  o f  the passage  is roughly  this: the e s s en ce  and 
dignity  o f  Reason  is thinking.  But to think is to think either (a) 
on ese l f  or (b) something el se  as the object  o f  thought ( n o e t o n ) .  It 
is concluded  that Reason must think itself .  W hy is (b) rejected?
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B e c a u s e ,  w e  are told,  i f  (b)  w ere  true,  God's th ink ing  w o u ld  
d e p e n d  on n o e t o n , and this d ep en d en ce  w ould  entail  that N o u s  
is a potential reality. But what is wrong with this? After all, Plato  
had d i s t in g u i s h e d  b e tw e e n  d iv in e ,  p ara d ig m a t ic  F o r m s  as the  
fu n d a m en ta l  rea l i t i e s  w h ich  the c a u s a l i ty  o f  G od  as R e a s o n  
l o g i c a l l y  d e p e n d s  on. Indeed,  w e  might  argue that Aristot le  has  
an eternal ly ex is t ing  co s m o s .  And his  main point in the quoted  
passage  above  is that i f  the a r c  he  of  the c o s m o s  ( N o u s )  w ere  a 
potential  reali ty ,  this w ould  im ply  that the c o s m o s  m igh t  n ever  
have been.  Potent ia l i ty ,  im pl ies  material i ty ,  and enta ils  m e t a b o l e  
and k i n e s i s  (change and alteration). Hence,  insofar as there is an 
eternally e x i s t in g  c o s m o s ,  N o u s  must ex ist  in dep en d ent ly  o f  the  
c o s m o s  which  is material.  But this log ica l -p h i losoph ica l  reason is 
not what is given here for spec i fy ing  the nature o f  the a r c h e  of  
the c o s m o s  as a se lf - th inking reality.  What,  i f  any, reasons  are 
being given?
First,  the p a s s a g e  under cons iderat ion  im p l ie s  that to separate  
n o e t o n  from n o e s i s  will  be to m ak e  the act iv i ty  o f  the latter  
d e p e n d e n t  on the former.  But this is not the final reason.  The  
f inal  reasons  are expressed  in comparat ive  and superla t ive  terms:
"k u r i o n " ( superior),  " t i m i o me r o n "  (m o re  h o n o u r a b le ) ,  " a r i s t e "  
(bes t ) ,  "k r a t i s t o n " (s tronges t) .  N o t e  in particular that th ese  
terms are neither  lo g ica l  nor ana ly t ica l ,  but im p ly  traditional  
attributions and condit ions  o f  divinity.  The point o f  the p a ssa g e  
has to do with the co n s eq u en ce  f o r  God o f  "his" d ep e n d e n c e  on  
n o e t a .  First o f  all such dependence  w ould  make n o e t o n  superior  
to ( k u r i o n )  and more honourable  than ( t i m i o t e r o n )  N o u s .  It is 
hard to see  h ow ,  i f  my c o g n i t io n  o f  trees d ep en d s  on actual ,  
separately  e x i s t in g  trees,  this m akes  the trees superior  to and
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more honourable  than me, ev-en i f  w e  su p p o s e  A r is to t le  to mean  
that d iv in e  n o e t a  is  the fu ndam en ta l  ground o f  all th in k in g .  
C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  i f  it w ere  d is t inct  from d iv in e  N o u s  as  G od ,  it 
w ould  determine  the latter's actuality and, in this s en se ,  w ou ld  be 
su p e r io r  and m o r e  h o n o u r a b l e  than G o d .  L o g i c a l l y  and  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  there is  n o th in g  in tr i n s i c a l ly  o b n o x i o u s  about  
G od 's  a c t u a l i t y  b e i n g  d e t e r m i n e d  by  a m o r e  f u n d a m e n t a l  
condition ,  unless  the point is that God q u a  God is superior to and 
more honourable  than all other things.  In other w ords ,  A ris tot le  
cannot  be understood  as o f fer ing  "k u r i o n " and " t i m i o t e r o n "  as 
log ica l  or p h i lo s o p h ic a l  reasons .  " K u r i o n "  s im p ly  im p l i e s  the 
re l ig ious  contrast  b e tw een  the causal  s u prem acy  o f  G od  over  all 
other things,  whi le  " t i m i o t e r o n ” l ik e w is e  im p l ie s  the com parat ive  
honour re l ig iou s ly  attributed to God in contrast  to any attributable  
to human and other agents.  X en oph an es ,  w e  rem e m b er  cri t ic ised  
traditional thought which  understood g o d s  to be causa l  p o w e rs  
and then a lso  b e l i ev ed ,  in con s is ten t ly ,  that the g o d s  w ere  born.
Again cf. Xenophanes: "For this is what a God and a God's capacity  
is - to have p ow e r  and not to be in som eon e 's  p ow e r ,  and to be
the mos t  p o w e r f u l  o f  al l .  H e n c e ,  in so far  as it is not m ore
powerful ,  to that extent it is not God' (M X G  -  28) .  Aristot le  could  t e  
seen in this p o le m ic  light.  For i f  God is superior to and m o s t
honourable than all other things,  then, log ica l  c o n s i s t e n c y  requires  
that God cannot be seen to d e p e n d  on s o m e th in g  e l s e  to rea l ise  
"his" suprem acy  and honour.  Here  w ould  be a p o l e m i c  against  
Platonic  t h e o lo g y  and a lso  against  tradit ional  r e l ig io n  in w h ich  
Fate o f ten  r e p r e s e n t s  the d e l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  the  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
powers  o f  the gods  including Zeus,  the father o f  gods .  M oreover ,
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there is no s u g g es t io n  that Aris tot le  takes k i n e s i s  and m e t a b o l e  
to be bad p e r  se\  only  that they are con d i t ion s  w h ic h  w o u ld  be 
w orse  ( c h e i r o n )  f o r  God to be in: potentia l i ty  is o f  contraries,  so  
i f  God w ere  in k i n e s i s  or m e t a b o l e  "he" w o u ld  think n o w  good  
n o w  bad. A g a in ,  the p o in t  is to su bs tan t ia te  the  tradit ional  
assumption that God is  good ,  and to c la im  that G od  is  es sen t ia l ly  
good.  Plato in the R e p u b l i c  ( 3 7 9 f f . )  argued  for  the e s s e n t ia l  
g o o d n e s s  o f  the g o d s ,  a g a in s t  the t r a d i t io n a l  or H o m e r i c  
rep resenta t ion  w h ich  was  l o g i c a l l y  c o m p a t ib l e  w ith  s e e i n g  the  
gods as not es sen t ia l ly  good .  Thus to substantiate the traditional  
assumption that God is g o o d ,  Aris tot le  needs  to s h o w  that, g iven  
God's nature as pure thinking,  God thinks on ly  the good; and that 
this is so because  God ex i s t s  beyond the con d i t ion s  o f  ev i l ,  viz ,  
k i n e s i s  and m e t a b o l e .  A g a i n ,  d e p e n d e n c e  on rather than 
identity  with n o e t o n  would  not make N o u s  the best  or strongest  
( a r i s t e , k r a t i s t on )  reality.  O n ce  more A r is to t le  is a n x io u s  to 
s u b s ta n t ia t e  the s u p r e m a c y  o f  G od .  N o t e  the in f e r e n t ia l ;  
'Therefore R eason  thinks it se l f ,  i f  it is the best' (or s trongest ,  
k r a t i s t o n ) .  F u rth erm ore ,  such d e p e n d e n c e  w o u l d  m a k e  the  
continuity  o f  N o u s '  th inking w e a r i s o m e  ( e p i p o n o n ). Here too it 
is clear that a re l ig ious  contrast  between  the l i fe  o f  God and that 
of  man is implied .  To substantiate  the traditional  b e l i e f  that the 
gods  l ive b lessed  l ives  free o f  toil and fat igue ,  A r is to t le  has to 
establish the suprem e God as a r c h e  b eyon d  the v i c i s s i t u d e s  o f  
material l i fe ,  which is the lot o f  human life.
S o  the final reasons  of fered for c h o o s in g  b e tw een  the alternative  
theses - either God thinks "himself" or thinks som eth in g  e l se  - are 
that by c h o o s in g  the first a lternat ive,  w e  are able  to substant iate
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our a s su m p t io n s  that God is the best l iv in g  rea li ty ,  the most  
honourable,  and the most  supreme o f  causes  w h ose  act iv ity  is, in 
contrast  to other agents ,  u n w e a r ie d .127 These  reasons are neither  
lo g i c a l  nor p h i lo s o p h ic a l ,  but re l ig ious .  They  establi sh ,  for the 
con cep t ion  o f  God,  a set o f  traditional condit ions  and attributions  
o f  d iv in i ty  - s u prem acy ,  perfec t ion  or idea l ity ,  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ,  
h onour ,  and u n w e a r in e s s .  D o  these  c o n d i t io n s  and attributes  
const itute  the fundamental  reasons  w hy  God ex ists  separate ly and 
in d ep en d en t ly  o f  the c o s m o s ,  and thinks nothing but i t se l f?  I 
venture to say.  Yes:  g iven  (i) God's es sen ce  as a thinking reality  
(an e s s en ce  which it shares with Plato’s God),  (ii) certain doctrinal 
assum ptions  about matter - assumptions ,  th em se lves  Platonic,  and 
d e r iv e  from  O r p h ic -P y th a g o r e a n  re l ig io n  - that matter is a 
p r in c ip le  or c o n d i t io n  o f  corrupt ion ,  c o n t i n g e n c y ,  e v i l  ( i . e . ,  
d e s tr u c t io n ,  for A r i s t o t l e ) ,  and ( i i i )  the tradit ional  r e l i g io u s  
condit ions  and attributions o f  d iv ine reality, w e  can derive God as 
a (a) s e l f - th ink ing  and (b) transcendent reality.  Just a s su m e (i) 
and (ii). Conjoin these with (iiia) God as self-sufficient.  It fo l lows  
that God's th inking cannot  be seen to d e p e n d  on anything else;  
for d e p e n d e n c e  e n ta i l s  lack  o f  ( i i ia )  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  ( i i ib )  
supremacy,  ( i i ic )  perfec tion  or ideality, and if  that on which  God  
d epends  is matter,  then,  lack o f  ( i i ib - i i i c )  in turn wil l  entail  a 
div ine l i fe  which  (i i id) is laboured,  ( ii ie)  lacks honour,  ( i i ie)  lacks  
e t e r n a l i t y . 128 Thus to satis fy  these condit ions  and attributes of
19 71 Cf. :  'So t o o  in i ts  d i s c u s s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the d i v i n e ,  w h a t e v e r  is
p r im ar y  and s u p r e m e ,  is n e c e s s a r i l y  u n c h a n g e a b l e .  T h i s  fac t  c o n f i r m s  
whai  w e  h a v e  said.  For  there is  no th ing  e l s e  s tronger than it to m o v e  it - 
s in ce  that w ou ld  be  mo re  d iv in e  - and it has no defec t  and lacks  n o n e  o f  
its proper  e x c e l l e n c e s '  (de C a e lo  2 7 9 a 3 0 - 3 4 ) .
It w o u l d  s e e m  that "eternality" is not d e c i s iv e  here s i n ce  the exi s tent ia l  
status o f  ce le s t ia l  and pr imary  b o d ie s  share in it. But the point  is rather
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div in i ty ,  God must ex is t  separately from the materia l  c o s m o s  and 
think i t s e l f  only.  Therefore,  the u lt imate grounds  for Aristot le ' s  
onto log ica l  separation o f  God from the c o s m o s ,  and for sp ec i fy ing  
its thinking activity as self -thinking,  are re l ig ious .  From this point  
o f  v ie w ,  he  has carried further than any b e fore  h im ,  the bas ic  
r e l ig io u s  a s su m p t io n s  w h ich  d e term in e  the c o n c e p t i o n  o f  G od ,  
although the process  o f  carrying this out has led to a G od  w h o s e  
causal  relation to the c o s m o s  is, arguably,  r e l ig io u s ly  problematic.
R elig ion  grounded in such a God may w el l  be Aris totle 's  vers ion  
o f  Socratic p h i l o - s o p h i a .  S o p h i a  for Aris totle  is a d iv in e  activity  
const ituted  by the sc ien t i f i c  and intuit ive  apprehens ion  o f  God or 
d iv ine  first principles:  'of  all forms o f  k n o w l e d g e  s o p h i a  is the 
m ost  d iv in e  ( t h e i o t a t E ), and the m os t  h o n o u r a b l e ’ ( t i m i o t a t P ,  
M e t a .  983a5;  cf. N E  1141 b 3 ). S o p h i a  i n v o l v e s  c o g n i t i v e  
activity in which  by grasping divine  first pr inc ip les  w e  grasp our
own essent ia l  s e l f  - a them e int im ated  in S o c r a te s  and fu l ly  
developed in Plato. It is in s o p h i a  that our capaci ty  for a taste of  
div ine  li fe is realised.  A ccord in g ly ,  s o p h i a  is the activ i ty  which
represents  the fu l le s t  rea l i sa t ion  o f  l i f e ,  and is c o n s t i t u t iv e  o f
d iv ine  e u d a i m o n i a . But if  s o p h i a  is activity in lo v e  o f  God's se lf-  
k n o w led g e ,  perfection,  eternality ,  etc. ,  it w ould  s e e m  to require a
highly  intel lectual  form o f  l ife.  S o m ew h a t  l ike the Socrat ic  man,  
the l i fe o f  the Aristotel ian man is su ff ic ient ly  fu l f i l led  in the full  
a c tu a l i sa t io n s  o f  th o s e  o f  his  s p e c i e s - d e f i n i n g  p r o p e r t ie s  and 
cap ac i t i e s  w hich  ex i s t  for him q u a  man. In this,  p h r o n l s i s  is 
required.  But q u a  rational participant in the d iv in e ,  the l i fe  o f  
the Aris totel ian man must cu lm inate  in the h igh ly  in te l lec tu a l i sed
that  m a t t e r  is  the  p r i n c i p l e  or  c o n d i t i o n  o f  c o n t i n g e n c y .  H e n c e  
d e p e n d e n c e  on matter  w i l l  af fec t  the e terna l i ty  o f  d i v i n e  l i f e .
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t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n  ( N  E  1 1 6 6 a l 7 ,  1 1 6 8 b 2 9 f f . ,  1 1 7 8 a 2 - 8 :  c f .
1 1 7 8 a 9 f f . ) .  S in ce  piety  has to do with the d iv ine ,  and s o p h i a  is 
d i v i n e  a c t iv i t y  w h i c h  is  c o g n i t i v e  o f  d i v i n e  f irst  p r in c ip l e s ,  
A ris tote l ian  p ie ty ,  as represented  in the E t h i c s  and M e t a p h y s i c s ,  
is a h ighly  in te l lec tua l i sed  activity.  For  a p h i lo s o p h er  w h o  equals  
Heracl i tus  in m ak in g  ac t iv i ty  the central  feature  o f  a l i fe  w e l l -  
l i ved ,  A r is to t le  g o e s  o n e  step b eyon d  S ocrates  and Plato  in not  
m a k in g  pract ica l  ac t ion s  an e s sen t ia l  in gred ien t  in p h i lo s o p h ica l  
rel ig ion: for p h r o n e s i s  does  not n ecess i ta te  s o p h i a .  Once  more,  
A ris to t le ,  w h i le  surpass ing  his p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p r e d e c e ss o r s  in the 
tradit ional  r e l i g io u s  g ro u n d in g  o f  his  G od  as a s e l f - th in k in g  
thinking w h o  ex is ts  independent ly  o f  the c o s m o s ,  has endorsed by 
this grounding,  a re l ig ion which  surpasses theirs in its intel lectual  
a sce t ic i sm .  But here too. the operat ive  as su m p t ion  is Aristotle's  
s e n s i t i v e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  the re l ig io u s ! } '  p e r c e i v e d  d isp ar i ty  
between the capaci t ies  o f  man and the properties o f  God, and the 
bel ie f  that polit ics  and ethics  are not features o f  d iv ine  life.
Let us su m m ar ise  the results  o f  our in v e s t ig a t io n s  in the next  
and c o n c lu d in g  chapter.
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SIX
CONCLUSION: ARISTOTLE AND HIS PREDECESSORS
W e  started o f f  w ith  a t w o - f o l d  aim. T h e  f irst  w a s  to s e e  h o w  
A ris to t le  stands in relation to his  p red ece ss o rs  on th e o lo g y ,  g iven  
his concept ion  o f  god  as, i n t e r  a l i a , a f inal cause  w h o  m o v e s  as an 
o b je c t  o f  des ire ,  a s e l f - t h in k in g  t h in k in g  w h o  is  o n t o l o g i c a l l y  
dis t inct  from the c o s m o s .  T h e  s e c o n d  w as  to s e e  w he th e r  the
read ing  w h i c h  p r e s u m e s  a d i v i s i o n  o f  P r e so c r a t ic  th o u g h t  into  
s c ie n c e  and p h i lo s o p h y  on the one  hand, and re l ig io n  or th eo logy  
on the  other,  is  ju s t i f i ed ,  g i v e n  the freq u en t  rec urren ce  o f  the  
word "god" in Presocratic thought.  W e  saw that the c o m m o n  is sue  
in our tw o-fo ld  aim was the concept ion  o f  god: for, to ach ieve  our 
first aim, it w as  n ecessary  to e lu c id a te  the c o n c e p t  o f  god  as it 
occurs  in pre-Ari Uotelian thought ,  but .o do so  a lso  enables  us to 
see whether a re l .g ious  or theo log ica l  s^nse o f  "god" is what  occurs  
in the pre-Aristotel ian  system s.  And t cis in turn w o u ld  i l luminate  
both the  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  the  n o n - t h e o l o g i c a l  r ea d in g  o f  
P r e so c r a t ic  p h i l o s o p h y  is true or f a l s e ,  and  h o w  A r is to t l e ' s  
a p p arent ly  p e c u l i a r  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  G o d  s ta n d s  in  r e la t io n  to 
preceding  thought.  The w h o l e  i s s u e  refers us back  to h o w  "god" 
was  c o n c e i v e d  in traditional  re l ig ion .  Th is  w a s  the subject  o f  
prel iminary  in ves t iga t ion  in our in troductory  chapter .  The  result
was  that in Greek re l ig iou s  culture ,  tf ere w as  an operat ive  model
o f  explanat ion  a< cord ing  to w h ich  a jh en om en on  or the universe
as a w h o l e  w as  d eem ed  to be  adequ<;e ly  a cco u n ted  for w hen its
d iv in e  origin  or ca u s e  w as  s p e c i f i e d  or traced as that w hich  was
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ultimately presupposed in that account.
The divine reality which was thus presupposed was a causal and 
/or originating power whose form ranged from physical  and 
psychic power cr force to causally effective conditions; and a
reality was god or divine if it satisfied a set of basic conditions of
divinity: self-sufficiency, supremacy, immortality and perfection 
or ideality. These conditions primarily imply a contrast to the 
dependency, finitude and imperfection of human life. A fortiori, 
they imply that god or the divine is a living reality. Hence, the
general but by r.o means universal personification of these causal
powers. The conception of god outlined above was basic  to Greek 
polytheism, and so contains the conceptual or intellectual core of 
religious piety. This conceptual  core does not entail (i) that god, 
although a living power, be anthropomorphic or (ii) that god be
morally or emotionally appealing or (iii) that god be actually 
worshipped - although, no doubt, (i)-(iii) would count as 
determinants of ; cultic god. Nor does it entail (iv) that god be 
material or immaterial or (v) that god he a specific kind of cause - 
material, efficien., formal or final. Consequently, any account of
the universe or a feature of the universe which derives the 
exis tence  of a causal  reality as that which is ul timately 
presupposed,  would be religious and theological, provided this 
reality satisfies the conditions of divinity.
We then entered on an exegeses of pre-Aristotelian philosophies. 
Beginning with the Presocratics,  we saw that  there was a 
universal tendency to argue to the necessary existence of a causal
and/or originating power - a divine- i r c h e  often called god, as
that which is u ltimately presupposed in what is apparently
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deemed an adequate account of the universe often conceived as a 
cosmos. The a r c  he  was a motion-god, in the sense that its 
function was always expressed in terms of motion which was 
presumed to imply life. Consequently,  there was an increasing 
tendency towards specifying divine causality as rat ional  motion. 
This culminated in the Anaxagorean postulate of a pure self-ruling 
Reason who governs the cosmos by motion. Generally, divine 
motion was regular, predicable, measurable or teleological.  From 
the logical and existential points of view, there was little doubt 
that an a rc  he  was assumed to be causally superior to all things, 
eternal,  perfect and (at least, logically) self-sufficient,  i.e., the 
a r c  he  did not depend on anything else for its existence. The 
apparent exception, the Eleatic or Melissean philosophy of Being, 
was not concerned with how the cosmos came to be or with how 
an arc  he  functions, but with the conditions which an a r c h e  qua 
a r c h e  must satisfy. The numerous condit ions recognised by 
Parmenides, and to a lesser extent by Melissus, are the same as 
those in which Xenophanes had conceived his God, and are all 
subsumable under the set of basic conditions of divinity we have 
identified. Thus, generally speaking,  the Presocrat ic  thought- 
systems are, by any reading, a series of rational theologies: they 
conta in  the m o ie l  of explanat ion continuous with traditional  
religious thought, namely, that of accounting for the universe as a 
whole by specilying or tracing its underlying divine cause or 
origin. Consequently, our second aim may be achieved; for we can 
now say that the reading of Presocratic thought which presumes it 
to be neatly divisible into philosophy and science on the one hand, 
and religion or theology on the other, is neither justified not true.
To characterise the Presocratic  philosophies  as rel igious and
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theological is to emphasise their continuity but not to claim their 
identi ty with traditional religious thought. Theologically, the 
Presocratic systems are arguments to the necessary existence of a 
reality whose nature contains the concep tua l  core  of god as 
conceived in traditional religion, i.e., as causal and/or originating 
power. Since the basis of this theology is the r e c o g n i t i o n  and 
m a i n t e n a n c e  of the conceptual core of god as traditionally 
conceived,  rel igious piety is thus retained. Yet the piety of 
philosophical theology is not exactly the same as in traditional 
religion. For philosophical theology involves a different mode of  
c o g n i t i o n :  there is a movement from god as mythologically 
(m u t h i k o s ) conceived to god as rationally (l o g i k o s ) conceived, 
with the consequence that while this latter conception recognises 
and maintains the conceptual core of the gods of traditional 
religion and mythology, it does so by jettisoning much that had 
traditionally courted as relevant in the conception of god. This 
l o g o s  - approach to theology reflects a mental development that 
had outgrown simple faith and had begun to feel the necessity of 
understanding the essence of what it believes. It entails a 
distinctive, if you like, an advanced kind of religion in which 
rationality becomes a key ingredient in piety. Intellectually, this 
contrasts  with the traditional piety of uncri tical,  submissive 
reverence and recognition of the gods and what they sanction.
Among the Piesocratics,  Xenophanes is the most expressive 
represen ta t ive  c f  this ra t ional  ( l o g i k o s ) theology and the 
r a t i o n a l  piety it entails: 'For this is what a god and a god's 
capacity is - to Lave power and not to be in someone's power, and 
to be the most powerful of all' (A28); 'those who assert that the
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gods are born are as impious as those who say that they die' 
(A12). As in vhe religious tradition, so in philosophy; god is 
ba s i c a l l y  a causal power. If so, impiety follows from any other 
conception of god which is logically inconsistent  with and/or 
contradictory of this basic meaning of god. A causal power per se 
cannot be said to be born or die. Consequently, to the extent that 
tradition conceives of god as a causal power and also as born, it is 
confused,  inconsistent or contradictory, and its devotees hold 
impious thoughts. God is that power which 'shakes all things by 
the will of "his" mind' (frr. 25, 26). This God, Xenophanes urges 
mankind to 'praise in hymns with pious myths and pure words' 
(B l) .  Here is religious consciousness returned upon itself; a 
degree of ratio.iality has been introduced into theology and 
religion.
If Plato's middle and late dialogues represent the culmination of 
the r a t i o n a l , cosm o lo g ica l  theo logy  in t ro d u c ed  by the 
Presocratics, his early dialogues, namely, Socratic philosophy,  
culminates in r a t i o n a l  piety. The primary concern of Socratic 
philosophy was with how to live the best life. But at the 
background of this philosophy was a new wave of rationalism 
which reached its acme in the fifth century. Partly representing 
this is the so-cal led Sophistic Movement, whose or ientat ion 
implies that it saw, in certain areas at least, clear limits to the 
power of human reason: if the Presocratics thought that human 
reason could reach beyond the epistemologically dark recesses of 
space and time to the luminous realm of the divine a r c h e  of all 
things, some Sophists and others were, at least, sceptical about 
this. Protagorean agnosticism or humanistic aphorism - Man is
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the Measure of all things - may well express a mood widely 
shared by the 5th century  inte l ligentsia .  Sophistic thought 
refocused the speculative energies of human reason away from 
cosmology, gods and all, to the immediate, practical, personal and 
relative historical and cultural circumstances in which human life 
or society finds itself and in which its own well-being was deemed 
to lie. This anthropocentric wave of rationalism involves a high 
revaluat ion of and dependence on human rather  than divine 
resource in connection with individual or social well-being. To an 
extent, this was a revival of the Homeric life, according to which 
the good life, the life of the a g a t h o s , in its rich intensity and 
variety, was guaranteed by the professional pursuit of a r e t e , the 
e x e r c i s e  of power and skill (largely military at this time) in 
achieving  and m ain ta in ing  personal  status,  honour  and the 
material goods o'  life, under socio-religious constraints like justice, 
temperance, prudence, and piety. The portrait of the 5th century 
a g a t h o s , howeve \  is unlike the Homeric man: the existence of the 
traditional gods having been subjected to rational scepticism at 
this time, the reins of socio-religious constraints of are te  have 
been set loose. That raw competitive power and skill constitutes 
are t e  for the agc . thos  at this time is manifest in Athen's imperial 
attitude towards members of her empire, in Thrasymachus' thesis 
that just ice is the interest of the stronger ( R e p u b l i c ) ,  and in 
Callicles* view that to do injustice is more honourable  than to 
suffer it (Gorg ias ).
In Plato's earl> dialogues, Socrates is represented as practising 
philosophy in the form of dialectics of the kind which contains not 
only a revis ion of traditional religion but also a critique of 
Sophistic rationalism, and depends on a real distinction between,
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but not a separation of, soul and body (G o r g i a s , C h a r m i d e  s , 
C r i t o ) .  On the one hand, Socratic dialectics im plies that the 
system of beliefs sustained by the traditional myths and relied on 
by conservatives like Euthyphro will not remain the same under 
rational scrutiny. On the other hand, and against the Sophists, he 
argues that a more perceptive attention to human life, specifically  
to the obvious patterns o f  moral behaviour - physical or verbal - 
intim ates a deeper structure o f  reality and human nature: 
dialectics points to forms as the fundamental realities i n  and o f  
things ( E u t h y p h r o ) ' ,  human behaviour is motivated by a desire 
for a final goal, the good of life ( L y s i s ,  G o r g i a s ), identified with 
e u d a i m o n i a  ( G o r g i a s , E u t h y d e m u s ) ' ,  a n d  intimates an essential 
connection  between e u d a i m o n i a  and a r e t e , to the extent that 
a r e t e  is, at least, necessary for e u d a i m o n i a  ( G o r g i a s ) .  The 
distinction between body and soul enables Socrates to argue that 
the good of life is not the same as p h y s i c a l  pleasure, health, 
beauty, and strength ( G o r g i a s ) .  Hence, e u d a i m o n i a  is not 
attainable by material goods, however quantitatively unlimited. 
The good of life is an optimum state - if  you like the health of the 
s e l f ,  the soul ( G o r g i a s ,  C r i t o ) .  Such a state o f  the soul is 
characterised by two significant features: (1) it is s o p h i a  by being 
cognitive of (eth:.cal) first principles, and (2) it is divine for two 
reasons: culturally, the ideal, the perfect, the sublime, is divine, 
and textually, the [key] property of god is s o p h i a .  Thus god, for 
Socrates, is the agent w ho e x e m p lif ie s  s o p h i a  ( m o r a l -  
philosophical w isdom ). A ccordingly, d iv ine nature must be 
characterised by a moral-intellectual perfection consisting in a 
cognitive relation to first principles. This required perfection
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com p le te ly  rules out arbitrariness, irrationality , and moral 
perversion from the nature of god.
As in Homer, so in Socrates, the a g a t h o s  is a person who 
possesses  a r e t e .  But unlike in Homer, Socratic man is a g a t h o s  
whose life is fully guided by s o p h i a .  And this entails an agent- 
as opposed to an act- centred approach to being a g a t h o s : for a 
Socratic man is not, like a Homeric or traditional man, a g a t h o s  
solely by his claims to acts performed; he must also have the
intellectual ability to justify such acts with an e l e n c h t i c a l l y  
irrefutable logos  of to aga t hon .  The basic assumption here is the 
thesis that to be  [ s a y ,  pious] is to k no w  [piety]: thus Nicias'
inability to give a dialectically irrefutable account of courage casts 
doubt on his own courage which was otherwise traditionally 
reputed; Euthyphro supports his self-confident piety by pointing 
to his impending action against in his own father, and justifies this 
by adducing the reverent precedent of Zeus' punishment, by 
castration, of his own father. For Socrates, however, if Euthyphro 
is  pious, as he claims to be, he must k n o w  what piety is. His 
piety is in doubt because he cannot justify his action by an 
elenchtically irrefutable l o g o s o f  piety. Thus, if to be  [say, good] 
is to k n ow  [what the good is], and to know is to know forms, then
here too, as in Presocratic thought, Socratic forms play the
explanatory role envisaged  in traditional relig ious thought,
namely, that they are the divine realities which are ultimately 
presupposed in what is deemed as an adequate account of a 
feature of the universe, the ethical-religious phenomena.
Against the charge o f  corrupting the youth and of impiety or 
atheism, Socrates claims that he is the greatest boon to Athens,
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and that he is pious { A p o l o g y ) .  In this he appeals to his practice 
of p h i l o s o p h i a  by which he claims to have spent all his life doing 
service to the god: that o f  persuading fe llow  citizens to make 
a r e t e  o f  the soul rather than the possession o f  any social or 
material good their priority in life; and of using e l e n c h u s  as the 
means o f  bringing hom e to fe llo w  Athenians a painful but 
beneficial awareness o f  the measure of their ignorance; and the
i
need to pursue s o p h i a  in its true sense as what they require for 
the good of life they have been seeking, and for real salvation 
from evils in this life and the life hereafter, i f  there is a hereafter 
{ A p o l o g y ) .  According to Socrates, therefore, the pursuit of 
s o p h i a  is a religious duty: not only does it constitute service to 
god but also it is god's order { A p o l o g y ) .  He implies, therefore, 
that the life dedicated to the love or acquisition of wisdom  
{ p h i l o s o p h i a )  is religion. This Socratic religion involves some 
transposition of fdements of Olympian and mystery religions: Zeus 
was b e lieved  to ex em p lify  the a g a t h o s  and s o p h o s  par 
excellence, and the mystery religions held out the prospect of  
divine blessedness and e u d a i m o n i a  to their initiates on the basis 
of the divine affinity of our soul to the gods. But the Socratic 
religion and theology of s o p h i a  implies a rejection of the form of 
religion which seeks spiritual salvation and happiness from its 
devotees by means of ritual sacrifices and observances, initiation 
rites, ecstatic carthasis, and so on. The ch ief  criterion of this 
religion of s o p h i a  is whether an activity helps to induce s o p h i a  
in us, not wheth t  such an activity is socially or legally approved. 
Piety may consist in a life dedicated to s o p h i a  but piety, as a kind 
of s o p h i a , is consummated by embodying it as a state of one's 
soul. It is in thit, that we fulfil our duty and service to the gods.
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A lthough there were earlier intimations o f  this religion of  
s o p h i a  in Pythagoras (fr. 87, Wehrli) and Heraclitus (B 114), its 
full elucidation belongs to Plato in his post-Socratic dialogues. 
Platonic theology and religion are that of Socrates' blown out into 
cosm ic  proportions, and incorporates a return to Presocratic 
cosm ology  and the conception o f  divine causality in terms of  
motion, as well as the Orphic separability of soul from body, and 
the assignment of m e t a p h y s i c a l  status to Forms.
Forms, soul, and body, constitute the three basic factors of Plato’s 
philosophy of re lig ion . The primary bodies constitute the 
principle or condition of disorderly change, of irrationality, evil, 
v is ib ility , d ispersability , etc. { P h a e d o , T i m a e u s , S t a t e s m a n ,  
E p i n o m i s ) .  Specific Forms derive from the universal Form of the 
Good. The Forms constitute a system of fundamental divine 
realities in terms of which an event is s t a n d a r d l y  true or a 
natural phenom enon is s t a n d a r d l y  orderly, good, beautiful, 
intelligible, happy, wise, just, equal, cold, etc. (P h a e d o , R e p u b l i c , 
P h a e d r u s , Ti maeus ) .  Thus the conception of Forms is continuous 
with traditional religious thought; they are divine principles and 
causes serving as ultimate explanations of the sensible features of 
the cosmos.
To serve as standards of perfection, Forms must be, in ter  a l i a , 
immutable, immaterial, and intelligible. But since that of which 
Forms are principles and causes is the changing, bodily universe 
conceived as a cosm os, Plato, in the late dialogues, requires the 
medial agency of d ivine Reason whose function, as knower of  
Forms, is to transmit the standard-establishing properties of  
Forms into the material cosmos. It does so in its poly-functional
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aspects as constructor and regulator. In its constructive function 
divine Reason is poetically  represented as a Craftsman who  
creates the cosmos by imposing order on the otherwise chaotic 
and disorderly material elem ents; in its regulatory function  
Reason governs the cosmos in the form of soul defined as "motion 
of Reason" { L a w s ,  T i m a e u s , S t a t e s m a n , E p i n o m i s ) .  Divine  
regulation of the cosmos by motion is transmitted through the 
circular and rotary motions of the stars and planets; these motions 
in turn account for the f o r m a l  features of phenomenal existence  
in the sublunar sphere { P h a e d r u s ,  L a w s ,  T i m a e u s ,  E p i n o m i s ) .
Reason is called God. So too are the countless stars and planets 
w hose  rational m otions are those of Reason { T i m a e u s ) .  
Consequently, Platonic gods are like those of the Presocratics, 
motion-gods. But unlike those, however, Platonic gods are what 
they are - their causal supremacy, supreme wisdom , justice, 
goodness, happiness, blessedness, everlasting life, etc. - in virtue 
of being imbued with Forms { P h a e d r u s ) .  The triumphant 
rationality of th^ celestial god-souls has been explained in two 
different but not incompatible ways { T i m a e u s , E p i n o m i s ): (i) 
that god-souls are a certain mathematical structure of the Forms 
of B eing, Sam eness and D ifference; (ii)  that the celestia l  
environment is o:* the sort - fiery - which is perfectly conformable 
to motions of Reason, (i) and (ii) imply corresponding contrasts to 
human souls who are, to a second degree, a mathematical 
structure of the same Forms and, in addition, inhabit a more 
recalcitrant and disorderly environment - the earth. As divine 
reality is presumed to be alive, so is Reason a living reality and, 
indeed, the celestial motions o f  Reason are the highest forms of
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life . Accordingly, rotary and circular motions are not merely 
p red ic ta b le ,  regular, orderly , num erable, te le o lo g ia l ,  and 
everlasting, etc; they are said to be supremely good, blessed, 
happy, w ise. And not only do the motions of Reason impart 
intelligibility, order, goodness, etc., to the cosmos, they also impart 
care, virtue or justice to the administration the cosmos { L a w s ,  
T i m a e u s ) .
The goal of human life is to be (divinely) e u d a i m o n .  In Plato, 
this entails that the life of the individual, social or personal, is to 
be fully governed by reason, i.e., by a soul that knows Forms 
{ R e p u b l i c , L a w  s ) .  This further entails the control of our 
environment or the freeing of our soul from its earthly influences 
- the ev ils ,  disorderly behaviours, irrationality and violent  
passions which it engenders. Since the full control or reduction of 
the influences of one's environment depends on knowledge of the 
laws and princip.es which govern it, this means in Plato that our 
spiritual freedorr and happiness depends on Forms in knowing  
which we become truly or divinely wise { s o p h o s ) .  Since a certain 
order of Forms constitute the internal structure of our souls, this 
also means that .n coming to know Forms, we are at once inuring 
ourselves to the fundamental principles and causes governing the 
cosmos and bringing to full self-consciousness our own essential 
nature (M e n o , P h a e d o , T h e a e t e t u s , T i m a e u s , Ph a ed r u s ) .  This 
is a kind of self-knowledge - call it rational self-knowledge, but it 
is a mediated self-knowledge; we need the media of l o g o i  or 
theoretical studies to bring to full self-consciousness principles 
which are already innate in us. On the other hand, God does not 
need the media of l o g o i  or theoretical studies in order to know  
Forms. This strongly suggests that God's knowledge is d i r e c t
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self-knowledge. Forms are the principles o f  divine cognition,  
creativity and care. If we combine this with the strong association 
of knowing and being which is so v isib le  in Plato, we can 
reasonably expect Plato to identify God and the Forms. Textually, 
however, Plato did not take this step. The Platonic corpus 
warrants an analytical distinction between Forms and Reason.
In the m iddle d ia logues, human s o p h i a  is attainable by 
dialectical studies which culminates in the rational v ision of the 
Form of Good. S o p h i a  crowns a series of theoretical studies of  
increasing abstraction and universality (P h a e d o , R e p u b l i c ) .  In 
the arguments from motion characteristic of the late dialogues, the 
pursuit of s o p h i a  would involve activities which inure us to the 
principles governing the rational convolutions of the celestial 
motions. Here, astronom ical studies (E p i n o m i s ), but also  
institutionalised drinking, dancing and other festiv ities  ( L a w s ) ,  
are legitimate ways of inducing s o p h i a  in our souls - provided 
these activities are organised in the basis o f  quantitative and 
other principles corresponding to those that govern the cosmos  
and the soul. Eiren the passive obedience of reason in the form of  
laws enacted by wise legislators, has the same effect of inducing 
s o p h i a  in us ( L a w s ,  S t a t e s m a n ) .  These moral-intellectual ways 
of organising our lives individually or socially may save our souls, 
on the dissolution of our bodies (death), from becom ing lower 
forms of life in a long round of transmigrations until redeemed by 
the ministrations of the stars ( L a w s ,  T i m a e u s ) .
How does Aristotle's philosophy o f  ielig ion stand in relation to 
his predecessors? My discussion of Aristotle tried to place his 
theology in a historical perspective. But by concentrating on the
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M e t a p h y s i c s , my task has been less than a thorough-going  
anatomy of the impact which preceding thought had on Aristotle. 
So far, w e have grounds for saying that the basic and most 
significant elements and assumptions of Aristotle's theology may 
be traced to preceding thought, with minor q u a lif ica tion s.  
Throughout his work Aristotle leaves no doubt that he is working 
in direct response to issues broached by his predessors. He
customarily discusses major philosophical issues with a historical 
survey of the state of knowledge reached by his predecessors. He 
then proceeds on his own after subjecting the historical state of 
knowledge to a critique, from which he argues to establish his
own theses. (Book one of the M e t a p h y s i c s  is a clear example).
Generally, Aristotle adopts, adapts, rejects or ignores tradition in 
the light of real on and of his own doctrines. For example, he
takes it for granted that the traditional gods should be 
w orsh ipped  { T o p .  105 a5), although elsew here he rejects by 
implication the traditional representation of the gods. Similarly, 
he rejects Hesiod's conception of gods { M e t a .  1000a9; cf. P o l .
1252b24; N E  1177b 31). In d e  M o t u  A n . y 699b35, he adopts a
passage from the I l i a d  to illustrate his unmoved mover but 
ignores the fact that Zeus sometimes moves from Mt Olympus to 
Mt. Ida. In M e - a  xii, while Aristotle praises the ancients for
naively intuiting that the unmoved movers are gods, he criticises 
tradition for anthropomorphising god (1074a38). In M e t a  xii 10, 
he quotes I l i a d  ii, 204 to confirm his logical and moral conclusion
that there must be a unique first cause { a r c h e )  of all things if an
infinite regress is to be avoided: "The rule of the many is not good; 
let there be one ruler". Again, Aristotle, in the M e t a p h y s i c s ,
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takes the religious tradition for granted: god is a cause and a 
principle, a living reality who exists eternally, and is supreme, 
self-suffic ient, ideal or perfect and most honourable. These  
conditions and attributions of divinity may be logically  functional, 
but they are primarily traditional re lig iou s  assum ptions or 
doctrines implying a contrast to the limitations and conditions of  
human existence. Aristotle also takes for granted the traditional 
religious model of explanation, according to which the universe or 
a feature of the universe is deemed to be adequately accounted 
for when its divine origin or cause is traced or specified. Thus he 
derives divine Reason as that which is ultimately presupposed in 
what he obviously deemed an adequate account o f  the universe 
perceived as a cosmos. And in his tripartite division of theoretical 
sciences, theology em erges as the most honourable and the 
highest, and its objects are the most universal, in the sense that 
they c o n s t i tu te  the fu n d a m en ta l  p r in c ip le s  u l t im a te ly  
presupposed in any (scientific) study.
With his philosophical predecessors, Aristotle is also in tune 
regarding the causality of God as a form of motion, and the 
specification of divine nature as pure Reason. The concept of god 
as a principle of motion is, on Plato's reading, intimated in Homer’s 
Okeanus (T h e a e t e t u s , 152e), while the concept of divine causality 
as motion was first put to philosophical account of the cosmos by 
Thales. Divine causality as r a t i o n a l  motion is intimated in the 
Presocratic systems. Aristotle quotes the I l i a d  to illustrate his 
idea of God as an umoved mover, and he must be aware of  
Xenophanes' Goci who, abiding the same m oves the cosm os by 
"his" m i n d .  The tripartite structure, if  not also the content, of  
Aristotle's account of the cosmos is an adaptation o f  Plato's: the
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most fundamental reality in Aristotle is divine Reason ( n o u s )  or 
Thinking (n o e s i s ) who is an identity of n o e s i s  and n o e t o n  (here 
he combines Plato's N o u s  and Forms as the n o e t a  o f  N o u s ) ;  by 
the agency of Reason circular and rotary motions are engendered 
in the astronomical sphere (as in Plato); from the celestial motions 
derive all p h e n o m e n a l  features of the cosmos (as in Plato). In 
both philosoph ies, the supreme rationality and eternality or 
everlastingness  Df rotary and circular m otions confirm  the 
traditional attribution of divinity to the astronomical sphere, and 
the belief that its inhabitants are gods. Traditional polytheism is 
thus substantiated but in a transposed form. The biblical tradition 
revolts against the sharing o f  the godhead by any other 
individuals or things. But the Greek mind represented deity quite 
differently. "God", we can now believe, was a predicative notion 
that was asserted of a causal power as an explanatory reality. But 
if one needs many causal powers to account for the existence of 
the universe, there will be as many gods.
But there are a p p a r e n t l y  A r is to te l ia n  n o v e l t i e s  and 
peculiarities. Three of these motivated this thesis, namely, that 
Aristotle's godhead, Reason, is a thinking who thinks nothing but 
"himself", who exists separately and independently o f  the visible  
cosmos and is a final cause whose function is denoted by motion 
of the type associated with an object of love or desire. Are these 
m erely apparent o r  real novelties and peculiarities? I have 
answered that they are merely apparent. In reality they are 
firmly grounded :.n or are adaptations of preceding thought.
In M e t a ,  xii, Aristotle’s reasons for conceiving God as a se lf­
thinking reality who thinks nothing but "himself" is that, were
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"he" to think o f  something else outside "himself", were divine
n o e t a  distinct from divine n o e s i s , the former would determine 
the essence o f  God's thinking insofar as n o e t a  would be the 
condition for the actualisation of God’s thinking. This would also 
imply that God is not a p u r e  self-fulfilling activity (e n e r g e i a ) or 
an actuality (e n t e l e c h e i a ) but a mere potentiality or capacity 
( d u n a m i s ) to think. But by being a potentiality God would be 
subject to change (k i n e s i s ) and alteration ( m e t a b o l e ) ,  and would
therefore change into or think now good now bad. But what is 
philosophically or logically  wrong if  God's thinking has to be
determined by a distinctly existing n o e t a l  After all - I have
pointed to this fact - the activity of Plato's supreme God 
p r e s u p p o s e s  the existence of Forms. Fortunately, Aristotle does 
offer reasons. He does not make avoidance of the state or 
condition of being a d u n a m i s  or being in k i n e s i s  and m e t a b o l e  
the final reasons why God must think itself only. Rather, he 
argues that the state or condition of d u n a m i s , k i n e s i s  and 
m e t a b o l e  is worse ( c h e i r o n )  f o r  God, for it would make God's 
life wearisome ( e p i p o n o n ), and God would think now good and 
now bad. In o;her words, the final reasons derive from certain 
assumptions or doctrines about God q u a  God. And what are 
these? They are that God q u a  God must be (a) unchanging in 
"his" nature, must have (b) an unwearied life, and must (c) 
intrinsically thir.k good things only. As our d iscussions of  
preceding thought (e.g. Plato) has shown, changelessness of  
nature, and intrinsic goodness are associated with perfection and 
ideality, and this implies a metaphysical or religious contrast of 
divine and other realities; while living an unwearied life implies
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the traditional religious contrast between, on the one hand, the 
imperfect life of man a n d  the perfect life of God. Aristotle offers 
another set of  reasons why God must think itself only: were God to 
think of something else , that other thing would be s u p e r i o r  
( k u r i o n ) to and more honourable than ( t i m i o m e r o n ) "him", and 
divine Reason would not be the best (a r i s t e ) or the strongest 
( k r a t i s t o n ) reality. Aristotle's words are w ell-chosen: they are 
neither logical nor analytical. "K u r i o n ", " t i m i ' o m e r o n " , "a r i s t e ",  
" k r a t i s t o n ", im ply  the traditional re l ig io u s  cond itions or 
attributions of God: that God must be causally superior to, and 
more honourable than, all else. Additionally, God must simply be 
the best, strongest or the most perfect and se lf-su ffic ien t of  
realities - which would not be the case were God's thinking to 
d e p e n d  on externally existing n o e t a .  So the final reasons which 
ground A ristotle's  con cep tion  o f  God as se lf-th in k in g  are 
traditional religious doctrines rather than logical or philosophical 
ones. Aristotle appears to be applying traditional tenets about 
God more consistently.
What about God's status as a reality existing separately and 
independently o f  the v is ib le  cosm os?  A gain, the operative  
reasons derive (a) from the same doctrines of traditional religion 
as those above, namely, that God must be perfect, eternal or 
everlasting, se lf-suffic ient, (causally) supreme, most honourable, 
etc. a n d  (b) some doctrinal assumptions about matter or body. 
These assumptions are Platonic and religious; they ultimately  
derive from Orphic or Pythagorean religious beliefs. These are 
that matter is, i n t e r  a l i a , a principle or condition o f  corruption, 
change or a lteration , c o n t in g e n c y ,  im p er fec t io n  and ev il  
(destruction, for Aristotle). Given (a) and (b), God's intrinsic
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nature as a causally  supreme, eternal, perfect, self-suffic ient
existent, would be corrupted, changed or altered, if, as a thinking 
reality, the scope of "his" activities extended to material forms or 
just any material reality. Hence, to keep God above the 
v ic iss itu d es  o f  mortality and contingency involves establishing  
God's existential status metaphysically. Therefore, God cannot be 
part of the visib le cosmos. Plato's way out o f  this dilemma of 
keeping the divine perfection and ideality of God intact while 
maintaining its essential function as a first cause is to make a
number o f  analytical and analogical moves. Analytically, pure, 
divine Reason is a knower of Forms. This retains the traditional 
doctrine that G o !  is a supremely wise being. But God is also,
traditionally, a causal power. So in a second step, the causal 
power of God is represented as regulatory and constructive. In its 
regulatory function, Reason governs the cosmos in the form of 
Soul. Analytically Soul is defined as motion of Reason. Then also 
Plato projects a craftsman image of Reason as God. In the 
T i m a e u s ,  this analogical projection of the constructive function of 
God combines with the regulatory function. The argument seems 
to be that any plausible account of the universe will conclude to 
the necessary existence of a first cause who is an agent imbued
with Forms and whose causality is constructive mobility, l i ke  that 
of a craftsman. Since, for Plato, what makes an agent divinely 
wise, good, blessed, etc., is his knowledge of or association with 
Forms, neither his analytical nor analogical move jeopardises God's 
intrinsic ideality and perfection. Aristotle, however, does not 
avail him self o f  any of these moves. He Keeps God clear of the 
visible cosm os ir. order to guarantee God's intrinsic perfection and
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ideality.
At first the specification of God's causality as solely final would 
seem to determine God’s ontological distinction from the cosmos; 
for an object of love and desire is sufficiently distinct from that 
which desires and loves it. However, nothing in Aristotle's own 
construal o f  final causality  in the c o r p u s  im p lies  that it 
n ecessita tes  onto log ica l separation o f  that w hich  bears it.
Furthermore, as Plato's co sm o lo g y  show s, safeguarding God's
intrinsic perfection, se lf-su ffic iency , etc., does not necessarily
entail God's causality as purely and solely final. Accordingly,
some other reason must be found. The text provides the reason, 
which shows an Aristotelian adaptation o f  Plato.
In M e t a ,  xii, Aristotle criticises those who postulate a first cause 
or principle in relation to which t he  G o o d  or the Beautiful (t o 
k a l o n )  is extraneous. In response to what he considers a mistake, 
he identifies the Good with his first principle (1072a28ff.), Reason. 
But in the G o r g i a s , R e p u b l i c , and P h a e d r u s , Plato implies that 
the Good or the Beautiful is, by definition, an object of f i n a l  
desire; it is that which every action, m ovem ent or desire  
anticipates from the very start. Hence, it is a final cause. Since 
Forms are the fundamental causes in Plato's system, and the Good 
or the Beautiful in the R e p u b l i c  or P h a e d r u s  is a (universal) 
Form, it follows hat the function of all things is to desire the Good 
or the Beautiful. Thus the P h a e d o  (75a2) claims that sensible  
things are desiring or yearning ( o r e g e t a i ) to be like their 
in te l l ig ib le ,  paradigmatic counterparts, nam ely , the Forms. 
Perhaps, Plato is using "o r e x i s " in a different sense from that of 
Aristotle. For in M e t a ,  xii (though not in the de  A n i m a )  desire
378
presupposes or depends on thought. But Plato's Forms are not 
ch aracterised  as thoughts, though they w o u ld  be thus  
characterised were Forms and Reason identical. Possib ly  too, 
"o r e x i s " in both philosophers is metaphorical. But there is no 
sufficient indication in the text for such a figurative use. However 
that may be, the postulation of the G o o d  as a first principle or as 
an aspect of the first principle inclines one to the view that if  the 
Good is conceived causally, it does cause at least as an object of  
desire. In the T i m a e u s , which is normally classified as a late 
dialogue, Plato does not characterise Forms as objects of desire, 
though this is implied in his Form-sensible participation thesis. In 
the late dialogues, the middle period emphasis on the statics of  
Form s - their  e te r n a l i ty ,  u n c h a n g e a b i l i ty ,  u n ifo r m ity ,  
incompositeness, self-identity - are translated, in cosm ologies, into 
the dynamics of rational motion, which accounts for all sublunary 
motions which in turn explain all phenomenal features of the 
cosmos. Thus whatever intelligibility, order and goodness there is 
in phenomena are traceable to intelligible, paradigmatic divine  
Forms. In this sense, Plato can say that it is in virtue of desiring 
the perfections c f  the paradigmatic Forms that phenomena exist. 
Correspondingly, the function of life is, for Plato, to attain to the 
divine state of god, and this necessarily involves desiring god's 
perfection, wisdom, happiness, etc. Indeed, in the S y m p o s i u m  
and P h a e d r u s ,  Plato argues that the soul is innately desirous of  
the Good or the Beautiful.
Nevertheless, to say categorically that all things in the cosmos  
are moved by God as an object of desire, may be said to be a 
distinctive move. Not least because in Plato divine causality is 
indistinctly final and efficient. On the other hand, Aristotle's
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exclusive specification God's causality as final denoted as erotic 
attraction is supportive of his consistent substantiation o f  God's 
perfection, self-sufficiency, and so on. For, by being exclusively  
an object of desire and love, God's thinking, hence "his" love or 
desire (since volition follow s thought) is set free for itself and 
from the imperfections of the cosmos.
It follows from this that God does not love or care for anything 
else beyond itself. But for a God fully conceived in the doctrines 
of traditional religion, this is apparently paradoxical. Aristotle 
should be seen is  arguing thus: God is [intrinsically] e.g., self- 
sufficient. God is a Thinking or Reason. Volition depends on 
thought. To think, hence to desire or love anything other than 
oneself entails d e p e n d e n c e  on that other for the realisation of 
one's thinking. Therefore God thinks, hence desires or loves  
"himself" only. Therefore God does not love the cosmos. The 
traditional grounds on which God was conceived would seem to be 
carried to religiously unacceptable limits. But the paradox of a 
carelessly selfish God who has been conceived in the doctrines of 
traditional religion may be dissolved. I have argued to the effect 
that Aristotle's God cannot legitimately be accused of careless 
insensitivity or selfishness. For God really does not need to know 
or look back on the cosmos. All "he" needs do is to contemplate
and love "himself" only. For it is in virtue of "his" eternal self­
knowing and self- loving that whatever goodness, intelligib ility  
order, food, etc. there is in the cosmos are eternally available to all
who depend on "him". Were God to depart from "his" essential
nature, chaos, disorder, and all motion, hence all phenomenal 
existence would cease to exist. And God, by knowing "himself"
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knows "himself" as a first principle who attracts to his perfection, 
self-sufficiency, essential goodness, etc., and that "he" does so in 
"his" essential self-thinking and self-loving nature. Whether or 
not something e lse  is actually attracted to "him" "he" does not
need to know. But God knows, cares for and loves the cosmos just 
by knowing, caring and loving "himself"; God's knowledge, love or 
care of the cosm os is contained in his self-knowledge, self-love
and self-care. And if  we were to ignore the catastrophic
consequence which would follow from God's having to undergo the 
least change of "his" essential nature, Aristotle can argue, like
Plato, that the ccsm os is as perfect and as good and orderly as its 
nature would admit. Consequently, the state o f  the cosmos would 
not be enhanced a jot just by being known and loved by God. And 
how can I accuse such a God o f  insensitivity, carelessness or 
selfishness; why should I worry to be known by "him" on whose 
very exclusive self-knowledge I depend for all the good things I
could ever possibly expect from "him" if "he" were to know me?
But if  God is pure Reason or pure Thinking, and moves the
cosmos solely as an object of love or desire, religion based on such 
a God would presumably be a version of the Socratic religion of 
p h i l o - s o p h i a .  For all things must desire God's pure thinking or, 
proxim ately, the h ighly  rational activity o f  the first heaven. 
Presumably different things would desire different aspects of
God's nature; for exam ple, the primary bodies may desire the
eternality of God or the first heaven, while man, because he and 
he alone is rational among animate things, desires also God's self- 
s u f f ic ie n c y ,  h cn ou r , sup rem acy  and s e l f -k n o w le d g e ,  and 
concommitantly, God's happiness and pleasure. Since to desire
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God's perfection involves being like "him" as pure Thinking, it is 
inevitable that this will entail a highly intellectualist conception of 
religion. In the M e t a p h y s i c s ,  A risto tle  reckons (p r o t e ) 
p h i l o s o p h i a  or s o p h i a  as divine activity. For it consists in 
activity or wisdom  that properly belongs to God, though it is 
intimated that we may share in it. It is the most divine
( t h e i o t a t e ) and most precious ( t i m i o t a t e ) form of knowledge. Its 
objects are divine first principles { M e t a .  983a). However, if  God's 
knowledge is direct self-know ledge where n o e s i s  and n o e t a  are 
identified, at leas* two things follow. First, as activity cognitive of 
divine first principles, s o p h i a  would involve a kind o f  self- 
knowledge, but xhis implies that divine first principles constitute 
an objective counterpart of ourselves, if  they are that in virtue of 
which we come to know ourselves. Plato, we saw, has such a
thesis. Secondl), s o p h i a , in the strict sense, would be h u m a n l y  
unattainable. For strictly s o p h i a  would seem to require a state of 
non-bodily existence in which pure reason ( n o u s )  and its object 
are identified. But this need not be the case. The celestial gods as 
gods must be s o p h o s ,  and they are bodily. Thus it is possible to 
see here an implicit accommodation of degrees of s o p h i a .  And 
the N E  suggests that we are capable of s o p h i a , which is specified  
as the supreme achievement and realisation of our essen ce  as 
rational beings. Indeed, Aristotle there recognises the difficulty of 
attaining s o p h i a  for man. Nevertheless, he urges the possibility  
o f  soph i a  by apoeal to the presence in us of the divine element -
reason: 'we must, so f a r  as  we  can,  make ourselves immortal, and
strain every nerve to live according to the best thing in us... the 
life according to reason is the best...for, it is not insofar as he is a 
man that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present
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in him’ ( N E  1177b26ff.; cf. T h e a e .  176a-b). "So far as we can", is 
supportive of my suggestion of "degrees of s o p h i a ".
However, according to Aristotle's account o f  the sciences and 
remarks about human reason in the N  E , s o p  h i  a or the 
contemplation of God does not involve the use of practical wisdom  
(p h r o n e s i s ). P h r o n e s i s  grounds knowledge in practical matters 
like ethics and politics, subject-matters whose first principles are 
only general lav/s or highly probable but not universal truths, 
because they contain elements of contingencies which cannot be 
universalised. No contemplation of God arises without s o p h i a  
(activity cognitive of divine first principles). Yet there seems to 
be no essential or necessary connection between p h r o n e s i s  and 
sophia .  P h r o n e s i s  does not necessitate s o p h i a .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  
there does not appear to be, for Aristotelian man, a central self to 
which the practical and contemplative lives may be referred as 
indistinguishable aspects of a unique, essentially and necessarily 
continuous life c f  a person. Unlike Socrates or Plato, Aristotle 
does not appear to see the practical life as essentially connected 
with the highest exerc ise  of reason and, hence, with the 
contemplation of God. The Aristotelian s o p h i a  would therefore 
seem to ground a highly intellectualised piety which is ultimately 
least concerned with day to day life. But here again Aristotle 
differs from his philosophical predecessors just by being a 
consistent applier of traditional religious tenets. Traditionally, 
politics and ethics are not part of divine life (cf. N E  1178 b 8ff .)* 
And s o p h i a  is standardly a divine activity; it is activity which is 
God's strictly speaking. But if, as Aristotle believes, we share in 
s o p h i a  in virtue of our rational nature, consistency requires that
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in s o p h i a  we are least concerned with politics and ethics. And if  
s o p h i a  does not cover ethics, then there is little or no moral 
dimension in s o p h i a .  The question then arises: why o u g h t  we to
engage in s o p h i a  to immortalise ourselves, i.e., have a god-like
<
life? Perhaps the question is wrong. Aristotle makes no moral 
appeal to s o p h i a  as does Plato and Socrates. Aristotelian morality 
consists in a quantitatively measurable action whose basic appeal 
lies in its humanism: it appeals to the resources available to man 
q u a  human.
Perhaps one might argue that Aristotelian piety is not as highly 
intellectualised as it seems, but is the same as Plato's in the late 
dialogues. Aristotle makes activity central to a life fully lived. 
Thus he permits religious festivals in his ideal state. And in 
M e t a ,  xii, the circular motions of the celestial gods, while desiring 
the perfection c f  divine Reason, constitute the final cause or 
proximate standard by which sublunar beings may attain to 
perfection, immortality and divinity. Consequently, Aristotelian 
piety would consist in those activities - whether it is a properly 
organised religious festival or what not - which inure our minds to 
the eternal patterns of the celestial motions. S o p h i a  would then 
be the highest form of piety. But this is speculation. Textually, 
Aristotle is not forthcoming: those propositions which are more 
accom m odating of traditional forms of piety do not form a 
coherent part of Aristotle's more consistent thoughts on s o p h i a .
On the other hand, we have seen that Aristotle's motivation for 
making God exist  in ontological separation from the v isib le  
cosmos, a final cause who moves as an object of love or desire, and 
a self-thinking Pleason, derives from (a) the traditional religious
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conception of god as a principle of f i n a l  explanation, a supreme 
causal, (i.e., l i v i n g )  power who, in contrast to man, is supremely 
wise, perfect, enjoys eternal and self-sufficient life and is most 
honourable; (b) a Platonic (but ultimately Orphic-Pythagorean) 
conception o f  matter or body, as a principle or condition of  
corruption , g en eration , destruction , co n t in g e n c y ,  etc.; (c)  
(adaptation of) elements of Plato's ontology and/or cosmology. By  
(a ) - (c )  the m ost s ig n if ica n t  e lem ents  and assum ptions of  
Aristotle's philosophy of religion are thus fully anticipated in 
preceding though;, without prejudice to the acute conceptual and 
analytica l d is t in c tio n s  and refinem ents by which A ristotle  
transposed these earlier thoughts into his own.
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